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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis presents a critical reflection on what is meant by a „Green Revolution‟ 
within the current, narrow „productivity-technology fix‟ paradigm. It shows the current 
focus on productivity is creating a limited view of technology as the principal means to 
address food insecurity in Africa, as opposed to a more comprehensive view that takes 
into account economic, social and political factors. The research combines a socio-
technical systems approach with an actor-oriented analysis to examine two input-
support programmes in Kenya. It focuses on input-support programmes due to the 
current interest in subsidies as the mechanism to address food insecurity and deliver 
agricultural technologies to smallholder farmers. It examines the political, social and 
institutional factors that influence the creation, design and implementation of these 
programmes. A multi-level approach (global, national and local) is used to map out the 
key narratives and actor networks operating in and across the different levels to 
highlight the dynamic interactions as they come together through these programmes. 
The thesis demonstrates how intermediary factors (institutions, policy and social 
networks) significantly affect programme outcomes. The two case studies show that 
policy and practice often diverge through changing actors, networks and funding flows. 
Each programme implementation is mediated through socially differentiated 
beneficiaries, creating interactions that unfold in numerous ways due to distinct social, 
political and economic factors, as well as to unique institutional and delivery 
mechanisms. The evidence suggests that technology-based programmes that fail to take 
account of these critical factors will encounter difficulties in uptake. Therefore, 
policymakers must consider context-specific approaches that appreciate the diversity of 
local conditions and the importance of socio-economic, institutional and political 
factors. The underlying message is that the impact of agricultural technologies on the 
practices and perceptions of smallholder farmers cannot be understood in isolation; end 
users constantly adapt technologies through complex social interpretations, local 
institutions and political processes. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: 
Understanding food insecurity in a changing world 
 
 
Rising food prices in 2008 and again in 2011 have once again prompted growing 
concern about a deepening global food crisis. Food price volatility over this period, 
coupled with the global economic downturn experienced in 2009, has had a devastating 
effect on the world‟s vulnerable populations and increased the total number of people 
that are hungry and malnourished. Price spikes in early 2011 have been blamed for 
pushing an additional 44 million people into poverty (World Bank, 2011a: 1), with the 
total number of people suffering from hunger reaching close to one billion (FAO, 
2010a: 1). Sub-Saharan Africa has been hit especially hard by these crises (World 
Bank, 2011b).
1
 Rising food prices, coupled with declining per capita food production 
and increasing populations, conflicts and droughts, have driven Africa‟s food security 
challenge to the top of the international agenda. 
 
Yet, the story of rising food insecurity in Africa is much more complicated than it first 
appears, and the continent has seen its share of successes and advancements. Africa has 
made impressive gains in agricultural productively since the mid-1990s. By 2008, 
Africa‟s economy had been growing by five percent per year over the past 10 years 
(World Bank, 2011b: 130). However, for the most part, these successes have remained 
in high-potential pockets, beyond the reach of millions of smallholder farmers who rely 
on less than one hectare of land to feed their families. Africa continues to suffer from 
increasing household food insecurity and rising rates of child malnutrition compared 
with other regions of the world (FAO, 2004a, 2009). Africa also has the highest 
percentage of people (30 percent) suffering from malnutrition (FAO, 2010b: 11). 
Furthermore, rising energy costs have led to increasing costs for such agricultural 
inputs as fertiliser, by as much as 50 percent (FAO, 2009: 25), leaving many poor 
smallholder farmers unable to purchase improved inputs and pushing the vulnerable 
further into poverty.  
                                                     
1
 From here on Africa will refer to sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa. 
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The FAO hunger map (Figure 1) shows the prevalence of very high rates of chronic 
hunger in large parts of Africa. 
  
Figure 1: Prevalence of undernourishment in developing countries (Source: FAO, 
2010c)  
 
The threat of an ever-increasing and deepening food security crisis is creating a new era 
of uncertainty and forcing African governments and the donor community to refocus on 
the needs of the rural poor. Now, after years of neglect and diminishing funding, 
agriculture and rural development are back on the development agenda. However, the 
success of efforts to alleviate food insecurity in Africa will be determined by the way in 
which the initiatives are designed, the language and storylines that drive their 
development, and the method by which they are implemented.  
 
In this thesis, I argue that complex pressures surrounding rising food insecurity and 
decreasing productivity are contributing to policymakers oversimplifying the problem 
and ignoring the diverse ecological, social, economic and political dimensions that 
contribute to the problem. Therefore, policymakers continue to promote narratives, or 
storylines, that define food security interventions narrowly, i.e., based on simplistic 
solutions that rely on productivity as the primary means of addressing food insecurity. 
The growing attention put on this productivity narrative has created a limited view of 
technology as the way to address food insecurity in Africa in many agricultural policy 
debates, to the detriment of other multi-dimensional solutions. This has led to the 
creation of food security programmes that focus exclusively on technology 
interventions and ignore many of the more complex factors and power relations that 
surround local farming systems.  
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Therefore, the task of this thesis is to explore how an exclusive focus on productivity, 
instead of a more comprehensive look at the economic, social and political factors that 
affect food insecurity, has led to misplaced policy decisions focused on the delivery of 
technology to the food insecure. I use a case study approach to examine how these 
narratives and the resulting technology-focus programmes, which offer hybrid seed and 
inorganic fertilisers, play out in practice. These programmes, such as Malawi‟s 
Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme, are currently influencing the food security 
debate and focusing discussions on a predetermined package of interventions for 
African smallholder farmers as the solution to food insecurity (cf. Chirwa et al., 2006; 
Morris, 2007; Chinsinga, 2008; SOAS et al., 2008; Sanchez et al., 2009; Chinsinga, 
2011). Through this exploration, I draw out some broad lessons from current 
trajectories and highlight alternative narratives that broaden the scope of the debate. 
 
Through this research, I assert that the thinking around food insecurity must go further 
than that currently proposed by agricultural support programmes to incorporate a 
broader approach that considers the unique political, institutional and social contexts 
surrounding local settings. This research adds to the development literature by 
including an analysis of the social and human factors affecting technology uptake and 
highlighting the interface between technologies and human interactions (Long, 1989; 
Orlikowski and Barley, 2001). Richards (1985: 12) showed how many of Africa‟s 
problems are “localized and specific, and require local, ecologically particular, 
responses”. Therefore, this thesis also builds on previous work by asking how will 
current food security programming, which is constructed within a „Green Revolution‟2 
narrative focused on a narrow set of exogenous technologies, offer site- and context-
specific responses to Africa‟s increasingly complex, diverse and risk-prone farming 
environments? 
 
                                                     
2
 There has been much written about the original „Green Revolution‟ (covered in Chapter 3), however a 
small sampling of the literature includes: Boserup (1965), Borlaug (2000), Byerlee and Eicher (1997), 
Cleaver (1972), Conway (1997; 2007), Djurfeldt (2005b), Ehrlich, (1968), Hazell and Ramasamy (1991), 
Lipton and Longhurst (1989), Perkins (1997), Sen (1981), and Shiva (1991). 
  
4 
 
Linking food security, soil fertility and productivity narratives 
 
The concept of food security has continued to evolve over the past few decades. The 
term originated during the mid-1970s, when the world was experiencing a global food 
crisis. At that time, the definition was limited to production and improvement of food 
supply (United Nations, 1975). However, over the years, the term has expanded to 
include access to food, and to distinguish between short-term hunger, associated with 
natural disasters and conflicts, and longer-term chronic food insecurity, associated with 
structural problems concerning poverty (Sen, 1981). The World Food Summit (1996) 
expanded the food security definition to represent a situation that exists when “all 
people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious 
food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” 
(FAO, 1996). This definition includes multidimensional aspects, such as access to and 
availability of food, the appropriate use of food, and the stability of food sources over 
time. Since then, the concept of food insecurity has evolved even further to include 
sustainable national food production, analysis of household level vulnerability and risk, 
and examination of the economic, social and political factors that affect food security 
(Devereux and Maxwell, 2001).   
 
With the latest food price crises, in 2008 and again in 2011, governments and donors 
are revising their analysis of the root causes of food insecurity, and seeking to develop 
policies to spark a new „Green Revolution‟ for Africa. Policymakers are increasingly 
under pressure to address a host of complex issues surrounding the underlying causes 
of food insecurity within increasing environmental, economic and political 
uncertainties and mounting pressures from rising poverty and declining soil fertility in 
Africa. However, these food security policies are often constructed at a national level to 
reflect particular social, political and institutional interests. There remains no unified 
view on how to address policy issues surrounding food insecurity, leading to growing 
debates about the best methods to reach national food security and to engage 
agriculture as the engine of growth for Africa (Holmén, 2003; Johnson et al., 2003; 
Eilitta, 2006; Wiggins and Leturque, 2010).  
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Embedded in this food security debate are a series of different narratives, or storylines, 
which aim to identify the root causes of food insecurity based on the unique 
perspectives and beliefs of the storytellers. Roe (1991: 288) argues: 
 
These narratives tell scenarios not so much about what should happen as about 
what will happen – according to their tellers if the events or positions are 
carried out as described.  
 
These narratives are simplifications of complex situations that are used within high-
level debates to influence and legitimise a certain trajectory of actions and policies. 
When powerful networks of actors support a specific narrative, it begins to dominate 
discussion and debate and ultimately can shape judgement and behaviour. However, if 
the premise that the narrative is based on is flawed, then the entire set of actions, plans, 
programmes and policies that follow will be misconceived (Keeley and Scoones, 2003). 
Moreover, powerful actors may use these simplified narratives to pursue a particular 
policy direction based on their own understandings and/or interests that may ultimately 
have different objectives than the narratives used for that purpose. Therefore, it 
becomes important to understand the set of assumptions and premises under which a 
narrative exists.  
 
There are various versions of the food security narrative that focus on technology as a 
solution to the problem. For example, one recurring narrative proposes that Africa‟s 
food security dilemma is strictly a problem of productivity. It argues that the best way 
to address Africa‟s increasing food insecurity is to fix declining productivity levels, 
which will improve the economy and reduce poverty. In agronomic terms, this 
productivity narrative advocates a focus on improving the input constraints; i.e., 
improve the availability of such productive assets as hybrid seed, fertiliser, irrigation 
and micro-credit. Another related narrative blames Africa‟s increasing food insecurity 
on a rising population and declining soil fertility, which in turn is affecting agricultural 
development (Larson and Frisvold, 1996; Buresh et al., 1997; Johnson et al., 2003; 
Otsuka and Kalirajan, 2005). In this population and environmental management 
narrative, overcoming Africa‟s food security problems means addressing its declining 
soil fertility through better management of the agro-ecological system, more research 
into new technologies, and a focus on improving fertiliser usage (especially inorganic 
fertilisers) to replenish the soil‟s lost nutrients. The common element in both these 
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narratives is the centrality of technology and how it should be used to address the 
current food insecurity problem in Africa.  
 
Yet Africa, unlike parts of Asia that experienced the first Green Revolution in the 
1960s–70s, has much greater variety in agro-ecologies and farming systems, along with 
a wide range of agronomic and institutional constraints. Africa has more fragile and 
variable soils, with unpredictable rainfall and little irrigation. Most food-insecure 
farmers are too vulnerable to changing shocks and conditions to be locked into a system 
based on technological solutions, such as inorganic fertiliser (Harsch, 1998). This 
diversity implies that: 
 
...a multitude of different technology solutions are required rather than single 
technology packages that were appropriate for vast and homogenous cropping 
areas in India (Johnson et al., 2003: 7).  
 
Therefore, I contend that this diversity requires a more comprehensive approach than a 
single focus on productivity and soil fertility. Africa requires a more site-specific 
solution to take into account the complexities of the continent. I argue that current 
perspectives surrounding food insecurity have been „locked-in‟ (Geels, 2004: 910) to a 
certain technology-laden approach that is further reinforced by policymakers and 
programme developers. These narrow policies are constructing particular trajectories 
for agricultural programming that will have long-term implications for smallholder 
farmers in Africa (cf. Lawrence, 1988; Turner et al., 1993; Heisey and Mwangi, 1996; 
Larson and Frisvold, 1996).  
 
These emerging food security approaches in Africa need to be analysed at different 
levels, global to local, to understand how the storylines have developed over time, how 
they affect the ability of actors at different levels to understand each other, and the 
consequences on food security programmes. To analyse how the global macro-level 
framing of the productivity debate has influenced national approaches, I take a closer 
look at Kenya, which has long been the testing ground for agricultural technology and 
policy experiments, to examine how these narratives are transposed and adjusted to fit a 
unique socio-technical context.  
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Kenya’s agriculture sector and food security situation 
 
Kenya is no stranger to technology-driven agricultural programmes. The country 
experienced a surge in programmes in the 1960s–1970s that focused on increasing the 
productivity of the agriculture sector. While such programmes were also implemented 
during the Asian Green Revolution, the Kenyan model was created with distinctive 
local characteristics. During this period, Kenya‟s Green Revolution was essentially 
„maize-based‟ and it was successful in increasing yields in the high potential areas in 
the west and central parts of the country. Production of export-based maize increased 
dramatically through heavy government intervention and donor assistance (cf. Heyer 
and Waweru, 1976; Smith, 1976; Tiffen et al., 1994; Nyangito and Okello, 1998; 
Wangia et al., 2002; Mango and Hebinck, 2004; De Groote et al., 2005).   
 
However, Kenya‟s successes in maize production at that time were not uniform across 
the country, and did little to address the food insecurity faced by vulnerable smallholder 
farmers within Kenya. Many of the achievements in productivity growth were limited 
to Kenya‟s high-potential areas and focused on the export-growing sectors of the 
economy. Many parts of Kenya, such as the lower highlands in the west, were left with 
stagnating production and increasing poverty and food insecurity (Heyer and Waweru, 
1976). Even the successes in the country‟s national productivity growth have declined 
gradually since the mid-1980s. The reasons are varied. Some factors include the 
withdrawal of government interventions and subsidies in the agriculture sector and a 
decrease in donor funding for agriculture. According to the World Bank (2009: v): 
 
The agriculture sector remains the Achilles‟ heel of Kenya‟s economy, both in 
terms of production and wealth distribution.  
 
Between 2005 and 2008, Kenya‟s average annual agricultural growth rate suffered from 
a large decline, with slight increases in 2009 due mostly to increases in livestock value 
due to destocking as a result of ongoing drought (Figure 2). Furthermore, the 
Government of Kenya‟s Food Security and Nutrition Strategy (2008a: 9) states that in 
2008 approximately one-third of the population (10 million people) suffered from food 
insecurity, based on insufficient dietary energy supply. In 2009, maize yields remained 
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low at 14.4 bags per hectare,
3
 resulting in a total maize production of 27 million bags, a 
shortfall from the projected consumption level of 36 million bags (GOK, 2010b: 27). 
This decline in production, coupled with Kenya‟s rapid population growth and the 
current food price crisis, has led to a reduction in food production per capita and an 
increased risk of food insecurity in the future (World Bank, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 2: Kenya‟s Agricultural GDP Growth Rates, 2005-2009 (Source: KNBS, 
Economic Survey, 2010) 
 
This current state of food insecurity and lagging productivity has prompted a 
resurgence of interest in agriculture. The Government of Kenya and the donor 
community have once again begun to invest in the agriculture sector and focus on rural 
development. Policymakers are keen to construct a distinctively Kenyan Green 
Revolution that addresses productivity concerns and food security across Kenya. 
Renewed national food security initiatives are looking to raise maize productivity and 
the government has turned to input-support programmes as one way to increase access 
to agricultural inputs for smallholder farmers (GOK, 2010c).  
 
Analysis of input-support programmes 
 
This research takes a specific look at maize production systems, since maize remains 
the staple food for food-insecure farmers in many parts of Africa, including Kenya. The 
research examines the actions of policymakers towards maize, which tends to have the 
greatest impact on food security. Maize is considered “...an important staple crop in 
                                                     
3
 In Kenya, a 90 kilogram bag is a standard measures for maize. Therefore describing yields in terms of 
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Kenya, socially, politically and economically” (Brooks et al., 2009: 1). This 
politicisation has created a „maize-based food security‟ model that results in the 
framing of policy options that reinforce a dependence on maize. Furthermore, it leads 
to the creation of agricultural programmes, such as input-support programmes, that 
focus on continuing dependency on maize as a food-security crop, even in areas that are 
better suited to growing different crops. Therefore, this research argues that such 
policies and social contexts create institutional and administrative functions that 
reinforce the promotion of input-oriented support programmes as the primary means to 
help farmers reach food (maize) security, to the exclusion of alternative solutions. The 
research examines the social, political and institutional factors behind maize-based 
input support to understand the larger picture behind the Green Revolution narratives 
and technological focuses currently used to address food insecurity.  
 
A common characteristic of input-support programmes is the combination of both 
hybrid seed and fertiliser into the package mix. While the use of both hybrid seed and 
fertiliser is examined, this thesis has a particular focus on inorganic fertiliser due to the 
growing narrative of a soil fertility crisis in Africa and the increasing debate about 
fertiliser as the „solution‟ for food-insecure smallholder farmers (Quifiones, 1997; 
Wanzala et al., 2001; Crawford et al., 2006; Morris, 2007). Critics point to continuous 
cultivation and the lack of input use as the leading cause of  soil nutrient depletion and 
decreasing yields, which lead to persistent food insecurity (cf. Buresh et al., 1997; 
Smaling et al., 1997). As a result, a focus on increasing smallholder farmers‟ use of 
fertiliser to improve yields and attain food security has rapidly taken centre stage 
(World Bank, 1996; Quifiones, 1997). 
 
The core of my research consists of an examination of two contemporary case studies 
that demonstrate how different agricultural programmes understand and implement 
technology-driven initiatives for food-insecure smallholder farmers. The focus is on the 
consequences for smallholder production and the longer-term sustainability of the 
technologies. The aim is to contrast two approaches, drawing out the ways in which the 
mainstream narratives, centred on a technology solution to the productivity gap, played 
out and highlighting the limitations and interactions within each programme. The 
analysis used in this thesis is set within a wider context of policy processes that have 
led to these implementation designs (see Chapter 3).  
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The aim is not to evaluate whether technologies such as inorganic fertilisers are the best 
technologies in a given area, but to focus on the social, political and institutional 
conditions that influence the adoption and sustained use of a technology within a given 
locality. Through the case studies, I argue that the formulation and delivery of input-
support programmes at the national and global levels will affect the interactions of the 
technologies at a local level. The rationale for choosing these two case studies is to 
compare the different input programmes and their implications for other countries 
within Africa. Both programmes use the same technology package (i.e., hybrid seed 
and fertilisers), but differ in the principles, design and delivery of the packages to the 
end users. Therefore, this research explores the ways in which the two contrasting 
programmes are developed and delivered. The following text briefly describes the two 
programmes (Chapters 6 and 7 provide more detail).  
 
Case 1 – Millennium Villages Project 
 
The Millennium Villages Project (MVP) is a donor-led, community-based approach to 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MVP is an integrated, 
area-based model, addressing issues of health, education, agriculture and environment. 
However, the focus for this research is on the agriculture programme and specifically 
on its input-support programme. I examine the delivery of MVP‟s input-support 
programme to determine what the outcomes have been in terms of the adoption and 
sustained use of the inputs. MVP operates within 10 countries in Africa. I choose the 
MVP site in Western Kenya –Siaya District– for this research because it was the 
project‟s first site, launched in 2004, and provides an interesting view of the input-
support programme‟s institutional and administration evolution over six years of 
operation. My rationale for choosing a high-profile programme such as MVP is that it 
represents a unique, donor-driven, integrated approach that combines a high focus on 
technology with strong community-driven and bottom-up components.  
 
Case 2 – National Accelerated Agricultural Input Access Programme 
 
In 2007, the Government of Kenya launched its national input support initiative, the 
National Accelerated Agricultural Input Access Programme (NAAIAP), which aimed 
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to reach 2.5 million farming households with affordable farm inputs in three to five 
years. The programme consists of a predetermined package of subsidised inputs for 
smallholder farmers. I examined one site in Western Kenya (Butere District) where 
farmers have received the Government‟s package of hybrid maize seed and inorganic 
fertiliser. NAAIAP is an interesting study of a national programme directly addressing 
the issues of agricultural growth through input support. It also provides a useful 
comparison case study as it uses a similar technology package to the MVP, with the 
same rationale to address productivity among food-insecure farmers. However, both 
programmes are administered and delivered through very different mechanisms, with 
varying levels of financial, technical and institutional resources. Due to its national 
scope and scale, programmes such as NAAIAP and Malawi‟s input support programme 
have garnered interest from other African governments wishing to implement similar 
subsidy projects. Therefore, the research results may offer policy options and practical 
solutions for nationally led input-support programmes.  
 
The two contrasting case studies have diverse political, economic and institutional 
foundations and implementation structures. This thesis provides a detailed comparison, 
looking not only at their delivery of similar packages of technologies (hybrid seed and 
fertilisers), but also at their distinctive design, implementation and administration. 
Through this study, I identify and critically examine the crucial factors that led to both 
positive and negative outcomes and impacts for different stakeholders associated with 
the two initiatives. Ultimately, I show how the narratives, design and implementation of 
these programmes have affected the uptake of the technology and the interactions with 
participants.  
 
Other African countries (i.e., Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia) are currently 
implementing – or revisiting models on how to implement – similar input-support 
programmes (SOAS et al., 2008; Dorward, 2009; Xu et al., 2009; Baltzer and Hansen, 
2011; Banful, 2011; Mason and Ricker-Gilbert, 2012). Therefore, the analysis of these 
specific sites offer insights well beyond Western Kenya, and the results could assist 
additional governments and donors in developing food security programmes across the 
region. By comparing the two programmes, I provide some overarching lessons and 
recommendations for future input-support programmes focused on food-insecure 
farmers.  
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Overview of chapters  
 
Chapter 2 covers the theoretical base and offers an overview of the literature 
surrounding these theories. It outlines how I combined the socio-technical systems 
theory with a policy processes approach to create a unique conceptual framework to fit 
this specific agricultural, socio-cultural and technological context. It explains the multi-
level perspective used in the research to examine the construction and delivery of input-
support schemes through three different levels (global, national and local). The chapter 
then explains the research methodology that combined historical and qualitative 
enquiry across the three levels, and the design of the individual household-level case 
studies that provided insight into the overall agricultural system at the local level. 
 
Chapter 3 presents an analysis of the Green Revolutions – Asian, African and Kenyan – 
to explain how politics, institutions and social factors affect the design, process and 
outcomes of input-support programmes. The Asian Green Revolution is often described 
as set of technological packages delivered to increase agricultural productivity in Asia 
in the 1960s (Djurfeldt et al., 2005a). This chapter demonstrates how the success or 
failure of the technology interventions used must be viewed within the particular 
administrative, political, social and delivery systems that were prevalent in Asia at that 
time (cf. Hossain and Singh, 2000; Johnson et al., 2003; Djurfeldt et al., 2005b). The 
chapter outlines the impact of the Asian Green Revolution narratives on the 
construction of the current „African Green Revolution‟. It shows that even with the 
diversity of the African landscape and lessons learned from the Asian Green 
Revolution, the solution for Africa‟s agriculture remains centred on technical „fixes‟, 
with less attention paid to socio-economic, political and institutional factors (cf. Eicher, 
1995; Rosset, 2000; Johnson et al., 2003; Scoones et al., 2005). 
 
Chapter 4 describes Kenya‟s current national socio-technical landscape to show the key 
political, institutional and social aspects that affect food security policies and 
programmes aimed at smallholder farmers. The chapter begins with an overview of 
Kenya‟s agricultural history to see why the agricultural institutions and polices 
remained relatively stable from pre-independence to the present. The purpose is to 
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frame how Kenya‟s agrarian evolution has affected the creation of Kenya‟s institutions, 
administration and policies, and how it continues to affect current policies (cf. Bates, 
1989; Berman, 1991; Berman and Lonsdale, 1992; Swallow and Kamara, 2000). This 
chapter shows how actors within particular institutions and administrative arrangements 
construct narratives in particular ways (e.g., through practices, incentives, histories, 
etc.) to advance various interests and agendas and ultimately influence the design and 
implementation of input-support programmes in Kenya.  
 
Chapter 5 narrows the focus to a micro (community/village) level to explore the socio-
technical dynamics within the two research sites: Butere and Siaya Districts in Western 
Kenya. It argues that the technologies are not disembodied artefacts, but are embedded 
in the wider socio-technical system that has a history, cultural context and institutional 
dimension, and is informed by highly differentiated farming and cultural practices. This 
chapter analyses the local administration, politics and social practices that shape and 
affect how a community interacts with technology. It shows how users adopt, adapt or 
reject new technologies through social interpretations, local institutions and politics.  
 
Chapters 6 and 7 represent a household-level analysis of the two input-support 
programmes, MVP and NAAIAP. The analysis of the case studies is based on the 
foundations set in the previous chapter and shows how political, institutional and social 
factors interact at the community and household level within a wider socio-technical 
system. Both programmes use the same technology package (i.e., inorganic fertiliser 
and hybrid maize seed) but the principles, design and delivery of both programmes are 
very different. This research explores the ways in which the two programmes 
understand the delivery of fertilisers and points out how local socio-technical factors 
affect programme outcomes. The chapter also examines the evolution of institutional 
factors and knowledge–power relations surrounding the two input-support programmes. 
 
Chapter 8 brings together the two empirical case studies and draws conclusions by 
examining the outcomes of adoption and sustained use of the inputs. It compares the 
narratives, design and delivery of the programmes, and also the response and uptake 
from the communities. It outlines how certain programme features have affected 
adoption rates and outcomes. This is not an evaluation of success or failure, but an 
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analysis of the socio-technical factors that interact with the technology-focused 
programmes when they are introduced at the household level.  
 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by offering a critical reflection of what is meant by a 
„Green Revolution for Africa‟, highlighting some missing facets of the agenda. By 
taking apart the different components of a Green Revolution, this chapter offers an 
alternative to the typical articulation by incorporating some components of the socio-
technical systems perspective. The thesis concludes with suggestions for future 
technology-focused programmes designed for food-insecure farmers in Africa.   
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Chapter 2 
Conceptual Framework and Methods 
 
 
Current studies of „technoscience‟ view agriculture as a “near perfect embodiment of 
the „seamless web‟ of social, technical, economic and political dimensions” (Shrum, 
2000: 96). Building on this statement, this research takes certain aspects of the 
technoscience view of agriculture to examine how technology-based interventions are 
created for food-insecure smallholder farmers in Kenya and outlines the factors that 
influence their application. The research draws from related „science in society‟ 
approaches, such as socio-technical systems analysis, to define agriculture as a system 
encompassing the production of the artefacts (e.g., fertiliser), with the actual use of 
these technologies in a given locality (Geels, 2004; Geels and Schot, 2007). By 
bringing these strands together, the research examines input-support programmes 
through a wider lens, exploring the hypothesis that politics, economy and social context 
matter just as much as technology in generating sustainable increases in agricultural 
productivity and ensuring food security for African smallholder farmers.  
 
Conceptual framework 
 
The thesis brings together two contrasting but complementary conceptual strands of 
study –socio-technical systems and policy studies– to form a hybrid conceptual 
framework through which to guide the research. It draws on a range of literature, 
including recent work on socio-technical systems (Kemp and Rotmans, 2001; Berkhout 
et al., 2003; van der Ploeg et al., 2004; Wiskerke and van der Ploeg, 2004; Geels, 2010, 
2011); and policy studies, drawing on the approaches of actor network theory (Callon, 
1986; Latour, 1987; Law, 1992; Law and Hassard, 1999; Latour, 2007) and narrative 
analysis (Apthorpe, 1986; Roe, 1991, 1994; Apthorpe and Gasper, 1996; Grillo and 
Stirrat, 1997). Within this framework, the research applies insights from the field of 
science and technology studies to explain the technology focus of much agricultural 
programming, such as input-support programmes. The scope is widened to include 
socio-technical theory to ensure that “the fulfilment of societal functions becomes 
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central” to the focus of the analysis (Geels, 2004: 898). Socio-technical concepts are 
useful as they allow technological changes to be viewed in a broader and more complex 
view, with a trajectory that is indeterminate and unknown (Carolan, 2010).  
 
While this research uses socio-technical theory as a starting point, it does not apply the 
theory completely or exclusively. Instead, I applied selective components of the theory 
and combined them with elements drawn from other literature to fit my specific 
research agenda. I expand this work by including an examination of how distinct 
narratives on food security incorporate a standard view of technologies, such as hybrid 
seed and fertiliser, which are then embedded in different levels, from global to national 
to local. In so doing, the research looks at the effect these narratives have on the 
creation, implementation and impact of input-support programmes. Figure 3 below has 
been adapted from the socio-technical systems literature to illustrate how the 
production of agricultural inputs are influenced by a combination of knowledge, capital 
and labour, and adapted by the end users through their own social interpretations, as 
well as by local institutions and policy processes (cf. Shrum, 2000; Geels, 2002). The 
links between the spheres emphasise that technological systems do not function 
autonomously, but are part of the social constructs created by human actors. It 
highlights how the sustained use of improved inputs is linked intrinsically to the actors, 
organisations and social structures that encompass the local farming system.  
 
Figure 3: The basic elements of socio-technical systems (adapted from Geels, 2004) 
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It is within this theoretical framing that the term „socio-technical system‟ is broadly 
used as a “conceptual reminder that technologies affect and are an effect of their 
broader infrastructural, organizational, regulatory and symbolic environment” (Carolan, 
2010: 65). In other words, it is not about the intrinsic workings of a technology –how it 
works or not– but how it is embedding into a specific socio-technical system that 
includes local knowledge, structures and institutions (Rip and Kemp, 1998: emphasis 
added). In this thesis I use this framework to examine how existing national systems 
surrounding food security are “locked in” (Geels, 2005: 682) at multiple dimensions to 
specific pathways for development and become difficult to change.  
 
To understand the complex system surrounding food insecurity in Africa, it is 
important not only to identify the social, economic and institutional factors, but also to 
appreciate the actors, networks and narratives that are shaping and influencing the 
current Green Revolution trajectories. Appreciating the important role of narratives is 
crucial to understanding how these storylines influence the creation and maintenance of 
the structures that promote certain development programmes (Korten, 1980; Hyden, 
1983; Roe, 1991). According to Roe (1991: 288), rural development is a complex and 
uncertain environment. Therefore, the method by which policymakers and development 
practitioners deal with uncertain situations is to rely on narratives that do away with 
ambiguities, simplify complexities and help to develop basic sets of programmes for 
implementation.  
 
However, narratives are not confined to policymakers. Narratives permeate throughout 
the entire system of decision making, from influencing the creation of regulations to the 
method of distribution of technologies to the end user. Likewise, narratives are created 
and shaped by local understanding and social interpretations of local practices, such as 
soil fertility management and application of agricultural inputs. Different narratives, 
from decision makers to implementers to end users, are not often in alignment and may 
at times be conflicting. Therefore, this research demonstrates the interactions, clashes 
and mismatches of ideas, knowledge and beliefs on how input use, such as hybrid seed 
and inorganic fertiliser, is understood and represented throughout these levels.  
 
Moreover, narratives do not exist solely in one given timeframe. Therefore, the 
research highlights how dominant narratives persist through time and resurface even 
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when there is evidence to suggest they may not be right for a given locality (cf. Cohen 
and Lewis, 1987; Roe, 1991; Chambers, 1997). Narratives are also used to defend a 
position about an existing problem, such as a soil fertility crisis, that is then used to 
influence policy and programmatic directions for input-support programmes (cf. Cohen 
and Lewis, 1987; Chambers, 1997; Scoones, 2001). Often large amount of time, money 
and resources go into developing the system to support the narrative, thus building 
strong opposition and resistance to altering the dominant structures.  
 
To understand the relationships between actors and the different networks/associations 
that exist, this research draws on aspects of actor-network theory to show how 
knowledge-power-politics relations contribute (positively or negatively) to 
development outcomes (Callon and Latour, 1981; Law and Callon, 1992). This 
„interface‟ occurs at multiple levels and includes different knowledge systems and 
forms of social linkages that situate the interactions within wider institutional, social 
and political structures (Long, 1989, 2001). According to Long (2001: 191):  
 
The concern for interface entails an acute awareness of the ways in which 
different, possibly conflicting, forms of knowledge intersect and interact.  
 
Therefore, the thesis outlines the main actors framing the food security debate, both 
globally and within Kenya‟s national policy process, to identify whose knowledge is 
being included or excluded from the policy deliberations (cf. Keeley and Scoones, 
2003).  It also shows how certain ideas are adopted by powerful actors who find these 
ideas advantageous in framing the Green Revolution debates so as to influence a 
particular policy that may not have the same objectives as those supported by the 
narratives. According to Richards and Diemer (1996: 1): 
 
To „map‟ the actor-networks that come together in any technology project is a 
significant step towards understanding the technical design and process and its 
outcomes.  
 
To understand the interaction of these different narratives and practices at different 
scales, the research uses another concept from current socio-technical theory: the multi-
level framework. 
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A multi-level analytical framework 
 
This research takes some liberties in defining a multi-level framework, borrowing 
loosely from the multi-level perspective (MLP) literature and the ongoing debates on 
the transitions of socio-technical systems (Kemp et al., 1998; Berkhout et al., 2003; 
Wiskerke, 2003; Smith et al., 2005; Geels and Kemp, 2007; Genus and Coles, 2008; 
Geels, 2011). I adapted the multi-level framework to fit the unique construct of this 
research and drew certain lessons from existing socio-technical systems work to 
examine the construction and delivery of input-support schemes through three different 
levels: global (macro), national (meso) and local (micro):   
 
(i) Macro level – This corresponds broadly with the landscape and regime level of the 
MLP and emphasises the broader political, economic and institutional context that 
supports such specific elements as infrastructure, political culture, networks, 
communities, social values, and the macro economy that directly affects agricultural 
systems and programmes. For example, changes in global food or fertiliser prices, 
climate change and economic growth will have a dramatic impact on the current macro 
landscape, which ultimately influences the lower meso and micro levels. Mapping the 
global landscape is not the focus for the research, but it is important in demonstrating 
the influence of this macro level on the other levels.   
 
(ii) Meso level – This refers to the interests, rules and beliefs that guide actions and 
public policy and account for the stability of existing technological development and its 
trajectories, defining, in the terms of the MLP, the regime. It looks at the technological 
regimes and supporting narratives that are created at the global level and continue to 
influence the creation of national-level policies that ultimately shape agricultural 
programmes. In this instance, regimes refer to the predetermined set of rules embedded 
in certain practices and technologies that come together to define a problem and 
become entrenched in institutions and infrastructures (Rip and Kemp, 1998). Therefore, 
the regime is used to specify the way society produces new agricultural technologies as 
well as its rules and modalities of operation.  
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(iii) Micro level –This comprises individual actors (i.e., farmers, farmers‟ organisations 
and non-governmental organisations), technologies and local practices involved in 
agriculture. At this level, the analysis focuses on the environment within which 
technologies interact with local actors and how they are altered through gradual 
experimentation and learning, as well as the local administration, politics, social and 
delivery mechanisms of input-supply programmes. It emphasises how farmers are 
constantly readjusting their farming practices and adapt to the particular ecological or 
economic situation they face. These innovations or niches in the micro-level are 
„protected spaces‟ (Kemp et al., 1998: 186) where farmers are able to experiment and 
create new modes of interactions with technologies that ultimately influence meso-level 
regimes.  Shifts in local social networks and power relations are analysed to understand 
how they interact with and shape the use of the technology in practice.   
 
The linkages between these three levels can be conceptualised within a multi-level 
framework (Figure 4). This framework illustrates how factors (such as institutions and 
social networks) at one level are connected and may influence or interact, positively or 
negatively, with factors (such as policy or administration) at another level (Kemp and 
Rotmans, 2001; Geels, 2002; Berkhout et al., 2003; Moors et al., 2004). According to 
Geels (2002), this relationship can be understood as a nested hierarchy where the three 
levels are embedded within each other and are heavily influenced by the other.  
 
Building on this framework, I have added in the concept of narratives to this diagram. 
As mentioned previously, narratives help to shape policy thinking and simplify 
complex situations. Therefore, the dotted lines in the conceptual diagram below 
illustrate how narratives at the macro-level not only drive policy at the meso level but 
at the same time are also used by meso-level actors to influence the global level 
narratives and objectives. It illustrates how different narratives flow from one level to 
another and interact with interests at all the multiple levels. However, in doing so they 
become heavily influenced by the realities of the surrounding environment at each 
level. It also shows how narratives flowing from the meso-level may strongly influence 
the micro-level and how experimentation and adaptation can create niches based on 
their particular ecological, institutional, political or social surrounding that may 
influence both their interactions with technology and the meso-level regimes.   
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Figure 4: Conceptual diagram of the multi-level framework (adapted from Geels, 
2002) 
 
The focus of my research is on the dynamics of these interactions and how the three 
levels come together in a given locality through a specific technology-driven 
agricultural programme. The analysis centres on the interplay of the different narratives 
and actors within each level that may or may not be aligned to highlight the mismatches 
in terms of underlying intentions of policymakers and how the programme recipients 
understand, implement and accept the food security and agriculture programmes.  
 
While not binding the research to the strictest definitions of the MLP, this hybrid use of 
the multi-level framework allows me to articulate the interactions between the 
individuals at the different levels and the impacts this may have on developing 
sustainable food security programming for smallholder farmers in Kenya. Bringing in 
components of the MLP allows a wider systemic perspective to be explored and 
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incorporates the view that technology is socially embedded and “emphasises co-
evolution of technology and society” (Geels, 2005: 642). 
 
Research design 
 
In designing this research, I used a combination of historical and qualitative enquiry 
across the three levels identified in the previous section. The core qualitative 
methodology involved in-depth interviews and documentary analysis of policy 
processes at global and national levels. Detailed village-level case studies were used 
with a combination of participatory appraisal and ethnographic approaches. I used 
individual household-level case studies to explore how technologies are embedded 
within wider social and economic systems (Rip and Kemp, 1998). These case studies 
are complemented by quantitative data collected from existing household surveys. This 
allowed the case studies to be defined and sampling of households to be carried out.  
 
The data provides information on the performance of the agricultural system at the 
local level (in terms of input delivery and uptake), as well as the impact this has had on 
household-level food security and socio-economic change. The research also provides 
an overview of the main narratives surrounding the use of improved agricultural inputs 
to address food security at different levels (global to local) to highlight the assumptions 
that are built into these narratives. In so doing, I was able to analyse how these 
narratives hinder or assist the ability of different actors within the levels to understand 
each other and the consequences this has on the programmes and actors.  
 
Research questions and multi-level analysis 
 
Based on the analytical analysis described above, the key question asked in this 
research is:  
 
 How are the current Green Revolution narratives that are constructed in/for Africa 
affecting the design and implementation of input-support programmes for 
smallholder farmers in Kenya? 
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As I described above, the research was conducted at three levels (macro/meso/micro). 
These are highlighted in Table 1 with an overview of the related sub-questions: 
 
Table 1: Overview of the multi-level research methodology 
Level Themes Sub-questions Research methods 
Macro Global 
environment 
1. What is the geopolitical context that is 
influencing the narratives on a Green 
Revolution for Africa and how does this 
influence Kenya‟s policy process and 
approaches to food security programmes? 
• What are the key Green Revolution 
narratives currently being espoused by 
the international donors? 
• What are the key international conditions 
that may affect the delivery of input-
support programmes? 
- semi-structured 
interviews with key 
actors such as bilateral 
donors, multilateral 
agencies, and 
government 
departments  
- literature review 
- document tracking 
Meso 
 
Politics and 
policy 
processes 
2. How has the global framing of the food 
security/productivity debate influenced 
approaches to and construction of inputs 
packages (consisting mostly of hybrid 
maize seed and inorganic fertiliser) to 
smallholder farmers in Kenya? 
• How has the national government and 
other key actors framed the input-
support problem within Kenya? 
- actor-network mapping 
- semi-structured 
interviews with key 
actors such as 
government (i.e., 
Ministries of 
Agriculture); local 
officials (i.e., district 
officials)  
Institutions, 
administration 
and delivery 
mechanisms 
3. How do national and donor policies – and 
their associated framings – construct input-
support programmes directed to 
smallholder farmers in rural Kenya?  
• What institutional and administration 
arrangements influence the style and 
form of input-support programmes? 
• What are the trade-offs and constraints 
faced by the staff who administer these 
programmes and how does this affect 
practices on the ground? 
- actor-network mapping 
- document tracking  
- semi-structured 
interviews with key 
actors such as those 
mentioned above and 
including local NGOs 
and private sector 
groups 
Micro Social and 
power-
relations  
4. How are agricultural socio-technical 
systems constructed at the village level and 
maintained through local socio-economic 
processes?  
• What is the role of social networks in 
disseminating technical information and 
related technologies? 
• How are local agricultural problems and 
practices defined (and by whom) and 
how is this information embedded into 
input-support programmes?  
- farm visits 
- focus group 
discussions 
- participatory 
workshops 
- participant observation 
- existing baseline data  
- interviews with key 
actors in the 
community, NGOs and 
private sector  
Multi-level comparison 5. Contrasting two types of socio-technical systems focused on delivery 
of agricultural inputs, what are the outcomes in terms of the adoption 
and sustained use? 
• How does the design of input-support programmes affect the uptake 
and response of new technologies among the local community? 
• How do the delivery structures and the understanding of those 
delivering the programme affect the outcomes of the programmes 
vis-à-vis those who are the „recipients‟?  
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Macro-level design – Asian and African Green Revolution(s)  
 
The macro-level analysis focused on a historical overview of the Green Revolutions 
and Kenya‟s agrarian change from colonial times to the present day. The aim was to 
focus on the key narratives surrounding these historical events and to unravel what is 
meant by a Green Revolution today. It examines the social, institutional and political 
factors that put pressure on, and helped to develop, the Asian Green Revolution. The 
research shows how dominant actors and narratives helped to establish a regime based 
on a stable configuration of “institutions, techniques and artefacts, as well as rules, 
practices and networks that determine the „normal‟ development and use of 
technologies” (Smith et al., 2005: 1493). The focus is on the agricultural technologies 
promoted at the time (such as inorganic fertiliser and hybrid seeds) and how these 
become ingrained in institutions (e.g., government and research institutions) and 
supported by individual actors. The concept of a regime is useful in both the macro- 
and meso-level analysis for three reasons.  
 
First, regimes evolve over time and build on previous regimes (van der Ploeg et al., 
2004). The research takes a time-scale approach to examine how the current African 
Green Revolution regime grew from the previous Asian one. It examines how a 
predetermined set of rules on national and supranational regulations become embedded 
when transposed from one setting (Asia) to another (Africa) and can directly, or 
indirectly, prescribe farming practices to the new locality based on the previous 
settings.  
 
Second, the term regime implies a specific trajectory for ongoing research and 
development (van der Ploeg et al., 2004). Therefore, the research highlights how 
current dominant food security narratives are entrenching the use of certain 
technologies and are influencing present Green Revolution programming. In so doing, 
certain development trajectories are being set and other innovations, considered less 
relevant, remain undeveloped. This has major limitations for the creation of alternative 
pathways and innovation (Nelson and Winter, 1977).  
 
Third, regimes at one level link different levels, actors and dimensions (i.e., social, 
technical and material) to regimes at another level (van der Ploeg et al., 2004). 
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Therefore, regimes allow for further exploration of the multi-level analysis (described 
earlier). They also examine how each of these levels affects the delivery of input-
support programmes and highlight the links between local farm-level operations and 
decision-making systems at national and supra-national levels.  
 
Meso-level design – Kenya‟s policy process   
 
Following on from the macro-level analysis, the meso-level analysis focused on the 
current design of the African Green Revolution concept and Kenya‟s agriculture policy 
process at the national and sub-national levels. This analysis investigated how a 
particular technology-focused regime becomes embedded into Kenya‟s national policy 
processes and plays out at the local context. Key actors and networks were mapped and 
related narratives were used to investigate the ways in which different food security 
programmes have evolved. Through extensive interviews with national and 
international development actors, the analysis identifies the key issues framing the 
productivity debate, both globally and within Kenya. Key tools include actor-network 
mapping, document tracking and key informant interviews with representatives from 
government, donor organisations, the private sector and NGOs.  
 
Informal interviews with a range of actors were used to understand the matrix of 
networks and narratives operating at the national level. Fifty-three semi-structured 
interviews were conducted between January and May 2010 in Nairobi for the policy 
process analysis (see Annex A for full list of interviewees). These included a series of 
interviews with national ministries, donor agencies, NGOs, national and international 
scientists, policy researchers and private sector seed and fertiliser companies operating 
in Kenya. The interviews covered a range of topics, including the Kenyan agricultural 
environment, food security, soil fertility management and improving access to inputs 
for smallholder farmers.  
 
I drew extensively from my previous work at the MDG Centre
4
 in Nairobi, where I 
worked as an Agriculture Policy Specialist and interacted with the Ministry of 
Agriculture and other key actors in food security in Kenya. Having spent five years 
                                                     
4
 The MDG Centre in Nairobi offers advisory services and policy support on the MDGs to national 
governments in the region and provides technical support to the Millennium Villages Project.  
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living in Kenya (2005–2011), I had established numerous contacts (including 
government, donors, private sector and NGOs), as well as collecting and analysing key 
documentation, and these were used to balance the qualitative interviews conducted 
during the research. I had come across many of these actors over the years and they 
were very open to meeting with me on numerous occasions to discuss my research.  
 
Micro-level design – Case studies of two input-support programmes 
 
The micro-level analysis was the main focus of the fieldwork. This involved a project-
level analysis of two input-support programmes. The purpose was to map the socio-
technical determinants at the local level and highlight the key social, economic, 
political and institutional factors that influence the outcome of input-support 
programmes. The micro-level case study analysis involved village-level data collected 
from Siaya (MVP) and Butere (NAAIAP). It involved gathering general background 
information about the social, institutional and political environment in these districts. 
This included an historical overview of input-support programmes operating in Western 
Kenya and data collection on the design and evolution of MVP and NAAIAP.   
 
My national contacts were also helpful in negotiating district-level contacts in Siaya 
and especially in Butere where I had less knowledge and work experience. Gaining 
access to individuals within the two sites was facilitated by my contacts at the MDG 
Centre in Nairobi. I also had opportunities to work in the MVP village site in Siaya and 
interacted frequently with the community members. This experience facilitated my 
entry and introduction into the community. I was always mindful that my previous 
relationship with the MVP project might influence my decisions as an independent 
researcher. Therefore, throughout the process, I tried to remain unbiased in my data 
collection and used my previous knowledge only as a starting point in my research 
activities.  
 
The micro-level fieldwork took place in Western Kenya over 15 months (April 2009 – 
June 2010) and consisted of 265 individual interviews and 11 focus group meetings. 
Semi-structured interviews with 72 households within the two research sites were used 
to understand the social structures/networks and cultural forces influencing fertiliser 
usage. A stratified sampling approach was used to choose the households for interviews 
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and to ensure representation of different households within each village (explained in 
the next section). A matrix was created to ensure representation across different wealth 
categories and equal representation of female-headed households. Each household was 
interviewed three times over the course of three planting seasons (April 2009–June 
2010). Interviews were conducted within households and on farmers‟ plots to include 
direct observation about cropping techniques, planting styles and views on soil fertility. 
When possible, discussions included interactions with different household members to 
obtain a deeper understanding of the respondents‟ lives.  
 
Of the 72 households interviewed, 12 were chosen as specific case studies for more 
detailed mapping of the local politics and institutions, and the cultural and social 
influences that affect adoption and use of fertilisers within their farming systems. The 
case studies were selected to represent particular types of households and to obtain a 
better understanding of the local socio-technical system surrounding fertiliser use 
through a more intensive interview format with additional family members. Focusing 
on a smaller sub-section of households for detailed case studies allowed the research to 
obtain a more nuanced and deeper understanding of some of the longstanding 
constraints to soil management and household food security.  
 
In addition to the individual household interviews, nine focus group discussions were 
held at the village level with a mix of village elders, community leaders, women‟s 
organisations and past participants of the development programmes. Two additional 
focus group discussions were held with past NAAIAP programme recipients in 
neighbouring sub-locations in Butere. Focus groups were an important element of this 
research as they allowed the voices of a greater number of community members to be 
heard. They also brought forward an interesting diversity of views on community 
dynamics that were hard to obtain from individual interviews.  
 
Another part of the research involved a deeper analysis of the surrounding socio-
economic and institutional structures within which the farmers operate. Therefore, to 
understand the issues surrounding access to agricultural inputs in the area, a series of 
informal interviews were conducted with 18 private sector fertiliser retailers (agro-
dealers) within six market locations surrounding the two research sites. Finally, to 
understanding the institutional and administrative structures surrounding the two input-
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support systems, it was important to conduct a series of interviews with programme 
designers, implementers and evaluators from each system. A total of 19 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with programme delivery personnel at the district, divisional 
and village levels, representing various levels of administration and delivery personnel 
associated with the two case studies. The following section goes into further detail on 
the research process for each of the case studies.  
 
The research sites:  Siaya and Butere Districts, Kenya 
 
The process of selecting the exact sub-locations for the research had to take into 
consideration a number of factors. Most importantly, the sites had to have some similar 
farming practices and agro-ecological factors so that a comparison could be made 
between the two sites. Figure 5 shows the locations of Siaya and Butere Districts and 
the locations of the research sites.  
 
Figure 5: Location of Siaya and Butere Districts 
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The following section gives a brief description of the agro-ecological differences 
between the research sites and the process for selecting the individual sub-locations. 
Chapter 5 presents a more in-depth view of the two sites and explores the similarities 
and differences in terms of farming practices, demographics and other factors. Table 2 
gives a short overview of the main characteristics of the two research sites.  
 
Table 2: Comparison of the two research sites  
Statistics  Butere  Siaya  
District level
a
 
Altitude (metres above sea 
level) 
1,240 – 1,641 metres  1,140 – 1,400 metres  
Average rain fall (per year) 1,600 – 2,800 millimetres 800 – 1,600 millimetres 
Soil type (general) Shallow sandy loams Ferrasols 
Population density (persons 
per square kilometre) 
661 (Khwisero Division) 410 (Yala Division) 
Farm size (average for 
district) 
1.42 hectares  1.05 hectares  
Key food crops (district) Maize, beans, sweet 
potatoes, cassava, 
sorghum, finger millet 
Maize, sorghum, beans, 
cassava, sweet potatoes, 
vegetables 
Main cash crops (district) Sugarcane, sunflower, 
tea, coffee  
Sugarcane, cotton, coffee 
Income from agriculture 65 percent 60 percent 
Research sites
b 
Fertiliser usage before 
programme 
91 percent 39 percent 
Hiring labour (outside of 
household) 
57 percent 55 percent  
Average age (years) of 
household head (2009) 
49.81 years 50.75 years 
Education level of household 
head (average year of 
schooling) 
7.3 years 6.4 years 
Average household family 
size (number of persons 
living in the house) 
5.91 5.6 
Notes: (a) Data sources: Butere District Development Plan (GOK, 2002), Poverty Reduction Plan for 
Butere District (GOK, 2001a); Siaya District Development Plan (GOK, 2001b), and Siaya Strategic Plan 
(GOK, 2005). (b) Data from interviews with 72 households in the research sites in Butere and Siaya. 
 
Siaya District - MVP 
 
Siaya District is located in Nyanza Province, in Western Kenya. It is bordered by 
Butere-Mumias Districts to the northeast, Busia District to the north, Vihiga District to 
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the east, and Bondo and Kisumu Districts to the south and southeast respectively. Siaya 
is divided into seven administrative divisions, with a total population of roughly 
500,000 (Mutuo et al., 2006). The landscape is characterised by undulating and rolling 
uplands with slopes that vary from 2 to 16 percent (Mango, 1999: 3). It has three major 
landforms (dissected uplands, moderate lowlands and swampland) with an altitude 
ranging from 1,140 to 1,400 metres above sea level (GOK, 2001b: 4) The district is 
classified as sub-humid tropics with an average annual rainfall of between 1,800 and 
2,000 millimetres (Mango, 1999; GOK, 2001b; Millennium Villages Project, 2005).   
 
The main economic activity is farming. Households practise intensive mixed farming 
systems, intercropping maize with 
beans, during two planting seasons. 
Most of the maize grown on farm is 
consumed within the household, while 
beans, groundnuts and some 
vegetables are grown as cash crops. 
While some larger-scale cash crops 
are produced (e.g., sugarcane, cotton 
and coffee), 98 percent of the land 
under cultivation is directed to food 
crops, including maize, sorghum, 
beans, cassava and sweet potatoes 
(GOK, 2001b: 9). However, even with 
this focus on food crops, Siaya 
remains a food-deficient district and 
an overall net importer of maize, 
which is brought in from surrounding 
areas and neighbouring Uganda (GOK, 2005).  
 
The MVP site is located in the northeast of Siaya, in Yala Division, which has 
relatively high altitude, rainfall and topography, and is considered a high potential area. 
Yala also has the highest population densities in the district with over 86,000 people 
and a density of 410 persons per square kilometre (GOK, 2001b: 7). Yala Division is 
divided administratively into three locations (Yala Township, Central Gem and East 
Figure 6: Emaculate Otieno showing her maize 
crops, Siaya, May 2009 
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Gem) and 19 smaller sub-locations. MVP covers parts of all three locations and 
operates in 11 sub-locations. To get an overall sense of the MVP, I chose one sub-
location within each of the three locations, with sites at Sauri, Lihanda and Nyandiwa 
(Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7: Yala Division and the three sub-locations (Lihanda, Nyandiwa, Sauri) 
 
Within the three sub-locations, the soils vary slightly but are mostly clayey, reddish, 
deep and well drained (Millennium Villages Project, 2007). Throughout the research, I 
noted slight variations within the three MVP sites. Sauri sub-location is flatter and less 
rocky than the other two sites, with little variation in altitude range (households 
interviewed averaged 1430 metres above sea level, with little variation). Lihanda sub-
location was markedly hillier and contained more rocky surfaces (averaging 1,450 m), 
with large exposed boulders rising throughout the hillsides. Nyandiwa had the most 
diverse landscape with both rolling hills and deep valleys (household range was the 
largest, ranging from 1,370 to 1,440 metres above sea level, with the average at 1,400 
metres). According to the MVP, most of the soils in the area are derived from volcanic 
material and were once quite fertile but are now depleted of essential nutrients for plant 
growth as a result of continuous agricultural cultivation (Millennium Villages Project, 
2005).  
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Butere District - NAAIAP 
 
Butere District is one of eight districts in Kenya‟s Western Province, and is bordered by 
Bungoma and Busia Districts in the west, Siaya District in the south, Vihiga District in 
the east, and Kakamega and Mumias Districts in the north. In 2010, the population of 
Butere was approximately 574,000, which represents a 20 percent increase from the 
previous decade (GOK, 2001a, 2010a: 4). Butere has one of the highest population 
densities in Kenya with 546 persons per square kilometre (GOK, 2002: 7).  
 
Butere‟s landscape is fairly flat with some slight variations in terrain, characterised by 
rolling hills and valleys interspersed with a few small streams. The district has a range 
of soil types, including fertile loamy soils in the northern part of the district that have 
contributed to the commercialisation of such crops as sugarcane, pulses and cereals. 
The mean average temperature for Butere is 29 degrees Celsius. Annual rainfall is 
between 1,600 and 2,900 millimetres per year, within a bi-modal rainfall distribution, 
resulting in two separate planting seasons (GOK, 2002: 6). The first planting season, 
often referred to as the long rains, occurs between February and June. The second 
planting season, or the short rains, occurs between August and November. In this 
region the long rains are considered much more stable and predictable.  
 
Butere represents one of the 38 districts in Kenya that received inputs from the 
NAAIAP. I focused the research on Butere after significant evaluation of different 
locations and discussions with Ministry of Agriculture officials. Next, I organised a 
series of meetings with the Ministry of Agriculture staff in Nairobi and the District 
Agriculture Officer (DAO) in Butere to decide on which division to base the research. 
Through these consultations, I decided that Khwisero Division within Butere 
represented not only the closest site to the MVP, but more importantly, it shared the 
closest similarities of farming practices and agro-ecological features. This provided me 
with the foundation for a strong comparative study of two distinctive case studies, 
which shared many socio-technical elements.  
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Khwisero Division, in the southern part of the District, has the highest population 
density with 661 persons per square kilometre (GOK, 2002: 8). It has relatively poor 
soils consisting of mostly shallow sandy loams that have become highly eroded (GOK, 
2002). Sugarcane is a major cash crop for Butere (GOK, 2002). However, Khwisero‟s 
poor soils have resulted in limited opportunities for commercialisation of cash crops. 
The major economic activity for most 
farmers in this division is subsistence 
maize and bean cultivation. The 
leading sources of income for the 
households tends to be casual labour 
in the sugarcane fields in 
neighbouring divisions to supplement 
their subsistence farming (Oiye et al., 
2009: 1314).  
 
Khwisero is the poorest division in 
the district due to a combination of 
poor soils, lack of staple cash crops, 
and a high population density, which 
has resulted in “heavy demarcation of 
land into small uneconomical units” 
(GOK, 2002: 22). The average farm 
size in Khwisero is 0.20 hectares per household. According to a recent survey by Oiye 
et al. (2009: 1314), households in Khwisero spend on average two-thirds of their total 
household income on buying food.  
 
To determine the exact sub-locations for the research, I held a series of meetings with 
the Division Agricultural Extension Officer (DAEO) and three Agriculture 
Representatives (referred to as „Farmer Reps‟)5 working in Khwisero. Based on these 
consultations, I selected Doho, Emutsasa, and Khushiku sub-locations (Figure 9).  
                                                     
5
 The Agriculture Representatives (Farmer Reps) are local farmers enlisted by the government to help 
extension officers to implement NAAIAP. Their role is to help facilitate the programmes and to liaise 
between the farmers, the village elders and the government officials. Applicants hold the position for two 
years. It is an unpaid position although they receive stipends for each day they assist the Extension 
Officer with implementing the programme. 
Figure 8: A farmer sifting beans that she will sell in 
the local market, Butere, June 2009 
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Figure 9: Khwisero Division and the three sub-locations (Doho, Emutsasa, Khushiku) 
 
These sub-locations are the closest NAAIAP sites in proximity to the MVP sites and 
represent similar agro-ecological conditions and comparable planting styles. Of 
particular interest was Doho, which shares a physical border with the MVP project site 
and offers very interesting insights into local farmers‟ personal observations about the 
two programmes. During the research, I found that the three sub-locations had much 
more uniform terrain than those found in Siaya. For example, Khushiku consists of 
mainly hilly terrain and homesteads had little variation, with altitudes of 1,440 metres. 
Doho ranged between hilly and green plains, with homesteads ranging from 1,397 to 
1,440 metres. Emutsasa was the least hilly of the sub locations, where homesteads are 
located at an average of 1,420 metres above sea level. 
 
Selecting the households 
 
I used a qualitative case study approach to delve deeper into the socio-technical 
realities of the people‟s lives and farming practices in my chosen research sites. This 
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uncovered textured information about the households in terms of their engagement with 
particular agricultural technologies (particularly seeds and fertilisers) and the different 
practices and choices that shape individual interactions. The 72 households (36 
households from MVP and 36 from NAAIAP sites) were selected to describe the 
different narratives surrounding soil fertility management and the social system 
interactions with technology that exist at the household level. This number of 
households allowed me sufficient time to revisit each one on numerous occasions and 
to explore in detail the unique nuances that occur within particular socio-technical 
configurations at the household level. 
 
Based on the hypothesis that social structures, power networks and local institutions 
have a bearing on farmers‟ interactions with technology, a sampling approach was 
designed to select a range of households within two axes: (i) wealth category and (ii) 
gender representation. For the wealth category, three income levels were chosen: 
„Wealthier‟ (A); „Middle‟ (B); and „Poorer‟ (C) (see Table 3). The categorisation was 
based on previous socio-economic assessment conducted by MVP surveys, which 
collected data from a range of income indicators and assets. Using a gender axis 
allowed me to explore key gender dimensions surrounding the intersection of social and 
institutional factors, and how these might affect the ways in which a household 
interacts with a technology, based on different factors such as access to resources (e.g., 
land, labour, credit) and other social factors. I was aware that additional factors, such as 
education, age and size of land holding, could affect farmers‟ interactions with 
technology. Therefore, I ensured that the intensive case study approach enabled me to 
collect such data and reflect it in my findings.  
 
Table 3: Overview of MVP households (HH)  
 
MVP had conducted an extensive baseline dataset based on wealth categories. I was 
able to access this data to randomly select 12 households per sub-location based on the 
chart below for a total of 36 households. I purposively sampled equal numbers and 
MVP wealth category Female-headed HH Male-headed HH 
Wealthier - A (upper quartile) 6 6 
Middle - B (median quartile) 6 6 
Poorer - C (lower quartile) 6 6 
TOTAL 18 18 
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equal ranks of households from these two axes as it allowed me to compare how 
different households, based on wealth and gender, interacted with the input package 
offered by the different programmes. This sampling methodology allowed me to relate 
my findings to the broad socio-technical patterns that are highlighted in the later case-
study chapters. Other important characteristics, such as age, education levels, land 
sizes, remittances, and other factors were gathered and analysed through intensive 
interviews with each of the households. 
 
The strata used to select all households were similar in format for the two research 
sites. However, household-level wealth category for the NAAIAP households was 
formulated slightly differently. While MVP had conducted extensive wealth category 
exercises prior to the start of the programme, the government official in NAAIAP had 
not. Instead, the programme administrators relied on recipient lists produced by the 
village elders and the Farmer Reps in each sub-location to determine who would 
receive the input packages. Therefore, in order to maintain the same wealth 
distributions, I conducted a general wealth category exercise in the three sub-locations 
based on the MVP exercise conducted in Siaya.  
 
The key wealth category indicators included: 
 type of house (thatched versus iron sheet roof); 
 wage earning (off-farm and other income earning activities); 
 number of assets (landholding size, number of livestock, other assets, e.g., 
bicycle, radio); 
 remittances (children living and working in towns); and 
 education level (of recipient and their children). 
 
Focus group meetings at the sub-location level determined the household wealth 
categories. The focus groups included village elders, agriculture representatives, 
community representatives (including women‟s groups) and key resource persons (self-
appointed) able to assist in this process. The wealth category process began with the 
focus group determining the appropriate indicators to classify a household as 
„Wealthier‟ (A), „Middle‟ (B), and „Poorer‟ (C) categories, based on the MVP 
characteristics.  
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Once the analysis was completed, the NAAIAP recipients were grouped according to 
their relative wealth and the gender of the household head. Then 12 households were 
randomly selected from the wealth categories and gender sub-groupings using the 
stratified random sampling approach used for MVP. This approach was replicated in all 
three sub-locations to obtain a total of 36 NAAIAP households to interview.  
 
While efforts were taken to purposively select an equal sampling of households based 
on wealth categories and gender representation, the final NAAIAP list required manual 
adjusting as some households identified as „female-headed‟ were not, since their 
husbands were still present in the compound. This misrepresentation may have been a 
result of NAAIAP criteria that targeted female-headed households, resulting in 
households listed incorrectly in order to benefit from the programme. Vetting the 
names through the focus groups allowed some refinement of the list to achieve a 
balanced distribution and include true female-headed households. Even with this 
vetting, later interviews revealed that some households were not, in fact, female-
headed. In the end, the research included 21 male- and 15 female-headed households, 
which allowed sufficient representation to make good comparisons between the two 
groups.  
 
Ethical considerations 
 
The case study analysis involved two ethnic groups (Luo in Siaya and Luhya in Butere) 
and interviews were conducted in the Luo (Dholuo), Luyah/Kisa and Kiswahili 
languages, depending on the household and location. I worked with one translator, 
Ezekiel Avedi, who spoke a variety of local languages. Avedi has extensive fieldwork 
experience in the area and has worked for five years as an enumerator and assistant 
researcher for MVP in Siaya and for The World Agroforestry Centre in the surrounding 
Butere area. His knowledge and ability to speak local languages proved to be a great 
asset in building relationships within the communities. All other interviews, including 
national-level interviews in Nairobi and programme-level interviews with staff and 
government officials in Siaya and Butere, were conducted in English. 
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During all these interviews, I was cognisant of the fact that I was asking personal 
information about household food security and garnering opinions on the programmes 
that were delivering the input packages. Therefore, at the start of each interview I 
explained the purpose of the research to ensure informants were comfortable with the 
topic and to ask their consent for participation. Each subsequent interview began with a 
recap of our previous discussions to ensure accuracy in how I had interpreted the 
previous interview. Participation was voluntary and interviewees were free to dictate 
the time, location and duration of our interactions. I also sought permission to record 
the discussions. A university student in Nairobi then transcribed the interviews. 
 
At all times, I was mindful of the ethical data collection standards as outlined by Laws 
et al. (2003) to ensure no harm was done to the research participants. Therefore, while I 
did receive permission to use their names throughout the research, I used household-
level identifier codes to document the responses. Most participants are presented in the 
thesis by wealth category, gender and location and pseudonyms are used when 
necessary. However, in the detailed household-level case studies, I requested 
permission to use their names and personal descriptions in writing their personal 
stories. Permission to use full names and organisations were sought in all interviews 
with programme staff and national-level participants. In the rare instances when 
persons requested to remain anonymous, I have not divulged their identities.  
 
I was conscious that I must seek the cooperation of members of the village and district 
officials, informally and formally. I was able to do this by articulating the nature, intent 
and purpose of my research and what would be done with the results. I was aware that 
my connections with the MDG Centre raised questions of my affiliation with MVP in 
both research sites. This was difficult to avoid in the Siaya sites as every household had 
completed numerous MVP-led surveys over the past five years. However, I continued 
to state my independence prior to each interview. The situation in Butere was different. 
Once the communities heard I had been in Siaya, rumours circulated that I was sent by 
MVP to investigate possibilities of the programme expanding to Butere. These initial 
rumours caused confusion with the village elders and chiefs.
6
 Understanding that these 
                                                     
6
 Village elders are the elected representative in the village, while the assistant chiefs and chiefs are 
appointed by the government to represent the administrative units of sub-location and location, 
respectively, on behalf of the government.  
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misconceptions could influence the data, I constantly re-emphasised that I was 
independent from MVP and outlined the purpose of the research. My ability to go back 
to each household three or four times over 15 months (April 2009–June 2010) allowed 
me to build a relationship with the households, and allowed for more in-depth 
discussions than would have been possible with a one-time visit. I tried to ensure that 
my interview style remained the same between the two sites and that my data could 
speak for itself without interpreting too much based on previous experience. 
 
Reflexivity and positionality  
 
As a „Western‟ researcher operating in an African context, it is important to understand 
the issues of „positionality‟, reflexivity, as well as the knowledge and power relations 
that exist within research processes (Marcus, 1994; Seale, 1999). I needed to be aware 
of my own position and interest and take account of the fact that knowledge becomes 
constructed by my interactions with the interviewees, including why I chose to ask 
some questions and ignore others that I felt were outside the scope of the research 
(Hertz, 1997). Therefore, in asking questions, I also had my own role to play in the co-
construction of knowledge (Finlay, 2002).  
 
Throughout this process, I was acutely aware of my ethnicity, educational and 
economic privilege and that I was considered an outsider. People placed me in certain 
categories (e.g., researcher, woman, or simply as „muzungu‟ a white foreigner), and 
negotiated their relationship with me on this basis. Therefore, I had to be cognisant of 
the power relations and politics within my own research process. While I may have 
lived in Kenya for five years and spent 15 months visiting the study sites, it was not 
enough time for me to begin to comprehend the lives of the people I was interviewing. 
Of critical importance was to be true to the interactions in that time and space (Sultana, 
2007) and to present to the best of my ability, a small part of their stories and the 
knowledge I gained through my research. And of course, to understand that my 
perceptions of what is „true‟ and „important‟ is deeply rooted in my own experiences, 
ideologies and positionality (Bruner, 1986; Richardson, 1994). I was also mindful that 
the information being translated was reinterpreted by my translator‟s own expectations 
and beliefs. Therefore, I had to be diligent throughout the interview process to ensure 
adequate data collection and interpretation, to the best of my ability.  
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Challenges and further research emerging from the research 
 
I experienced three main challenges in my village fieldwork. First, adequate recall of 
past events was an issue for some, mostly elderly, respondents. I addressed this issue by 
talking to additional family members who may have greater recollection of historical 
events, discussing the same events with local extension workers, and correlating the 
feedback with reports and surveys conducted by MVP and the government.  
 
Second, most village-level interviews and focus groups were conducted in local 
languages. My translator could cope with a variety of languages and so allowed 
respondents to speak in their own language. Yet, it took time for him to learn how to 
translate and, at times, the responses were summaries of longer conversations. 
However, since we went back to each household numerous times during the research 
period, I was able to review the information with the respondents to ensure that the 
stories were acceptable to them.  
 
Third, since I chose three sub-locations in Siaya and three in Butere, the distances 
between the households were quite far. This not only increased the time spent going 
from house to house, it also meant I had less time to get to know the wider community. 
However, I felt that having a diversity of locations for each site allowed me to test out 
many of my assumptions and avoid having the data influenced by one set of community 
or village-level characteristics that might not be representative of the area.  
 
In addition, three priorities for further study also emerged from my research. First, due 
to my desire to focus the research, this was not a comprehensive look at all Green 
Revolution components but only a particular set of technologies (hybrid seed and 
fertiliser). I felt that these represented a key component of what I wished to accomplish 
through a socio-technical approach. However, these technologies alone are not the 
answer to food insecurity. Therefore, looking at the impact and possible interactions of 
additional technologies and related policies could be possible in further studies.  
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Second, I took a very specific slice of the two programmes. MVP has many other 
activities that go beyond input support and NAAIAP had a credit scheme, neither of 
which are addressed in this research. However, I took an early decision to focus 
exclusively on the input-support packages for both MVP and the NAAIAP so that I 
could compare „like-for-like‟ and I did not go into details on other programmes offered 
by MVP or the Government of Kenya. Further research into the dynamics of alternative 
interventions offered by the two programmes (i.e. MVP‟s integrated approach, 
including other agriculture, irrigation and health-related interventions and NAAIAP‟s 
cereal banks and credit programmes) could add to this literature.  
 
Third, I purposely selected a small sample size for this research so I could focus on in-
depth household-level case studies. However, this sample size should not be seen as 
fully representative of the entire NAAIAP or MVP programme across different sites. 
The results are not indicative of the entire programme, but explain what happened in 
those locations within Siaya and Buture. By taking a small sample of households and 
using a qualitative approach, I was able to focus on the „story‟ of the households and 
examine deeper issues than would have been possible with a wide-scale questionnaire. 
As a result, the outcomes do suggest interesting lessons that can be extrapolated to 
other areas. However, further research could look at multiple locations within the two 
programmes to explore results findings across a range of different programme sites.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has highlighted my hybrid conceptual framework that brings together 
components of multi-level socio-technical perspective and policy process analysis to 
create a more integrated perspective that takes into account multiple socio-economic, 
political and institutional factors that influence the interaction between technology and 
society. These aspects are conceptualised as a process of co-evolution, in which 
technology and society interact and change at multiple levels. The role of narratives, 
power structures and actor networks in shaping and influencing the current discussions 
around food insecurity and Green Revolution technologies are examined throughout the 
chapters. Together, the two case studies (MVP and NAAIAP) demonstrate how 
farmers‟ individualised socio-technical worlds shift and are altered as a result of their 
interaction with a particular technology and implementation processes. The household-
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level interviews highlight how these technologies are embedded within wider systems 
of environmental and socio-economic change. Therefore, the essence of the study is on 
the construction of this change and how it is influenced by the unique characteristics of 
dynamic livelihoods and social worlds at multiple levels (local, national and global).  
 
The next chapter starts at the global level and revisits the Green Revolution through a 
socio-technical lens to identify how certain political, economic and social factors 
affected the technical design, process and outcomes of agricultural input-support 
programmes. By examining the evolution of the Green Revolution, it shows how a 
productivity-technology fix narrative has become embedded in development policies 
and programmes to create a prevailing developmental regime – a set of rules and norms 
to address food insecurity in the developing world.  
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Chapter 3 
Green Revolution(s) Revisited: Back to the future? 
 
 
To understand the current food security and input-support programmes in Kenya, it is 
important to have a better understanding of past agricultural programming and a deeper 
appreciation of the policy processes that supported these programmes. This involves a 
macro-level analysis of the changing development landscape and the programmes 
implemented by donors and governments in an attempt to address food security over a 
given timeframe. This macro-level emphasis centres on the broader political, economic 
and institutional context that supports such specific elements as infrastructure, political 
culture, networks, communities, social values and the macro economy that directly 
affects agricultural systems and programmes. It also requires an understanding of the 
development narrative that evolved during this period. Such narratives are used to 
describe the underlying causes of food insecurity and outline the consequences if 
problems are not dealt with immediately. Mapping the global landscape is an important 
first step in demonstrating the influence of the macro level on the other levels. 
 
One of the best-known narratives surrounding food insecurity was created during the 
Green Revolution that began in the mid-1960s. This narrative, which focused on the 
urgent need to address declining productivity to deal with an emerging food crisis in 
Asia, sparked a series of technological advancements in the fields of wheat and rice, 
and led to huge advances in agricultural production. Therefore, the chapter addresses 
two specific questions: (i) How has the global framing of the Green Revolution debate 
influenced approaches to the delivery of inputs to smallholder farmers? (ii) What 
geopolitical context is influencing the Green Revolution narratives for Africa today?  
 
The chapter starts with a brief analysis of the origins and legacy of the Asian Green 
Revolution. It shows how agricultural technologies may have been the intervention tool 
used to address food insecurity and improve agricultural productivity, but that the 
success or failure of these interventions cannot be seen in isolation. Instead, these 
technologies must be viewed within the particular administrative, political, social and 
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delivery system that was prevalent in Asia at that time. This definition of the Green 
Revolution, expanded from the narrow „technology focused‟ explanation, includes such 
factors as the geopolitical context, domestic realities, state interventions, markets and 
policy process as key components to aid understanding of the Asian model. By 
highlighting key socio-economic-policy elements of the Green Revolution, the section 
sheds light on the policy implications for the evolution of a Green Revolution regime 
for Africa and particularly for Kenya, as discussed later in Chapter 4.  
 
The second part of the chapter focuses on agricultural development in Africa and 
presents an analysis of present thinking on a Green Revolution. It examines how the 
narratives of soil fertility improvement and a strong technology focus are being injected 
into current debates about African food insecurity. I use this present-day analysis to 
argue that certain limited narratives originating in the Asian Green Revolution have 
become the dominant storylines that are shaping current food security policies and 
programmes focused on smallholder farmers in Africa. Therefore, the attention on 
African agriculture has become biased towards technical „fixes‟, with less attention on 
social and economic factors that affect the livelihoods of smallholder farmers.  
 
The purpose is not to make the case for or against technologies or technical approaches, 
but to highlight the need to go beyond these narrow storylines and to broaden the scope 
to include the multitude of social, economic, political and institutional factors that 
shape food insecurity. I argue that Green Revolution programmes that address a 
multitude of factors will benefit from better uptake and sustained use of the 
technologies promoted. 
 
The Asian Green Revolution reconsidered 
 
Much has been written and debated about the Asian Green Revolution since it began in 
the mid-1960s. It started with a growing global food crisis, triggered by expanding 
populations and widespread crop failure in South Asia. As a result, many donors and 
national governments shifted their focus to increasing agricultural production to avert 
the predicted humanitarian crisis (Ruttan, 1984). The original Green Revolution 
sparked a radical change in food crop production and created breakthroughs in crop 
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breeding. This was first achieved for wheat in Mexico and later for rice in Asia. Both 
advances were coupled with the use of fertilisers to achieve remarkable increases in 
productivity (Barker et al., 1985; Conway, 1997).  
 
There was a diverse set of drivers for the Asian Green Revolution during that period. 
Some historians claim that it was driven by the governments‟ desire for self-sufficiency 
in food grains, which was motivated by both the threat of famine and the volatility of 
world markets for grain (Djurfeldt et al., 2005a). However, many critics believed that 
the food crisis was not the only driver. Alternative narratives included Cold War issues, 
such as preventing the „population bomb‟ (Ehrlich, 1968), ecological disaster 
(Borgstrom, 1973), geopolitics (Perkins, 1997) or communist insurgence (Richards, 
2004; Djurfeldt et al., 2005a). The real drivers sit somewhere in the middle. As Shiva 
(1991) states, this period of history is of great significance, not only because it 
represents the advancement of technology, but also because it signifies how science and 
politics became “wedded together in the very inception of the Green Revolution” 
(Shiva, 1991: 52). These dominant narratives and prevailing structures have shaped the 
way development practitioners and national governments have created programmes 
within the continuing Green Revolution. 
 
The Green Revolution model has often been narrowly couched as a set of technology 
packages that were delivered mostly to Asia and Latin America in the 1960s to increase 
agricultural productivity (Djurfeldt et al., 2005a). However, the Green Revolution was 
much broader and included a complex blend of technical, political and economic 
factors that existed in specific locations at that given time. Policymakers and scientists 
not only championed the spread of high-yielding varieties of rice and wheat, coupled 
with inorganic fertiliser, but also pushed for crop management practices that would 
allow these varieties to achieve their full potential. Other factors were also emphasised, 
including enabling policies, irrigation schemes, mechanisation, seed production, better 
infrastructure and stronger national research systems (Djurfeldt et al., 2005b).  
 
While the main Green Revolution technologies (improved seed, fertilisers, irrigation 
and mechanisation) have received the majority of the attention, much less notice has 
been given to the unique administrative and programming structures within the 
governments and the donor community that dominated development thinking during 
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that time (Djurfeldt et al., 2005a). The early period of the Green Revolution can also be 
categorised as highly state-directed, when most Asian governments controlled many 
aspects of the agricultural supply chain and governments created input subsidy 
programmes to promote the use of the new technologies and increase agricultural 
productivity (Hossain and Singh, 2000). The state took on monopolistic roles 
throughout the entire value chain, from procurement and distribution of fertiliser by 
parastatal entities, through fertiliser subsidy programmes, to the setting of prices of 
commodities (Djurfeldt and Jirström, 2005).  
 
The strong political commitment to the Green Revolution is exemplified by the 
experiences of India at that time. India implemented a blend of rural development 
interventions that consisted of large public investments and policy interventions to 
provide incentives for the adoption of new agricultural technologies. Throughout this 
time, government investment in rural areas increased fivefold, going up by 13 percent 
per year during the 1970s (Fan et al., 1999: 7). According to Johnson et al. (2003: 4): 
 
The level of investments of this magnitude was a clear sign of the broad 
political commitment, at both the federal and state government level, to 
accelerate agricultural income growth in rural areas.  
 
Millstone et al. (2009) highlight, however, that while there were successes, even within 
India there are great differences in the outcome of these programmes. Green Revolution 
technologies amplified prevailing inequalities in some regions, while having different 
and more beneficial results in others. By contrasting results with the same technology 
within different parts of Asia, Millstone et al. (2009: 9) illustrate: 
 
...the crucial influence of the socio-economic context into which technologies 
are introduced in determining the character and distribution of impacts. 
Inappropriate technologies can amplify social and economic inequalities rather 
than diminish them, and aggravate rather than diminish poverty. 
 
Therefore, technology-laden programmes are influenced heavily by a multitude of 
exogenous factors, including social, economic, political and institutional, that 
ultimately affect the outcome of the programme and the sustained use of the 
technologies by the recipients. While developing country governments were focusing 
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on large public investment projects and control of the rural economy, international 
donors were revisiting their role in agriculture and rural development. 
 
Evolving global perspectives  
 
Prior to the Green Revolution, many development programmes were implemented 
under the banner of „community development‟. This included economic and political 
objectives to improve the well-being of rural people, yet “without revolutionary 
changes in the existing political and economic order” (Holdcraft, 1978: 14). By the start 
of the Green Revolution, with the growing concerns over the global food crisis, 
international donors shifted their attention to agricultural production (Ruttan, 1984).  
 
During this time, development practitioners‟ focus on agriculture and rural 
development began to widen to include a multitude of related sectors, including finance 
and infrastructure (Cohen, 1980). This belief in interconnectedness gave rise to a 
„systems analysis‟ perspective that began to view rural development in a broader 
perspective that included an emphasis on the rural poor (Armor et al., 1979). This focus 
was reflected strongly in the speech by the then World Bank President, Robert 
McNamara, to the Board of Governors in Nairobi, where he called for rapid 
smallholder development that focused on increased productivity while simultaneously 
addressing the inequalities that existed in rural areas (McNamara, 1973).  
 
In line with this thinking, development approaches began to regard the 
complementarities between different sectors within rural areas. By the 1970s, 
programmes became more comprehensive or integrated (Ruttan, 1984). Programmes 
began to place greater emphasis on equity in the distribution of wealth between urban 
and rural areas and between economic and social classes within rural areas (Rondinelli, 
1979; Ruttan, 1984). This resulted in a shift in rural development programme focus 
from the mobilisation of community resources to the delivery of programme inputs and 
services through a „package of technologies‟  (Holmén, 2003). 
 
One of the earliest and most influential donor-led programmes during this time was the 
Comilla Project in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) created in response to the 1966 Indian 
famine. It aimed to address production constraints and to coordinate rural services 
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(Raper, 1970; Choldin, 1972). At the centre was a package of reinforcing activities 
taking place in a particular area to improve smallholder farmer productivity and 
promote more effective support for agricultural development (Cohen, 1987). The 
success of the Comilla Project rapidly made it a model for other donors‟ rural 
programmes.  
 
Yet, even with these early successes, Rondinelli (1979: 390) argued that these strategies 
were done: 
 
...without a clear understanding of the ways in which poverty might be 
alleviated and rural economies stimulated, and without the political and 
administrative commitment to make the drastic changes in economic structure 
which were needed to implement these policies.  
 
Therefore, while early results of large-scale technology packages were achieved for 
numerous agriculture programmes, many others were unable to address the underlying 
problems of rural poverty, which lay more with the weak administrative capacity of 
developing countries and the lack of political commitment to make a substantive 
change. The next section touches briefly on some of the mixed results of the Green 
Revolution.  
 
Lasting effects of the Asian Green Revolution  
 
Overall, there were large increases in agricultural productivity with new technological 
advancements in many developing countries. Between the early 1960s and mid-1980s, 
the production of food doubled, the number of rural poor were reduced, and the real 
prices of the main cereal crops fell considerably (Conway, 1997; Wood et al., 2000). 
Proponents considered the Green Revolution a success and Malthusian predictions of 
catastrophic famines caused by increasing population growth did not take effect.  
 
However, these successes were not spread evenly across regions and within crops 
(Evenson and Gollin, 2003). Critics argued that the results were not equitable and that 
the wealthier portion of the population absorbed many of the technologies (Conway, 
1997). They suggested that failing to tackle the complex power relations within 
communities and the overarching political factors that hamper the effective delivery of 
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input programmes allowed the elites and better off to capture the benefits. Therefore, 
the links with sustained food security for smallholder farmers were less evident and 
more difficult to establish. In addition, women were poorly integrated, with less 
attention given to their needs and women farmers were often bypassed completely 
(FAO, 1997). Other critics argued that the Green Revolution was plagued with 
environmental concerns about the loss of biodiversity, the increased use of pesticides 
and other chemical inputs and the focus on monocultures and grain crops (Shiva, 1993).  
 
By the early 1980s, the tide began to turn and the amount of development assistance to 
agriculture began to wane. According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD, 2010: 3), aid to agriculture fell from a 17 percent share in 
the early 1980s to six percent at the end of the 1990s. This era also saw the introduction 
of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). Promoted by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, SAP advocated that national governments reduce controls 
on their agricultural production and marketing and provide a more open enabling 
environment for private sector participation. The result was a reduction in overall 
funding for agriculture in both donor and government allocation.  
 
There were many reasons for this decline. Some were linked to difficulties in managing 
the complexity and risk of agricultural programmes. Others focused on the lack of 
success in obtaining and sustaining results in certain regions, especially in Africa. 
Ultimately, all these factors led to a loss of appetite to fund large, complex and 
expensive programmes, and to increased wariness of heavy state involvement in the 
agriculture sector. The perception that the Green Revolution (the model and the 
technologies) were not applicable to Africa began to take hold. 
 
Africa and a new Green Revolution 
 
While the original Green Revolution was intended to be a global phenomenon, it did 
not generate significant or lasting success in Africa. As mentioned, the Asian Green 
Revolution concentrated on wheat and rice, not on the traditional food security crops 
grown in Africa, which include millet, cowpea, sorghum and cassava. These African 
staples received less attention and less funding for crop improvement. Some 
  
50 
 
improvements were made on maize during this time, such as the hybrid maize grown 
on commercial farms in Zimbabwe (Eicher, 1995) and Kenya (Hassan and Karanja, 
1997; De Groote et al., 2005). Yet, in comparison, maize still garnered comparably less 
attention than rice and wheat.  
 
In Kenya, there was some success from 1965 to the 1980s though national maize 
production campaigns that focused on research, seed, maize marketing, pricing and 
credit programmes. However, even these successes were not sustained. According to 
Hassan and Karanja (1997: 90) these programmes:  
 
... collapsed in the 1980s, as severe economic pressure weakened public 
financial support for research, extension and credit. 
 
Some critics contend that the research conducted for the Asian Green Revolution was 
not well implemented within the African context. For example, a study by Evenson and 
Gollin (2003) states that while researchers, governments and donors worked together to 
adapt improved varieties to the Asian context, the same could not be said in Africa. 
They state:  
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, national and international programs may have sought 
to “short-cut” the varietal improvement process in Sub-Saharan Africa by 
introducing unsuitable varieties from Asia and Latin America, rather than 
engaging in the time-consuming work of identifying locally adapted germplasm 
and using it as the basis for breeding new varieties (Evenson and Gollin, 2003: 
758).   
 
Evenson and Gollin (2003) argue that these short cuts in Africa contributed to very low 
productivity increases with the improved Green Revolution varieties in Africa. The end 
result was that production increases in Africa during the first Green Revolution were 
due more to the result of expanding the area under cultivation rather than improving 
productivity (Evenson and Gollin, 2003).  
 
Another difference is the low levels of irrigation and rural population density in Africa 
compared with Asia. While Asia has vast areas under irrigation, African smallholder 
farmers depend mostly on rain-fed agriculture with very limited access to irrigation and 
within a multitude of agro-ecological climates (Harsch, 1998; Johnson et al., 2003). 
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The risk of crop failure is much higher for farmers dependent on rainfall than for those 
who can depend on irrigation systems. Sparse rural densities mean that rural labour 
markets are weaker, resulting in “higher per capital costs for investing in and 
maintaining basic rural infrastructure and services” (Johnson et al., 2003: 7). Therefore, 
Africa‟s low rural population densities caused a lack of investment in rural areas, 
resulting in poor transport and communication infrastructure (Dorward et al., 2004a). 
The high per capita costs of improving and maintaining rural infrastructure also 
affected the development of adequate agricultural markets for smallholder farmers. 
Lack of markets severely limits farmers‟ access to the inputs they need to improve their 
productivity and provide outlets to sell their produce (Spencer, 1994; Johnson et al., 
2003; Dorward et al., 2004b).  
 
In addition to the constraints of labour and markets, there were political and economic 
variations between the two continents. According to Eicher (1995: 806), the economic 
policy environment in Africa has been less favourable towards agricultural 
development for smallholder farmers versus the policies that were put in place in Asia. 
Most African governments had not made the same commitment to agricultural growth 
and rural poverty reduction that India‟s government made in the 1960s (Johnson et al., 
2003: 8). As a result, national governments‟ budgetary allocations and investment in 
agriculture and the rural sector has remained lower than investments made by Asian 
governments at that time.  
 
Refocusing on food security and agricultural productivity in Africa  
 
As the previous section highlighted, the overall funding directed to rural development 
and agriculture started to diminish in the mid-1980s. This decrease had a direct effect 
on Africa, leading to under-investment in African agriculture. The long-term effects of 
this lack of attention on a continent where roughly 60 percent of all households depend 
on agriculture for their livelihoods are now apparent (FAO, 2008: 30). Nearly 30 
percent of the population in Africa is undernourished, with child malnutrition getting 
worse rather than better, although large variations occur between countries (FAO, 
2011: 66). While Asia can demonstrate success in its increased productivity, Africa is 
the only region in the world experiencing declining food production per capita (FAO, 
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2004b) and stagnant cereal yield trends (Figure 10). Rising food prices have pushed 
even more households into poverty and created a pervasive and deepening food crisis.  
 
 
Figure 10: Cereal yield trends (Source: FAOSTAT data, 2012) 
 
While progress has occurred in some parts of Africa, other parts have experienced 
deepening food insecurity and little improvement in productivity (Wiggins and 
Leturque, 2010). These growing disparities have prompted a marked shift in today‟s 
development debate, resulting in increased attention on improving African agriculture. 
Many countries have begun to refocus on agriculture as the „engine of growth‟ for their 
economies. This renewed focus is leading to discussion on what exactly constitutes a 
„Green Revolution for Africa‟ and what must be different this time to fit the African 
context. The re-emerging narrative states that if Africa is to overcome its worsening 
food security crisis, it will have to focus on agricultural productivity. At the same time, 
there is increased attention on the need to focus on smallholders, leading to the 
recognition that a new, more equitable and sustainable African Green Revolution is 
needed, one that is able to close the gap between scientists‟ priorities and the needs of 
food-insecure farmers to attain concrete results and sustained benefits.   
 
National governments have also changed their stance from seeing the state as 
„implementers‟ of projects to one of „facilitators‟, bringing new partners onto the stage. 
Such initiatives as the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme 
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(CAADP), a programme of the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD) 
of the African Union, offers a framework for partnership and policy renewal in African 
agriculture. As well, national-level funds directed to agriculture have slowly begun to 
increase, as per the Maputo Declaration, with signatories agreeing to increase spending 
on agriculture and rural development to 10 percent of national budgets. While many 
countries have yet to meet this target, they have attempted to increase agriculture‟s 
share. 
 
The Abuja Declaration on Fertilizer for an African Green Revolution, which came out 
of the Africa Fertilizer Summit in June 2006, was another event that galvanised support 
for agriculture.
7
 The summit aimed to put soil fertility and fertiliser usage firmly on the 
agenda of African countries. In support of this emerging narrative, the African Union 
declared Africa is “trapped in a fertilizer crisis” (African Union, 2006: 1) and urged 
African leaders: 
 
 ...to show their strong and unanimous commitment to achieving the African 
Green Revolution by taking immediate actions to solve Africa‟s fertilizer crisis 
(African Union, 2006: 1).  
 
The AU urged African countries to increase usage rates from an average of eight 
kilograms per hectare to at least 50 kilograms per hectare by 2015 (African Union, 
2006: 2).  
 
This section demonstrates that the emerging Green Revolution narrative has re-
surfaced, based on a narrow „productivity-technology fix‟ paradigm that has significant 
elements of the earlier Asian Green revolution (Thompson and Scoones, 2009). This 
has created a particular vision for Africa that has a predominant focus on soils and such 
agricultural technologies as improved seeds and fertiliser. This increasingly limited 
view of technology as the principal means of addressing food insecurity in Africa has 
led to various policy decisions focused on the delivery of technology to the food 
insecure. The following section touches on the increasing debate on subsidies as a 
delivery mechanism of agricultural technologies for smallholder farmers in Africa.  
                                                     
7
 See Abuja Declaration on Fertilizer for African Green Revolution  
http://www.nepad.org/foodsecurity/knowledge/doc/1815/abuja-declaration-fertilizer-african-green-
revolution.  
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The subsidy debate 
 
The rise of global food prices in early 2008 and increasing food insecurity in parts of 
the world has reopened the debate on the use of subsidies, particularly what the World 
Bank has termed „smart subsidies‟.8 These are based on delivery of agricultural inputs, 
such as hybrid seed and inorganic fertiliser, through various input-support programmes 
(Dorward et al., 2008; Poulton and Dorward, 2008). Interest in subsidy programmes has 
been revived in many African countries, including Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, 
Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia (Minde et al., 2008; Dorward, 2009; Baltzer and 
Hansen, 2011). Many of these have been based on recent successes with Malawi‟s 
national Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme (AISP).
9
 The AISP has sparked debate 
on the impacts and benefits of subsidy programmes but is cited increasingly as a good 
example by other African countries wanting to model their own subsidy programmes 
(Chirwa et al., 2006; Crawford et al., 2006; cf. Chinsinga, 2007; Denning et al., 2009; 
Dorward and Chirwa, 2009; Minot and Benson, 2009; Poulton, 2009).  
 
For those promoting the use of subsidies, the rationale stems mostly from the belief that 
farmers do not use inputs because the prices are too high. Therefore, input subsidies are 
viewed as a method to keep prices low and as an “aid in accelerating the learning 
process and thereby promoting its use” (IFDC, 2003: 15). Once the farmers have 
experienced the value of these inputs and begun to use them regularly, then the subsidy 
would no longer be required. However, Dorward (2009: 13) states that fertilisers have 
already been promoted widely in Africa and that it is “no longer the case that most 
farmers are unaware of fertilisers‟ benefits”. The main constraint is not knowledge but 
access to the technologies. It is the farmers‟ ability to use the fertilisers effectively and 
efficiently that is more variable, and therefore “input subsidy programmes continue to 
                                                     
8
 Smart subsidies are often referred to as market-based targeted input-support programmes that use 
private sector dealers for input distribution and that have a clear exist strategy to control the overall cost 
of the programme.  
9
 The Malawi Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme began in 2005/06 with maize seed and inorganic 
fertiliser subsidies (it has since then increased to other crops). The subsidies were distributed to 
qualifying households through a voucher programme, in which farmers would redeem the vouchers at 
selected agro-dealer shops. The vouchers subsidised the cost of inputs to a predetermined value (initially 
pegged at two thirds of the price of a 50 kilogram bag of NPK fertiliser) and farmers paid a „top-up‟ to 
the agro-dealers (i.e., US$7.80) to receive the inputs (Dorward and Chirwa, 2009; quoted in Poulton 
2009: 2). 
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have a potential role in helping farmers to learn from experience” (Dorward, 2009: 13). 
Yet, the key is to ensure the appropriate fertilisers and crop varieties are available at the 
right time, and are tied to improved extension services and soil and water management 
training. The importance of timing and having appropriate technologies for the given 
context are examined in the case studies in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
Another common reason for promoting subsidies is the argument that farmers often 
have difficulty obtaining credit. Farmers often lack finance to purchase inputs and 
subsidies can be used to compensate for this lack of credit. Therefore, subsidised credit 
is often used as a method to help farmers purchase inputs and increase their 
productivity (Dorward et al., 2004b; Djurfeldt et al., 2005b; Dorward, 2009). However, 
there are several difficulties in providing subsidised credit to farmers on a seasonal 
basis. For example, socio-economic factors, such as elite capture of the credit or low 
repayment rates from borrowers, can diminish the results (Chambers, 1978; Omamo 
and Mose, 2001; Liverpool and Winter-Nelson, 2010). However, a review of an 
agricultural credit scheme in Western Kenya, called the Sustainable Community-Based 
Input Credit Scheme (SCOBICS), offers some interesting conclusions (Poulton et al., 
2004). The scheme showed that credit programmes could be:  
 
...fully commercially viable only if borrower groups assume greater 
responsibility for loan collection and repayment than is the case under current 
microfinance models (Poulton et al., 2004: 1).  
 
Therefore, greater understanding of the social dimension, including participation and 
ownership by recipients, is an important factor behind the success of such programmes.  
 
Other political factors, such as the national or local political structures and interests, 
can have an effect on the efficacy of programmes. Subsidies often involve a high 
amount of transferred capital and can lead to a large degree of rent seeking, or political 
interference, from certain actors interested in gaining unfairly from the subsidies 
(Dorward, 2009: 28). Therefore, there is a danger that governments may use these 
subsidies as patronage tools to garner political support (Bates, 1981; Chinsinga, 
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2007).
10
 Administering subsidies on agricultural inputs can be difficult and ineffective 
due to delays in delivery of the inputs, delays in payments to suppliers and lack of 
capacity of the government to adequately monitor or appropriately manage different 
parts of the process.  
 
Dorward (2009) highlights a political economic paradox, stating that stable, continuing 
and longer-term subsidies are needed for successful development of the supply chain 
and to improve the lives of the rural poor, yet, if subsidies continue for long periods of 
time, there is greater risk of them becoming politically entrenched and hijacked for 
political gain. There is an additional risk that long-running input support programmes 
can become expensive, resulting in a financial drain on limited government resources. 
Dorward (2009: 45) goes on to explain:  
 
Input subsidies have played an important role in successful agricultural 
development in the past, offering major potential gain when effectively applied 
to overcome market failures constraining growth in poor rural areas, but also 
carrying substantial risks of costly, ineffective and inappropriate design and 
implementation using large amounts of scarce government and national 
resources for little gain.  
 
In addition to political and administrative factors, critics assert that local and national 
input markets can be adversely affected by subsidies (Gregory and Bumb, 2006). They 
contend that subsidies distort the proper functioning of markets and inhibit the growth 
of the private sector in delivering these technologies (IFDC, 2003; Mason and Ricker-
Gilbert, 2012). This lack of institution building can be detrimental to long-term 
sustainability, since the removal of subsidies can result in farmers discontinuing use of 
the technology, as the structures (e.g., markets and infrastructure) have not been 
developed sufficiently to facilitate long-term use.  
 
Proponents point out that subsidies can promote rapid growth in fertiliser use and 
agricultural productivity. However, opponents argue that recipients become dependent 
on subsidies for low-cost inputs, resulting in social and political pressures on 
                                                     
10
 According to Chinsinga (2007), the origins of the Malawi fertiliser subsidy programme originate from 
the Malawi national election in May 2004, in which the incoming president, Mutharika, and the other 
candidates ran their campaigns based on promises for input support to the Malawian smallholder farmers. 
The recurring droughts and increasing hunger in the country had “turned food security into a fierce battle 
ground both for parties in government and outside government” (Chinsinga, 2007: 6). 
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governments from farmers and input suppliers to continue the programmes, even when 
the subsidy may no longer be necessary (Banful, 2011; Mason and Ricker-Gilbert, 
2012). This long-term continuation of subsidies can become a drain on government 
budgets and the costs associated with maintaining them puts into question whether it is 
the most cost-effective way of improving agricultural productivity (Ariga et al., 2009: 
48). Yanggen et al. (1998: iv) argue: 
 
...unless subsidies are accompanied by a clear program to rectify the underlying 
problems they are compensating for (e.g., inefficient markets, poor 
infrastructure) their demands on the budget grow rapidly, reducing the ability 
of government to make other agricultural investments.  
 
While input subsidies are becoming the preferred solution for the delivery of new 
technologies for boosting production, the debate continues about the appropriateness of 
subsidies, and the wider social, political and economic dimensions. These issues are 
examined in more detail within the context of the two case studies in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter presents a macro-level examination of how a regime, such as the Asian 
Green Revolution, became a stable configuration of institutions, processes, 
technologies and supporting policies that determined the trajectory of development 
programming to address food insecurity. It illustrates how the main agricultural 
technologies promoted at the time (i.e., inorganic fertiliser and hybrid seeds) have 
become engrained in institutions and supported by actors, so maintaining their 
prominence within the current system. Evolution over time shows how the Green 
Revolution emerged to become a dominant regime in Asia and how that regime, along 
with its supporting narratives on food security, is being incorporated into current 
debates on African agriculture. The trajectory of current development thinking 
demonstrates how these narratives are entrenching the use of certain technologies and 
influencing present Green Revolution programming. In so doing, certain development 
trajectories are being set and other innovations, considered less relevant, are becoming 
under-utilised. This has major limitations for the creation of alternative pathways and 
innovations. Despite much talk about the need to take into account the complexities of 
the African continent, the existing narratives from the previous Green Revolution in 
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Asia are being used to justify the creation of a specific regime, with a technology focus, 
as the major path for Africa. 
 
The Green Revolution regime is still evolving in Africa and it remains to be seen 
whether national governments and international aid agencies will learn the lessons from 
the past, adapting flexibly to local contexts. Flexibility will allow development planners 
to offer a multitude of technology options to fit the needs of the diverse livelihoods and 
regions within Africa. Dennis Rondinelli‟s (1979: 415) astute observation from more 
than 30 years ago still holds true today: 
 
Technology is merely a means to an end; in most cases even sophisticated, 
proven technologies will be unable to stimulate growth or alleviate poverty if a 
developing nation cannot mobilize political commitment, break institutional 
barriers to economic participation, and structure administrative agencies in 
such a way as to serve rural beneficiaries.  
 
Ultimately, examining the Green Revolutions past and present through a wider socio-
technical, political and economic lens sheds some light on the factors that shape today‟s 
policy debates and builds the groundwork for the Kenya-focused chapters and the 
specific case studies that follow. Global narratives at the macro- or landscape-level link 
different actors and dimensions (i.e., social, technical and institutional) to create 
national regime structures and narratives. Therefore, the next chapter takes a more 
detailed analysis of the national processes in Kenya to show the key political, 
institutional and social aspects that affect food security and fertiliser policies and 
programmes for smallholder farmers. It builds on the multi-level analysis to examine 
how meso-level factors affect the delivery of input-support programmes and creates 
links between decision-making systems at national and supra-national levels.  
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Chapter 4 
Politics, Power and Bureaucracy: 
National food security policymaking in Kenya 
 
 
This chapter builds on the Green Revolution overview presented in Chapter 3, 
providing a more detailed view of Kenya and showing how the wider macro-level 
narratives have been transposed to the Kenyan context. Here, I describe Kenya‟s 
current national policy landscape, highlighting the key political, institutional and social 
aspects affecting food security and fertiliser policies and programmes for smallholder 
farmers. This chapter also explains how certain political, institutional and social 
configurations and interests drive the narratives that promote specific agricultural 
technologies used in Kenya‟s „Green Revolution‟ approaches for smallholder farmers. 
Emphasis is placed on the range of views that dominate Kenya‟s political landscape, 
from those that perceive food insecurity as primarily a lack of technological 
advancement, to those that combine technology and social spheres to define a wider 
view of food security and soil fertility. The common element tying these perspectives 
together is the ubiquitous role played by maize in influencing the country‟s national 
food security policies (Thompson et al., 2010).  
 
The overarching purpose of this chapter therefore is to analyse the political, social and 
institutional processes of different development actors in Kenya, including government, 
donors and development partners, to gain understanding on how they construct the food 
security narratives (e.g., through discourse, practices, incentives, histories, etc.) that 
ultimately influence policymaking. Thus, the chapter traces the evolution of the 
agricultural policy environment in Kenya with specific reference to food security 
policies. It examines the role of key research and development institutions in 
influencing their design and implementation. The assessment is based on existing 
literature and detailed interviews with selected representatives of government ministries 
and other public and private entities, such as the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute 
(KARI), donor agencies, NGOs, domestic and international seed and fertiliser 
companies, policymakers and researchers (see Annex A). By unpacking the range of 
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agricultural policies championed by political actors within Kenya over time, the chapter 
repositions the food security debate with a focus on power relations, social standings 
and influences.  
 
The first section offers a brief overview of the history of agriculture-based interventions 
and policies in Kenya. It looks at key aspects of Kenya‟s agrarian history to explain 
why the framing and promotion of agricultural polices has remained so stable, from 
pre-independence to present-day policies. It stresses how this agrarian system was 
constructed through policy decisions reinforced by narratives prevalent at that time and 
supported by particular actors over time. It shows the central place of agriculture in 
defining the history of the country and how past policies and institutions continue to 
shape and influence current processes today. This historical introduction shows how the 
Green Revolution unfolded in Kenya with a local flavour, due in part to certain unique 
Kenyan attributes.  
 
The second section takes the historical context and frames it within Kenya‟s current 
problems of rising food insecurity and declining soil fertility. This section examines the 
current political narratives created by different actors and networks. It revolves around 
the different solutions, including technical (types of fertilisers and application rates) 
and institutional/administrative (subsidies, delivery, extension, markets, agro-dealers, 
etc.), being debated today. It highlights different national actors‟ visions of how to 
reach food-insecure farmers, based on their perceptions on the causes of Kenya‟s 
current food security situation. These different narratives are used to either justify or 
oppose the use of a subsidy programme to assist smallholder farmers.  
 
By showing the evolution of these different narratives surrounding food security, this 
chapter seeks to demonstrate how politics, policy, economy and social contexts affect 
the creation and configuration of input-support programmes in Kenya. It gives further 
evidence to the assertion that a mix of socio-technical configurations ultimately affects 
the creation of different programmes. This conclusion in turn provides the foundation 
for the in-depth analysis of the two input-support case studies (NAAIAP and MVP) in 
the subsequent chapters.  
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A brief history of agrarian change in Kenya 
 
A great deal has been written about Kenya‟s agrarian history and this section does not 
cover all this material. Instead, it briefly examines the political economy of the 
country‟s agricultural development during the 20th century. It highlights the key policy 
decisions made by colonial and post-independence governments that directly affected 
agricultural growth and land use patterns, and the effects these had on smallholder 
farmers. It touches lightly on certain policies surrounding land tenure, agriculture 
promotion, soil conservation and decentralisation. The purpose is to show the central 
role of agriculture in defining the history of Kenya, and how certain policies continue 
to shape and influence current policy processes.  
 
Pre-independence: a fight for land and policies of alienation  
 
Prior to the arrival of the British colonists, the main social and political structures in 
African communities consisted of subsistence agricultural and pastoral economies 
(Cone and Lipscomb, 1972; Leys, 1974). In most areas, the vast amount of land 
available allowed various forms of agriculture, including shifting cultivation (Smith, 
1976). With the arrival of the colonists, the pace of agricultural commercialisation 
accelerated (Cone and Lipscomb, 1972; Berry, 1993). Access to land changed with the 
new economic and political structures imposed by the colonists (Berry, 1989).  
 
Two land ordinances were passed by the colonial administration in 1902 and 1915 to 
attract new European settlers (Cone and Lipscomb, 1972). These allowed for the 
appropriation of large tracts of arable land (20 percent of arable land was set aside for 
exclusive European use) and led to the creation of the „White Highlands‟ (Cone and 
Lipscomb, 1972; Smith, 1976). The colonists introduced new crops, the most important 
of which was maize. The British agricultural policy at the time was directed at 
maximising the export of cash crops grown by the European settlers (Mungeam, 1966; 
Sorrenson, 1968). This meant that very little attention was given to African agriculture 
(such as sorghum and millet), as Africans were forbidden to grow export crops (such as 
coffee, tea or pyrethrum) so they did not threaten the monopoly of the European settlers 
(Spencer, 1983; Berry, 1993; Ochieng' and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1995).  
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After the First World War, an influx of new British settlers created a greater demand 
for land (Cone and Lipscomb, 1972). The second „Crown Lands Ordinance‟ (1915) 
declared all „waste and unoccupied‟ land in Kenya to be Crown Land and subject to 
alienation (Aliber et al., 2004: 11). The colonial authorities then created „Native 
Reserves‟ for the African population, commonly in areas less suitable for European 
settlement (Aliber et al., 2004). The government drew the boundaries of the reserves 
along what they deemed to be tribal lines and Africans were forbidden by law to live in 
any reserve other than those allocated to their ethnic group (Sorrenson, 1967; Aliber et 
al., 2004). This act had the effect of linking land rights firmly to social identity 
(Sorrenson, 1967; Berry, 1992). As stated by Aliber (2004: 11):  
 
A clear process, which linked ethnicisation and politicisation of mechanisms for 
control of land, had begun in earnest.   
 
During the 1930s, several factors combined to influence the Kenya Land Commission‟s 
policies towards African farmers. These included the increasingly poor conditions on 
the reserves, political fears of the settlers, the Great Depression, the global anti-erosion 
movement, recurrent droughts, and the new professionalism of the colonial agricultural 
bureaucracy (McCracken, 1982; Anderson, 1984; Rocheleau et al., 1995). Concern 
over soil conservation became a priority for many European settlers, but behind it lay 
an anxiety about the Depression and fears about the legitimacy of their land ownership 
and the preservation of the White Highlands (Anderson, 1984). Environmental 
concerns became a weapon used by the settlers to legitimise their land claims and to 
persuade the colonial government to continue supporting their agricultural enterprises. 
The need to address this perceived soil erosion „crisis‟ became the pivotal policy action 
that began to politicise the land crisis (Throup, 1987; Mackenzie, 1991).  
 
Land scarcity in the reserves meant that African farmers had to reduce the frequency of 
the traditional fallow period and adopt continuous cropping techniques. When this 
intensification was combined with the replacement of traditional crops (e.g., sorghum 
and millet) with maize, it further depleted soil fertility and yields began to fall 
(Rocheleau et al., 1995). The colonial government began to introduce policies and 
programmes to combat soil erosion (terracing), recondition the soil (enclosing and 
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seeding of grazing land), and reduce livestock stocking rates. However, each of these 
measures addressed the symptoms of soil erosion rather than the causes and had limited 
success (Smith, 1976). In addition, the soil conservation campaign rested on external 
experts‟ advice on the construction of narrow bench terraces, which was both labour 
and land absorbing (Mackenzie, 1991). Terracing had limited impact on soil 
conservation and instigated growing conflict among the local communities forced to 
build them (Throup, 1987). Ultimately, opposition to the imposed conservation 
schemes united the African population against the colonial administration (Sorrenson, 
1967: 91). Increasing fears of further land grabbing by the European settlers provided 
the necessary impetus for local political upheaval (Mackenzie, 1991).  
 
The Second World War also had a profound effect on European and African farmers. 
During this period, the British began to focus on increasing wartime production of 
crops (Rocheleau et al., 1995). Yet, the European farming sector had suffered greatly 
from the Depression in the previous decade and did not have sufficient capital for 
investment purposes (Smith, 1976). Therefore, the colonial government introduced the 
„Increased Production of Crops Ordinance‟ (1942). This included the concept of short-
term credit and guaranteed minimum return for crops on European-owned farms that 
were on government contracts (Smith, 1976). This new wartime policy created a two-
tier system with different prices being offered for maize from the European- and 
African-owned farms. The differential pricing scheme was not only unfair to the 
African farmers, but also brought large profits for the European settlers (Spencer, 
1980). This discriminatory pricing policy was compounded by an increasing focus on 
maize grain exports and a period of bad weather, which led to severe food shortages 
and worsening livelihoods on the African reserves (Spencer, 1980). The resulting food 
crisis, along with continued pressure on land and increasing rural resistance to 
government controls, contributed to resentment over the colonial state and gave rise to 
the Mau Mau Rebellion in the 1950s (Throup, 1987).  
 
In 1954, as growing unrest began to spread, the British implemented the „Plan to 
Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya‟ (also known as the 
„Swynnerton Plan‟, named after RJM Swynnerton, then Assistant Director of 
Agriculture). The Swynnerton Plan aimed to address the land crisis by reforming the 
land tenure system, consolidating fragmented holdings, issuing freehold title to 
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Africans, intensifying African agriculture, providing access to credit and removing 
restrictions on growing export crops (Leys, 1974; Bradshaw, 1990; Rocheleau et al., 
1995). However, the Swynnerton Plan was not framed to attain „equality‟ but to 
increase productivity. The result of land consolidation and loans meant that wealthier 
and politically better connected African farmers with larger tracts of land benefited 
disproportionately over poorer smallholders, who experienced increasing landlessness 
and unemployment. This inequality was not an accident, as it was outlined in the 
Swynnerton Plan (1955: 10, cited in Leys, 1974: 52):  
 
Former government policy will be reversed and able, energetic or rich Africans 
will be able to acquire more land and bad or poor farmers less, creating a 
landed and a landless class. This is a normal step in the evolution of a country.  
 
Thus, the Plan had twin political and economic objectives (Ochieng, 2007). The 
economic purpose was to create a new class of „progressive‟ African farmers (Berry, 
1993) who could produce commercial crops with improved techniques and contribute 
to the economic development of the country. It was believed that this would create a 
politically stabilising influence and help to quash the growing Mau Mau resistance 
movement (Berry, 1993; Ochieng, 2007). The Swynnerton Plan was credited with 
tripling agricultural output between 1955 and 1964 (Shipton, 1988; Bradshaw, 1990). 
Yet, the extent to which the growth of the agriculture sector can be attributable to the 
policies implemented and the overall impact of the Swynnerton Plan is still hotly 
contested (House and Killick, 1981; Aliber et al., 2004). In the end, the Plan failed to 
quash the growing resentment over colonial rule and restricted access to land. 
According to Bates (1989), the Mau Mau Rebellion that followed may have failed 
militarily, but it was successful in convincing the British that a white minority could no 
longer hold power in Kenya. 
 
Post-independence: controlling the means of production and redistribution 
 
Kenya ultimately gained its independence in 1963 and the new post-independence 
government immediately focused on agriculture as the main driver of economic growth. 
However, some critics claim that independence did not have a large effect on the major 
ideology of the state (Smith, 1976; Ochieng' and Atieno-Odhiambo, 1995). According 
to Ochieng‟ and Atieno-Odhiambo (1995), there was no structural break with the 
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colonial state and the new government simply expanded the former colonial 
administrative and economic infrastructure. The Swynnerton Plan continued mostly 
intact after independence (Swallow and Kamara, 2000). However, the new government 
did embark on a major land reform policy. Redistribution of land, together with 
commercialisation of smallholder agriculture, was viewed as the solution to the 
country‟s poverty and hunger (Rocheleau et al., 1995).  
 
The government created programmes to distribute parts of the former white settlers‟ 
farms in medium- and high-potential areas to smallholders (Nyangito and Okello, 
1998). One such programme was the „Million Acre Scheme‟, in which 35,000 families 
were settled on 470,000 hectares of land. This was followed by the „Haraka Scheme‟, 
in which 14,000 families were settled on 105,000 hectares (Senga, 1976). The cost of 
financing the Million Acre Scheme increased over the next 10 years. The amount 
borrowed from the World Bank and other donors to pay for the land reform accounted 
for a third of Kenya‟s entire foreign debt (Leys, 1974: 74).  
 
Yet, Kenya‟s land reform policies were far from egalitarian. The land tenure reform 
may have allowed some farmers access to land, but  this happened at the expense of 
others (Rocheleau et al., 1995). The new regulations once again strengthened the 
property of a few wealthier and better politically connected Kenyans, but left many 
men – and most women – with less secure access to resources and reinforced regional 
biases that continue today. Most importantly, women‟s rights to land were severely 
undermined, and most women retained no legal authority over the land they occupied 
or farmed (Rocheleau et al., 1995).  
 
Apart from partial redistribution of land, the first years of independence brought little 
change in the overall strategy of the State. By the 1970s, with growing evidence of 
unequal development, the government began to create policies designed to generate a 
more egalitarian pattern of rural income and growth. One such policy involved 
equalising smallholders‟ access to productive resources, such as farm inputs, credit, 
infrastructure and amenities, through national agricultural subsidies and government 
credit programmes (Heyer and Waweru, 1976; Killick and House, 1983; Bates, 1989).  
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The new government also put in place new policies to foster the growth of the 
agricultural sector. This involved government intervention in nearly all aspects of 
agricultural production and marketing (Nyangito and Okello, 1998). The use of 
agricultural inputs, such as fertilisers, was promoted through the licensing of 
distribution and state subsidy programmes, and the provision of inputs and credit was 
encouraged through farmers‟ cooperatives and crop marketing boards and authorities 
(Heyer and Waweru, 1976). The government had little confidence in the private sector 
industry to deliver fertilisers and created a near monopoly on fertiliser pricing and 
distribution (Freeman and Kaguongo, 2003).  
 
Yet, it was in marketing that the government interventions in agriculture were most 
pronounced. Agriculture marketing was controlled through state-run institutions, which 
had a monopoly in the marketing of the commodities (Nyangito and Okello, 1998). A 
board or an authority was created for each product that was considered as essential for 
the country. These institutions had complete control over the commodities‟ production 
and marketing (Nyangito and Okello, 1998).  Kenya‟s policy towards maize marketing 
followed the structure put in place by the colonial government, which had created a 
tightly controlled maize sector to provide economic support to European settlers in the 
Central Highlands. This control was maintained after independence and continued for 
the next three decades (Wangia et al., 2002).  
 
An era of mixed liberalisation and retraction: Setting the scene for today 
 
During the 1980s, the country‟s economy, including the agricultural sector, entered a 
period of general decline (Ochieng, 2007). Both the balance of payments deficit and the 
government‟s budget deficit increased, due to falling world coffee prices and increasing 
world oil prices (Mosley, 1986). From 1981 onwards, the government began a major 
shift away from strict control over the agriculture sector and towards more liberalised 
markets with the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). 
(Nyangito and Okello, 1998). These programmes, promoted by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, advocated reduced government control on the agriculture 
sector and a more open environment for private sector participation.  
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While the World Bank continued to put pressure on the government to eliminate the 
distortions in the market, the official commitment to these reforms was often lacking 
and the reforms met with overt resistance (Nyangito and Okello, 1998). Therefore, the 
liberalisation period was fraught with patchy, intermittent and unstable development, 
due in part to the government‟s unwillingness to comply. The government was 
especially slow to make changes in such key sectors as its maize marketing policies 
(Gerdin, 2002).  
 
By 1980, the years of monopolisation by the state maize marketing board had adversely 
affected Kenya‟s main food crop. For 45 years the state marketing board regulated 
prices and exercised the right to veto all private bulk sales of maize between districts 
(Mosley, 1986). A large price gap had grown between the price paid to the producer 
and that paid by the consumer.  There was increasing consensus within the donor 
community that: 
 
It was heavy state involvement that impeded the development of efficient input 
and output markets and thus was responsible for the stagnation, and even the 
decline in agricultural productivity (De Groote et al., 2005: 34).  
 
In this light, the World Bank made liberalisation of the agriculture sector a key 
condition of its Structural Adjustment loans. International donors began to impose 
conditions to force the government to comply (Mosley, 1986). Eventually, the 
Government of Kenya agreed to a process of maize liberalisation (Wangia et al., 2002). 
However, during the 1990s, even with liberalisation, the economy did not improve and 
production of most agricultural commodities continued to decline (Nyangito et al., 
2003). Kenya‟s average annual rate of agricultural growth slowed to 1.1 percent in 
1990-2000 (Ochieng, 2007: 456).  
 
The overall impacts of the policy reform and SAPs on the long-term development of 
the agriculture sector have been mixed (Nyoro and Jayne, 2000). According to 
Nyangito (2003), liberalisation did not have the intended results due to several factors, 
which include poor sequencing and timing of policies that were not in line with the 
institutional capacity to implement the changes. In addition, instability and lack of 
coordination in policy implementation affected investors‟ confidence in the markets 
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and did not allow the private sector to take up the activities once controlled by the 
government (Nyoro et al., 1999). Dorward et al., (2004b: 78-79) state: 
 
One reason for states‟ often half-hearted commitment to liberalisation, 
particularly in food crop markets, is their recognition that pervasive market 
failures prevent the private sector from delivering the necessary services. 
Policymakers therefore continue to attempt to intervene to remedy these 
failures. 
 
These uneven policies of liberalisation, together with unstable policy implementation, 
created an uncertain environment. There were no adjustments to ensure continuation of 
important rural services targeting food-insecure farmers. The agricultural credit system 
collapsed, the agricultural extension service was reduced substantially, and funding for 
agricultural research fell (De Groote et al., 2005). The lack of such important 
agricultural services continues to affect Kenya‟s food-insecure smallholders today.11 
Therefore, Nyangito and Okello (1998) argue that the government‟s implementation of 
its liberalisation policies adversely affected the development of the agriculture sector 
and have laid the groundwork for Kenya‟s present agricultural and food security 
environment.  
 
Kenya’s current policy landscape and food security narratives  
 
This section outlines Kenya‟s current food security and soil fertility narratives and 
reinforces the ways in which current agricultural policies remain connected to 
established historical narratives. By highlighting the different framings and 
perspectives on food security held by government, donors and researchers in Kenya, the 
section demonstrates that policy “is the product of the interested actions of private 
parties who bring their resources to bear upon politically ambitious politicians and the 
political process” (Bates, 1989: 5). By so doing, it shows how these narratives have a 
strong influence on the policy solutions promoted by the government and donors, and 
how they affect the conceptualisation, design and implementation of food security 
programmes.  
  
                                                     
11
 The effects of liberalisation on markets and stability of food prices are still being debated. See Poulton 
et al. (2006) for an overview of the debate on state intervention for food price stabilisation in Africa.  
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Kenya’s political sphere – contrasting narratives on the causes of food insecurity 
 
Arriving at a common definition of food security in Kenya is difficult, with different 
development actors holding various viewpoints. Reflecting broader global discourse 
(see Chapter 4), Kenya hosts an ongoing debate between those who view food 
insecurity strictly in terms of productivity, e.g., the need to improve production through 
increasing agricultural inputs, and those who expand the definition to include a more 
systems-level approach, e.g., addressing political, institutional and social factors that 
affect availability, access and distribution. As Richard Jones, a senior scientist at the 
Nairobi campus of the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT) states: 
 
The definition of food security has changed so much since the 1970s that it is an 
amorphous term these days. The term needs to be used with caution; otherwise 
people will be talking about different things.
12
  
 
For the Government of Kenya, addressing food security is linked to reaching national 
food self-sufficiency. This is a key goal for the long-term development of the country. 
„Vision 2030‟ is the government‟s current policy statement for the future, and it relies 
on agriculture as a key sector to address food security and economic growth (GOK, 
2007). Kenya‟s Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) outlines the strategy 
for agriculture, which has its origins in the previous Strategy for Revitalizing 
Agriculture (SRA).  
 
The SRA focused heavily on increasing agricultural productivity and was originally 
hailed as a paradigm shift for Kenya‟s agricultural ministries (Pearson et al., 2004). 
However, the SRA has been criticised for the lack of stakeholder consultation in its 
formulation. Smith et al. (2004: 27) argue: 
 
This lack of consultation also means the significance of the paradigm shift and 
culture change... has not been fully appreciated by technocrats from within the 
Ministries or by those who have enjoyed, or are enjoying, patronage and rents 
from the agricultural sector through the current level of government 
involvement and regulation of production and marketing activities.  
 
                                                     
12
 Interview, Richard Jones, Assistant Director, ICRISAT, Nairobi, March 11, 2010 
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The current strategy, ASDS, has two main overarching policy themes: increasing 
productivity and developing/managing the key factors of production (GOK, 2010c). 
Vision 2030 guides the agriculture policy, which has highlighted agriculture as the 
economic growth engine for Kenya and one of the key sectors to deliver on the 10 
percent annual growth target. Maize production will continue to play a large part in that 
growth and it remains an important food security crop for the majority of smallholder 
farmers in Kenya. Therefore, the production of maize has become elevated to a highly 
political level. Kenya‟s current national food security programme is biased 
predominately towards improving maize production, almost at the expense of a 
diversified food basket. As indicated in the previous section, this bias was favoured by 
the colonial government and since then the sector has been “characterized by heavy 
government interventions dating back to the colonial period” (De Groote et al., 2005: 
33). The connection between maize and politics can still be seen in the current policies 
and political preoccupation. According to Hannington Odame, Executive Director of 
the Centre for African Bio-Entrepreneurship (CABE): 
 
The national narrative of a Green Revolution in Kenya is hinged on maize. It 
has three crucial features for farmers – food, cash and security. Therefore, 
maize has become a very politicised crop. This has led to a political structure 
where there are few policies directed towards the smallholder to offer 
alternatives and to diversify out of maize production.
13
 
 
The importance of maize as a measure of national food security has led to a unique 
policy structure within the country. Critics argue that the government‟s maize 
production strategy is influenced heavily by political favouritism and that the benefits 
have not been equally promoted throughout the country. For example, a World Bank 
study found Kenya‟s current maize production structure was skewed in favour of two 
percent of maize farmers (World Bank, 2009: 14). These maize growers account for 50 
percent of the “marketed maize production in Kenya, and their average maize sales 
income is over twenty times that of the bottom 70 percent of households” (World Bank, 
2009: 14).  
 
The majority of investments have focused on Kenya‟s high potential areas, while 
investment and development in the rest of the county has been marginalised. As a 
                                                     
13
 Interview, Hannington Odame, Executive Director, CABE, Nairobi, April 22, 2010. 
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result, maize production has been concentrated in small pockets, particularly in the 
higher potential areas of the Rift Valley and Western Province. This focus on Kenya‟s 
limited high potential areas also has some foundation on historical policies that aimed 
to protect the interests of the white settlers and to develop these areas for export 
production. According to Phil Dobie, Director of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) Drylands Development Centre: 
 
There is a strong hangover from the colonial focus on just the high potential 
area and not the arid or semi-arid parts of the country. Therefore, this has 
meant that the focus in the past has been on only 20 percent of Kenya‟s land 
mass and rather ignored the rest of it. And that political bias still exists today.
14
 
 
Likewise, the Government of Kenya still has a hand in the coordination of maize 
markets. After the liberalisation period of the mid-1980s, the dominant role of the 
National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) in purchasing, marketing and setting the 
price for maize was severely curtailed. However, NCPB continues to play a role, albeit 
much reduced, in the maize markets and “the government still influences maize prices 
and imports” in the name of national food security (Alene et al., 2008: 319). The 
rationale advanced by the government relates to the management of the national food 
reserves (especially during periods of drought), ensuring access to affordable and good 
quality seed, guaranteeing prices for producers and protecting consumers from high 
maize prices (Ikiara et al., 1995: 62).  
 
Maize is not the only sector that garners such heavy public sector attention. As 
mentioned earlier, the Government of Kenya has a long history of intervening in the 
fertiliser sector. While liberalisation of the fertiliser industry (in terms of importation 
and distribution) has taken effect, the government still interferes in fertiliser distribution 
under the banner of ensuring national food security. Part of the government‟s rationale 
for continued interventions is that it still holds a level of distrust of the private sector‟s 
ability to provide smallholder farmers with adequate and affordable inputs. Therefore, 
the government points the finger at market failures and the high cost of inputs in Kenya 
as a reason to control the distribution of these commodities. These concerns continue to 
shape national policies related to fertiliser supply and marketing. 
 
                                                     
14
 Interview, Phil Dobie, Director, UNDP Drylands Centre (retired), Nairobi, February 11, 2010. 
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One example of the change in policy direction came about during the 2008 food and 
energy crisis. When the crisis hit, food and fertiliser prices in Kenya soared and the 
government was quick to highlight the failure of the markets to deliver inputs to 
farmers. It thus began to import US$183 million in fertiliser inputs, providing these to 
farmers at a subsidised rate (Ariga et al., 2009: 2). Farmers in Western Kenya called 
this „Ruto‟s fertiliser‟, after the incumbent Minister of Agriculture, William Ruto, and 
it was distributed by the NCPB at a reduced rate to qualifying farmers.  
 
The focus on agricultural technologies, such as fertiliser, as the solution to food 
security is one narrative that continues to permeate Kenya‟s policy environment. 
According to ASDS, the country‟s current agricultural development strategy: 
 
Experience has shown that where agriculture is led by technology, poverty 
alleviation and food security can be achieved... Currently, the use of improved 
inputs such as hybrid seed, fertilizer and pesticides or machinery is low. 
Increased productivity is possible in smallholder farming, but it will require 
concerted efforts to encourage farmers to adopt modern farming practices 
(GOK, 2010c: 29). 
 
What this passage illustrates is the government‟s constant emphasis on the need for 
smallholder farmers to adopt „modern farming practices‟, tied explicitly to 
technologies, and this perception continues to dominate national food security 
narratives and permeate policy-setting processes. It offers an insight into how the 
national government frames the food security problem within a modernisation agenda. 
As Long and van der Ploeg (1994: 2) state:  
 
...the practice of modernization was (and still is) shaped by sets of external 
interventions, mostly centralized in state-agencies aiming to introduce new 
organisational models of farming, new interlinkages between farming, markets 
and market-agencies, new technological innovations meant to replace exiting 
techniques and knowledge, new forms of socialization and techno-economic 
training and, last but not least, new models for the definitions of roles and 
identities for farmers. 
 
While technology is an important component to improving agricultural productivity for 
smallholder farmers, the analysis of the two input-support programmes in the following 
chapters illustrate that technology by itself cannot provide the silver bullet that achieves 
food security. Instead, the analysis demonstrates the need to go beyond this narrow 
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„technology for productivity‟ narrative and to broaden the scope to include the 
multitude of social, economic and institutional factors that shape food insecurity.  
 
Expanding the productivity debate 
 
The Government of Kenya‟s focus on productivity has led some critics to question 
whether it addresses the needs of the food insecure. Food sufficiency or availability is 
only one aspect of food security and is not the sole answer to the food insecurity 
problem. It does not address issues of access to food, stability of food supply and 
utilisation of safe and nutritious food by those vulnerable to shocks and stresses in food 
supply chains. In this view, Richard Jones, Assistant Director of ICRISAT, argues that: 
 
Pursuing national food self-sufficiency as a means of addressing food insecurity 
is a bit of a red herring and may not improve the wellbeing of the very people it 
aims to address.
15
 
 
Leigh Stubblefield, a livelihood advisor from the United Kingdom Department for 
International Development (DFID) echoes this view: 
 
Kenya has a structural food security problem because there is a mismatch 
between the supply and demand sides of the equation. Kenya is not looking at 
food security in a very pro-poor way. The food security policy is skewed around 
production. It focuses less on trade and much less on affordability. There is less 
consideration of nutrition and the importance of those issues in human 
development.
16
 
These perspectives have led to an expanded food security view among some 
development actors in Kenya that incorporates a functioning food system, rather than 
strictly food self-sufficiency. One expanded definition of food security focuses on the 
importance of markets. It recognises that even very food-insecure households 
participate in markets and argues that these farmers can be more dependent on markets 
than the better off, who are able meet their food requirements. There are thus links 
between food security and income enhancement through improved markets. This 
storyline states that poorer farmers have less ability to purchase production-enhancing 
inputs and thus have less to sell at markets, and need to purchase food to supplement 
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 Interview, Richard Jones, Assistant Director, ICRISAT, Nairobi, March 11, 2010 
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 Interview, Leigh Stubblefield, Livelihood Advisor, DFID, Nairobi, March 10, 2010 
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their limited production. The solution, according to Akin Adesina, former-Vice 
President of the Alliance for a Green Revolution for Africa (AGRA), is that food 
security needs to be implemented at two levels: 
 
First, the household needs to have access to affordable inputs to produce 
enough so that they have a marketable surplus that they can sell. Second, the 
role of the state becomes one of supporting both sides of the equation – input 
and output markets – to fix the fragmentation of the value chain and make 
markets work better for food-insecure smallholder farmers.
17
  
 
This expanded market-based narrative argues that the government‟s underlying goal of 
maize self-sufficiency is misguided, based on the viewpoint that most of Kenya‟s 
households are net sellers of maize (Brooks et al., 2009). This misconception has led 
policymakers to support a high maize price policy by restricting maize imports into the 
country and by purchasing maize through NCPB at prices higher than market value. 
The result is that Kenya has one of the highest maize prices in eastern and southern 
Africa. Supporters of this market-based narrative point to a study by the Tegemeo 
Institute of Egerton University (Jayne et al., 2005: 6) which shows: 
 
... the proportion of rural households that are net buyers of maize is much 
higher than previously thought.  
 
They argue that the government‟s high maize price policy actually harms a large 
number of the farmers it is intended to help, since up to 82 percent of the smallholders 
surveyed (in Western Kenya) are net buyers of maize (Jayne et al., 2005: 6). Therefore, 
high prices have a wider negative effect than expected on food-insecure smallholders, 
who must purchase food during some parts of the year.  
 
Even with these maize-focused policies, Kenya does not produce enough maize to meet 
domestic consumption. The country fills its deficit by importing maize from 
neighbouring Tanzania and Uganda. Therefore, Kenya remains very sensitive to 
changes in global commodity prices. The 2008 food and energy price crisis had a large 
impact on the food security situation in Kenya. This crisis not only limited the ability of 
poor households to purchase food, it also restricted the poorer smallholder‟s access to 
affordable inputs, such as fertilisers. According to Poulton et al. (2006), food price 
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volatility has a different effect on households that are food secure (surplus) versus those 
that do not produce enough food (deficit). While high prices will encourage surplus 
households to diversify to other non-staple, higher-value crops, the opposite will 
happen with deficit households. These poorer households react to volatile prices by 
continuing to invest scarce resources in staple food production, resulting in a “major 
impediment to many poor households climbing out of poverty” (Poulton et al., 2006: 
343).  
 
Climate change and a number of environmental challenges have further compounded 
the food price crisis. Prolonged droughts in recent years (2008–2011) 18 have increased 
incidence of malnutrition and refocused the debate on national food security. In 
addition, there have been rising security threats from Somalia and continued conflict on 
the northeast border. These wider global political and economic contexts make food 
assistance and food security an important feature of foreign and domestic policy to 
address economic, social and political instability.  
 
To address these domestic and wider trends, the food security narrative in Kenya will 
need to become broader than the productivity and technology narrative or market-
focused narratives described above, and reframed within a wider systems context that 
includes social, ecological, institutional and political factors. However, which narrative 
takes hold and shapes the food security policies has as much to do with Kenyan politics 
as it does with evidence and research knowledge surrounding food security. In the same 
fashion that the colonial government focused on maize production for European settlers 
as the politics of the day, so too is the present government‟s focus on maize production 
relevant to the current socio-political environment, but within a very different political 
balancing act. The current environment has thus evolved over time and is reflected in 
today‟s unique coalition politics. The next section goes into further detail on the 
interface between politics and bureaucracy. 
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 See data on Kenya from the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) on agro-climatic 
monitoring and emerging food security issues at http://www.fews.net/Pages/country.aspx?gb=ke&l=en 
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Politics and bureaucracy: the creation of institutions and administrative structures 
 
Another major challenge to addressing food security is the ability of the administrative 
structure to implement food and agriculture policies. As mentioned earlier, power and 
politics play an interesting role in food security policy in Kenya. There is extensive 
literature on the role of political elites, networks and alliances in the national political 
environment and policy agenda setting (cf. Throup, 1987; Bates, 1989; Throup and 
Hornsby, 1998; Anderson, 2002). For example, Throup (1993: 382) argues: 
 
Astute use of government patronage, civil service and parastatal appointments, 
low-interest loans, government contracts, and rural and urban land grants, had 
ensured the continuing loyalty of the vast majority of the educated elite and 
political class. 
 
Many of these alliances and the policies and social networks with which they are 
associated have their historical roots in the colonial era but continued into the post-
independence period (Bates, 1981). This is especially relevant in the agriculture sector. 
According to Colin Poulton, a food policy expert with the School of Oriental and 
African Studies (SOAS) at the University of London: 
 
Agriculture Ministers are often not judged by their capacity to run a ministry, 
and not on their public policy objectives. Rather it is implicit that you have the 
resources of your ministry to provide rents down your patronage networks to 
deliver the national votes of your region.
19
  
 
From this perspective, technical and political issues become intertwined in the policy 
process and are influenced heavily by ethnic and regional politics. Thus, agriculture and 
food security policies become part of a political environment of rent seeking and 
coalition building for those in power, and so become linked to a small, but powerful 
network of larger commercial farmers around the country. A poor farmer has little 
control over the policies that are implemented and few avenues within which to seek 
redress. Therefore, smallholder farmers look at elected officials and village elites to 
provide local public goods, such as subsidised inputs, that benefit their village and gain 
votes for the politician. In this way, small-scale farmers become what Srinivas (1955) 
                                                     
19
 Interview, Colin Poulton, Research Fellow, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
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terms „vote banks‟, in which politicians provide citizens with benefits and favours to 
garner support for their political interests. Colin Poulton explains: 
 
What you get are policies that effectively disperse patronage to particular 
regions. If there is a coincidence between what can be claimed as national 
policy and of interest of relevant ministers or powerful politicians, then these 
things happen. Therefore, a minister of agriculture may decide to promote a 
subsidy policy and to purchase maize to support and appease the larger 
farmers.
20
  
 
Therefore, complex and longer-term policies, particularly those that require more 
systemic change, offer fewer incentives to the political elites to implement. However, 
certain changes occurring over the past few years have merged political interests with a 
food security focus. Andrew Karanja, a World Bank economist in Nairobi, states: 
 
Food issues are on top of the political agenda. During the last national 
elections [2007], one of the main driving forces was the food crisis and there 
were even food riots. Therefore, the government had to do something to cool the 
temperatures down and appease the population. They cannot ignore it any 
longer.
21
 
 
The political benefits of focusing on food, with the potential for winning votes, provide 
a strong impetus behind the agenda-setting process for a number of national-level 
politicians and development actors. This agenda-setting process was evident after the 
2007 post-election violence, with politicians manoeuvring to position themselves in a 
favourable alliance. Political rhetoric focused on issues of national food security with 
promises from one political group to do more than the other to address food insecurity. 
Consequently, post-election politics has been marked by “uncertain policy regimes” 
(Aringa and Jayne, 2011: 271) which has led to large increases in government 
interference in fertiliser marketing mechanisms though procurements and distribution 
of subsidised fertiliser. Current policies, therefore, must be seen in relation to the 
balancing act of coalition politics in a highly tense and unstable political setting. 
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 Interview, Colin Poulton, Research Fellow, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London, Nairobi, February 10, 2010. 
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 Interview, Andrew Karanja, Agricultural Economist, World Bank, Nairobi, March 16, 2010. 
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This uncertain policy regime has led to an uncertain environment for both the private 
sector and farmers. According to Andrew Karanja, these policy reversals have 
hampered concrete change: 
 
After liberalisation of the fertiliser sector, the private sector has been driving 
the agenda in distribution, but of late the government has been using the excuse 
of market failure to come and interfere with the same markets and this has 
created a situation where nobody knows what is going on.
22
  
 
These policy reversals and inconsistencies in government policy messages have longer-
term effects on the economy. Uncertainty can add elements of risk to industry, which 
can increase the costs of operating and provide “powerful disincentives to invest and 
produce” (Nyoro, 2002: 39). Some experts blame the poor performance of the 
agriculture sector on failures of institutions and governance as well as agro-ecological 
factors. According to Ng‟ethe et al. (2004: 14), the state maintains numerous public 
sector agencies that are inefficient, take up a large percentage of public spending on 
agriculture and have unclear mandates, yet “provide an important source of political 
patronage”. Through this lens, failure is the result of an inadequate public sector which 
“encourages clientelism and corruption” (Booth, 2011: 3).  
 
What this research shows is that policy emerges from the realities of the political 
setting and cannot be seen solely as a condition of governance failures or a lack of 
political will. For example, due to the politicisation of maize, networks of power and 
politics have a strong hand in the creation of food security polices within Kenya. 
Therefore, a full understanding of food security policies requires an exploration of the 
institutional constraints and the enabling factors at the macro- and meso-levels, which 
are connected to the conditions at the micro-/farm level (Booth, 2010: 7).  
 
According to Festus Murithi from the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), 
Kenya‟s national and local institutional and organisational structures have at times 
perpetuated the problems of food insecurity and decreasing soil fertility. He blames 
many of the problems on the lack of capacity of the administrative structures in Kenya 
to carry out the policies. Murithi sums up this view by stating: 
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The government‟s policy documents are well meaning and if we implement all 
these policy documents, then we would come a long way. However, what is 
lacking is an implementation strategy to accompany these policy document 
statements.
23
 
 
This technocratic argument that the technological solutions are available and it is just 
proper implementation that is needed was a recurring theme in my interviews. For 
example, three senior Kenyan policy analysts agreed that Kenya has strong technical 
experts who are capable of analysing the situation and producing the reports needed. 
However, what is lacking is the capacity to translate these technical documents into 
appropriate policies and the administrative structures needed to implement them.  
 
Antti Seelaf, a senior advisor for the German Agency for International Cooperation 
(GIZ), seconded to Kenya‟s Agriculture Sector Coordination Unit (ASCU), states: 
 
I do not think we require technical assistance to have good research in 
improving fertility, good farm management and so on. We want the assistance 
that will tell me how I can better coordinate the ministries, administration, 
management issues that deal with corruption.
24
  
 
He goes on to state that without this clear linkage between policy and implementation, 
there is a lot of room for political manoeuvring and positioning for personal gain. What 
this viewpoint represents is a slight shift from the prescriptive, top-down technocratic 
solutions, towards the view that „governance‟ and well functioning bureaucracies are 
the solution to the food security problem. Governance remains an important component 
in the creation and implementation of policies, yet, similar to the technocratic or market 
fix narratives mentioned previously, this viewpoint overlooks the effects of politics on 
the creation of both the narratives and policies on food security.  
 
This section therefore demonstrates that the creation of rural development policy, such 
as food security and agriculture, is not linear. Policy can come from an array of 
different directions and “implementation can be as much about agenda-setting and 
decision-making as execution of decisions” (Keeley and Scoones, 1999: 4). Policies are 
thus „political technologies‟, in which the relationship between knowledge, power and 
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policy is combined with the power relationships that exist between citizens, experts and 
political authorities (Burchell et al., 1991; Foucault, 1991; Shore and Wright, 1997). 
The emerging Kenyan narratives pick up on the predetermined set of rules at the 
national and global levels to prescribe a productivity-based approach that entrenches 
the use of technologies as the central means for addressing food insecurity. These 
narratives are altered to fit within the unique Kenyan settings that are linked to 
particular actor-networks, institutions and political processes. However, politics is not 
the only process that influences food security policies and programmes. The next 
section examines important social interactions that continue to shape and influence the 
current national socio-technical system in Kenya. 
 
Social interaction and citizen engagement in the policy process  
 
While it is important to understand the role of elite politics and bureaucratic 
manoeuvres, it is also necessary to look at citizen engagement through civil society 
organisations (CSO) and NGOs. These social interactions influence the policy process 
in significant ways. CSOs, NGOs and private sector actors are increasingly influential 
in policy processes in Kenya. They have become very vocal in addressing their 
frustrations with the level of corruption in the country and made increasing calls for 
collaboration and inclusion in decision-making processes.  
 
These non-state actors have multiplied in numbers over the past few decades, yet their 
impact within the food security policy-setting environment has been mixed. According 
to Antti Seelaf, while democratic change in Kenya has brought about greater 
accountability and transparency, civil society and the private sector remain highly 
fragmented. There are many individual players, with different interests and mandates, 
which have not come together under a unified voice to demand change. He explains 
that what is lacking is a credible representation of a compelling and coherent alternative 
perspective demanding better policy making from those in powerful positions:   
 
If these private sector groups and civil society organisations could have the 
capacity to collect their views, prioritise them and make concrete suggests to 
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feed that in through the ASCU thematic working groups, then they might have a 
voice. However, I have not seen that happen yet.
25
 
 
A representative from the Seed Trade Association of Kenya (STAK) also highlighted 
this problem: 
 
In many democracies, the whole issue of lobbying and advocacy for change is 
very important and many international seed companies know how to position 
their issue and lobby for them. However, the problem is that the industry in 
Kenya does not know the art of lobbying and advocacy. These sectors need to 
be organised to be effective in lobbying and advocating for change. The private 
sector as a whole does not have a strong voice in policymaking in Kenya. They 
have to work harder to get policy shaped to serve their agenda. The private 
sector needs to be better organised and to have a bigger coalition. We need to 
have a regular forum where we meet with government and say that food 
security in our country is our problem. Then we can agree on common 
objectives, pick a few priorities, and determine how we are going to work 
together towards them. It is happening in other places with much worse 
agricultural climates than Kenya because there is a structure and an ability to 
shape the policy environment so that it works for all, especially for the farmer.
26
 
 
While a coordinated advocacy network within civil society and industry may be 
lacking, Kenya has an historic unifying social element in ethnicity. In their analysis of 
the 1997 national elections, Throup and Hornsby (1998) point out that ethnic origins 
and personalities of political leaders had far more importance in Kenyan politics than 
ideology or class. This was also the case in a recent study by Leonard et al. (2009), 
which once again showed how Kenyan politics is determined largely by ethnicity, 
kinship and neighbourhood. The main political parties are organised mostly along 
ethnic lines, with large numbers of people, especially in the rural areas, voting in 
accordance with their ethnic identities. To some extent, many CSOs and industry 
lobbies also reflect and reinforce these ethnic divisions.  
 
Therefore, setting coherent policies directed towards food security, within such an 
ethnically, economically and geographically diverse country, becomes much more 
difficult. The result is a diverse set of narratives, linked to an evolving global landscape 
where Green Revolution narratives and national political framings all cohere around a 
focus on productivity-technology-fix as the primary solution for smallholder farmers. 
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The resulting regimes work to reinforce the institutions, practices and networks that 
frame the food security policies and subsequent programmatic decisions in Kenya.   
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter shows how different aspects of history, politics, economy and social 
contexts have framed Kenya‟s agricultural development and food security policies. It 
demonstrates how policymakers build food security storylines with a limited focus on 
improving maize productivity. Kenya has seen an historical continuity of certain 
elements of the technical-productivity fix narrative. Yet, this narrative has not remained 
static and has been critiqued and adapted over time. The emerging food security 
narratives include a market-oriented fix (emerging from of the liberalisation era) and, 
more recently, a governance fix (emerging from debate on corruption, administration 
and political reform).  
 
Even with these new emerging narratives, the proposed solution concentrates on 
streamlining policies to deliver a particular vision of food security with a maize focus, 
and hinges on the adoption of new technologies to improve productivity. The limits of 
such policy narratives to address the complex nature of food insecurity are apparent: 
complex politics, ethnic divisions, alliances and patronage direct policies to benefit 
some groups over others. This shows how the real internal dynamics and politics of 
Kenya drive the creation of policies, especially those linked to maize and food security. 
The politics of maize frame the discussions on national aggregate food security and the 
resulting programmes aimed at smallholder farmers. This political framing becomes 
apparent in the interaction between the high-level debates among policy elites – within 
governments and the donor community – and the complex negotiations that surround 
policy implementation and the reality on the ground. It is here, at the interface of these 
multiple levels, that the real effects of the politics, markets and social arrangements 
become more apparent.  
 
However, these evolving narratives and policy formulations do not adequately capture 
the range and dynamic nature of farmers‟ practices in the field. Therefore, building on 
the multi-level framework described in Chapter 2, this analysis now moves from broad 
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general framing (at the global and national levels) to local specifics, where multiple 
negotiations and the micro-politics of what is and is not incorporated becomes more 
significant. This is when the macro-level narratives begin to unravel, or become recast, 
and new narratives that are more located, specific and socially determined, become 
apparent.  
 
The next chapter, then, takes a closer look at the local level of the farming model in 
Western Kenya and demonstrates how the adoptability and sustained use of new 
technologies, such as hybrid seed and fertilisers, are linked intrinsically to the actors, 
organisations and social structures that constitute local livelihood strategies. It 
investigates the overarching argument that when programmes fail to take account of 
these critical social, political and institutional factors when introducing a new 
technology, they will encounter difficulties in uptake and will be unlikely to stimulate 
lasting improvements in productivity.   
  
84 
 
Chapter 5 
Complexities in Smallholder Farming in Siaya and Butere: 
Negotiating and incorporating new technologies 
 
 
The previous chapter outlined Kenya‟s national-level policy scene by highlighting key 
political, institutional and social aspects that affect food security and fertiliser policies 
and programmes. This chapter moves from a broad political and economic analysis to a 
narrower focus on the dynamics at the micro level. It looks at the specific and unique 
smallholder farming systems in Siaya and Butere Districts of Western Kenya. The 
purpose of this chapter is to highlight the ways in which the adoption and long-term use 
of agricultural technology depends on the actions of the key actors and specific 
practices and processes found within that locality. It argues that, once a technology is 
introduced, its interaction with local actors, networks, conventions and conditions 
(people, social relations, institutions, ecologies, etc.) is affected by an array of external 
factors. It is at the micro level that “variations to, and deviations from, the status quo 
can occur, such as new techniques, alternative technologies and social practices” 
(Moors et al., 2004: 39) resulting in niche creation and shifts in socio-technical 
structures.  
 
This chapter focuses on the range of factors affecting local farming practices, which 
include social (e.g., networks, power relations and gender), economic (e.g., wealth 
groupings), field type and usage (e.g., home field, outfield and home garden) and agro-
ecological setting (e.g., soil type, topography and rainfall patterns). In this chapter, I 
show how the use of such new technologies as improved seeds and inorganic fertilisers 
(as components of an input-support package), must be understood within this wider 
context. As highlighted in Chapter 2, technologies can fulfil their true functions only in 
association with human agency, social structures and organisations (Geels, 2002). 
Therefore, these technologies cannot be viewed as disembodied artefacts to be injected 
independently into a locality. Instead, their interactions become embedded within the 
wider socio-technical system that has a certain history, cultural context and institutional 
dimension, and is informed by highly differentiated farming practices and livelihood 
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strategies. In so doing, this chapter offers insight into the physical, social and political 
environments within which the two case studies were implemented. 
 
The chapter begins with an overview of the farming systems found in Siaya and Butere, 
including the prevailing constraints and underlying narratives on soil health and food 
security. The second part explores some existing practices for managing soil fertility, 
including the use of fertiliser and hybrid seeds. The third part highlights how people 
respond to external interventions and how a system can evolve with the arrival and 
adoption of such new technologies as hybrid seed and inorganic fertiliser packages. 
Together, these three sections provide a detailed description of the socio-technical 
environment of Siaya and Butere, highlighting the diversity of local farming systems. 
 
Farming systems in Siaya and Butere: Context and constraints 
 
Butere and Siaya have two separate planting seasons. The first coincides with the „long 
rains‟, (February–June) and the second with the „short rains‟ (August–November). In 
this region, the long rains are considered much more stable and predictable (GOK, 
2002). Timing is a very important element in the system, for planting and application of 
inputs. Farmers begin to prepare their land for the long rains in February. The actual 
planting time depends on the individual farmer‟s perception of the start of the rainy 
season. If farmers buy seed or fertilisers, they purchase these inputs close to the 
planting time in January or February. Late planting or late supply of inputs can hamper 
yield potential and has a direct effect on the food security of the household. Harvesting 
for the long rains ranges from mid-June to early August, depending on the location and 
that year‟s rainfall pattern. 
 
Maize is the main staple cereal crop in both districts (GOK, 2001b, 2002; Masotsi et 
al., 2008). The farmers in my research area plant maize twice a year, during the long 
rains and the short rains, and it remains a critical component in their local food security 
strategies. However, the long and short rains vary greatly in terms of their frequency, 
duration and consistency, increasing the level of risk for maize yields. While maize 
remains the dominant long-rains crop, farmers adjust the land committed to maize 
during the short rains to compensate for their unpredictable nature and the shorter 
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planting season. The majority of farmers diversify their production strategies to 
mitigate against the risk of crop failure by planting their fields with other crops that do 
much better in the short rains, such as groundnuts, beans and sweet potato. Grace, an 
elderly farmer from Butere, explains the links between adequate maize yields and her 
decision on what crops to plant for the next season:  
 
I must plant maize and beans twice a year because my production is not 
sufficient. If I get a good harvest in the long rains then I would not plant as 
much maize in the short rains, I would divide my land and plant more 
groundnuts. However, I cannot know that decision until the end of harvest time 
when I know my yields.
27
 
 
Low productivity and food insecurity are a constant concern in this area. According to a 
survey by Oiye et al. (2009: 1314), households in Siaya and Butere do not grow enough 
food to be self-sufficient and spend two-thirds of their household income on additional 
food. Farmers I interviewed in Siaya reported that, on average, they lacked sufficient 
quantities of their own maize to feed their families and had to supplement with 
additional maize bought at the market for approximately five months of the year. 
Poorer households with limited access to arable land (i.e., less than 0.4 hectares) 
reported up to seven months when they are deficient in maize. Butere farmers also 
reported a similar five-month period of food insecurity, which was associated with a 
need to buy maize. Due to these deficits, families often supplement their diet with 
alternative food crops, including sorghum, beans, cassava, finger millet and sweet 
potatoes, especially during the short rains.  
 
Factors affecting land management techniques  
 
Farmers in Butere and Siaya encounter many constraints when it comes to managing 
their land. Each has an impact on the evolution of the farming system and farmers‟ 
adaptability to changing conditions. Smallholder farmers are highly vulnerable to such 
shocks as adverse weather, plant diseases and changing market forces, and even a slight 
change in their expectations can be financially and economically devastating. These 
issues weigh heavily on their risk management strategies, as they decide whether or in 
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what capacity to invest in a new technology based on the likelihood of obtaining a 
desired range of outcomes (Stirling, 2003).  
 
This section outlines some of the main constraints and risks, both biophysical and 
economic/social, facing farmers in the research sites, as well as their coping 
mechanisms. It is based on extended interviews with men and women in the study area 
at different points in the growing seasons, as part of a series of semi-structured 
interviews and focus group discussions (see Chapter 2). The aim is to give an overview 
of the diverse factors influencing farming practices and, in particular, the ways in 
which agricultural inputs, such as hybrid seed and inorganic fertilisers, are incorporated 
into farming.  
 
The research sites in Butere and Siaya Districts (Khwisero and Yala Divisions, 
respectively) are characterised by low to moderate soil fertility. According to previous 
surveys, soils have become degraded due to constant maize cultivation with little 
application of fertilisers, especially chemical fertilisers, to restore nutrients (GOK, 
2002; Millennium Villages Project, 2005). Many farmers in this area have very low 
rates of fertiliser usage (13 percent), resulting in few nutrients being put back into the 
soil (Ariga et al., 2009). Maize farming is exclusively rainfed, therefore the weather 
and rainfall patterns have a large effect on yields. As Peter, a young well-off farmer 
from Butere, explained:  
 
In 2009 and 2007, the climatic conditions really affected us because the rains 
just disappeared all of a sudden when the maize was flowering. Climatic 
conditions affect farmers currently because you cannot even bank on the rains 
when you are doing farming, if you bank on the rains, you are going to fail. 
Therefore, the weather is no longer reliable and I can no longer predict what 
will happen or what I can produce on the farm.
28
 
 
There is also a seasonal dimension to risk assessment when considering whether to 
purchase inputs for the long rains versus the short rains. The short rains are often too 
unpredictable and many farmers perceive an investment in improved inputs as too risky 
for that planting season. Dependency on the rains affects all levels of wealth categories. 
Emily, a well-off farmer from Butere, purchases improved seed and fertiliser for the 
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 Pseudonym used. Interview, male farmer, wealth category A, Khushiku, Butere, May 10, 2010. 
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Figure 11: Farmer showing Striga (purple flowers) infestation on 
her fields, Butere, June 2010 
long rains only, since the chances of a good return on her investment should be higher 
than during the short rains. She states: 
 
For long rains I would buy fertiliser, but not for short rains. I feel fertiliser is a 
must to use in long rains. If I have money, I purchase 10 kilograms that covers 
about a quarter acre. Then I supplement the remaining of my fields with cow 
manure. However, for the short rains, I plant without anything. Why would I 
spend money on fertiliser and then the rains fail me?
29
 
 
Many plant diseases (e.g., maize streak virus, grey leaf blight and head smut) and pests 
(e.g., African maize stem borer, rats, moles, termites, weevils, squirrels and monkeys) 
are prevalent in the study areas. The most common problem mentioned was the 
excessive growth of Striga hermonthica (witchweed) (cf. Oswald, 2005; Kiptot et al., 
2007; Vanlauwe et al., 2008). Striga is a parasitic weed that affects cereal crops, 
especially maize and 
sorghum. It attaches 
itself to the plant‟s 
roots and grows by 
stealing nutrients from 
the maize. Striga is 
often associated with 
poor soil fertility and a 
lack of soil moisture. 
Control mechanisms 
include intensive 
hoeing and weeding, 
but these are often 
ineffective (Manyong et al., 2008). Infestation by stem borers was the second most 
common complaint. The stem borer moth lays its eggs on maize leaves and the larvae 
chew into the stems and stalks, cutting the flow of nutrients to the plant (Vanlauwe et 
al., 2008). Both Striga and stem borer can drastically reduce yields and sometimes 
cause complete crop failure. Farmers‟ ability to overcome these risks are often linked to 
their social and economic standing and their access to knowledge and capital to 
adequately address these problems.  
                                                     
29
 Pseudonym used. Interview, female farmer, wealth category C, Khushiku, Butere, June 15, 2009. 
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Once farmers harvest their maize crops, such economic factors as market price 
fluctuations affect the farming system. Maize prices are quite variable throughout the 
year, dropping at harvest and then increasing dramatically in the period just before the 
long rains (cf. De Groote H. et al., 2004; Barrett, 2008; Jayne et al., 2008; Ariga et al., 
2010). Many factors cause this price variability. One of the major causes is the 
seasonality of maize production and the lack of adequate storage facilities at the 
household level (Komen et al., 2010:1231). Price variability affects farmers differently, 
depending on their wealth categories. For example, the majority of farmers in the lower 
wealth categories (95 percent) sell their maize just after harvest due to lack of storage 
capacity and the need for money to buy household goods, keeping little until the next 
planting season. These same farmers then buy maize from the markets at a higher price 
later in the season when their own supplies run out. 
 
Farmers have many reasons to sell their maize at harvest. One reason revolves around 
problems with long-term storage. Post-harvest losses among smallholder farmers in 
Kenya are often very high (Giles and Ashman, 1971; Dobie, 1974; Nyambo, 1993; 
Oduor et al., 2000; Waithaka, 2010). Measures to offset post-harvest losses (e.g., timely 
harvesting, appropriate facilities to keep maize at a constant moisture content and 
application of „dusting‟ with pesticides) require labour and capital that many poor 
smallholder farmers do not possess. In addition, harvest time typically coincides with 
high seasonal household expenses (e.g., school fees) when farmers have the least 
amount of money available. Consequently, many farmers are forced to sell maize at 
harvest, when the prices are lowest, to pay for urgent household expenses.  
 
The wealthier farmers in the area, who have better storage facilities, are able to store 
the bulk of their maize until the price goes up. However, even these wealthier farmers 
reported that they suffered from heavy losses due to pests and theft. Without the ability 
to store maize adequately or safely, investing scarce resources into increasing 
production may not produce the return on investments that farmers expect. The wastage 
due to post-harvest losses and low prices achieved at harvest time may make it 
uneconomic to spend limited resources on improved inputs. 
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Figure 12: A group of farmers working together to weed a field, 
June 2009, Siaya 
Furthermore, factors such as household composition, wealth, gender and labour 
availability can affect farmers‟ interactions with the market. For example, five female-
headed older households (over the age of 55 years of age), in both middle and poorer 
wealth categories viewed their food security situation linked so tightly to the maize 
harvest that they reported using maize strictly for household consumption and did not 
sell their produce. As Claris, an older widow from Siaya, remarked:  
 
I am not someone who can sell my maize. It is our custom; we do not sell 
maize.... If I sell my maize, I will have to buy it back later for a much higher 
price, then I am lost.
30
 
 
The availability of labour is a major issue affecting smallholder farmers‟ ability to 
invest in new technologies. The composition of the household is tied to the availability 
of labour to work the fields or to bring in an income from off-farm employment. The 
majority of farmers in Butere and Siaya rely on family labour to tend their farms. There 
are distinct gender 
roles based on power 
relationships within 
the household. The 
husband concentrates 
mostly on ploughing 
and sowing, while the 
wife, children and 
grandchildren focus 
on weeding and 
harvesting. A number 
of factors can limit 
access to household 
labour, including out-
migration or health-related issues that affect people‟s ability to work the land. 
Therefore, farmers often rely on hired labour, assistance from relatives or, on rare 
occasions, assistance from community groups or church members.  
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 Pseudonym used. Interview, female farmer, wealth category B, Nyandiwa, Siaya, May 3, 2010. 
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More than half (55 percent) of the farmers interviewed reported hiring labour at some 
point to help with weeding or planting.
31
 Labour from outside the household is often 
used for plots far from the homestead, or during times of crisis, such as illness. The 
labour market is therefore a means of mitigating against the risks of labour shortages 
within the family.  
 
However, the ability of a household to hire labour is affected by its own demographic 
composition and its wealth status. Households in the highest income wealth category 
(77 percent) reported hiring labour to work on their fields. These wealthier households 
not only have larger plots of land (over two hectares), but also have more disposable 
income available from remittances supplied by family members working in 
neighbouring towns. Remittances from family and relatives working off-farm are an 
important income source for households at all levels in this area, and can be used to pay 
for labour and inputs. Farmers in Siaya and Butere mention a strong cultural tradition 
of sharing wealth with the family back in the village. Zadock, a middle-wealth category 
farmer from Butere, explained how he depends on remittance from his relatives to 
purchase inputs:  
 
I tried fertiliser three years ago for the first time because that year I was lucky 
to get money from a relative in town. I decided to buy fertiliser since that 
relative supported me. I have not been able to purchase it since that time.
32
 
 
Within the middle-income wealth category, the labour results are more mixed, with 53 
percent of those households stating that they regularly hire labour during the growing 
season to help with weeding, cultivation and harvesting. The majority (75 percent) of 
the poorest households state that the rate for hired labour is too high for them to afford. 
These households depend (almost exclusively) on family labour to work their fields and 
are less able to benefit from labour-intensive technologies. Yet, even within this wealth 
category, labour issues affect households disproportionately, depending on their 
household composition. For example, three elderly widows in Siaya mentioned that 
they are too old to work their land and so they depend on the assistance of family and, 
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 Data is based on a series of semi-structured interviews with 76 households based in the two research 
sites, between April 2009 and June 2010. See Chapter 2 and Annex A for overview of data collection.   
32
 Interview, male farmer, wealth category B, Khwisero, Butere, August 12, 2009. 
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at times, hired help. Two poor widows mentioned that they often leave some parts of 
their fields fallow due to lack of labour to assist them in planting.  
 
The effects of HIV/AIDS have compounded the labour issue, with the epidemic 
affecting the working-age population (ages 15-49) heavily. HIV/AIDS prevalence in 
Siaya is estimated to be close to 38 percent (GOK, 2005: 5). Estimated rates in Butere 
are put at roughly 14 percent (GOK, 2002: 24), but other health organisations assume 
these rates to be far higher (Thomas, 2004: 23). Loss of a large part of the active labour 
force has placed a heavy burden on those that remain on the farm, especially the elderly 
and young children, who are often unable to fend for themselves. Women are also 
disproportionately disadvantaged, since they usually have to care for sick and ailing 
family members, as well as providing the main source of labour for the farm and other 
livelihood activities (Aliber et al., 2004).  
 
Overall, smallholder farmers in this area face a range of risk factors. From the 
biophysical factors of soil fertility, pests and diseases, to the economic factors of price, 
labour, landholdings and credit markets, these farmers must negotiate around these 
risks to develop a unique farming system. In so doing, these farmers construct changes 
based on their individual characteristics, which include wealth, access to land, labour 
supply, capital, social standing and cultural factors. The next section takes a closer look 
at some of the key social factors that affect the farmers‟ ability to incorporate new 
technologies into their farming practices.  
 
Social structures and power relations affecting technology adoption 
 
Social connections and access to knowledge shape people‟s understanding of their 
surroundings and affect their ability to take advantage of opportunities and adjust to 
changing conditions. According to Long and Villarreal (1993: 160):  
 
Knowledge is essentially a social construction that results from, and is 
constantly reshaped by, the encounters and discontinuities that emerge at the 
point of intersection between actors‟ life-worlds [or social fields].  
 
Therefore, farmers depend on an array of different networks to gain or improve their 
knowledge of new farming techniques and soil improvement practices and to construct 
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their own socio-technical system. Moreover, it is at the intersection of social and 
technical factors that the process of technology adoption is co-constructed. As 
explained in Chapter 2, a whole set of negotiations take place at the social and technical 
interface (Long and van der Ploeg, 1988; Long, 1999). According to Long (2001: 243), 
social interface refers to:  
 
... a critical point of intersection between life-worlds, social fields or levels of 
social organisations where social discontinuities, based upon discrepancies in 
values, interests, knowledge and power, are most likely to be located.  
 
Here, different narratives about agriculture, farming practices and technology interact, 
with narratives framed at the macro level intersecting with those constructed at the 
meso and local levels. The interface between local farming practices and project 
implementation is a major focus of the subsequent two chapters. These show how such 
encounters may lead to dissonance, misunderstandings and conflicts. How a farmer 
translates his/her knowledge about a technology into practical use will differ depending 
on their individual socio-technical setting and the social and political basis of their 
interactions with projects, project staff and the knowledge networks they draw upon.    
 
Local knowledge and understanding about the state of the soil has a large influence on 
how a farmer manages their land. During a focus group in Siaya, participants discussed 
the different techniques they use to understand the state of their soil or why their fields 
are affected by pests and diseases.
33
 They use the colour and feel of the soil as one of 
the indicators of soil health. Spencer, a retired teacher and well-off farmer from Butere, 
explains: 
 
The soils on my fields vary a lot. Like down there by the road, that soil is 
different from what I have here in my home garden. This one is red, that one is 
almost brownish. The texture is very different. Therefore, I must use different 
seeds and different inputs. You see, I know much more about my soil than 
someone in Nairobi who wants to sell me some inputs.
34
 
 
Spencer exemplifies a well-off farmer who uses his larger plots of land to experiment 
with different crops and farming techniques to see what grows best in different portions 
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 Focus Group Meeting, Lihanda, Siaya, April 22, 2009. 
34
 Pseudonym used. Interview, male farmer, wealth category A, Doho, Butere, May 14, 2010. 
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of his land. Due to his social connections within the community, he has benefited from 
previous training programmes and has travelled to different training centres for further 
instruction. Therefore, he uses both his on-farm experimentation and off-farming 
training to adapt and adjust his farming techniques based on the performance of the 
land and his knowledge of the soils.  
 
However, not every farmer has these opportunities. Even when farmers are able to 
identify the changes in colour and texture of their soils, a common complaint is the lack 
of appropriate knowledge, labour and inputs to deal with these problems. This lack of 
knowledge is linked to a recurring complaint about the inadequate government 
extension services in the area. Extension services in Butere are understaffed and 
underfunded. This has led to frustration amongst extension officers in Khwisero, who 
complain that they have too large an area to cover with no means of transportation. One 
officer pointed at his broken bicycle and said: 
 
This bicycle is my only means of transportation to cover all my sub-locations. It 
has been broken for months and I have no other way to travel. This means that 
most days I do not go out to the field and instead wait in my office for farmers to 
come to me.
35
 
 
The problem of underfunded and de-motivated extension officers is not unique to 
Khwisero and runs deeper than a broken bicycle. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the 
liberalisation period of the mid-1990s negatively affected the extension services in 
Kenya with large reductions in funding. The results are expressed today in the limited 
capacity of extension services to reach the intended beneficiaries. With little support 
and poor targeting from extension agents, smallholder farmers often rely on their 
community connections and social ties for information. However, access to these social 
networks depends on the class and wealth/power status of the individuals within the 
communities. For example, the wealthier and middle-income farmers in Butere possess 
strong community connections and social ties to the leaders in the community. These 
farmers are able to access information, through the local programme promoters or 
community connections, and benefit disproportionately compared to others without 
these strong networks. When programmes enter an area, farmers who are better 
connected to social networks, or in a position of power, are often the first to hear about 
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 Interview, Agriculture Extension Officer, Khwisero Division, Butere, June 18, 2009. 
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the programme and have an added advantage in terms of participation. Information on 
new technologies is often passed on through informal networks (such as family ties or 
relationships with the leadership of the village) or through direct participation in 
community functions, including barazas (public meetings), church functions, and other 
community activities. These added benefits often do not exist for farmers, especially 
women, who are on the fringes of the community and in the poorer wealth categories.  
 
Melissa is one such poor widow from Butere, who feels that her poor wealth status in 
the community has directly affected her chances of participating in or benefiting from 
new technologies that are brought into the village. She is the sole provider for her six 
small children, her brother‟s child, plus another distantly related child. She rarely 
attends community meetings and has very little knowledge of what is happening in her 
community. She feels that her status within the community has affected her chance of 
participating in certain programmes, observing: 
 
Even though many programmes have come into my area over the many years, I 
have not benefited from any programmes because I do not attend the community 
meetings. Sometimes when I attend a burial I hear that some assistance is 
coming, so I wait in my house to be told there is assistance but it does not reach 
me. I do not know why I am passed by when these programmes do outreach in 
the community.
36
 
 
Melissa goes on to explain that she feels she is left out of opportunities to learn about 
new technologies due in part to her lack of connections to local leaders. Therefore, she 
believes new technologies are denied to widows like herself. In her experience, the 
most vulnerable members of the community often miss opportunities for training and 
accessing new technologies because of limited outreach and improper programme 
targeting.   
 
Alternatively, for farmers who are connected, their personal networks can prove to be a 
useful vehicle for access and knowledge and allow them to engage further with a 
programme‟s rollout. Moreover, because these networks extend beyond the community 
limits, farmers can often rely on external network contacts for information even when 
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 Pseudonym used. Series of interviews with female farmer from poorest wealth category, Emutsasa, 
Butere, May 2009 to June 2010.  
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programmes are outside their communities. In these instances, farmers are likely to 
benefit when knowledge is transferred from farmer to farmer.  
 
However, integration into a programme is not the only route to knowledge and 
technology for poor households. Some poorer farmers described how they were 
introduced to improved inputs by working as paid labourers on other people‟s fields 
who had already adopted the technology. For example, for Monika, a poor farmer in 
Butere, her first encounter with fertiliser was through working on another farmer‟s land 
where the technology was already in use. Monika describes how she first learned about 
fertiliser: 
 
When I worked in other farms, I saw how good their farms were and that they 
were using fertiliser. I had not used fertiliser before but I discovered that 
fertiliser was important for the soils so I decided to try it. Now, if I have money 
after working, I buy a little bit of fertiliser – on average I buy 15 kilograms of 
fertiliser and mix it with compost from my household rubbish.
37
 
 
The movement of labour, within and outside the region, affects local knowledge 
transfer about new technologies. This is especially true for Butere, where many people 
work on commercial farms (e.g. sugarcane). Several have learned about fertiliser by 
working in the areas that have a high rate of technology adoption. The mobility of 
workers has helped to bring back information and knowledge. For example, Jane, a 
poor farmer from Emutsasa Sub-location, explains how her husband Ernest used to 
spend a lot of time working on the commercial farms within Butere. She explains: 
 
I started using fertiliser in 2005. My husband used to travel a lot to work in 
other districts on some big farms. It was through these visits and travelling that 
he learned the importance of fertilisers. He would send me some money and tell 
me to buy some fertiliser.
38
 
 
Farmer-to-farmer knowledge exchange is very common in the study areas. Farmers 
learn by watching their neighbours or by working alongside other farmers. Farmers are 
more willing to replicate successful farming practices, when they have seen them 
working, especially if the adopting farmer is doing better than they are. In this way, 
farmers experiment with new technology and planting methods in consultation with 
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 Pseudonym used. Interview, female farmer, wealth category C, Doho, Butere, August 28, 2009. 
38
 Pseudonym used. Interview, female farmer, wealth category C, Emutsasa, Butere, August 28, 2009 
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other farmers in their social network. Farmers who did not have access to these social 
networks learned about new technologies in a more informal and varied way.  
 
This section has shown that the process and outcomes of knowledge are shaped by the 
interaction of power, authority and access to resources that are available to different 
actors. Long coined the analysis of these processes the interface of knowledge. 
According to Long (2001: 191): 
 
Studies of interface encounters aim to bring out the types of discontinuities that 
exist and the dynamic and emergent character of the struggles and interaction 
that take place, showing how actors‟ goals, perceptions, values, interests and 
relationships are reinforced or reshaped by this process.  
 
In addition, according to Röling (1988: 4), the exchange or diffusion of knowledge 
about a new technology can “only take place within a „population‟ of intended utilisers 
who face similar production conditions.” Therefore, knowledge exchange about an 
innovation or new technology among only a few people may not diffuse to everyone in 
the community. To promote successful diffusion of knowledge, “extension must often 
focus on mobilising farmers and on creating organisations for delivering or utilising 
technology” (Röling, 1988: 4). Therefore, through a closer examination of these social 
networks at the micro level, this research focuses on:  
 
... the interplay of different social constructions of „reality‟ development by 
various parties to the interface (e.g., government bureaucrats, peasant farmers 
and traders) and traces out their social implications (Long, 2001: 191).  
 
This actor-oriented approach is a useful tool to shed light on the creation, dissemination 
and transformation of knowledge at the local level. The next section takes a closer look 
at these transformations of knowledge at the interface between different technologies 
and the realities of farming and social constructions.  
 
Integrating soil management practices: Developing niches to manage 
constraints  
 
While the previous section described the physical, economic and social factors that 
frame the farming system in general, this section outlines the range of soil management 
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practices used by farmers in Western Kenya, and adapted to innovative niches in their 
efforts to overcome physical, biological and capital constraints (Moors et al., 2004). 
Again, this section is based on a series of semi-structured interviews and focus group 
discussions (see Chapter 2 for methodology). It describes how soil management 
practices may or may not become embedded in specific local social systems and how 
their adoption is affected by social standing and gender. It also highlights how 
innovation systems change when people experiment, adapt or distance themselves from 
technologies. It goes into detail on the ways in which farmers appropriate ideas and 
adapt them to their own circumstances.  
 
While a range of soil management strategies exists, this section highlights four main 
technologies that have been introduced into the research sites over time: (i) fallow 
management; (ii) composting; (iii) bean intercropping; and (iv) agroforestry. Each 
section touches on some of the factors that have influenced the evolution of these 
practices, highlighting some of the main constraints (e.g., land, assets, markets and 
labour) that have shaped local soil management strategies and helped to define the local 
socio-technical systems.  
 
Fallow management techniques and conflicting land constraints 
 
As previously highlighted, declining soil fertility is a major constraint for farmers in the 
research sites. Continuous cultivation of farmland has become a recent imperative in 
Western Kenya due to high population densities and increasing pressure on the land 
(Omamo et al., 2002; Tittonell et al., 2007). In the past, it was common to leave land 
uncultivated, or fallow, for a period to help replenish soil nutrients (Barrow, 1989; 
Kariaga, 2004). Interviewed farmers still believe this is the best way to restore soil 
fertility. However, the practice of fallowing has decreased considerably in both Siaya 
and Butere due to the rising population and decreasing landholding area per household 
(Kiptot et al., 2007).  
 
Lack of farmland is a critical issue in both study sites. With limited land available, 
fallow systems are ad hoc and inconsistent. According to the interviews, farmers who 
practise fallow systems on a more continuous basis are better off and have access to 
additional land for cultivation (averaging greater than two hectares). Most farmers (80 
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percent) with small land sizes (less than 0.4 hectare) are unable to leave land idle on a 
continuous basis. This is especially true if they had a poor harvest during the long rains, 
forcing them to plant maize again during the short rains to make up for a low yield. 
Two of the poorer farmers who had less than 0.4 hectare described how they would 
leave small portions of their land fallow; however this was due more to external 
constraints, such as lack of labour or financial capital, and less to soil management 
techniques. Farmers with slightly larger land plots, on average 0.4–1 hectares, reported 
leaving small portions of their land fallow during the short rains, especially those parts 
that had not performed well during the previous long rains. Yet, the consistency of 
using fallows varied across the households and depended on the amount of maize 
harvested during the long rains.  
 
Farmers like Helen from Siaya understand that continuous planting has a detrimental 
effect on soil fertility and may perpetuate the problem of low yield. However, low 
maize yields and lack of available farmland make it difficult to do otherwise. Helen is a 
young widow in Nyandiwa sub-location, Siaya District. She has 0.4 hectares of land, 
which must sustain her and four young children. Farming is her only source of food and 
income. She knows how much food her children require for the year so she makes her 
calculations on what and how to plant based on a number of important factors, such as 
previous yields from the long rains harvest. As she explains: 
 
If my harvest in the long rains is good, and I can get six or seven bags of maize, 
then I do not plant maize in the short rains. However, if I get less than that I 
have no choice and I will plant maize again.
39
  
 
Helen‟s choices on what and when to plant are vital determinants of the health and food 
security of her family. She admits that most times she does not harvest enough on her 
small plot of land to keep her family fed throughout the year. Without improved inputs, 
such as hybrid seed or inorganic fertiliser, her highest yield is around two bags (180 
kilograms) of maize. This is not enough to feed her family. Therefore, she depends on 
the two growing seasons to produce maize. Even though she harvests twice, she still 
must buy maize for her family for 4–5 months of the year. She depends on her income 
from working on other people‟s farms to make ends meet.  
                                                     
39
 Pseudonym used. Series of interviews with female farmer from poorest wealth category, Nyandiwa, 
Butere, May 2009 – June 2010 
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Helen‟s story demonstrates how one young widow is faced with both land and labour 
scarcity and how these shape her farming decisions. Therefore, her decisions to invest 
in soil management techniques are based on a careful analysis of how much food she 
needs to feed her family for the year. The two planting seasons become intricately 
connected and the decision to practice land management techniques, such as fallowing, 
becomes a question of her relative food security risks and how she is able to manage 
those uncertainties.
40
 Her limited access to land and additional labour highlights her 
socio-economic standing in the community and severely affects her ability to adapt her 
farming techniques to include alternative practices – leaving her in a continuous cycle 
of decreasing productivity and increasing poverty. Therefore, the introduction of any 
new systems or technologies must take into account these constraints, offset risks, and 
allow the farmers to adapt the technologies to fit their specific socio-economic 
circumstances.  
 
Composting strategies and overcoming asset constraints  
 
Another very common method of soil fertility management is the use of boma 
(farmyard) manure and pit composting. These two methods have been practised in this 
area for many decades as a technique to replenish soil fertility. Both technologies have 
been promoted by the government at different times from as early as the 1930s 
(Mackenzie, 1991: 237; Onduru et al., 1999: 4). Initially the farmers rapidly adopted 
boma manure, but pit composting was much slower to take hold and was not sustained 
due to the availability of manure, which was cheaper and easier to manage. However, 
pit composting was reintroduced in the 1960s and promoted vigorously in the 1980s by 
NGOs and other institutions endorsing „sustainable agriculture‟ (Tiffen et al., 1994; 
Onduru et al., 1999; Hilhorst et al., 2000).  
 
                                                     
40
 See Tripp (2006) for discussions on how low-external-input technologies are in many respects not 
different to other Green Revolution high-input technologies such as hybrid seed and inorganic fertilisers. 
Both forms of technology (low-external-input versus high input) often require significant amounts of 
labour, commitment and additional skills to be employed. Therefore, Tripp advocates for a more detailed 
understanding of the unique and diverse challenges facing individual farming households to ensure a 
wider range of technological choice to meet the diversity of needs of highly differentiated farming 
communities.   
  
101 
 
People mentioned using different methods of composting on their farms. Pit 
composting involves filling a pit with vegetation, such as maize stalks or cuttings from 
hedges and other green manure. This is covered with a layer of animal manure or some 
previously made compost and a layer of topsoil to cover the pit. Farmers also add 
kitchen waste and green cuttings, such as weeds, grass and hedge cuttings. They cover 
this with more top soil or with ash from their fires. These layers are then repeated. Then 
the pile is watered and mixed every few weeks until the compost is ready, usually after 
about two months. It is commonly used in the fields closest to the house and the 
vegetable gardens outside the kitchen, as it is labour intensive to carry the compost 
further from the home. As Jane, a poor widow from Doho Sub-location, explains:  
 
Before 2007, I used only to make compost on the farm. This came mostly from 
my household waste, as I have no animals. It would not be enough for my one-
acre plot so I would put some closer to my home garden and the rest I would 
plant without anything. I could usually get about one to two bags of maize.  
 
Jane goes on to explain the results she now gets when she incorporates composting with 
a bit of inorganic fertiliser:  
 
However, for the past three years, I aim to buy a little fertiliser, like last year I 
bought 15 kilograms, and I mixed it with my compost. I harvested seven bags of 
maize. This was the highest yield I ever received.
41
 
 
Boma manure is another type of compost, made from animal manure, including cow, 
sheep, goat, chicken or rabbit, which is mixed with a bedding of maize stalks, grass, 
leaves, ashes, weeds and other material. This mixture is sometimes combined with the 
compost manure in the method described above. However, a farmer‟s ability to make 
boma compost manure is dependent on their access to animal manure. In Butere, 90 
percent of the households interviewed used boma manure combined with either 
compost or small amounts of inorganic fertiliser.
42
 Only eight percent of Butere 
households did not use boma manure and depended exclusively on compost made from 
household waste. In Siaya, the number of interviewed farmers that used boma manure 
was much lower and only 64 percent of the farmers discussed using boma manure. 
Approximately 36 percent of farmers interviewed in Siaya did not use any boma 
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 Pseudonym used. Interview, female farmer, wealth category C, Doho, Butere, June 24, 2009. 
42
 As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this data is based on semi-structured interviews with 76 
households and a series of focus groups within the two research sites. See Chapter 2 for further detail.  
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manure and relied only on composting. The main reason cited for not using boma 
manure was the lack of livestock.  
 
Therefore, using boma manure in Butere is more prevalent due to the higher 
concentration of livestock. While in Siaya, composting (and green manure – discussed 
later) is more common, due to fewer livestock and the long-term presence of NGOs and 
international agricultural research institutes (such as the World Agroforestry Centre) 
that focused on alternative soil management techniques in the area well before the 
MVP programme was launched.  
 
Intercropping and the importance of markets 
 
Planting beans in between maize lines is a common practice in the study sites and has 
been documented for many years in Western Kenya (Mango and Hebinck, 2004; Kiptot 
et al., 2007). Beans are grown largely for subsistence and are a major source of protein 
(Katungi et al., 2009; Mucheru-Muna et al., 2010). They are an important component of 
household-level food security for farmers in Butere and Siaya, especially when maize 
harvests are inadequate. The traditional method of planting maize and beans is through 
„broadcasting‟ the seeds by hand (Mango, 2002). In this method of planting, seed is 
thrown by hand and then covered using a hoe. However, this technique has been 
replaced over the years by intercropping of maize and beans in lines, a technique 
introduced by several government and NGO programmes.  
 
The benefits of intercropping include less erosion and leaching, weed control, pest 
management, nitrogen fixation, provision of green manure, soil coverage, and increased 
food security (cf. Odhiambo and Ariga, 2001; Woomer et al., 2004; Okoth and 
Siamento, 2010; van Wolfswinkel, 2010). However, farmers differed in the way they 
adapted the knowledge to fit within their current context. While farmers in Siaya 
mentioned the benefits of beans in improving soil fertility and control of Striga, the 
majority of farmers did not list soil fertility as their top reason for intercropping maize 
and beans. Instead, farmers described how they adopted intercropping techniques 
because of the growing population competing for land. However, at least 50 percent of 
households considered intercropping to be a method of soil fertility management and 
weed control. The households in Siaya often referred to programmes from the World 
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Figure 13: Farmer getting her beans ready for market, 
Butere 
Agroforestry Centre that had been in the area for the past decade and focused on 
training farmers on different techniques to improve the fertility of their soils. Yet, the 
top reason for intercropping for Siaya farmers still remains a question of land scarcity 
foremost, and soil fertility management as a secondary and added benefit.  
 
Intercropping maize and beans has an additional value to farmers that directly affects 
their food security situation. In 
addition to being a good source of 
protein, farmers use beans as a cash 
crop. Many of the households, 
especially the female-headed ones, 
rely on the sale of beans to pay for 
household expenses. Due to the high 
market value of the bean crop in 
Butere, farmers emphasised the 
benefits of the bean harvest for 
improving household income. 
Therefore, their farming system has 
developed a strong focus on bean 
production due to market demands. 
Musa, the Farmer Rep for Doho 
Sub-location in Butere, explained: 
 
Farmers in this region continue to broadcast beans because farmers felt that 
planting beans in rows could affect the quantity of the bean yield. Here in 
Khwisero, beans tend to fetch a higher price and many households sell beans to 
help with their household incomes. Our neighbours in Siaya are taught to plant 
the beans in rows by Millennium, but here it will not work. The beans in Butere 
will get you a better price in the market, so we will continue to broadcast our 
beans as we have been doing. It does not make sense to change that custom.
43
 
 
This farming practice evolved in Butere to ensure a higher yield of beans since many 
farmers depended on the sale of beans to earn income to support their families. 
Therefore, the effects of the markets and the price that farmers can get from products 
had a direct effect on the evolution of the system. The availability of reliable output 
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 Interview, Farmer Representative, Kisa West, Doho, Butere, May 13, 2010. 
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markets to sell their produce is an important consideration in farmers‟ decision-making 
processes when they consider investing in improved agricultural inputs. Programmes 
that introduce new technologies into a given locality must therefore understand the 
local economic conditions that embrace that specific farming area.   
 
Agroforestry techniques and labour constraints 
 
Several organisations, including the World Agroforestry Centre, KARI, and the Kenya 
Forestry Research Institute (KEFRI) have attempted to introduce agroforestry into 
Siaya and Butere as a means of addressing declining soil fertility (Rao and Mathuva, 
2000; Odame et al., 2003; De Groote et al., 2005). Improved fallows and biomass 
transfers using fallow trees are the two most successful technologies introduced (Place 
et al., 2005). The two tree systems were introduced in the area between 1997 and 1999 
and initial adoption was good. However, since then, many farmers have stopped 
planting them (Place et al., 2005). This is due in part to high labour requirements and 
difficulties in obtaining good quality seedlings (Place et al., 2005). Both systems are 
labour-intensive; tree fallow systems require manual removal of trees from the field, 
while biomass transfer systems need labour to cut, carry, spread and incorporate the 
biomass in the fields. In addition, small farm sizes preclude the use of tree fallows as 
they cannot grow enough to justify the amount of labour needed.  
 
Within the research sites, trees are used for timber, firewood and boundary planting. 
Smaller shrubs – including the species introduced under the agroforestry biomass 
system – are planted mostly on field boundaries. Farmers mentioned the benefits of 
trees for firewood, setting the boundary of their compounds or to keep cattle out of their 
fields, but biomass transfer was not discussed as a means of addressing soil fertility. 
Therefore, even though the fallow tree species introduced in this area worked well to 
improve soil health, real life constraints including labour shortages and small land sizes 
are enough to make the system unsustainable in the longer term. Farmers have changed 
their use of the tree crops to fit their socio-economic realities.  
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Weighing up the costs 
 
These four examples of soil management technologies (fallow management, 
composting, intercropping and agroforestry) suggest that the benefits of new 
technologies need to be weighed against the costs of adoption in particular settings. 
Farmers may experiment, adapt and appropriate ideas from outside, such as new 
sowing patterns and multipurpose tree species, but they always adapt these technologies 
to their particular socio-technical circumstances. Even when farmers see a value in a 
technology, their ability to continue use of that technology is affected greatly by the 
local social, economic and ecological factors that shape their socio-technical context 
and their own personal needs and capacities.  
 
These four examples demonstrate that adoption of a technology is not straightforward. 
There are many reasons why people do or do not incorporate the technology into their 
farming repertoire, and so embed it within the knowledge, politics and institutional 
arrangements that make up the socio-technical system. Thus, in negotiations around 
technologies for soil fertility management in the study sites, the four examples show 
how a particular narrative of soil fertility management pushed by external actors – 
around agroforestry and biomass transfer for organic matter management – while 
technically sound, was not appropriate to the local contexts. The result was that in the 
encounters between local farmers and external actors (in this case NGOs and the World 
Agroforestry Centre), technologies and their application were transformed in ways that 
the external players had not envisaged. Farmers experimented and developed particular 
niches to fit with their own realities. For example, trees were incorporated for different 
reasons since farmers could not afford the labour or the farm space for the 
technological designs proposed.  
 
In this fashion, new socio-technical configurations were created through „performance 
knowledge‟44 as farmers experimented with the technologies over time (Richards, 1989, 
1993). This experimentation followed from the „knowledge encounters‟ created by 
interactions with the projects of the 1980s and 1990s (cf. Long and Long, 1992). The 
                                                     
44
 According to Richards (1993), farming performance or „performance knowledge‟ is not a design but a 
result of experimentation by the farmer at a given time. Therefore, what transpired, and why, “can only 
be interpreted by reconstructing the sequence of events in time. Each mixture is a historical record of 
what happened to a specific farmer on a specific piece of land in a specific year” (Richards, 1993: 67).  
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result today, as observed in the field during this research, is a very particular and novel 
configuration of social and technical practice, as a response to a series of constraints 
and the on-going pressure of soil fertility decline. The following section turns more 
specifically to an examination of local adaptation and contesting strategies surrounding 
hybrid seed and inorganic fertilisers: two technologies that are central to the Green 
Revolution narrative and that are at the core of the two case studies that follow.  
 
Farmers’ responses to seed and fertiliser interventions 
 
Having shown how smallholders respond to soil fertility problems in various ways, this 
section touches directly on the social and institutional factors affecting farmers‟ 
interactions with hybrid seed and fertiliser technology packages. It highlights some of 
the channels through which farmers deal with the introduction of new technologies and 
the methods they employ to adapt or reject these new systems and knowledge, within 
the context of multiple risks and vulnerabilities (Chambers et al., 1989; Scoones and 
Thompson, 2009). 
 
Farmer-owned strategies for maize seed selection  
 
Many of the input-support packages offered to farmers in development programmes in 
Kenya contain both inorganic fertiliser and hybrid maize seed together. The type of 
seed offered is of great importance to the farmer, as it must not only grow well in the 
ecological conditions of the specific area, but also conform to the preferences of the 
farmers themselves. Many documents have been written concerning maize seed 
selection in Siaya District (cf. Cohen and Atieno Odhiambo, 1989; Mango, 2002; 
Mango and Hebinck, 2004). Mango‟s research highlights the evolution of the maize 
landscape in Siaya as: 
 
...different social processes, repertoires, experiences and commitments, and 
resonates with different bodies of knowledge.... in which maize is selected, bred, 
multiplied and exchanged (Mango, 2002: 290).  
 
For example, he found that farmers base their seed selection primarily on taste, 
tradition, cost and performance. With both hybrid and local maize seed, the farmers 
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rely on their knowledge, community interactions (i.e., cultural repertoires) and 
sometimes on extension advice to select the seed.  
 
By looking at maize selection through a socio-technical lens, Mango demonstrates the 
way in which the selection and use of local maize varieties are embedded in local 
knowledge, shaped by local cultural repertoires, and passed on from one generation to 
another. He concludes that the evolution of the socio-technical system around maize 
selection in Siaya ensures the predominance of local seed varieties. Hybrid maize seed 
was introduced into the region but it has never managed to completely replace local 
varieties.  
 
My research supports Mango‟s findings. Out of the 72 farmers interviewed, only 53 
percent purchased hybrid seed. However, issues of price, availability and financial 
constraints impeded the ability of farmers to purchase hybrid seed regularly. Anton, a 
young farmer from Siaya, described the competing priorities in this way: 
 
I do see the difference that hybrid seed and fertiliser makes on my yield but I 
can only budget for it when it is close to planting time. Other priorities take 
precedence over these inputs. In my daily expenses and savings, the purchase of 
household items is prioritised above these because my young children cannot 
take porridge without sugar. Therefore, things such as inorganic fertiliser and 
hybrid seed are only budgeted for when it comes to planting time.
45
 
 
Even among those who purchased hybrid seed, there was always a portion of land 
reserved for local maize seed. There are many reasons why farmers prefer local seed 
varieties. Ibrahim, a middle-wealth farmer from Doho, cites the difference in the 
resilience of local maize to local conditions and pests. He explains his disappointment 
with the performance of the hybrid seeds versus that of the local seed, citing lower 
yields when compared with the local varieties: 
 
When I use my local seed I know I will get a good harvest, but when I use 
hybrid seed the yield is much worse. I tried hybrid seed once but the yield was 
not good. So even if I purchase the hybrid seed, I must also always plant my 
local seed, the white local maize variety.
46
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 Interview, male farmer, wealth category B, Nyandiwa, Siaya, interview, May 7, 2010. 
46
 Interview, male farmer, wealth category B, Doho, Butere, June 22, 2009. 
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Farmers also discussed their preference for the taste and cooking quality of local maize. 
Florence, a middle-wealth widow from Siaya, dislikes the texture, flavour and weight 
of hybrid maize: 
 
The problem with hybrid maize is that it is so light that the six bags I harvest 
are consumed within three to four months. Not like the local maize that is much 
heavier. Even the maize flour is heavier and makes for a better meal for my 
family. Therefore, I focus on the local seed to feed my family.
47
 
 
Failure of seeds to perform properly can be due to a number of reasons, including 
adverse weather, but are especially devastating for poor smallholders who rely on the 
harvest to feed their families. Grace, a poor elderly widow from Butere, describes how 
she mitigates against the risk of one seed variety failing by planting different types: 
 
I plant maize twice a year because my production is not sufficient. I will buy 
hybrid seeds, but I always try a different variety from Pioneer, Western or 
Kenyan Seed Company. I buy only a few packages of different seeds, what I can 
get at the shop, and then I must supplement with my local maize seed and a bit 
of millet.
48
 
 
In diversifying the type of seed she plants, Grace is not only experimenting with 
different varieties to see how they will perform, but also spreading the risk of a total 
crop failure. Grace believes that adverse weather conditions affect the hybrids 
differently. She goes on to explain that she always plants a portion of her plot with 
local maize, as she feels this gives her the greatest security and she can harvest this 
maize earlier than the hybrid varieties. The local variety is used as a stopgap in farmers‟ 
household food-security strategies, since it can feed the family during times of hunger 
just before the main harvest.  
 
Most importantly, the relatively high price of hybrid seed makes it unaffordable for 
some, and those short of cash will save some of the maize they grow to plant in the 
following season. Risper, an elderly farmer from Siaya, sees the high price of improved 
maize seed as a major constraint to continued use of the technology. She argues that she 
must always plant with her own seed, as it is her custom, and she will only buy hybrid 
if she has enough money to buy the hybrid seed together with inorganic fertilisers. An 
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 Interview, female farmer, wealth category B, Lihanda, Siaya, April 26, 2010. 
48
 Interview, female farmer, wealth category C, Khushiku, Butere, June 18, 2009. 
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extension officer taught Risper that hybrid seeds require inorganic fertiliser to perform 
well and therefore she feels that she would be wasting her efforts if she purchased one 
without the other. Peter, a local agricultural-input shop owner in Khushiku Sub-location 
in Butere, confirms this view: 
 
It is very rare to find a farmer who buys seeds and not DAP [di-ammonium 
phosphate] because there is a belief among most people here that if you buy 
hybrid maize seed then you must have DAP. However, if you plant the local 
seed it is believed you may even plant without any DAP.
49
 
 
These experiences demonstrate that many factors influence a farmer‟s decision to 
purchase hybrid seed or to continue planting the local varieties. Seed selection 
strategies are embedded intrinsically in farmers‟ social networks and cultural practices, 
and linked to accessibility to such resources as land, labour and financial means. 
Farmers thus negotiate and reconfigure their relationships to ensure they have access to 
social networks as an access point to technologies. In addition, local preferences 
regarding taste, seed price, and the resilience of hybrid seed to local ecological 
conditions are important factors influencing adoption of technology packages. 
Therefore, standard seed packages that exist outside these preferences and realities are 
not in tune with the local circumstances. Farmers will continue to adjust or redesign the 
package in multiple ways to fit their conditions, customs and practices (Mango, 2002). 
The result is multiple configurations of social and technical elements that are co-
constructed over time and in relation to different wealth groups and social networks.  
 
Incorporating inorganic fertiliser 
 
When hybrid maize seed is packaged with inorganic fertiliser, the official recommendation 
from the Ministry of Agriculture is 75 kilograms of nitrogen per hectare (FURP/KARI, 
1994). This is translated into 50 kilograms of inorganic fertiliser (e.g., di-ammonium 
phosphate (DAP), the most commonly used fertiliser in Western Kenya) per acre (0.4 
hectare) applied when planting. The application rate is supported by government 
extension officers and based on agronomic optimum rates determined on research 
station sites through KARI trials (KARI, 1994). These application rates have become a 
benchmark for many input-support programmes incorporating inorganic fertilisers.  
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 Interview, Agro-dealer, Khushiku, Butere, May 10, 2010. 
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In some ways, Kenya is heralded as a success story for its high use of inorganic 
fertiliser compared to most other African countries (Ariga and Jayne, 2006; Ariga et al., 
2009). However, this success is not uniform across the country, with different levels of 
uptake in high- and low-potential areas (Freeman and Omiti, 2003). A report by Ariga 
and Jayne (2006: 17), found that between 1996/97 and 2003/04, the proportion of 
Kenyan households using fertiliser rose from 57 to 74 percent in the Western Highlands 
(e.g., Vihiga and Kisii), but stayed at around eight percent in the Western Lowlands and 
Nyanza (including Siaya and lower Butere).  
 
These low adoption rates can be related to various factors, including highly variable 
rainfall patterns, inefficient input distribution and lack of adequate returns on yields 
after fertiliser usage (Rao and Mathuva, 2000; Freeman and Omiti, 2003). A report by 
Anderson (1992) states that farmers‟ decisions to use fertilisers were based on the risks 
associated with their resource constraints and whether it was more profitable or not to 
use fertiliser than existing practices of soil fertility management (i.e., compost or 
manure).  
 
The price at which farmers buy fertilisers is relatively high due partly to high transport 
costs. For example, Mose (1997: 5) found that in Western Kenya, average farm-gate 
fertiliser price for DAP was roughly US$475 per tonne, compared to roughly US$350 
for most African countries and US$250 per tonne in other parts of the world at that 
time. Due to the high cost, farmers tend to alter the recommended application package, 
based on the realities of their economic situation. Farmers in both research sites buy 
fertiliser from small agro-dealers in different quantities, ranging from as little as 1–2 
kilograms up to 50 kilograms bags. However, it is more expensive per kilo to buy a 
smaller quantity.  
 
For example, Angela, a middle-wealth widow from Siaya, explains her difficulty in 
purchasing inorganic fertilisers. Angela lives with her four youngest children, five 
grandchildren and two orphan children from her late brother-in-law. She depends on 
her small plot (0.4 hectares) to feed her family and receives additional income from the 
sale of vegetables, bananas and sweet potatoes from her home garden. However, this is 
not sufficient to meet the expenses of school fees, food and clothing for the children. 
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Therefore, she depends heavily on remittances sent from her uncle and brothers 
working in a neighbouring town.  
 
In 2009, her uncle sent money so she could purchase 10 kilograms of DAP at Ksh 750 
(roughly US$10). She knew that the government was selling subsidised fertiliser 
through the National Cereal and Produce Board (NCPB) at Ksh 2,500 (US$32) for a 50 
kilogram bag. Yet, Angela could not afford to buy the entire 50 kilogram bag. By 
purchasing a smaller quantity from her local agro-dealer, Angela knows that she was 
paying Ksh 3,750 (roughly US$49), an additional 50 percent for repackaging the 
fertiliser. However, she continues to purchase the higher priced fertiliser because she 
believes that she must use fertiliser. Therefore, in 2010, she asked her brother to send 
money so she could purchase another 10 kilograms of DAP from the local market. 
 
Angela explains that while small quantities of fertiliser are relatively expensive, her 
financial constraints make it difficult to buy an entire bag. Nonetheless, she remains 
determined to purchase inputs for her farm:  
 
I know that I cannot keep asking my uncles and brothers for money to help my 
farm. However, I will keep trying despite the difficulties I face. All I can do is 
hope for the best, and if luck is on my side then I will be able to make better 
long-term plans.
50
 
 
Angela‟s experience is substantiated by a report by Mose (1997: 5) who found that, on 
average, the price per kilogram was 29 percent higher for small quantities of non-
subsidised fertiliser than an unopened 50 kilograms bag sold (non-subsidised) at the 
market. Agro-dealers in Siaya and Butere acknowledged that they sold more fertiliser 
in small packages than in the original 50 kilogram bags supplied by fertiliser 
companies. This is especially true just prior to the planting season, when some shops 
increase the price due to increased demand and limited supply. Agro-dealers explained 
that limited financial and physical capacity prevented them from stocking sufficient 
quantities of inputs at the times when they are most needed by the farmers.  
 
Once farmers have purchased their inputs, they often redesign the application method 
to fit their needs and financial realities. For example, Joseph is a young middle-income 
                                                     
50
 Series of interviews with female farmer from wealth category B,  Siaya, May 2009 – June 2010. 
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farmer from Butere who farms on 1 hectare of land. He started using DAP in 2005 but 
is unable to purchase enough to use the application rates recommended by the local 
extension officer. Therefore, he reduces the quantity to 25 kilograms of DAP per 0.4 
hectare and supplements his application with animal manure or compost from 
household kitchen waste. While Joseph applies less than is recommended, he feels that 
buying fertiliser is important and he views farming as a long-term investment for the 
future of his family:  
 
I like to make farming a business. I will continue with farming until I can start a 
business like a posho (mill) or a kiosk (store), to make sure I have enough food 
and to take the children to school. I feel I have not succeeded in farming until I 
get to start that business, which will come from the support of the farm. So now, 
I use money from my boda-boda (bicycle taxi) business to buy fertiliser. It is not 
enough, but you have to think ahead to see what you can do.
51
 
 
Respondents also mentioned that they do not apply inorganic fertiliser evenly across 
their different plots of land, focusing instead on certain areas of higher-value crops. 
These decisions are based on their experience and knowledge and include factors like 
the condition of the soil, prevalence of such weeds as Striga, slope of the field and 
presence of water. The proximity of the land to the homestead is also important, since 
closer fields tend to receive more compost than the further fields. Access to labour, 
especially for weeding, is a constant constraint and farmers tend to resist techniques 
that are more labour-intensive. 
 
Farmers also hold beliefs about the effects of inorganic fertiliser based on their 
perceptions and experiences. One common fear is that excessive use of fertiliser 
(especially DAP) will increase the acidity of the soil. One village elder from Emwaniro 
Village in Butere explains: 
 
Farmers were using DAP but it has made the soils acidic because after some 
years they are not getting good yields and so we are advising farmers to add 
animal manure or compost, if you do not have money you can just use animal 
manure.
52
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 Interview, male farmer, wealth category B, Doho, Butere, June 23, 2009. 
52
 Interview, Village Elder, Emwaniro Village, Emutsasa, May 18, 2010 
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Farmers also blame the increased acidity caused by excessive use of fertiliser for the 
increase in Striga. While Striga is more often associated with low fertility, some 
farmers interviewed believe that weeds, including Striga, are harder to control when 
inorganic fertilisers are used.  
 
In a similar view, farmers also report that, since fertilisers increase weed growth, they 
have an associated and increased labour cost for weeding. For farmers with limited 
labour, this is another burden caused by the inorganic fertilisers. Farmers also mention 
that heavy fertiliser use can result in a hard pan in the lower part of the soil, making it 
more difficult to cultivate fields and reducing the yield. Others mentioned that fertiliser 
can „burn‟ the plants if applied when rains are insufficient.  
 
There are also worries that soils may get „too used to fertiliser‟ and that once they start 
using fertiliser their fields will get „addicted‟ to the inputs and will require continual 
application, otherwise yields will decrease drastically. Farmers fear that trying fertiliser 
just once would lead to an annual commitment to purchase expensive inputs. This fear 
prevented several farmers from experimenting with fertiliser.  
 
The land tenure system is another important determinant, since tenant farmers are 
hesitant to use fertiliser if their long-term access to the land is not secure. Access to 
land is becoming an increasingly important issue in Kenya, especially within the two 
research sites that represent some of the most densely populated areas in the country 
(see Chapter 2). Land sizes have been dwindling gradually due to population growth 
and the custom of subdividing paternal homesteads amongst the wives and sons of the 
household (Haugerud, 1989; Shipton, 1992; Mango, 2002). While Kenya‟s written law 
does not discriminate against women, this customary practice of subdividing the land 
means that women have „usufruct‟ rights (usage rights versus legal title) over the land 
through their husband and they have no right to sell or rent the property (Njuguna and 
Baya, 1999). Therefore, cultural practices, gender relations and land tenure issues come 
together to affect farmers‟ interactions with technologies.  
 
Finally, some households rejected hybrid seed and fertilisers completely. For example, 
Joyce, an elderly widow from Butere, who is representative of the poorest farmers, has 
never used inorganic fertiliser. She states: 
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I use only my local seed and I plant without any fertiliser. I do not buy fertiliser 
since I know it is not for the local seed, it is for the hybrid seed. Therefore, I did 
not need to use it and I do not have the pesa [money]. Even if I were to save 
money, then I have to buy sugar first, since I cannot take tea without sugar.
53
 
 
Joyce‟s comments about lack of money and competing priorities was a common 
constraint voiced by farmers. The amount of disposable income is an important 
indicator that shapes a household‟s ability to purchase and use improved inputs. 
However, there are competing household priorities for this limited financing. The three 
top household priorities stated by farmers in both Butere and Siaya are health, 
education and purchase of household food and other items. Once these household 
concerns are dealt with, the extent to which farmers can purchase inputs is dependent 
on their disposable income and labour supply at the start of the long rains planting 
season. Therefore, the quantity of input purchased varies over the years and is 
influenced by many household priorities that compete for the limited resources.  
 
This section has explored some of the social and institutional factors affecting farmers‟ 
interactions with hybrid seed and fertiliser technology packages. It highlights some of 
the channels through which farmers deal with the introduction of new technologies and 
the methods they use to adapt or contest them. It shows that farmers‟ seed and fertiliser 
use are influenced by a range of socio-economic, political and institutional factors and 
shaped by multiple risks and vulnerabilities. These risks change over time as farmers 
adapt and contest new technologies and are important elements in shaping each unique 
farming system. The resulting socio-technical systems are neither stable nor linear, and 
consist of dynamic interactions with the various elements within the system, 
differentiated by wealth, location and gender. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter shows the dynamic and shifting nature of farmers‟ relationships with 
Green Revolution technologies as farmers interact with the many social, institutional 
and economic factors that surround the use of improved inputs. Farmers must consider 
a range of aspects, including agronomic and ecological factors, unfavourable market 
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 Pseudonym used. Interview, female farmer, wealth category C, Doho, Butere, June 24, 2009. 
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conditions, and other competing household priorities (such as health and education 
needs) before they decide whether or not investing in hybrid seed and inorganic 
fertilisers is economic, profitable and sustainable. They adjust their strategies and 
expectations over time as they interact with changing social networks and through 
experimentation and learning (Wiskerke, 2003). It is in these evolving niches, based on 
the farmers‟ own evolving strategies, that new socio-technical configurations develop 
(Geels, 2002; Geels and Kemp, 2007). Therefore, programmes that introduce new seed 
varieties must take into account local preferences of taste, the price of the seed, the 
resilience of the seed to local ecological conditions and the requirements of different 
kinds of farming households, and expect the intervention to change in the hands of 
diverse, experimenting farmers.  
 
The chapter also demonstrates how intermediary factors (e.g., actors, organisations and 
social networks) affect the adoption and sustained use of agricultural technologies. The 
selection of inputs is rooted intrinsically in the local household economy and associated 
social network, since these influence access to such key resources as land, labour and 
capital. Furthermore, the research highlights how farmers‟ vulnerabilities to shocks are 
important determinants of their interaction with any new technology. Farmers will thus 
continue to adjust or redesign the package to fit their unique conditions, customs and 
practices. Therefore, the long-term outcomes that result from introducing improved 
agricultural inputs, such as hybrid seed and inorganic fertilisers, need to be understood 
within the wider context of improving the food security situation, and the multiple 
dimensions of risk and vulnerability discussed throughout this chapter. These socio-
economic realities on the ground affect farmers‟ decisions on resource allocations and 
investments, and ultimately shape farmers‟ interactions with new agricultural 
technologies.  
 
Furthermore, a deeper appreciation of these local socio-technical realities needs to be 
nested within an understanding of how macro-level Green Revolution narratives and 
associated technologies are translated and promoted by national policy narratives (as 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4) and ultimately adopted, adapted or contested at the local 
level. Therefore, this chapter builds on the multi-level approach and presents the 
encounters that take place at the interface between these broader narratives – and the 
technologies and practices they bring through project interventions – and the micro-
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level day-to-day farming practices. The result is a reconfiguration of socio-technical 
systems at the local level that adapt, reinvent or reject external interventions in new 
ways, as part of ongoing farm dynamics.  
 
This interface between local farming practices and project implementation is a major 
focus of the two case studies presented in the next two chapters. Building on this 
chapter, the following case studies examine how farmers translate their knowledge 
about a technology into practical use, depending on their individual socio-technical 
setting and the social and political basis of their interactions with project staff and the 
knowledge networks they draw upon. The chapters build on the mainstream Green 
Revolution narratives about production, markets and technology promoted by the 
dominant policy actors at the global and national levels (presented in Chapters 3 and 4). 
They show how these narratives confront local realities and how these are transformed, 
challenged and reinvented. 
 
The following two case studies (MVP and NAAIAP) focus on this social and technical 
interface and the role that social and organisational structures play in the uptake of the 
package promoted by these input-support programmes. They demonstrate how 
localised socio-technical realities heavily affect programme design, implementation and 
outcomes. The two chapters explore the ways in which local political dynamics, social 
structures, cultural features and institutions influence smallholder farmers‟ responses to 
new technology and how they place value on it. They examine how the technology 
interacted with the existing local socio-technical system and how people adopted, 
adapted or contested the technology to fit their own socio-technical realities. These two 
chapters analyse the ways in which the continued use of a new technology is influenced 
by factors that are often external to the technology itself. They show how adoption 
depends on the delivery mechanism used to introduce a technology package to a 
community. Through this process, they demonstrate how a socio-technical system is 
constructed over time, through a series of encounters in the field, and how diverse 
narratives from the macro to micro levels interact and ultimately influence the aims, 
design and outcomes of programmes.  
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Chapter 6 
Millennium Villages Project: 
Evolution of an integrated and intensive development model 
 
 
The Millennium Villages Project (MVP) is an international development initiative 
coordinated by The Earth Institute at Columbia University (USA), Millennium Promise 
(an NGO based in New York) and UNDP. MVP grew out of recommendations 
stemming from the United Nations Millennium Project – an independent advisory body 
created in 2002 by the UN Secretary-General, to develop a concrete action plan to 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals (UN Millennium Project, 2010).  
 
The underlying objective of the MVP is to show that poverty in rural African 
communities can be overcome by science-based interventions that focus on well-known 
technologies to combat the multifaceted nature of poverty. The primary goal is to prove 
that the MDGs can be attained using low-cost, technologically proven interventions in a 
multitude of sectors, implemented concurrently to benefit from synergies between 
sectors. By designing a delivery mechanism for community-based integrated 
programming, within a set financial envelope of US$110 per capita over a period of 
five years (UN Millennium Project, 2010), the project hoped to use it as a „proof of 
concept‟ model for increasing the levels of aid committed by G8 countries in the 
Monterrey (2002) and the Gleneagles (2005) Summits.  
 
The US$110/capita/year investment envelope was created by the UN Millennium 
Project to indicate the total cost required for developing countries to reach the MDGs. 
This amount is to be cost-shared by donors, government, the community and the private 
sector, which roughly translates into the following funding sources: 
 
 US$70 raised by donors (MVP to supply US$50 while raising funds from other 
donors/private sector for remaining US$20),  
 US$30 provided by national government, 
 US$10 per person from households, either in kind or in labour.  
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The per capita investment is split along sectoral themes to indicate a general target of 
investment per area, including agriculture, nutrition, health, infrastructure, education, 
environment, business development, water and sanitation. The project outlines the 
investment per sector, but this can change slightly, depending on the location and 
priorities of the sites. However, each site is expected to dedicate a portion of the budget 
towards each sector. Teams of technical experts work with community-developed 
committees to plan and implement a series of interventions that are contextualised for 
the local situation. Such topics as community development/empowerment and gender 
issues are integrated within all these sectors.  
 
Design features of the MVP 
 
MVP is a site-intensive programme that operates in 14 different sites in 10 countries 
across Africa.
54
 The sites span most agro-ecological zones and therefore represent 
almost every type of farming system adopted by smallholders in Africa. Specific sites 
are selected based on a definition of hunger „hotspots‟, where chronic hunger and 
malnutrition is considered widespread. The sites also have a high prevalence of such 
diseases as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, as well as a lack of basic services and 
infrastructure. Government involvement is considered to be an important component 
and sites are located where national governments are committed to the initiative and to 
achieving the MDGs (Millennium Villages Project, 2010: 10). Final selection of the 
locations within countries is done in close collaboration with government to ensure 
coordination of efforts and partnerships. 
 
Creating a new Millennium Village site requires guaranteed funding of US$1.5 million 
over five years for a population of roughly 5,000 people. This is to guarantee that each 
site has sufficient funding for a range of activities over the five-year period. MVP 
coordinates most of the development activities in these areas, including those of other 
development organisations and government departments (except for the basic services 
of health and education). There are finite geographical boundaries and activities do not 
go beyond these.  
                                                     
54
 The countries are Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and 
Uganda. For more information see: http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/mv/index.htm.  
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There are three different types of MVP site.
55
 The first category is „research villages‟ 
(MV1), which have a research component added to their agendas. These sites are 
managed by the Earth Institute and have an additional US$50 per capita in the budget 
for research-based activities. This extra cost is to cover the expenses of expert staff at 
Columbia University, the Africa-based MDG Centres or other partners that offer 
technical advice to the MV1 research villages. The cost for the management of the 
project in New York is covered under a separate budget and is estimated at 
US$250,000 per annum per project site. There are 12 MV1 sites. MV1s have more 
extensive baseline data collection as well as monitoring and evaluation strategies for 
each household. There is a high level of external staff interaction and the results of the 
MV1s are expected to be used as models for future village sites (e.g., MV2s, explained 
below). Sauri Sub-location in Siaya District was the first MV1, established in 2004, and 
is one of the study sites of this research.  
 
The second category of MVP sites is „cluster sites‟ (MV2). Each cluster site contains 
approximately 5,000 people and these are typically adjacent to an MV1. Millennium 
Promise manages MV2s. These sites do not have the intensive research components 
characteristic of the MV1s, although all other intervention activities are similar. The 
project states that these cluster sites benefit from „economies of scale‟ and draw lessons 
from the neighbouring MV1 research village. Baseline data is still taken in the MV2s, 
although at a representative sample level (rather than the individual household level, as 
in MV1s). Two of the sub-locations in this research, Nyandiwa and Lihanda, are MV2s, 
and these are located adjacent to Sauri MV1.  
 
The third, and most recent category is MV3 sites, which are created and funded 
independently by other organisations. MV3 sites follow the same model as the others 
but are not under the guidance or control of the Earth Institute or Millennium Promise. 
This research does not examine MV3 sites since their designs are independent of the 
MVP and their input-support programmes vary considerably from those in MV1 and 
MV2.  
 
                                                     
55
 The descriptions of MVP sites are based on data collected from series of interviews with MVP staff in 
Nairobi and Kisumu between April 2009 and August 2009.  
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MVP is an integrated programme that delivers multiple interventions in agriculture, 
health, environment, infrastructure and education to the same recipients at the same 
time. This integrated approach remains a key component of the MVP strategy and 
philosophy. The storyline behind MVP‟s holistic approach states that many of the 
problems in rural areas (including health, food security and poverty) are caused by 
failures in multiple sectors and require various entry points to address them 
(Millennium Villages Project, 2010). In addition, by implementing interventions in an 
integrated fashion, the project hopes to benefit from the synergies that occur through 
multi-sectoral interactions. For example, addressing health issues will not only improve 
the health of the community, it will also have a lasting effect on agricultural 
productivity by reducing lost labour due to illness, or allowing money to be redirected 
towards purchase of improved inputs instead of towards health care.  
 
MVP has received a lot of attention from development practitioners, the media, 
governments, donors, and the public at large.
56
 This is due in part to its vast network of 
promoters from a variety of sectors and a very well organised campaign to keep the 
villages in the spotlight. This stretches from the high politics of MDGs and high-profile 
actors involved in the negotiations to the perceived high budget allocations and 
subsidised delivery systems. The project also represents a return to a model of 
integrated development, which has critics and supporters that debate the merits of the 
project‟s principles of integrated development within a high cost set of interventions. 
Issues of sustainability and the ability to take the model to a large scale continue to be 
discussed and debated in development circles. MVP has evolved over time in response 
to these multiple interactions, which combine high-level policy decisions with field-
level realities in a complex mix.  
 
A number of evaluations, both internal and external, have examined MVP (cf. Cabral et 
al., 2006; Buse et al., 2008; Denning et al., 2009; Dorward, 2009; Nziguheba et al., 
2010; Okoth, 2010). This research does not aim to replicate these evaluations, but 
                                                     
56
 See recent blogs and debates on Millennium Villages in the Lancet 
(http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(12)60824-1/fulltext), the World Bank 
(http://blogs.worldbank.org/impactevaluations/jeff-sachs-the-millennium-villages-project-and-
misconceptions-about-impact-evaluation), the Guardian (http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-
development/poverty-matters/2011/oct/10/millennium-villages-project-impact-questions) and 
Development Horizons (http://www.developmenthorizons.com/2011/10/jeff-sachs-lvp-of-
mvp.html?spref=tw). 
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instead adds to them by presenting a wider analysis of the MVP as a uniquely 
constructed socio-technical system that has specific narratives about achieving the 
MDGs through a set package of technical interventions. This research looks at reasons 
why the households interacting with the MVP technology packages may adopt, adapt or 
reject the technologies, due to overarching market-related factors, patterns of supply 
and demand, social interactions, and the institutional and administrative structures of 
the programme. The next section examines these intersections at the household level 
and explores the ways in which the MVP narratives, administration and interactions 
with households‟ unique farming contexts ultimately affect the style and consequences 
of delivery. 
 
Unpacking the socio-technical system: Interactions between farmers and 
MVP in Siaya District 
 
This section examines how the programme was introduced to the community and the 
entry points used to build awareness of the programme, its goals and the technology 
package offered. It then analyses how the distribution channels used in the programme 
interacted with the farmers and the range of perceptions this created. It describes how 
the programme was able to use the existing administrative structures in the community 
to reach some of its goals. The programme‟s ability to disseminate information about 
the technology to ensure appropriate understanding and acceptance of the package of 
inputs is also highlighted. The section concludes by looking at the viability and 
sustainability of the institutions that were altered or created by the programme.  
 
The politics of community mobilisation and sensitisation: Siaya District MVP 
 
In July 2004, Sauri Sub-location, in Siaya District of Western Kenya, was selected to 
be the first Millennium Research Village, based on a number of factors (UN 
Millennium Project, 2005: 2):  
 
(i) Located within a „hunger hot-spot‟ defined by the UN Millennium Project‟s 
Task Force on Hunger as a location where more than 20 percent of children 
under five years are underweight for their age group  
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(ii) Represents one of the 12 key agro-ecological zones in Africa –Siaya 
represents a „bimodal maize-growing region‟;  
(iii) Resides in a country where the national government was committed to 
furthering the MVPs and would partner with the project in its activities;  
(iv) Offers possibilities for collaboration with NGOs operating in the area.  
 
This area also had a long history of donor-led agriculture programmes. For example, 
the World Agroforestry Centre (formerly known as the International Centre for 
Research in Agroforestry or ICRAF) had been conducting agroforestry projects in the 
surrounding area over the previous 10 years and had a long-standing history with the 
MVP founders.
57
 This facilitated MVP‟s entry into the villages. In fact, many farmers 
in the community had previous contact with MVP staff members who used to work 
with the World Agroforestry Centre. As Jessica Masir, the MVP Community 
Coordinator explains:  
 
I would not say that the project was new in Sauri, because most of the 
Millennium staff that the Sauri community met were staff who had worked in 
Sauri before with other ICRAF-related programmes. Therefore, they knew each 
other.
58
 
 
This close connection between MVP staff and the community helped to facilitate one of 
the main narratives that underpin the programme: that of an integrated, community-
based approach to achieving the MDGs. When MVP began in Sauri, project staff spent 
a considerable amount of time making sure certain community structures were in place 
before starting on the technical interventions. They did this by creating three types of 
institutions. The first is what MVP calls „multi-purpose steering institutions‟, which 
occur at multiple levels, from the village to the district. The second are „sector group 
institutions‟, which are single-purpose committees, such as the Health Management 
Committee, Agriculture Committee, Water Management Committee and Forest 
Committees. The third are „executive leadership institutions‟ at the village and higher 
sub-district level. For example, MVP created Executive Committees that are leadership 
positions within the communities and represent the official channels between the 
village and the programme staff.  
                                                     
57
 Interview, Pedro Sanchez, Director, Tropical Agriculture and Rural Environment Program, Columbia 
University, March 1
st
, 2011.  
58
 Interview, Jessica Masira, MVP Community Coordinator, Kisumu. May 7
th
, 2010. 
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Since these structures did not exist in Sauri, the MVP started with an initial two-week 
training on community action planning with the leaders of the newly formed village 
committees. At the same time, they worked with the community to create eight sectoral 
committees (for water, environment, health, education, etc.) at the sub-location level 
and parallel committees at the village level. These committees were organised to 
address one of the eight MDGs. The sector committees were asked to meet once a week 
to discuss plans and activities within their sector. The heads of each village-level sector 
committee would then come together at a larger sub-location sector committee to 
coordinate the sectoral activities for the greater sub-location. The sectoral committees 
would work with MVP staff to carry out each of the sector activities. MVP used the 
same methods and structures to expand to the surrounding 10 sub-locations in 2006.  
 
However, MVP staff were careful to consider the existing local institutions. Where 
there was an existing structure, such as a village development committee, then MVP 
tried to work within that arrangement. However, in places where MVP staff felt that the 
structure was either nonexistent or not operating well, it created or strengthened those 
institutions. Sauri represented a mix of both systems, as explained by Rafaela Kozar, 
MVP‟s Community Development Coordinator:  
 
When MVP came in, the pre-existing structure in Sauri was called a „Sub-
location Development Committee‟ and the one in Sauri in particular was 
fraught with conflict with a particular leader there at the time, and had not held 
a meeting in years. There was not an immediate clear entry point and we would 
not be able to revitalise the existing structure in a timely manner for the project 
to start intervention.
59
 
 
Therefore, the community and MVP deemed the original development committee 
ineffective and the project worked with the community to create a new development 
committee and consultative forum as a short-term solution. According to Jessica 
Masira, this model worked well for the site. The most important component when 
incorporating community participation was to appreciate pre-existing structures within 
the community and then build on them through participatory approaches:  
 
                                                     
59
 Interview, Rafaela Kozar, MVP/EI Community Development Coordinator, Nairobi, June 24, 2010. 
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We worked on mainly improving the structures to do with administrating the 
interventions. We were working on management structures by the community 
and just agitating, awakening the government officials to participate actively in 
the whole thing. The agriculture sector had started to deliver the inputs and so 
we had to build on what had already been created. Therefore, we continued to 
refine the existing structures in the village.
60
 
 
To help facilitate the MVP‟s specific input-support programmes, Agriculture 
Committees were set up at each village and sub-location level. Each village elects an 
Agriculture Representative and these representatives come together at the sub-location 
level to form the Agriculture Committee. At the initial stages of the project, the 
Agriculture Representatives were tasked to work alongside MVP staff to measure 
farmers‟ plots and determine the amount of seeds and fertiliser the farmers would 
receive in the input-support package. They would also assist with regular monitoring of 
farm activities.  
 
MVP depends heavily on the committees to disseminate information. For example, the 
village-level Agriculture Committee performs a variety of tasks, such as information 
dissemination, monitoring the implementation of an intervention and collecting yield 
data. All members of the Agriculture Committee receive training under a „training of 
trainers‟ (TOT) model. After receiving training, committee members go on to train 
other farmers about the techniques they learned from MVP. An Agriculture 
Representative for Lihanda explains: 
 
If there is information that the project wants passed on to the farmers, then they 
can come to us, and we go door-to-door or hold a Chief‟s Baraza [public 
meeting] to pass on this information.
61
 
 
While the MVP invested a lot of energy into building committees, the results were 
often mixed. Many of the results hinged on individual characters and the power 
relations within that village. Therefore, the extent to which MVP could rely on these 
committees to carry out the work varied considerably. For example: 
 
 In Sauri, there has been a very strong Agriculture Committee and there, master 
farmers took ownership and leadership of the many activities. Whereas in other 
                                                     
60
 Interview, Jessica Masira, MVP Community Coordinator, Kisumu, May 7, 2010 
61
 Interview, Agriculture Representative, Focus Group Discussion, Lihanda, Siaya, April 22, 2009 
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sites, the committees might be much weaker and then actually the agriculture 
staff of the project might end up doing most of those activities.
62
 
 
The key to a committee‟s success is its ability to disseminate information and be 
inclusive. Therefore, to facilitate information dissemination, MVP selects a number of 
farmers in the community who have extensive knowledge, who are leaders in the 
community, or who are considered „master farmers‟ (those considered by the project as 
highly productive or who had been involved in previous ICRAF interventions). MVP 
also looks for younger 
farmers who might be 
interested in agriculture 
interventions and starts 
them out as aides to the 
facilitators, extension 
officers or master 
farmers who took up 
larger roles. These 
village facilitators act 
as resource persons in 
the community to help 
facilitate the MVP 
programmes.  
 
When MVP disseminates information to the community, it convenes village-wide 
training sessions during the planting season. MVP sets up two or three group training 
sessions in a given area and every community member is obliged to attend if they 
wished to receive the agricultural input package. If a farmer does not attend the training 
then they do not receive the package. A team consisting of MVP‟s agriculture extension 
agents, the elected Agricultural Representatives and the master farmers follow-up on 
the training. The team visits each farm, offering technical advice and monitoring 
progress. MVP relies on this network of staff and community participation to 
communicate technical information.  
 
                                                     
62
 Interview, Rafaela Kozar, MVP/EI Community Development Coordinator, Nairobi, June 24, 2010 
Figure 14: Eunice Owino showing her maize fields and the spacing 
technique she learned, Siaya, May 2009 
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However, the vast amount of information that the project attempts to disseminate can 
lead to misinformation and conflicting messages passing on to the community. At 
times, farmers refer to the lack of information and to feeling that some individuals in 
positions of power are hoarding the information for their own personal gain. The next 
section describes these social conflicts centred on those elected onto the committees. It 
describes some of the social tensions that arise as a result of creating committees and 
community institutions.  
 
Social and power relations 
 
The MVP‟s philosophy is based on a particular framing of community-led and 
participatory decision-making approaches. The concepts of participatory development 
have evolved since the 1980s (Chambers, 1980; Korten, 1980; Longhurst, 1981; Korten 
and Klauss, 1984; Cernea, 1985; Richards, 1985; Chambers et al., 1989; Chambers, 
1994, 1997) and include a suite of participatory approaches and methods that 
emphasise local knowledge and enable local people to make their own appraisals and 
plans. This has allowed development practitioners, governments and local people to 
work together to plan context-appropriate programmes. Although participatory 
approaches are aimed at inclusion, this approach has also been subject to criticism for 
not addressing issues of information and knowledge sharing at the community level 
(Kapoor, 2002), especially in relation to biases against women (Mosse, 1994; Guijt and 
Shah, 1998), and concerns that it can ultimately favour the existing elites (Mosse, 1994; 
Kapoor, 2002).  
 
Therefore, Cooke and Kothari (2001), contend that community and participatory 
approaches have the potential to become „tyrannical‟ and thereby to oppress those they 
seek to empower. They argue that participatory projects that attempt to generate 
empowerment, but do not take into account local politics and power relations, can 
result in another form of technocratic imposition (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). 
Development practitioners cannot be naive about the complexities of these power 
structures within communities and must understand that “technology is mediated by 
social processes, and the social relationships into which they are introduced” (Place et 
al., 2003: 4). This research aims to highlight how local social networks and power 
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relations interact with the technologies promoted by MVP and how knowledge-power-
politics relationships contribute to the development outcomes of the project. 
 
Part of MVP‟s overarching narrative revolves around the need to combine technical 
expertise with community-based learning and knowledge to ensure science-based 
development. This commitment to a bottom-up approach is one of the principles by 
which the project separates itself from past failures with the integrated rural 
development programmes of the 1970s.
63
 Village-level committees and community 
members work with groups of technical experts during the initial stages of the project 
to identify possible interventions. These interventions are ranked according to 
community preferences and against the MVP‟s pre-set menu of interventions. Together, 
the community and experts create a package of village-level interventions and a 
community action plan (Konecky and Palm, 2008; Millennium Villages, 2010; UN 
Millennium Project, 2010). The ideal narrative is one whereby the local socio-technical 
system is co-developed by communities and experts, allowing innovative niches to 
evolve and reinforcing or readjusting the learning process. 
 
However, this ideal does not address unequal power relations in the process. 
Participation challenges arose during the early days of the project in Sauri. Initial 
challenges included high expectations among community members of the benefits of 
becoming involved with a high-profile donor project. As Rafaela Kozar states: 
 
In Sauri there were quite a number of challenges in the beginning, a lot of 
common challenges you find in community development. Definitely, people who 
signed up for these committees were expecting some kind of individual benefit 
from being in the committee.
64
 
 
Another common problem centred on exactly which people were participating in the 
committees and attending the meetings. Ensuring equal representation from every 
member of society is a constant problem encountered by MVP, especially when it first 
started working in Sauri. Willy Diru, MVP‟s Agriculture Coordinator, describes this 
challenge in detail:  
 
                                                     
63
 Various interviews with MVP project staff.  
64
 Ibid. 
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You have a process that is targeting the entire community but you never get to 
that level because the elites are always there and blocking that contact. When 
you look at the vulnerable they will not come to meetings and they may have 
good reason for not coming. They might come to meetings but eventually they 
are cut out in one way or another. So how do I get to this particular 
disadvantaged group so that they are not cut off? These people who remain 
vulnerable, there are certain things that keep them in that wealth category. It 
requires a specific examination of those things to come up with ways to address 
them. Sometimes you will find the vulnerable are not coming to meetings simply 
because of the way they dress. The community have their own social categories 
based on who is well dressed at a meeting and when the vulnerable come, they 
look out of place. Therefore, that social stigma will keep them away from 
attending those meetings.
65
 
 
This form of social ostracism creates a process of social differentiation and influences 
the power relations in the village. The poor become even more isolated because they 
cannot participate in the project meetings. Therefore, the project becomes reliant on 
local patronage relations with elites, who gain even more access to the material benefits 
of the project. This restructuring of social and political relations is at the core of the 
evolution of the MVP socio-technical system.  
 
However, some MVP staff members note how this system is changing and that the 
programme‟s approach to community involvement has evolved: 
 
I do think there has been an evolution in the approach. In the beginning in Sauri 
the people that came forward were either natural leaders or had an advantage 
in that they were elite in some way and they were able to benefit more than 
others. However, I certainly would not say that was 100 percent of the people 
involved in the project now.
66
 
 
By 2010, the project was in its sixth year and MVP staff members had been able to 
reach further to some of the vulnerable groups. A few staff felt that they were better 
equipped to focus on excluded people who may not have come forward at the 
beginning of the project. However, with such a large geographical area, an increasing 
number of recipients, and mounting strains on staff time to deliver all the components 
of the project, it is still to be determined whether all households had similar interactions 
and opportunities. This point is discussed in detail in the last part of this chapter.  
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 Interview, Willy Diru, MVP Agriculture Coordinator, Kisumu, May 7, 2010 
66
 Interview, Rafaela Kozar, MVP/EI Community Development Coordinator, Nairobi, June 24, 2010 
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Another challenge relates to the fact that MVP relies heavily on volunteer positions 
from the communities to manage the committees. There are heavy time commitments 
attached to these positions. Therefore, this time-related cost to participation affects 
community members differently depending on their ability to dedicate time. From the 
group of farmers interviewed in this research, 22 percent had been involved in one of 
MVP‟s committees. Of these farmers, membership is evenly divided between the two 
highest wealth categories. One poor farmer from the lowest wealth category explains: 
 
I already suffered from labour shortages on my farm and these commitments to 
participate in committees and planning groups were an even greater burden. 
They have so many meetings and I do not have the time to go there to listen.
67
  
 
Therefore, volunteering in certain committees excludes farming households who find it 
difficult to participate due to labour/time commitments or other social pressures. These 
constraints to participation fundamentally influence the social and power relations 
within the socio-technical system. The emphasis on participation, within a non-
homogeneous community, creates an unhealthy dynamic in which certain wealthier 
groups within the community are able to benefit disproportionately.  
 
In addition, due to the numerous development activities occurring simultaneously 
within the community, there is a large investment and related costs for MVP staff to 
ensure knowledge transfer and community involvement and participation. MVP staff 
members mentioned the personal and financial costs of organising the community to 
attend regular meetings for all the committees. Dependence on community participation 
caused frictions at times due to the fast pace of the MVP planning process and the need 
to synchronise implementation schedules. Some activities could not be carried out as 
planned because the government or village contributions were not in line with MVP 
planning deadlines. Moreover, delays in community contribution (i.e., community 
labour for various activities) affected some MVP activities.  
 
According to one Siaya focus group meeting, over the course of six years this became a 
growing problem with community members asked to participate in too many MVP 
committees. This resulted in falling participation rates and MVP village meetings 
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 Interview, female farmer, wealth category B, Nyandiwa, Butere, July 23, 2009 
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becoming less well attended.
68
 This mounting apathy challenges the „participatory‟ 
model that MVP espouses. According to one MVP staff member, low turnout in 
community feedback meetings has become a constant problem:  
 
The problem is that farmers are busy planting and MVP needs to plan meetings 
around the calendar of farmers. The problem is that there are so many sectors 
and each sector has their own meetings and own committees and these require 
a lot of the community‟s time.69 
 
The project relies on committee meetings to pass along information on MVP-related 
activities to the specific sector committees. However, it has proved difficult to ensure 
community attendance and that the right information is transferred to the broader 
community. Social structures again come into play in the dissemination process. At 
times, information from MVP stayed mostly within the committee and its members, 
failing to reach community members not involved in the committee, or not within the 
social networks of committee members. A number of farmers described how 
community members shared information within their own social networks, leaving out 
other groups (i.e., lower social standings and wealth categories): 
 
The elected leaders ignore us in information delivery. Sometimes the 
information from MVP does not reach us out here.
70
 
 
An elderly male farmer from the lowest wealth category who lives in a remote part of 
the sub-location expressed his concerns: 
 
I feel that MVP ignores this area at times, especially when it comes to 
information dissemination. Nothing about MVP is communicated to us.
71
 
 
This section illustrates that participatory development does not automatically translate 
into a process in which the participation of people within the development activities is 
realised. The knowledge included or excluded is subject to the local power networks 
and social structures that define the knowledge at that moment in time and space 
(Foucault, 1989). Therefore, knowledge becomes a „social product‟ (Antweiler, 1998) 
                                                     
68
 Sauri focus group meeting, Siaya, April 2009. 
69
 MVP staff meeting, Yala Town, Siaya, April 2009. 
70
 Interview, male farmer, Wealth Category B, Nyandiwa, Siaya, September 10, 2009. 
71
 Interview, male farmer, Wealth Category C, Nyandiwa, Siaya, September 9, 2009. 
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and it is not shared equally and thus “not necessarily sustainable, or socially just” 
(Bicker et al., 2004: 10). According to Cornwall (2002: 56): 
 
Without a dynamic understanding of people‟s social networks and the 
institutions and dimensions of difference that matters in the pursuit of their 
livelihoods, naive efforts to bring about equitable change may simply make 
things worse.   
 
MVP encountered exactly these challenges with the participation model as it aimed to 
implement a bottom-up approach to community and participatory development. The 
next section looks deeper into the capacity building and participation components of the 
model.  
 
Capacity building and participation 
 
An important part of MVP‟s programme involves training farmers on techniques of 
planting and soil health management, including application of fertiliser. Many of the 
respondents (61 percent) mentioned that they were using no fertiliser prior to MVP. 
Low use of inorganic fertiliser was confirmed by baseline data, which indicated that 
fertiliser use averaged only 1.5 kilograms of nitrogen and 1.1 kilograms of phosphate 
per hectare, resulting in poor crop production (average 0.9 tonnes of maize per hectare) 
(Millennium Villages Project, 2007: 12).  
 
The baseline study found that farmers used a combination of soil management 
techniques, including small amounts of inorganic fertiliser (DAP, urea), boma 
(farmyard) manure, compost, green manure (i.e., from trees and shrubs such as Tithonia 
diversifolia) and other techniques introduced earlier by ICRAF. However, the main 
goal for MVP was to increase productivity and their input package was based on hybrid 
seed and inorganic fertiliser. Therefore, the project spent considerable time training the 
farmers on fertiliser application, seed placement, spacing and weeding techniques. The 
aim was to transform the socio-technical system from a low- to a high-input system.  
 
Out of the 36 MVP households interviewed, every individual was able to describe in 
detail the training they received during the first two years of the programme. This high 
number is not surprising, since training sessions were a prerequisite to receiving the 
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input package. Some of the training was centred on improving or changing current 
planting practices. Some farmers mentioned that, prior to MVP, they were broadcasting 
maize seed and that one of the biggest lessons they learned was to plant in a row: 
 
I learned to use a spoonful of fertiliser and maize spacing was to be two feet. 
Before MVP we were broadcasting both maize and beans. At first we were told 
to plant maize in a pure stand but the second year we were told if we want to 
intercrop then we have to plant even beans in a line. We are still using that 
technique.
72
 
 
One female farmer from Nyandiwa described a new planting technique that she learned 
and that changed the way she plants her crop: 
 
We were trained since MVP came the first year. The kind of training given has 
helped. The main knowledge I got was on use of fertiliser. I also received 
knowledge on how to plant in lines. That is the knowledge we are still using 
today.
73
 
 
Almost every farmer interviewed described the training as one of the main benefits they 
received from MVP. However, interest in attending meetings and training has waned 
over the past few years. Only 14 percent of respondents confirmed attending an MVP 
meeting in 2009/10. The rest acknowledged it had been a while since they attended a 
meeting mostly because they had received no communication from MVP:  
 
The Millennium used to come when they gave some fertiliser and seed but after 
last two years, nobody has come. Most times, we have even forgotten that 
Millennium is around. We only remember when we see the red plated vehicles 
drive through our village.
74
 
 
This decrease in participation in meetings and training also affected membership in 
some of the sectoral committees set up at the beginning of the project. As one well-off 
male farmer from Sauri explains:  
 
I used to be on the Education Committee. I am still a member but it has 
slackened over the years. There is no burning interest like when we first 
started.
75
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 Interview, male farmer, wealth category A, Nyandiwa, Siaya, May 3, 2010. 
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 Interview, female farmer, wealth category A, Nyandiwa, Siaya, April 29, 2010. 
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 Interview, male farmer, wealth category B, Sauri, Siaya, April 27, 2010. 
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 Interview, male farmer, wealth category A, Sauri, Siaya, May 4, 2010. 
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MVP‟s Agriculture Coordinator Willy Diru has heard that villagers feel they no longer 
hear from the project because “it is winding down.” In his view, participation at the 
training was very high during the initial phase, but they have had difficulty in getting 
farmers to participate in activities and meetings more recently, after the subsidies were 
phased out: 
 
What was driving the farmers to come to the meetings was because they would 
be told the processes of getting free inputs. So now, you go to the meeting and 
you are told that these inputs are not going to be free and we are going to link 
you now with service providers, like the agro-vets and financial services. Then 
the person goes through his mind and says, “Maybe this is not the sort of thing 
that I am going to come here for”, so they drop out because of that.76  
 
This puts into question the value farmers placed on the training, when the main benefit 
of attending the training was perceived as the receipt of subsidised inputs. While many 
farmers have changed their farming practices to incorporate the lessons learned, it 
remains to be seen how long the new techniques will continue, especially when the 
training was not the initial reason for attending. One farmer highlights the link between 
participation and receiving inputs and explains why she no longer attends meetings:  
 
 I will only go to these trainings if I get fertiliser. When Millennium came, they 
started very strong, they brought us fertiliser and seeds. However, those of us 
who started weak are still down. Therefore, I feel that Millennium is just 
looking at those who started strong. Those who were weak they did not follow.
77
 
 
Participation in the training was not based on farmers‟ inherent need to learn about a 
new technology but was linked to being rewarded with a substantial package of 
valuable commodities. The result of linking training with inputs creates the situation in 
which participation begins to wane when the inputs are no longer there. Therefore, 
these external reward structures shaped the socio-technical system, which has a direct 
effect on the main outcomes of the programme. The following section goes into detail 
on the evolution of the input-support package and the outcomes of the programme.  
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 Interview, Willy Diru, MVP Agriculture Coordinator Interview, Kisumu. May 7, 2010. 
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 Interview, female farmer, wealth category C, Lihanda, Siaya, April 27, 2010. 
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MVP’s input-support programme: From universal subsidy to targeting 
 
One of MVP‟s main interventions is the supply of subsidised fertilisers and improved 
seeds to every household in the Millennium Villages. The underlying strategy was to 
“quickly and dramatically increase crop yields” by applying inorganic fertilisers “at 
recommended rates, ranging from 50 to 100 kilograms of nitrogen and 5 to 20 
kilograms of phosphorus per hectare” (Millennium Villages Project, 2010: 21) .  
 
In 2005, the first year of MVP, every farmer in Sauri received the equivalent of 100 
kilograms of nitrogen and 50 kilograms of phosphorus per hectare on all plots planted 
with maize for the long rains (Millennium Villages Project, 2005: 8). This translated 
into two bags (100 kilograms) of DAP planting fertiliser, 1 bag (50 kilograms) of urea 
top dressing fertiliser and 10 kilograms of maize seed for each acre (0.4 hectares). 
MVP, the Agriculture Committee and the landowner calculated the land area for each 
household and determined the size of the input package. The smallest quantity of DAP 
received among Sauri respondents in this research in the first year of subsidy was 50 
kilograms and the largest was 300 kilograms. Willy Diru, MVP Agriculture 
Coordinator, explained the process:  
 
In the first year, Sauri got a high level of subsidy. The amount of subsidy was 
much higher than in the other sub-locations. In Sauri, one could get as high as 
150 kilograms of DAP because every farmer was provided according to the 
area of land that was measured. The maize plot area determined the amount of 
fertiliser a farmer would receive.
78
 
 
The MVP agriculture team, which included soil scientists and other experts based in 
New York and Kisumu, designed the input package. They conducted baseline soil 
surveys in Sauri and found the soils to be deficient in nitrogen and phosphorus 
(Chomba, 2007: 60). Due to the severity of nitrogen depletion, the MVP team decided 
to provide a technology package that supplied a heavy dose of nitrogen fertiliser (100 
kilograms per hectare) in the first year. According to Patrick Mutuo, there was little 
fear of acidifying the soil with this high level: 
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 Interview, Willy Diru, MVP Agriculture Coordinator, Kisumu. October 16, 2009. 
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We were dealing with highly buffered soils. Therefore, we would need 
something like 20 years of application of urea to make an impact on the pH 
levels of the soils.
79
 
 
Application of 100 kilograms of nitrogen per hectare is above the KARI 
recommendations of 75 kilograms per hectare (KARI, 1994). KARI‟s recommendation 
was based on the Fertiliser Use Recommendation Project (FURP), a national field 
testing trial conducted between 1966 and 1986 (FURP/KARI, 1994). Kenya‟s current 
national fertiliser recommendations stem from these early trials. The MVP agriculture 
team felt that the FURP/KARI trials were outdated for this area and, based on the 
optimal rates of return from MVP field tests, decided to use a heavier dosage.  
 
Despite existing criticisms from others (cf. Gudu et al., 2005) that the KARI 
recommendations are already too high, particularly for the majority of smallholder 
farmers in Western Kenya who cannot afford them, MVP was concerned initially with 
getting the highest yields possible for the farmers. Due to the high profile of the project 
and the desire to meet the MDG goal of „halving hunger‟ within five years, there was a 
strong interest from project designers to obtain fast and impressive results. Therefore, 
MVP‟s initial distribution of fertilisers was aimed at improving yields and 
demonstrating results quickly. As Diru explained: 
 
The initial philosophy was this issue of „quick wins‟. You go in there and have 
an impact, a bang, in addressing the issues of hunger by raising food 
availability through increased yields. To me it was the right thinking because it 
had the right impact, where within the first year the households were seeing 
themselves with vast quantities of maize. We even had problems with storage 
within the homes. It had a very big positive impact and prepared the entry of the 
other agricultural interventions, such as diversification, later on.
80
 
 
This initial package design was applied only for the first year. In the second year of the 
project (2006), MVP widened its operations, increasing the number of households from 
the original 1,000 to roughly 11,000 households. They also changed the input package, 
setting quantities of inputs at a predetermined rate that was no longer based on acreage.  
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 Interview, Patrick Mutuo, Agriculture Specialist, MDG Centre, interview, Nairobi, April 11, 2011. 
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 Interview, Willy Diru, MVP Agriculture Coordinator Interview, Kisumu. May 7, 2010. 
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For Sauri, the second-year package of inputs was 50 percent less than that received in 
2005. MVP determined that farmers within Sauri (MV1) were to receive 50 kilograms 
of DAP and 50 kilograms of urea per 0.4 hectare. The interviews support this, with all 
the Sauri farmers describing how they received half the package in the second year. 
However, they were still receiving inputs for multiple maize plots. For example, two 
farmers from Sauri received 150 kilograms of DAP in the second year. Therefore, the 
second-year inputs were still enough for most farmers‟ main plots and yields continued 
to increase.  
 
The surrounding 10 sub-locations (MV2) were treated differently. MVP staff decided to 
base the subsidy input package on an estimation of land sizes. MVP conducted a 
household land survey based on 300 randomly selected households from the 10 new 
sub-locations, from which they calculated the average holding size to be 0.34 hectares 
per household. Diru explained this breakdown: 
 
In the other villages, we estimated an average acreage for the whole cluster that 
was 0.34 of a hectare. Therefore, each household received an equivalent of 40 
kilograms of fertiliser, which is sufficient for 0.34 hectare. Instead of varying 
inputs we assumed each farmer gets 40 kilograms of DAP and 40 kilograms of 
top dressing. Everyone got the same amount in these clusters, whereas in Sauri 
each farmer was given inputs according to their farm size.
81
 
 
There were several reasons for giving a uniform rate. First, the expansion of the 
programme meant it was no longer feasible for project staff to measure each plot of 
land. Second, each new sub-location was labelled as MV2, which meant they were not 
considered „Research Villages‟ (MV1) as in Sauri, and received a lower level of 
monitoring and reporting. Third, and most importantly, the MVP operates within a set 
budget for the inputs, which was based on a predetermined value of 15 percent of the 
overall budget, based on a ratio of 1,000 farming households per sub-location. The new 
sub-locations had more households than anticipated, so MVP field staff decided to limit 
the amount of the input packages to fit within the existing budget constraints.  
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 Interview, Willy Diru, MVP Agriculture Coordinator, Interview, Kisumu. October 16, 2009. 
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MVP field staff members explain the change in policy from universal to targeted 
subsidy and the programmatic choices that happened due to budget constraints. Patrick 
Mutuo, who used to coordinate the Sauri site, clarifies the rationale:  
 
Yes, five years is what was promised to the communities when we started the 
project. However, the reason for limiting the subsidies was based on the whole 
MVP budget. The cost of fertiliser would have taken the whole agriculture 
budget and if it went on for five years then it would have over shot the entire 
budget, leaving very little for other activities.
82
 
 
At this stage, the MVP input-support programme began to adapt to the overarching 
administrative pressure from the subsidy requirements and its financial limits. MVP 
cluster administration staff were given some leeway to interpret the model according to 
the specific conditions on the ground, and therefore the overall input programme in 
Siaya began to change as field and budget realities evolved over time.  
 
Introduction of a micro-credit scheme 
 
By the third year of operations (2007), both MV1 (Sauri) and MV2 (including 
Nyandiwa and Lihanda) were receiving a greatly reduced subsidy. The project had 
hoped that after two years of declining subsidy that the farmers would make up the 
difference and „top-up‟ with the amount of fertiliser needed to continue their levels of 
productivity. Diru described the process: 
 
The first year was full subsidy and then the second year it was reduced. In some 
places, it was reduced to around 75 percent, in other places to 50 percent. We 
were asking the farmers to make up the balance. There was an assumption that 
you provide that 50 percent and then the farmer will go out to the shops and buy 
the difference to make up to what he needs.
83
 
 
The assumption that farmers would „top-up‟ with additional fertiliser was met with 
mixed results. In the MV2 cluster sites, farmers received 75 percent of the previous 
year‟s inputs which meant those who had received 30–40 kilograms of DAP in 2006 
received 25–35 kilograms in 2007. Farmers‟ reactions were varied. Approximately 28 
percent described how they managed to purchase additional fertilisers, ranging from 10 
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83
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to 35 kilograms. The majority of the households that were able to purchase additional 
inputs came from the highest wealth category and were overwhelmingly male-headed 
households. The rest of the interviewed farmers adjusted to the reduction in subsidy by 
incorporating their existing methods of soil fertility management. They mixed the 
fertiliser with farm manure or compost to make up for the decrease in quantity. A small 
number of households interviewed, mostly from the lowest wealth category, did not top 
up at all. This group described how they changed the application rate, applying „mos 
mos‟ (little by little) on the plots closest to their homes.  
 
In 2007, MVP also piloted a credit voucher system in Sauri in partnership with Saga 
Thrift and Enterprise Promotion Ltd (Saga), a local micro-finance institution (MFI). 
The input subsidy ended for approximately 75 percent of farmers in Sauri, and they 
were asked to register with Saga to receive a loan for the inputs instead. The remaining 
25 percent of Sauri farmers were listed as „vulnerable‟ and were targeted for a special 
input subsidy programme.  
 
At first, the loans were available only to Sauri farmers. The surrounding 10 sub-
locations (which started a year later) still received subsidised inputs through a subsidy 
voucher programme. This new voucher programme was created by MVP to improve 
the capacity of agro-input dealers in the area. MVP worked with CNFA (formerly 
known as the Citizen‟s Network for Foreign Affairs) Agricultural Market Development 
Trust (AGMARK), an American NGO that specialises in capacity building, to train and 
certify approximately 13 agro-dealers in the 11 sub-locations to administer the voucher 
programme.
84
 Vouchers were given to all farmers receiving the input subsidies. The 
farmers would present these vouchers to the registered agro-dealers to be redeemed for 
a specified amount of inputs. The agro-dealers were either existing shops that received 
additional training or new shops set up to improve access to inputs in the area.   
 
A farmer in the lowest wealth category from Lihanda explained how he coped with the 
decrease in subsidised inputs:  
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 CNFA is working with AGRA to promote agro-dealers in multiple countries. Building agro-dealers to 
bring technology closer to the smallholder farmers remains central to the efforts of many organisations‟ 
Green Revolution agenda. To read more on the links between agro-dealers and the Green Revolution in 
Kenya see Odame and Muange (2010) “Can Agro-dealers Deliver the Green Revolution in Kenya?” at 
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The first year with Millennium, I got 14 bags, which is the best yield of my life. I 
was able to sell three bags to pay school fees and we consumed the rest. 
However, the second year [2007], the fertiliser was less so I bought some more 
inputs because I believed if I added more fertiliser my production would 
increase. However, my production was not as much as I had expected. This year 
I only got nine bags. I blame the fertiliser we were given by Millennium and too 
much rain at harvest time. The fertiliser this year looked different and did not 
perform as it should. However, I am happy I was able to sell four bags to pay 
for my daughter to learn tailoring.
85
 
 
MVP‟s agro-dealer programme suffered from a number of difficulties. First, there was 
little trust established between the farmers and the new agro-dealer shops. The majority 
of farmers had not previously purchased inputs through local agro-dealers. Those who 
did purchase inputs tended to rely on the larger trading centres. Some farmers felt that 
the agro-dealers were giving sub-standard inputs. Other farmers felt that the agro-
dealers were cheating them somehow on the quantity of inputs offered. Samson, an 
Agriculture Representative from Nyandiwa, explained at a focus group meeting some 
of the distrust that occurred between farmers and the agro-dealers: 
 
 In 2007, MVP used agro-dealers and brought in AGMARK, which really 
sidelined us in the Agriculture Committees. Instead of giving us DAP fertiliser, 
the dealers brought in another type of fertiliser. Our yields were lower and it 
went down because the agro-dealers were not giving us the best fertilisers and 
seed. They gave us bad quality inputs and our yields suffered for it.
86
 
 
Second, some of the agro-dealers were new businesses, or new to agro-inputs, and 
lacked proper experience in managing a seasonal business. Many of them struggled to 
stay open despite receiving training and certification from CNFA/AGMARK. They 
faced several challenges, including management issues, adapting to the seasonal nature 
of the products, competition from bigger shops in larger market centres, poor transport 
links that increased the cost of the inputs, and lack of credit to stock their shelves with 
adequate quantities of inputs.   
 
Unfortunately, in 2007, farmers in MVP suffered one of their lowest yields since the 
start of the programme in 2005, even though rainfall was plentiful. This could have 
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been due to the heavy hailstorms and floods that struck the area that year. However, 
MVP had its own speculation as to the causes of the low yields, according to a report 
by Nziguheba et al. (2010: 92): 
 
In Sauri, the variations in maize yields in 2005 (Year 1), 2006, and 2008 are 
correlated with seasonal rainfall totals. But the lowest yields observed in 2007, 
the year with the highest seasonal rainfall, are perhaps due to a shift in the 
management of inputs distributed from MVP to a local NGO [Saga] and agro 
dealers. 
 
This poor performance signalled to MVP that they needed to change the way they 
distributed their inputs. The poor experience with setting up agro-dealers and using a 
small micro-finance institute with limited capacity to carry out the voucher programme 
prompted MVP to change again its course of action. By late 2007, MVP had created a 
new entity called Millennium Farms Limited to administer a new credit scheme to the 
farmers in all 11 clusters. 
 
Millennium Farms Limited 
 
Millennium Farms was an agri-business development company created to facilitate the 
provision of farm input credit to farmers in the MVP and promote contract farming in 
maize production. It focused on providing credit to the 12,700 maize farmers within the 
MVP project catchment. Millennium Farms still partnered with Saga, the same local 
micro-finance institution, to help administer the loans. However, this time, the number 
of loans was expanded to include all 11 sub-locations. Saga had no previous experience 
with such a large client base and therefore relied heavily on Millennium Farms for 
building its capacity to handle this increase in loans.  
 
By early 2008, political upheavals in Kenya arising from the December 2007 
presidential elections had sparked violence and unrest in many areas. Across the 
country, farmers were displaced and businesses were affected. Prices of inputs rose 
sharply and distribution channels for inputs were disrupted. Siaya was heavily affected 
by these national events and many agro-dealers went out of business. Therefore, instead 
of rebuilding the agro-dealer networks in the sub-locations, Millennium Farms took 
over the distribution of the input packages to farmers. Even though MVP had invested 
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in setting up these agro-dealer networks in 2007, changes in MVP programmatic 
direction from headquarters in New York, coupled with Kenya‟s national political 
realities, forced MVP to abandon their agro-dealer programme and begin a new input 
supply and distribution system. According to Willy Diru: 
 
The post-election violence had a devastating effect on the agro-dealers in the 
MVP area. The agro-dealers we set up in the cluster are just out of business.
87
 
 
Therefore, the programme stopped using agro-dealers because the post-election 
violence had disrupted the distribution networks and an alternative was needed quickly. 
Yet, due to administrative issues associated with setting up a new entity and a new 
system of operations, Millennium Farms did not become operational until March 2008. 
The late start coincided with the onset of the long-rains and a crucial time for planting. 
In Willy Diru‟s view, this led to a precarious situation that forced the project to 
implement the new programme in the quickest way possible: 
 
Because of the political upheavals, there was not sufficient time to phase in the 
credit programme gradually. We were in a rush to get started and to give the 
farmers the inputs.
88
 
 
The short timeframe available for distributing inputs to the farmers in time for the 
planting season meant that communication concerning the credit scheme had to take 
place very rapidly. Many of the procedures surrounding building farmers‟ groups and 
verification of credit worthiness were not accomplished. Every household within the 
MVP area was automatically eligible for a loan. Saga was given a list of households 
and no other screening, appraisal or credit checks were made. Farmers were able to 
request a loan package ranging from US$50 to 200. Approximately 7,300 out of 12,700 
(around 57 percent) of households in the 11 sub-locations applied for loans with Saga.
89
 
The farmers received a voucher from Saga indicating the amount of the loan and they 
could redeem this voucher for farm inputs from Millennium Farms directly. 
Millennium Farms brought the fertilisers to central depots previously used by MVP to 
distribute the free inputs and farmers went to these designated pick-up spots.  
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Since the loans were a relatively new process for the outlying clusters, MVP held many 
meetings to explain the process to farmers. However, even with numerous information 
sessions, the research found that the short timeframe caught many farmers off-guard. 
Farmers interviewed expressed concern about the change in direction from subsidies to 
a credit system and the limited advance warning they were given. The farmers in the 
lower wealth category were much less aware of the changes. As stated by one 
respondent: 
 
MVP should be announcing to farmers issues related to programme changes, 
such as coming up of loaning institutions, in advance so that we have time to 
prepare and to re-organise our decision making. We were given too short notice 
when this happened and many farmers were unsure of what to do.
90
 
 
This disconnect between the MVP staff understanding of the process and dissemination 
of information led to confusion and frustrations among farmers. MVP‟s shift in 
direction from a long-term full subsidy programme originally conveyed to the 
community, combined with the rapid expansion of the project to 10 additional 
locations, affected the relationship between the project and the communities. The 
relation between the networks of actors involved also shifted. The shift in input 
suppliers from direct project distribution to agro-dealers to wholesale distributors (such 
as Millennium Farms) was an important determinant in restructuring the socio-technical 
system in fundamental ways. The creation of new actors generated new trust issues and 
changed power relations, which affected access to and delivery of the technology. 
Furthermore, the project suffered from the wider political turmoil associated with the 
post-election violence, demonstrating how larger national-level political forces can 
affect micro-level socio-technical structures. 
 
Uptake and repayment of the micro-credit programme 
 
Of the recipients interviewed, 53 percent reported taking the Saga loan through 
Millennium Farms. The majority that took loans (68 percent) were in the highest wealth 
category (Category A). These households have multiple plots of land and multiple 
sources of income (especially from remittances) that can be relied on as a safety net for 
loan repayment if the need arises. One well-off female farmer reports: 
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I thought that if I get the loan I could get a good harvest and sell it to repay the 
loan. I harvested 18 bags from all my plots, and sold five bags to repay Saga. I 
even had enough money saved from my previous harvest to hire extra land and 
labour to make sure I got a good harvest so I was able to clear my Saga loan.
91
 
 
Of the 47 percent of households that did not take the Saga/Millennium Farms loan, 
most (82 percent) came from the middle and lowest wealth categories (Categories B 
and C). The reasons for not taking the loan included a fear of loans and that they would 
be unable to repay the loan. One farmer observed: 
 
I assessed my situation and realised that I would not be able to repay the loan 
and I worried about that repayment, so I did not take the loan.
92
 
 
However, there was some miscommunication, with at least three widows from the 
lowest wealth category not taking the loan because they assumed they were still eligible 
for subsidised inputs. Once they realised that they would not receive inputs, it was too 
late and they were unable to participate in the loan programme. One widow describes 
what happened: 
 
I thought my name would be on the list of vulnerable because I was told that all 
widows would be on the list by the village elders. Therefore, I waited to see if 
my name was on the list and it was not. By then I had missed signing up for 
Saga and I was not able to take the loan.
93
 
 
Besides a fear of defaulting and confusion over eligibility, many other social factors 
featured in the decision-making process. There were indications that some village 
leaders were pressuring farmers who had decided not to take the Saga loan. Village 
elders and agriculture representatives mentioned at focus group meetings how they 
went to homesteads in their village to ask why someone was not taking a loan. These 
household visits resulted in some farmers, especially in Lihanda, feeling coerced into 
taking a loan. These social pressures were felt within all wealth categories. Beatrice, an 
elderly widow from the highest income category, explains:  
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I was told that whether we like it or not that we had to take a loan. The 
Assistant Chief and the village elders were going house-to-house to tell us to 
take a loan. I was afraid of a loan. However, I was not feeling free, I felt forced 
to take a loan.
94
 
 
Beatrice had never taken a formal loan before and had many reservations, yet she took 
the loan after being approached by the Assistant Chief. She explained how she felt 
obliged to listen to the village leaders and decided that it was better to go along with 
their request than go against it. Because she came from a well-respected homestead, she 
was more inclined to follow the social pressures exerted by the village elders and since 
she was part of their social network she had more to lose by not doing as they asked.  
 
However, Anginya Tabu, MVP staff member who worked for Millennium Farms, 
questions the validity of these claims of coercion and states that farmers often report 
being compelled to take the loan when they find they cannot pay it back. He argues that 
farmers were using the excuse of coercion and social pressure as a justification for non-
repayment. According to Tabu, the role of the village leaders and Assistant Chiefs was 
to raise awareness of the loans, not to force members to take the loan. Therefore, MVP 
staff members see this social pressure as a distortion of their message.
95
 
 
Another factor that led some farmers to take the loan was the close association with the 
MVP subsidy programme. During one interview, a farmer discussed how she had been 
originally against taking the loan, but then she heard from a neighbour that it was a 
“loan from Millennium” and not to worry if she could not pay it back. Another farmer 
states: 
 
The loan was the first one I have ever taken. I was told by the Assistant Chief 
that every household must take a loan. Therefore, I decided to take the loan. 
Initially I was not willing but since everyone was taking it, I thought I should 
too.
96
 
 
The move from universal subsidy to a credit programme was not well received by 
respondents, who felt the project had not upheld its promises. Farmers expressed the 
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opinion that the initial communication from MVP indicated that the subsidy would run 
for five years. One farmer articulated it in the following manner: 
 
Two years is not enough. We were told we would be given fertiliser for free for 
five years. We had expected Millennium to be five years so we were not 
prepared. If we had been told it would be one or two years from the beginning, 
then we would have been prepared.
97
 
 
Another farmer stated that the change in policy was not explained adequately: 
 
When Millennium came in 2005, there was communication that this assistance 
would be for five years. Nobody gave us a good explanation why this aid was no 
longer for five years.
98
  
 
While some farmers may have felt inadequately prepared, MVP staff member Jessica 
Masira (Community Coordinator at that time) reported that they conducted extensive 
information activities and follow-up meetings to reinforce understanding of the loan 
agreement. Farmers interviewed concur that they had been part of meetings to discuss 
the nature of the loan and repayment schedules. Farmers stated the loans issue became 
a regular topic of discussion at their barazas (village meetings). Therefore, the 
information was being presented, but the extent to which misinformation occurred or 
social pressures played a role in persuading members to sign up to the loan remains 
unclear and would require further analysis into the decision-making process and effects 
of social pressures from within the community. 
 
Once farmers had signed up for their loans and planted, they were to repay their loans 
after they had harvested their crops. One component of the credit programme was that 
repayment was to be made to Millennium Farms, not to Saga, the micro-finance 
institution. Repayment was to be in the form of maize at the time of harvest. 
Millennium Farms set the repayment ratio based on a predetermined price of maize and 
then tagged it to the amount of loan taken by the farmer. For example, one bag of maize 
(90 kilograms) was worth approximately US$14. Therefore, if the farmer received a 
loan for US$90, then the farmer was to repay seven bags of maize.
99
 This calculation 
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 Interview, female farmer, wealth category A, Lihanda, Siaya, May 13, 2009. 
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 Interview, male farmer, wealth category C, Sauri, Siaya, June 4, 2009.  
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 Since describing yields in terms of bags of maize per hectare is a common practice in Kenya, it was 
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also included the interest on the loan. Millennium Farms would store the maize and sell 
it at a higher price later in the season. It was expected that the profit from the sale of 
maize would create a viable business model, allowing the loans to be carried on the 
following year.  
 
However, after the harvest in 2008, the market price of maize exceeded the rates agreed 
by Millennium Farms with the farmers at the beginning of the year. This led many 
farmers to sell their maize to resellers who were offering better prices. Farmers then 
asked to repay the loan in cash instead. Millennium Farms initially refused the cash 
repayment, but later changed its policy to meet the farmers‟ demands, reducing the 
number of bags required for repayment. This only increased the farmers‟ confusion 
since now some farmers were repaying less than those who had repaid earlier. To add 
to the difficulties, farmers complained that unfavourable weather had affected their 
yields, which were now too low to allow them to repay in full. One farmer describes the 
list of problems encountered that season: 
 
My yield was very bad. The seed was bad and many people complained. The 
time of distribution of inputs was late. In addition, we had some bad weather 
and animals disturbed the crops. I only harvested one and a half bags on my 
quarter acre, so I sold half a bag and paid back a portion of the loan. I was not 
able to clear the loan with Saga.
100
 
 
Even after MVP staff organised numerous community meetings, a high outstanding 
default rate remained and repayments from the 2008 credit programme were much 
lower than Millennium Farms had anticipated. By April 2009, only 40 percent of all 
farmers had repaid the 2008 loans.
101
 MVP instigated an internal study to investigate 
the reasons for the low repayment rate, but they have yet to release the results. 
According to Anginya Tabu, one of the main problems was: 
 
Everyone qualified for the loans so there was no collateral and no appraisals 
done. This should have been done and not everyone should have been given 
loans. Therefore, farmers took loans without consequences, so there were no 
incentives to pay back.
102
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 Interview, female farmer, wealth category B, Lihanda, Siaya, May 9, 2009. 
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 Interview, Anginya Tabu, Programme Coordinator Millennium Farms, Kisumu, April 17, 2009. 
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 Interview, Anginya Tabu, Programme Coordinator Millennium Farms, Kisumu, April 17, 2009. 
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According to Tabu, the sub-locations with the lowest repayment rates were those in 
which the village leaders and elders did not repay. He assumed this was a significant 
factor, as it was difficult for MVP to ask the village leaders to use social pressures to 
persuade people to repay when the leaders had not yet repaid.  
 
Patrick Mutuo (previous Team Leader for Sauri) lists two main reasons for the low 
repayment rate. First, the heavy involvement of the project in the loan programme 
made it difficult for farmers to disassociate between the project and the loans. Many 
staff members from Millennium Farms were also working with MVP, and MVP staff 
often delivered the messages about the loans. The farmers knew the project would have 
little power in enforcing repayment, so there was little risk associated with non-
repayment. Second, farmers generally failed to understand how the credit system 
worked. The rush to implement the programme resulted in insufficient training and the 
farmers failed to realise that timely repayments would allow them access to future 
loans. This was seen as a short-term project that required no commitments and had no 
repercussions or benefits in the future. 
 
This brief analysis of MVP‟s evolving credit system demonstrates how external forces, 
due in this case to the post-election instability, can de-rail planned activities. In this 
case, the MVP administrators quickly changed the input-support model without putting 
in place adequate training and procedures to allow staff to explain changes to the 
farmers. This led to a lack of understanding among the farmers and changed the 
dynamics of the relationships. Local leaders became more involved in the process and 
were able to use their authority to influence farmers‟ involvement in the programme. 
This relationship between the local powers and the community created a new dynamic 
in the socio-technical system, and ultimately created further tensions within the villages 
and with the project. MVP was aware of the shortcomings of its credit programme, 
which was evident through the poor repayment schedule and the social tensions it 
created, and once again adjusted the programme. The socio-technical system was thus 
evolving continuously in response to the wider system, which included credit finance, 
agro-dealer capacity and relationships between communities and the project, as well as 
to the technologies themselves.  
 
  
148 
 
Changing to commercial credit 
 
The following year (2009), MVP changed the system again and took over the input 
delivery programme once more. MVP closed down its operations within Millennium 
Farms and ended its partnership with the micro-finance institution, Saga. Instead, MVP 
started a new credit programme by linking with Equity Bank, a large and well-
established commercial bank, to administer loans to those who qualified. MVP worked 
with the development organisation AGRA to support credit guarantees to Equity Bank 
and encourage the bank to offer loans to the farmers.  
 
MVP and Equity Bank put new loan criteria in place. MVP stated that only farmers 
who had cleared their previous loans to Saga in 2008 were eligible for the loan. Even 
partial repayment of the loan was not admissible. These strict criteria meant that only 
1,500 farmers out of a possible 12,700 were eligible for loans. No other loan package 
was offered to the farmers who did not qualify. Farmers who were entitled to the loans 
had mixed feelings. Some welcomed the new structure, since Equity Bank offered new 
options of savings accounts and other loan products. Others mentioned that they chose 
not to take the loan since Equity Bank had too many conditions and they feared they 
could lose their lands if they did not repay the loan. Approximately 916 farmers (61 
percent of those that qualified and roughly seven percent of the entire MVP cluster 
population) took the Equity loan in 2009.
103
  
 
One poor female farmer from Lihanda described how she felt excluded from the new 
loan programme: 
 
I would have liked to continue to get another loan but I could not because I had 
not cleared my Saga loan. However, I did struggle to pay almost half of that 
loan, and now it does not matter how much I struggle to clear it. It is not very 
fair as I was willing to be in Equity but I did not qualify.
104
  
 
This rapid change to include Equity Bank as the new credit provider was difficult for 
both the farmers and MVP field staff implementing the project. While Saga, the smaller 
micro-finance institution, had problems with capacity, it had allowed MVP staff control 
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 Interview, Anginya Tabu, Programme Coordinator Millennium Farms, Kisumu, April 17, 2009. 
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 Interview, female farmer, wealth category C, Lihanda, Siaya, September 2, 2009. 
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over the process and the staff had grown familiar with Saga staff. The initial year of the 
new programme presented challenges as MVP staff adjusted to the new structure and 
requirements. The selection criteria were set by MVP staff in New York and did not 
have full agreement from the field staff in Kisumu. As one senior field officer stated: 
 
I do not agree with the 100 percent cut off for repayment to get the Equity loan. 
I would have liked the cut off to be around 65 percent, which shows to me a 
commitment to repay. However, New York was strict on the 100 percent 
repayment criteria. It cut off so many people from receiving assistance.
105
 
 
At the time of this research, the full numbers of the repayments had not been 
calculated. However, indications were that 2010 repayments were much higher than 
those of the previous season. This is to be expected as farmers took the loan from 
Equity Bank much more seriously. However, with only seven percent of the MVP 
cluster taking part in this lending scheme, the scheme‟s overall impact on alleviating 
food security in the area is questionable. The majority of the food-insecure farmers are 
in the lower wealth categories that did not take part in the Equity Bank credit 
programme. Therefore, the network of actors taking part was restructured again, 
especially when the project changed its plans to outsource the delivery of finance and 
technology without full consultation with the community. Such frequent restructuring 
of the relationship between actors has had negative impacts on the overall system of 
trust, power, politics and relations.  
 
Choosing the vulnerable  
 
While the majority of households were no longer eligible for subsidies or loans under 
the 2009 commercial bank credit system, the MVP still operates a targeted subsidy 
programme for farmers listed as vulnerable, aimed at the poorest 25 percent of the 
entire population. The local agriculture committee members put the targeted lists 
together by asking each village to name the most vulnerable members of their 
communities, based on criteria provided by MVP. Once the list was compiled, MVP 
and the agriculture committee held a general farmers meeting during which the 
community could discuss and finalise the list.  
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 Interview, MVP field staff, Nyandiwa, Siaya, April 23, 2009. 
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However, it is difficult to ensure transparency and accountability in implementing such 
a system, due to existing power relations and the status of various community 
members. According to Florence Ashioya, MVP‟s Agriculture Facilitator for Lihanda, 
the process of leaving it up to the community to decide on the list of vulnerable had its 
difficulties:  
 
That selection is a bit tricky because even during the selection, we may not 
know the real vulnerable so we rely on the community to give us those who are 
vulnerable and they do not always give us the real vulnerable. They give us 
some people who are a little bit well off, depending on how they relate with the 
community. Therefore, it is a bit tricky, it may not work 100 percent if we were 
to go out looking for these vulnerable people and if you get a real vulnerable 
person, these are guys who do not even mix with others. If you go talking to that 
person, he may not even listen to you.
106
 
 
Willy Diru also mentioned the problem of social pressures brought on by some village 
leaders who may push certain members to be part of the vulnerable list: 
 
There is one sub-location where the Assistant Chief is much more outgoing and 
he will bring in those people he considers vulnerable. Once we subject it to that 
general meeting sometimes you can have the community feeling intimidated 
with who the Assistant Chief has brought on the list. But this happens only in 
one sub-location, in the rest of the sub-locations the Assistant Chief will just sit 
there as a participant.
107
 
 
Nevertheless, MVP staff members were readily available to investigate any 
discrepancies and address problems that arose with the subsidy programme for the 
vulnerable. This constant monitoring helped the programme run more smoothly. While 
it did not eliminate all the community criticisms, close monitoring of the process did 
help to ensure that the community and project staff vetted the list, thereby improving 
the targeting process.  
 
However, targeting the vulnerable based on criteria developed by MVP once again 
restructured the local socio-technical interface by defining a particular group (i.e., the 
„vulnerable‟) within the community that had not been defined during the original 
inception of the programme. The politics of defining this group – and so providing 
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 Interview, Florence Ashioya, Agriculture Facilitator, Lihanda, Siaya, October 21, 2009. 
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 Interview, Willy Diru, MVP Agriculture Coordinator Interview, Kisumu, May 7
th
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them with access to inputs – ensured that community politics (and elite manoeuvres) 
were able to exert a degree of control. The impacts of this are highlighted in the next 
section, which provides a deeper analysis of how the programmatic changes and 
challenges of the input-support system affected the household-level narrative.  
 
The outcome of the programme 
 
As the previous sections have shown, MVP‟s input-supply programme shifted, from 
providing a universal subsidy, to a targeted subsidy programme, followed by a formal 
credit system. At the same time, there was a focus on training in such complementary 
technologies as crop diversification and improved fallows. The content of the package 
given to farmers also changed over the course of the project and included fertiliser and 
seed together with extensive training on planting and soil management techniques (i.e., 
spacing, agro-forestry, improved fallows and green legume crops). With such a range 
of interventions, the perceptions of the input-support programme are often tied to the 
entirety of the MVP activities.  
 
As stated earlier, Siaya is a food-deficient area with the majority of households being 
net buyers of food. A large proportion (86 percent) of the farmers interviewed did not 
produce enough maize to feed their families and had to buy maize for at least five 
months of the year. However, all households interviewed stated that when MVP began 
to distribute the subsidised input packages, they experienced increases in their yields. 
As a farmer from the middle wealth category explained: 
 
Life is now different from before MVP. Food security is there. Before MVP we 
could only have maize for a short time and we bought maize, but now we have 
enough food.
108
 
 
When the MVP input-subsidy programme stopped, the majority of farmers (97 percent) 
reported a decrease in their yields compared to when the subsidy programme was 
operating. This affected their food security status and, by 2010, they again began to 
purchase maize for part of the year.
109
 However, half of the farmers reported a shorter 
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 It is important to note that yields are affected by many other factors, including rainfall. The country 
experienced a prolonged drought in many areas from 2007 to 2009. And while the 2009 long rains were 
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maize-deficit period of around three–four months in March–June. The remaining half 
stated that they had returned to the same level of food insecurity as they experienced 
prior to the MVP interventions. This observation is supported by a study that measured 
farmers‟ perceptions of the food security situation before and after MVP interventions. 
That study interviewed 246 respondents from Sauri and found that 54 percent of 
respondents felt they were now more food secure than prior to the MVP interventions, 
while 46 percent reported remaining food insecure (Okoth, 2010: 63).  
 
From the farmers I interviewed, the group most affected by the decrease in subsides 
was the widows from the lowest wealth category. The comments of two poor widows 
from Lihanda illustrate their views: 
 
In the first two years of MVP, my life changed, but in the last two years, my life 
is back to where it was. I only benefited from two years of good harvests, and I 
did not invest in anything else. At least my children get school meals from 
Millennium‟s school feeding programme so they do not disturb me for meals at 
home. That is the only positive thing I have seen.
110
 
 
I would say I was food secure for the first two years. But I am not food secure at 
this time. I started having problems last year when Saga came. I did not take the 
loan and the yield was low because I was unable to purchase inputs.
111
 
 
Helen Anyango is one of these poor widows who did not managed to retain the 
advances she made during the early years of the subsidy programme. Helen became a 
widow at the age of 24. She has not remarried and lives in her husband‟s family 
compound with her four young children. She has approximately 0.30 hectares of land to 
sustain her family. She had never used inorganic fertiliser before Millennium and 
depended mostly on household and farm waste that she mixes into compost. While she 
owns only a few chickens, she is allowed to gather some manure from her mother-in-
law‟s livestock, but only if her mother-in-law does not require it and if there is any left 
for her to share. Most times Helen does not use anything on her land. The highest yield 
she received was two bags of maize. This is not enough to feed her family so she 
depends on handouts from her relatives in the compound.  
                                                                                                                                                          
considered average, the rains in 2010 were much more variable, with heavy flooding in the early part of 
the year (March) and then failing of the short-rains (Oct/Nov), which heavily affected yield rates for 
many farmers in that region (GOK, 2010d).    
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 Interview, female farmer, wealth category C, Nyandiwa, Siaya, April 27, 2010. 
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 Interview, female farmer, wealth category C, Nyandiwa, Siaya, April 28, 2010. 
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Figure 15: Helen Anyango showing her fields destroyed by Striga 
 
When MVP came, Helen was given the input package and her yield jumped from two 
to six bags of maize; during the second year this increased to seven bags. She had never 
received such high yields before and she says that her life had changed. She had a few 
reservations about the DAP since she had never used it before, but when she saw 
everyone in her village using the package she decided it must be a good thing. After 
two years, she noticed the change in her yields. However, by the third year, she was not 
given free inputs and she did not take the loan offered by Saga. She knew that in her 
unstable financial position she would not be able to pay back the loan so she decided 
against it. She did not purchase any inputs that year and her yields dropped back down 
to 1.5 bags of maize.  
 
Farm visits to her fields that year showed how poorly her crops were doing next to 
those of her in-laws. Helen‟s small land area was covered in weeds and over-run by 
Striga. The crop was barely visible. She explains that she must work on other people‟s 
lands to get a little income to support her family, leaving her very little time to weed 
her own plot. She has no labour to help her, so her land is left largely unmanaged. By 
the fourth year, Helen 
had decided not to 
plant during the long 
rains and is 
concentrating on 
planting beans for the 
short rains. Initially 
she says she decided 
to „rest‟ her soils but 
then admits she has 
been too busy 
working on other 
farms this year to 
plant her own plot. She earns very little (approximately US$1/day) for a full day‟s work 
and her food security situation is precarious, at the same level as it was prior to MVP‟s 
interventions.  
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Helen wants to change the way she manages her land. She received training from MVP 
and she recognises the benefits of maintaining the health of her soil. However, she has 
no savings to invest in her small farm. The most she has saved is US$8 and she needs 
to spend that on her four children, for food, school and other necessities. Locked out of 
the latest loan programme, and with only her own labour, she cannot afford to buy farm 
inputs. She says: 
 
The two years was not enough time for me to stabilise myself to start saving. If 
it could have been for five years, at least I could have saved something”. 112 
 
Helen illustrates the challenges facing many poor widows. She was given only a small 
piece of land by her late husband‟s family and receives very little support in terms of 
labour or inputs from his family. Despite seeing the benefits of fertiliser on her yields, 
the yield increases over two years were not enough to allow her to start saving and 
purchasing inputs on her own. The risks associated with such a small land parcel of 
poor quality (as evident by the overgrowth of Striga), force Helen to offer herself as 
labour on other farms to earn an income, which she views as more stable than relying 
on her own plot to sustain her family. She is also locked out of the loan offered by 
Equity Bank, since she has no credit history (she did not take the Saga loan) and 
therefore has very little options for purchasing inputs. While she benefited from two 
years of inputs and training, once that was finished her food security situation reverted 
back to it former level.  
 
However, not all MVP farmers experienced such a reduction in their food security 
status when the subsidies finished. Of the farmers interviewed, 22 percent (eight 
respondents) felt that MVP had a positive impact. These farmers came from different 
wealth categories, including 50 percent (four respondents) from wealth category A and 
25 percent (two respondents) from each of the lower wealth categories B and C. These 
farmers experienced productivity increases as a result of several factors introduced by 
MVP, including increased use of fertiliser, training on planting methods and 
diversification to higher value crops. One male farmer from the middle wealth category 
describes how his other activities are helping him improve his food security situation: 
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 Series of interviews with Helen Anyango, Nyandiwa, Siaya, May 2009 – June 2010. 
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Since Millennium came the one thing we got is food security, even if maize 
production goes down, I have other things to boost me.
113
 
 
George Opondo is another farmer who has managed to incorporate the subsidy with 
other activities to change his food security situation. George comes from the lowest 
wealth category and lives at the top of a rocky hillside in Lihanda with his two wives 
and fourteen children. The three houses in the compound are built in the traditional 
manner with mud walls and thatched roofs. He owns about 1.6 hectares but most of the 
land is rocky and steep, with half the area set aside for maize. Prior to MVP, George 
applied cow manure collected from his three dairy cows. He used to average four to 
five bags of maize per half a hectare. The maize was strictly for household 
consumption, and he relied on selling milk and tomatoes for his main income. Before 
MVP, he had experimented with inorganic fertiliser applied to his tomatoes but he had 
never used it on his maize. When MVP came in 2006, he was given 30 kilograms of 
DAP and 30 kilograms of urea along with some maize seed. He used that on 0.4 
hectares of land and harvested almost 14 bags of maize. George states: 
 
I got the best yield of my life that year. I sold three bags to pay for school fees, I 
gave one back to the project and we consumed the remaining 10 bags.
114
   
 
The next year (2007), MVP gave him the same amount of fertiliser and George decided 
to buy more. He purchased an additional 25 kilograms from a local shop in Luanda and 
rented a small portion of land (approximately 0.10 hectare) to plant more maize. This 
time he harvested 18 bags. The following year, 2008, he decided to take a loan from 
Saga worth 70 kilograms of DAP. He used the inputs on roughly one hectare and 
harvested 32 bags. With this harvest he was able to clear his loan with Saga and have 
enough left over for his family.  
 
In 2009, the MVP loan programme changed from Saga to Equity Bank. Even though 
George would have been eligible for a loan, he decided against it. He explains: 
 
I did not take the loan that year. I was so stressed the last year with repayment 
and I just wanted my mind to relax this year, so I did not take the loan. If it was 
another loaning institution, other than Equity, then yes. But Equity, no.... When 
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deadlines reach Equity, they do not listen even if a relative died they will come 
and take things from your home. 
 
Therefore, George decided to forego the loan and instead he purchased 20 kilograms of 
DAP from the local market in Luanda. The quantity of inputs was much less than he 
had used the previous year, but he defends his decision: 
 
I used 20 kilograms of DAP and combined it with animal manure for part of my 
land. I know DAP is good for the soil but it is very expensive and manure from 
my cows is free.  
 
However, that year (2009), George‟s yield was not as good as the previous three years 
and he harvested 11 bags of maize. He blames the drought and the fact that he did not 
have enough manure. However, he is not downhearted: 
 
Farming is a funny enterprise; sometimes you are up and sometimes you are 
down. But because I have a large family, I have to buy at least some fertiliser to 
get enough maize to feed my family. However, even if my maize production goes 
down, I have other things, such as my cows and my vegetables that will boost 
me.  
 
The last visit with George (in June 2010) revealed that he has continued to diversify his 
crops while still focusing on his tomato- and milk-producing activities. He has received 
additional training from MVP on both of these activities and his production continues 
to improve. George feels that these activities will allow him to earn enough to purchase 
fertiliser. He plans to sell one cow and buy at least 50 kilograms of fertiliser. He feels 
that fertiliser is important to improve his maize production and will help put all his 
children through school.  
 
George exemplifies how a farmer uses complementary technologies and a diversified 
production strategy to spread some of the risk associated with rain-fed agriculture. Over 
the past seven years, George has lost cattle to disease, tomatoes to blight and maize to a 
range of pests and diseases as well as to drought. Therefore, spreading risk becomes an 
ever-important food security strategy. In addition, George owns two hectares of land, 
which allows him the opportunity to experiment with new technologies. He has the 
space to plant on half his land and leaves his cattle to graze on the remaining half. 
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These activities have also allowed him to earn money to pay for additional labour and 
to rent more land to expand his activities.  
 
Perceptions and adaptation of technology package 
 
While some farmers experienced variation in the quality of the seed and fertiliser they 
used over the last five years, every household that I interviewed held an overall positive 
opinion of the need to use the inputs (improved seed and fertiliser) delivered by MVP. 
As stated previously, before the arrival of the programme, few farmers in the area had 
knowledge or experience with inorganic fertilisers. Therefore, MVP spent a 
considerable amount of time training them on how to use the technologies and on 
improving their farm management practices. The training was successful in changing 
farmers‟ perceptions on soil management and the role of fertiliser (see Chapter 5). A 
young male farmer from Lihanda explained how his preconceptions about what 
inorganic fertiliser might do to the soil had been altered: 
 
Before Millennium there was this kind of belief that when you use fertiliser it 
depletes the soil. But now I am not seeing that. I have realised since using 
fertiliser that it is good. If I stop using it then I will not get a good harvest.
115
  
 
Another male farmer also described how the community had worried about the ill 
effects of fertiliser and the change he has seen in the community: 
 
After applying the fertiliser they were given by Millennium, the results made 
them realise the importance of fertiliser. Before Millennium, most people were 
planting without fertiliser. They had a feeling that fertiliser was not good for the 
soil; that other weeds like Striga start spreading in the field when you use 
fertiliser. Since Millennium, I have seen the importance of fertiliser, and that is 
why I now try to use it.
116
  
 
Other farmers mentioned that, while they may not buy inputs without the subsidy 
programme, they have changed their planting methods, through spacing or other 
management techniques learned through MVP. Some farmers are now planting in a line 
rather than broadcasting their maize seeds. Others talk about new spacing and weeding 
methods. All these new techniques have enabled farmers to alter the management of 
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their farms and, along with the use of the input packages, have helped many of them to 
increase their yields, particularly of maize.  
 
Incorporating elements of the input-support programme with additional knowledge and 
technologies presented by MVP results in the creation of „experimental niches‟, which 
facilitate local innovation by altering and combining promising new technologies and 
concepts (Moors et al., 2004). These niches provide the farmers with new models for 
understanding and using the technology (cf. Kemp et al., 1998; Rip and Kemp, 1998; 
Hoogma et al., 2002; van der Ploeg et al., 2004). It is within this niche that “actors are 
willing to invest significant time, effort and financial costs in testing, or making 
improvements to the promising practice or new technology” (Adey, 2007: 34). 
Therefore, farmers have adapted the technologies and combined them in a unique form 
to suit their particular farming realities (both ecological and economic).  
 
While some of the larger-scale and wealthier farmers stated that they had been using 
inorganic fertiliser, the majority of the households in the middle and lower wealth 
categories did not use any or used very little (i.e., 5 to 10 kilograms) prior to the 
project. Every household in the 11 sub-locations experienced the technologies over at 
least three to four years through the subsidy and credit programmes. The resulting 
increase in yields, especially during the first two years, meant that farmers were able to 
experience real changes on their farms over this timeframe. However, the question 
remains whether or not these results are sustained after the subsidy has passed and 
whether the farmers would use the inputs at the dosage rates recommended by the 
programme. 
 
MVP has made some efforts to track the use of inputs within the MV1 (Sauri) since the 
end of the input subsidy programme. According to the Sauri Annual Report 
(Millennium Villages Project, 2009: 4), data collected indicated that: 
 
... out of the 1,160 households, 324 [28%] used local seed and no fertilizer or 
very little fertilizer; another 156 [13%] used only DAP and no top-dressing. A 
total of 300 [26%] households bought the full complement of fertilizers
117
 and 
recommended inputs. 
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fertilisers” consists of 50 kilograms of DAP and 50 kilograms of urea for 0.4 hectare of land.  
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While this research had a much smaller sample size (36 MVP households), the 
qualitative case study-oriented approach was useful to delve deeper into the socio-
economic realities of the people‟s lives and their decision-making processes. These 
results are used to present more textured information about people‟s engagement with 
the inputs and offer some insight into the results outlined in the larger sample size.  
 
For example, in 2010, 67 percent of households interviewed purchased inputs, 14 
percent were on the vulnerable list and 19 percent of households did not purchase any 
inputs. In terms of gender differentiations, male-headed households purchased inputs at 
a higher level (58 percent) than female-headed households, with remittances from off-
farm labour and diversification into other crops (such as vegetables and beans) playing 
an important role in income generation in 75 percent of these female-headed 
households. Of those who bought fertiliser, 36 percent came from the top wealth 
category, 36 percent from the middle, and 28 percent from the lowest. The majority of 
households that received inputs via the vulnerable category were female-headed 
households (80 percent), all from the lowest wealth category. The majority of those that 
did not use inputs were female-headed households (86 percent).  
 
While these numbers present a picture of the purchases made in that year, they do not 
describe whether or not farmers have adopted, adapted or rejected the input packages. 
What the research shows is that an array of different behaviour shifts has occurred. 
These shifts are a product of the different social worlds of diverse people, differentiated 
by wealth, age and gender, and how they cope with a predetermined technology 
package. While their responses to the technology package are extremely varied, the 
respondents can be divided into four categories: a) those using fertiliser prior to the 
programme; b) those not using fertiliser before but who have continued to use it after 
the programme; c) those not using before and who are still using in limited amounts; 
and d) those not using before who are not using now.  
 
The first group (40 percent of all households) represents the respondents that were 
using fertiliser prior to the programme. This group is evenly divided between male and 
female-headed households. Before the MVP interventions, their purchases were very 
small and irregular, with an average of 5–15 kilograms of fertiliser a year. Only two 
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households purchased DAP at close to the rates recommended by MVP. By the end of 
the MVP programme of subsidies, 80 percent of the farmers in this group continued to 
purchase inputs. Most of them have increased the quantity they use and are now 
purchasing between 25 and 50 kilograms per year.  
 
The most important transformation mentioned by members of this group has been their 
inclusion of other practices, such as diversification of crop production, which has led to 
reduced dependence on maize. Therefore, they have been able to invest in other parts of 
their farms, spreading the risk between other crops and activities. Out of this group, 20 
percent did not continue to purchase inputs after the subsidies ended. They are all 
female-headed households but have different reasons for not purchasing inputs, which 
include personal tragedy (the death of the main income earner), diversification out of 
maize and health-related issues that affected their ability to farm. The following stories 
illustrate this group
118
:  
 
Jacqueline is a young widow from the poorest wealth category in Nyandiwa. She farms 
0.2 hectares and rents an additional 0.2 hectares from a neighbour. She rarely produces 
enough to feed herself and her five young children. Jacqueline‟s husband used to work 
in a neighbouring town as a day labourer and the family depended heavily on his 
income. Jacqueline would purchase small amounts of fertiliser from a local market in 
Nyangweso. However, even with the fertiliser, her highest yield was four bags of 
maize. In 2006, MVP began the input-support programme and Jacqueline received 40 
kilograms of DAP, 40 kilograms of urea and eight kilograms of hybrid maize seed. In 
2007, when MVP switched to the loan system with Saga, Jacqueline was too afraid to 
go for a loan and did not apply. Unfortunately, this also coincided with the death of her 
husband. Without her husband‟s income, she has not been able to make ends meet and 
she was unable to purchase inputs. In 2008, Jacqueline was put on MVP‟s vulnerable 
list and she received a small package of inputs (25 kilograms of DAP, 25 kilograms of 
urea, six kilograms of maize seed). At the last visit (June 2010), Jacqueline was still on 
the vulnerable list but she had joined a women‟s savings group and was hoping to save 
enough to purchase some inputs for the next long rains.  
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 The following represents a series of interviews with women-headed households in all three wealth 
categories (A, B, C) in the three sub-locations between May 2009 and June 2010.  
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Sulmena comes from a middle-income household. She had used fertiliser a couple of 
times before MVP. After two years of receiving the subsidy package (2005/06) and one 
year of loan from Saga (2007), she decided not to purchase inputs in 2008. Instead, she 
decided to expand her planting area by renting additional land. According to Sulmena, 
her fields are very poor quality (the area is very hilly and rocky) and she cannot depend 
on her farm as her primary source of income. Therefore, she depends on income from 
many off-farm activities, such as charcoal production and selling vegetables and local 
brew. She recently joined a group of women to make and sell local brew in the area and 
spends most her time in that activity. Therefore, Sulmena believes that growing maize 
is not a priority and that the investments needed to improve the yields are too costly. 
She says she uses her income from other sources to make up her deficit in maize.  
 
Elisabeth is the third and youngest wife from a wealthy polygamous homestead in 
Sauri. Her husband worked in a neighbouring town and regularly purchased inputs for 
the family. In 2005, MVP started in Siaya and Elisabeth received 300 kilograms of 
DAP. Her yield increased from 10 to 35 bags of maize on one hectare. The next year 
(2006), she received 150 kilograms of DAP and her yields were slightly down to 25 
bags. She says the reason was that the fertiliser was not enough and she „under-dosed‟. 
In 2007, she applied for a Saga loan for 100 kilograms DAP, and she harvested 20 
bags. However, that year her husband passed away and Elisabeth spent most of her 
money on funeral expenses. She also became sick, which left her little energy to work 
her farm. In 2008, she did not buy any inputs and planted only a small area. Her yield 
dropped to eight bags. Then in 2009, without inputs and with increasingly poor health, 
she managed to harvest three bags of maize. Due to lack of labour, most of Elisabeth‟s 
land remains idle. Her social situation, being the youngest (third) wife of a polygamous 
homestead, means that Elisabeth does not have access to the same social support 
networks that are available to the older, more senior wives on the compound. 
Therefore, even with the subsidies she received from the programme, other factors such 
as health and socio-economic standings have affected her ability to adopt the 
technologies.  
 
The second group (26 percent of all households) consists of those households who had 
not used the technology package prior to the MVP and yet have continued to purchase 
inorganic fertiliser (DAP) after the subsidy programme ended. The majority of these 
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households (67 percent) were male-headed. The wealth categories were split evenly 
between the wealthier, middle-income and poorer households. Many farmers in this 
group took advantage of Kenya‟s national subsidy programme to purchase 50 
kilograms of DAP from the NCPB at reduced rates. Dismas Okello exemplifies this 
second group and his story follows.  
 
Dismas is a young well-off farmer from Nyandiwa. He lives in his father‟s compound 
with his wife Eunice and their two small children. When Dismas‟ father divided his 2.4 
hectares of land between his sons, Dismas, being the eldest son, received half of the 
land (approximately 1.2 hectares). At 
28 years old, Dismas is an experienced 
farmer and enjoys experimenting on 
his farm. However, he leaves the 
majority of the farming activities to 
his wife, so that he can earn additional 
income in nearby villages doing 
masonry work and other jobs. When 
MVP came into the area, Dismas 
received the inputs and training. His 
yields in the first two years were much 
better than before. He repaid 20 
kilograms of maize to the school 
feeding programme run by MVP and 
sold two bags to pay for household 
items.
119
 
 
However, when the subsidy was replaced with the credit programme, Dismas turned 
down the loan and borrowed some money from a friend to buy 50 kilograms of 
government-subsidised fertiliser from the NCPB in Yala at Ksh 3,500 (approximately 
US$46). He was able to harvest enough to repay his friend, feed his family and sell 
some maize. In 2010, Dismas did not receive any inputs from MVP and did not apply 
for the Equity loan. Instead, he purchased 30 kilograms of DAP, 25 kilograms of urea 
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 As part of the input subsidy programme, MVP required each farmer that received the input package to 
repay 10 percent of their yields to the MVP school meals programme.  
Figure 16: Dismas Okello and his children, Siaya, May 
2009 
  
163 
 
and six kilograms of Monsanto maize seed. Unfortunately, that year his yield was 
exceptionally low. He attributes this to the monkeys, squirrels, hailstorms and Striga 
that continue to affect his fields. Yet, he shrugs this off saying these challenges are a 
part of farming and adds that things are better now that he uses fertilisers. Dismas says 
he will continue to depend on his masonry work for income but that he has changed the 
way he farms since he experimented with fertilisers. He had always known about 
fertiliser but thought it was too expensive. He now ranks fertiliser as a priority and has 
started saving his money for the following season‟s inputs.  
 
The third group (12 percent of all households) consists of farmers that had not used 
improved inputs prior to the programme and who are now continuing to purchase 
inputs but at low rates. These farmers have adapted the input package in some fashion 
to fit their current situation. They rely heavily on the composting and boma manure 
techniques they used prior to the project, but have added small quantities of inorganic 
fertiliser to the mix. The purchasing of inputs is also rather variable, rising and falling 
depending on their financial status. Interestingly, these households are split evenly 
between the highest and middle-income category, suggesting other external factors 
must come into play when purchasing inputs. The one similar trait that this group has in 
common is that they are all older (55+ years old) female-headed households.  
 
For example, Sara is an elderly (82-year-old) widow from Lihanda. She describes how 
she had changed her beliefs about fertiliser after the programme. She benefited from 
having one of her plots as a demonstration site by MVP and describes her experience 
positively:  
 
I started using [inorganic] fertiliser with Millennium. In earlier days, these 
farms were more fertile. There was no knowledge of fertiliser, but maybe 
manure from the chickens, we were using that method. However, if you use 
fertiliser there is a very high yield. If you try a portion with fertiliser and one 
without, there is a very big difference. When we tried to plant one portion with 
and one without we realised the difference and now I will always try to plant 
with fertiliser.
120
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 Series of interviews with an elderly female farmer from the wealth category B, Lihanda, Siaya, May 
2009 – June 2010 
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Yet Sara‟s change in perception about fertiliser does not always translate to change in 
ability to purchase improved inputs. She admits that when the subsidy ended, she 
managed to purchase 3–5 kilograms of fertiliser, which she uses on a very small rocky 
plot next to her house. However, even this small amount is more than she was 
purchasing before. In addition, she has been able to rent more land. Working with her 
son, they have expanded their farm and leased some better quality land. The previous 
year she rented a quarter acre, and this year she has rented almost a half an acre. She 
focuses on putting the little fertiliser she can purchase on her own home field because, 
as she says, the new rented land is “still a bit fertile”.   
 
Sara explains that pests (e.g., Striga, monkeys, moles and squirrels) and natural 
calamities (droughts and hailstorms) affect her yields on a yearly basis. She believes 
that increasing the land area will help to spread the risk. Sara counts herself lucky that 
she has two grown sons who live with her and work the land with her. Therefore, she 
feels that labour is not her biggest issue; it is more the unknown of what might happen 
once she starts planting. The perceived risks have made her cautious about spending too 
much on inputs, only to have her yields affected by pests, diseases or the weather.   
 
These findings are reinforced by Okoth‟s report on adoption rates in MVP, which also 
emphasises the importance of household demographics as a determinant to adoption. 
Okoth found that household demographics, including age and gender of household 
members were “directly linked to adoption of any interventions” (Okoth, 2010:68). The 
report goes on to show how the age of household members is a good indicator of the 
labour available and that households with productive members could offer the most 
labour towards producing enough food for the household (Okoth, 2010: 68). 
 
The last group (20 percent) represents the households that have decided not to purchase 
the inputs after the subsidy disappeared. This group was predominantly (86 percent) 
female-headed households. This demonstrates that the poor and vulnerable were at 
times unable to adopt the technology in the ways assumed by the project. Rael‟s story is 
typical of the constraints faced by poorer farming households in the area.  
 
Rael is a young widow and mother of four young children. Her husband died eight 
years ago when Rael was just 21 years old. In accordance with Luo tradition, Rael was 
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remarried to a relative of her late husband as his second wife, with whom she has had 
her last two children. However, Rael continues to live alone in her compound with her 
children and farms her land on her own. Labour is a constant issue for Rael. Her 
deteriorating health has made it increasingly difficult to keep up with the demands of 
farming. She describes the mixed blessing that she saw with the new technology she 
started using when MVP started in this area. She mentioned the increase of weeds and 
the effect this has had on her labour demands:  
 
I have mixed feelings about fertilisers. It is sometimes good or bad. If you do 
not use fertiliser well in the field it triggers weeds to come up strongly. It forces 
me to do early weeding; if you leave the weeds, it will grow taller than the crop. 
Another problem I see with fertiliser like DAP is when the crop is this tall 
[chair height] it needs another fertiliser, like urea. You have to use urea for top 
dressing. Otherwise, the crop is not as good. And that is an added cost that I 
cannot bear.
121
  
 
Rael benefited for two years (2006/07) from MVP‟s subsidised input programme. 
However in 2008, when the loans programme started, she decided against applying as 
she feared she would not be able to pay back the loan. She was told that repayment was 
six bags of maize. Yet, the largest yield she has managed to get from her 0.30 hectare 
was six bags, even with the subsidised inputs. So based on her experience of past 
harvests, she did not know how she could repay the loan and have enough to feed her 
family. Therefore, she did not take the loan nor did she purchase any inputs. That year, 
her situation, along with her health, continued to deteriorate. In 2009, she was put on 
the vulnerable list and received 25 kilograms of DAP, 25 kilograms of urea and four 
kilograms of maize seed. She planted on 0.2 hectares of her land and managed to 
harvest three bags of maize.  
 
The following year (2010), Rael had been certain her name would be on the list again 
and she only found out in March when she went to pick up the inputs that she was not 
part of the vulnerable programme. She does not know why she was not on the list. Her 
neighbours told her that it depends on luck, and she might be back on the list next year. 
Rael says that since she had not properly planned or saved money for the inputs, she 
was not able to purchase any for her farm. Therefore, she planted with local seed and 
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 Series of interviews with female farmer from poorest wealth category C, Lihanda, Siaya, May 2009 – 
June 2010. 
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some goat manure. Rael admits she has never gone to purchase fertiliser, however she 
has recently joined a women‟s savings group and hopes to save enough by the end of 
the year to purchase inputs for the following long rains.  
 
For the past two years, Rael has suffered from deteriorating health. Her poor health, 
poverty, limited access to land, labour and finances, and her marginal social position in 
the community has made it difficult for her to adopt or adapt the new seed and fertiliser 
technologies to fit her specific requirements. While some farmers have been able to 
take advantage of the technologies, Rael has been unable to benefit. She does mention 
the training she received and the importance of fertilisers, however she is unable to plan 
properly and save to purchase the inputs. The programme must have a clearer 
understanding of the constraints that Rael faces and a deeper understanding of the types 
of technologies she may require to assist her out of poverty. In this instance, a 
predetermined package of inputs for a set period was not the right set of interventions 
required for her current situation. A more nuanced approach that examines her 
constraints and her options may have come up with a more flexible plan.  
 
These stories offer a small glimpse into the realities of the farming households in Siaya 
served by the MVP and associated initiatives. The sample size is too small to make 
generalisations on the characteristics of adoption or dis-adoption, and this was not the 
underlying rationale for the research. However, by taking a socio-technical systems 
approach, the research shows how the patterns of social differentiation and social 
structure dramatically influence the nature of adoption and technological access. The 
characterisations of these groups show the varied responses to a given technology. 
Much depends on a household‟s demographic composition and socio-economic 
characteristics, such as wealth, age, gender, or health status, particularly of its main 
producers, or its vulnerability to internal and external shocks (i.e., death in the family, 
droughts, disease, etc.), which can affect a household‟s financial situation.  
 
All households are susceptible to shocks and stresses of different kinds. Some have 
developed better coping mechanisms for responding to risk and uncertainty. Each 
household reacts differently to these disruptions, depending on their individual 
circumstances. Some farmers have altered their use of new technologies and have 
developed new practices in which they are able to create a niche and become less 
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passive recipients of the knowledge offered by the project. Other farmers have been 
unable to interact with the technologies in this way and have been locked out of any 
benefits the inputs may offer. By using a case study approach and investigating the 
background to their decision-making processes, the unique and varied nature of these 
complex farming households becomes more evident.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter describes how MVP has undergone a number of modifications and 
administrative „retooling‟ over the years as it has developed. Originally a broad Green 
Revolution narrative focusing on technology interventions to address food insecurity, 
MVP has experienced interaction at the national, programmatic and local levels, during 
which key actors have renegotiated the MVP concept. This co-evolution of technology 
and society results from changing politics in the relationship between headquarters and 
the field and the tensions that exist between framing, funding, implementation and 
practice. Some of the changes have been made in response to challenges arising in the 
field, where ideas and practice interact with the realities of the local socio-technical 
system. Others were in response to macro-level factors resulting from the broader 
political, economic and institutional context, with ideas originating from the New York 
headquarters being implemented by field staff who may not necessarily agree with 
them. Some changes were influenced by the need to show results quickly, perhaps 
faster than field staff and villagers could adapt. Therefore, the programme is not static 
and continues to be transformed throughout time.  
 
As described in the chapter, the input model was modified at least four times over the 
course of five years (2005–2010) to include the following:  
 Direct distribution: inputs distributed directly from MVP to recipients through 
designated collection centres on specific distribution days  
 Agro-dealers and vouchers system: MVP trained 18 local agro-dealers within 
the sub-locations and offered vouchers that were redeemed at these shops  
 Private company: MVP created Millennium Farms to manage distribution of 
inputs and worked with a micro-finance institution to offer loans, with 
repayment in maize to Millennium Farms  
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 Commercial bank loans: MVP created a partnership with a commercial bank to 
offer loans for a limited number of qualified households.  
 
While the ability of the programme to make rapid changes and learn from its previous 
experiences shows flexibility and adaptability in its approach, the effects of a fast-
changing mandate on local farmers need to be understood better. The shifting mandate 
of the input-support programme affected the relationships between the networks of 
actors in the community and within the project. It restructured the socio-technical 
system in fundamental ways. New actors were created, trust relationships were tested 
and there were changes in the power relations that determined access and delivery of 
the new technologies. The chapter also highlights the challenges faced by the 
programme in response to the changing national landscape, and in particular the 
political disruption that followed the 2007 elections.  
 
The analysis also showed how local actors altered the technology package through 
gradual experimentation and learning to create their own unique niches, as well as in 
response to local administration, politics, social networks and delivery mechanisms. 
Farmers constantly re-adjusted their farming practices to create innovative niches in 
response to the changing system imposed on them by MVP, but also in relation to the 
dynamic and uncertain economic and ecological conditions they faced. Many new 
socio-technical arrangements emerged when the subsidy was removed. While farmers 
may not have adopted fertiliser at the promoted rates, their knowledge of the 
technology has changed fundamentally. They have had time to experiment with 
different seed-fertiliser-farm management combinations and have adapted them to fit 
their specific socio-economic contexts and priorities. New social arrangements around 
the technology have emerged that may not have been the intended goals of the 
programme, but have nonetheless had a positive impact on the farmers and their 
agricultural systems. 
 
This analysis has shown that adoption and continued use of a new technology is heavily 
influenced by a multitude of factors that are external to the technology and depend on 
the delivery mechanism and messaging used to introduce that technology to a 
community of diverse users. Furthermore, the recipients‟ responses are determined by 
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their own socio-technical conditions and constraints. Thus, the early expectations of a 
„quick win‟ focused on disseminating technology were hampered. The research thus 
highlights the link between socio-technical system change and social differentiation, 
with systems constructed and altered based on the different social, political and 
economic characteristics of the people on the ground. A much wider socio-technical 
system, differentiated according to wealth and gender, had to be transformed as well, in 
a fast-changing and challenging context.  
 
This chapter demonstrates the differences in responses between the relatively asset-
poor and those with better access to assets. It confirms how any new intervention 
presents a risk. This can be a social risk, when farmers are socially excluded from 
benefiting from certain technologies or access to information. It can be a financial risk, 
especially when credit is tied to the use of the new technology and when farmers divert 
limited capital to it, leaving little to cover other household needs, such as health care 
and education. In addition, it can be an economic risk, when access to the technology is 
tied to training and participation that may contain an opportunity cost for those who 
already suffer from labour constraints on the farm.  
 
The next chapter takes a closer look at the second case study, the NAAIAP, to highlight 
some of the similarities and differences between the programmes‟ design and the 
interaction of the technology package within the existing local system. It thus sets up 
the comparative chapter (Chapter 8) that will draw some broad lessons from the two 
case studies.  
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Chapter 7 
The National Accelerated Agricultural Input Access 
Programme: 
 A large-scale national targeted subsidy programme  
 
 
In 2007, the Government of Kenya launched the National Accelerated Agricultural 
Input Access Programme (NAAIAP) with the aim of addressing food security and 
poverty among resource-poor farmers. In line with the Government of Kenya‟s 
perspectives on national food security, described in Chapter 4, this programme is linked 
directly to the overarching policy objectives of increasing agricultural productivity and 
improving farm management among smallholders. The central aim of the programme is 
to reach 2.5 million smallholder farmers (those with one hectare of land or less) with a 
predetermined technology package comprising seed and fertiliser. Initially, the 
programme was funded entirely by the Government of Kenya. Since 2008, additional 
donors, including the Egyptian Government, European Union, Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations, Japan‟s International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) and the World Bank, have contributed additional funding to expand the 
programme.   
 
While increasing smallholder yields is the overarching rationale for the programme, the 
main strategy for NAAIAP centres on addressing low fertiliser usage rates. According 
to the programme documentation, less than 30 percent of smallholder farmers in 
Kenya‟s high-potential areas, and less than 20 percent in the low-potential areas, use 
inorganic fertiliser and improved seed (GOK, 2008b: 2). It states that many smallholder 
farmers in marginal areas do not have the knowledge or the financial capital to 
purchase the inputs. This low input usage has resulted in declining agricultural 
productivity, increasing food security and deepening poverty (GOK, 2008b). NAAIAP 
was designed to address the poverty trap by improving smallholder farmers‟ access to 
Green Revolution inputs, thereby increasing yields of the main staple crops, 
particularly maize, and enhancing household-level food security. This fits directly into 
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the productivity-technology fix narrative that views improving access to technology as 
the principal means to reduce food insecurity.  
 
In addition, the programme expects the raised yields will allow farmers to generate 
additional income and be able to save, so they can purchase their own inputs the 
following year. The programme also seeks to strengthen the capacity of the value chain 
by supporting smallholder farmers, private agro-dealers and government extension 
officers through training on the effective use of improved inputs (GOK, 2009). 
NAAIAP aims to link the farmers to a network of agro-dealers who can provide inputs 
to local markets to ensure sustainability of the programme. It strives to improve access 
to credit for farmers and agro-dealers to help strengthen the entire value chain. The 
programme also trains farmers and extension officers in establishing and managing  co-
operative groups, cereal banks and warehouse receipt systems to address the market 
difficulties often encountered by smallholders (GOK, 2010e). Thus, in addition to the 
technology transfer focus, NAAIAP adopts a two-pronged approach that brings in a 
wider systems view, linking technology change to markets and wider support services.   
 
NAAIAP consists of the following two programmes: 
 
1. The Kilimo Plus Starter kits (grant programme). This is the main component of 
the NAAIAP programme. Kilimo Plus is a subsidy programme that targets resource-
poor smallholder farmers with a package of improved inputs to cover 0.4 hectares.
122
 
The farmers receive three vouchers worth 7,000 Kenyan Shillings (Ksh) 
(approximately US$90), which covers the cost of seed, planting fertiliser and top-
dressing. The main technological input is a package of 50 kilograms of basal planting 
fertiliser, 50 kilograms of top dressing fertiliser and 10 kilograms of maize seed. While 
the initial programme discussed the need to focus on a range of crops, during the roll 
out of the programme the focus has centred on maize. The programme expects that 
farmers will „graduate‟ from the input grant onto the credit scheme described below. 
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 Kilimo is a Swahili word for „agriculture‟.  
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2. Kilimo Biashara
123
 packages (credit scheme). This smaller programme is a credit 
scheme that targets farmers who are considered slightly better off than the Kilimo Plus 
target group, yet are still financially constrained and not able to purchase agricultural 
inputs. This group of farmers can apply for credit to purchase inputs from Equity Bank, 
at slightly subsidised interest rates.  
 
While the NAAIAP programme has both components, my research focused exclusively 
on the Kilimo Plus, the targeted input-support programme. I excluded the Kilimo 
Biashara from the study as it was much less developed and targeted larger-scale 
commercially oriented farmers, and so went beyond the focus of this research. 
Therefore, the term NAAIAP will refer to only the Kilimo Plus (input-support) 
component of the programme. This element of NAAIAP is the main component of the 
government programme and has important similarities to MVP, although with a very 
different level of intensity in programme delivery (see Chapter 6).  
 
Design features of NAAIAP 
 
Initial discussions around NAAIAP began as early as 2003, when the government held 
a meeting with a number of international donors and partners involved in the 
agriculture sector in Kenya to discuss how to improve smallholders‟ access to seed and 
fertiliser. According to Steve Collins, Country Director of ACDI/VOCA, an NGO that 
manages a USAID-funded maize development project in Kenya:   
 
The original idea was to get support to smallholder farmers with improved seed 
and fertiliser. This was the original point so that the farmers can actually have 
access to these inputs. We were not talking about subsidies, at this point we just 
wanted to make sure the input got out to smallholder farmers.
124
  
 
Following this meeting, the Rockefeller Foundation funded a concept document, which 
investigated input access problems and developed a programme to address them. The 
original concept focused largely on training and linking smallholder farmers to markets 
and credit lending institutions. The government and donors organised national-level 
consultations to bring multiple stakeholders – including private sector input providers – 
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 Kilimo Biashara is a Swahili phrase that is often translated as „agricultural business or „farming as a 
business‟. 
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 Interview, Steve Collins, Country Director, ACDI/VOCA February 19, 2010, Nairobi. 
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to the table to discuss the specific challenges facing smallholder farmers. Rockefeller 
presented the final proposal to the Ministry of Agriculture. However, the government 
decided to increase the number of recipients significantly, introducing a much larger 
programme than had been envisaged in the concept work and aiming to provide 
subsidies to 2.5 million smallholder farmers over five years. There were many different 
views on why the government expanded the programme from the original proposal. 
One senior staff member from Rockefeller explained it as the disconnect that happens 
between policy and implementation:  
 
That is the difference between policy design and implementation. Because in the 
design they were to concentrate in particular areas and work with a specific 
number of farmers and create that link with the credit programme, from Kilimo 
Plus to Biashara. However, Permanent Secretary Kiome [Ministry of 
Agriculture] wanted it spread out from the beginning, maybe because of 
political pressure. Therefore, it ends up too thin on the ground and the end 
results would have been better if they had not done that.
125
  
 
The government was keen to push the low productivity trap narrative and demanded a 
nation-wide response programme for a number of reasons. First, the recent success of 
the Malawi subsidy programme (AISP) had created high awareness, and many African 
countries, including Kenya, were looking to create a similar model. Festus Murithi, 
Director of KARI, explained it in these terms: 
 
The subsidy programme in Malawi can be good for a government as it saves the 
government the embarrassment of having to beg for food. There is nothing as 
bad as when someone uses food to make you take certain decisions because if 
you get it wrong you are going to die of hunger. Malawi did whatever it takes. 
The president said, “My people should be fed, and other things can come 
later”. When people are food secure they can look for off-farm incomes and this 
can be channelled to education and other social things that the farmer requires. 
However, food, whether you are rich or poor, takes a substantial part of the 
budget. I think it is a social responsibility for any government to ensure people 
are food secure.
126
 
 
Second, the political make-up of Kenya, with a mix of different ethnic groups and 
power networks, and the tense political environment leading up to the 2007 national 
elections, forced the government to consider a wider focus for such a politically 
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sensitive national food security programme that had the potential to affect large 
numbers of people across the nation. Therefore, as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
political interests can capture such programmes and affect the ultimate design and 
implementation. As Steve Collins from ACDI/VOCA explained:  
 
NAAIAP is trying to be everything to everyone because of the politics in Kenya. 
You cannot give the inputs specifically in one location, which was the original 
plan - to concentrate in one area. However, the government said, “No, it has to 
go to every single person”. This was whether it was suitable or not. For 
example, the government promotes the programme in places like Ukambani, 
where you should not even be planting maize because four out of five years you 
do not get a crop, but there are political reasons why they go to those places. 
However, to me, this is politics and not smart policy.
127
 
 
The difference in geographical scope between a wide national programme and a narrow 
pilot within specific localities created a philosophical divide between the donor 
community and the Government of Kenya. The donors disliked the expanded subsidy 
programme and reduced focus on extension and training. They complained that the 
programme was spreading itself too thinly, spending too much of the budget on the 
subsidies, and focusing insufficient attention on training aspects. However, the 
government stated that the current food crisis justified this wider and faster approach, 
and that politically there were reasons of „equity‟ for pushing for a broader and more 
inclusive food security programme. In the end, the government pushed ahead on its 
own. However, after one year of implementation (2008), a few donors came on board 
to help fund different parts of the programme. The following section goes into further 
detail on the administrative factors that have influenced the delivery of the programme 
and shaped its interactions with recipients at the community level. 
 
Administrative factors: NAAIAP’s capacity constraints  
 
The government began implementing NAAIAP in 2007/08. In the first year, it funded 
the programme out of its national agricultural budget and was able to deliver inputs to 
37 districts in six provinces, reaching 36,000 farmers. In the second year (2008/09), the 
programme received funding from the donor community and the focus area doubled to 
70 districts. The programme reached roughly 96,000 farmers with agricultural input 
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packages. By the third year (2009/10), further donor support allowed the programme to 
cover over 100 districts and to reach over 187,000 farmers. Farmers could only receive 
the input package once. This condition meant that the programme had to shift around 
the country and each year new sub-locations and new sets of farmers were targeted. 
 
This rapid expansion and constant shift in project area made it difficult for the 
administration and delivery staff to implement the programme adequately. With such 
massive numbers of farmer-recipients in so many new districts, the amount of time 
needed to train the programme staff properly was severely compromised. In addition, 
the programme encountered problems identifying and training new agro-dealers in the 
new districts within the short timeframe. There were also problems with the programme 
logistics in terms of sourcing the right type of inputs in the right quantity and delivering 
them to the farmers in time for planting.  
 
According to Dixon Korir, the Input Promotion Officer at NAAIAP: 
 
We had a big jump in the number of beneficiaries this year because the EU 
came in. I think the figure was 187,000 farmers, almost double from last year, 
so there was a lot of straining. We strained the capacity of the stockists in so 
many places and there were serious problems in supplies especially in Eastern 
District. The same happened in the western part of Kenya where there were 
demands that we could not supply.
128
 
 
The increased donor support occurred for a number of reasons. Some donors decided 
that the political upheaval following the December 2007 elections warranted increased 
attention on food security. Some donors committed to funding in the areas hit hardest 
by the violence and tied their financing directly to delivery of inputs to internally 
displaced persons. These donors saw the programme as a form of relief funding and 
limited it to one year of support from their humanitarian portfolio. Other donors 
realised that the NAAIAP programme was going to happen with or without their 
involvement and decided it was better to be involved and to have a say in its progress. 
As Andrew Karanja, from the World Bank in Nairobi, put it:  
 
I think the same thing played out as it did in Malawi. There are always 
misunderstandings when a programme starts. What was not clear initially was 
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how the subsidy was going to be implemented and then it became clear to us 
that it can be implemented through the agro-dealers and private sector, and we 
do not have to give it directly to the farmers. Because we initially thought it was 
a package that we just go and dish out to farmers. The other thing we realised is 
that if we stay out of it we will never be able to correct some of the issues. When 
you are inside it is easier to say this is working, this is not working. You are 
better off criticising from within rather than from outside because they harden 
their position and you harden your position.
129
  
 
NAAIAP programme staff had their own set of institutional and administrative 
difficulties in implementing the national programme. There was no increase in 
resources and administrative staff had to rely on extension officers already in the field 
to implement the programme. Despite having additional donor money for training field 
staff and related activities, there was little evidence of that training in many of the areas 
where it was implemented. NAAIAP staff mentioned the capacity issue as one of their 
main constraints:  
 
The challenge was we had budgeted for 36,000 farmers in nine districts but now 
we have 175,000. We got support from the World Bank but to date not a single 
shilling has arrived. We are doing so much above the budget. We are 
overstretched. We have put in everything, our allowances, everything. We 
overstretch not just resources but also people. The DAOs practically close down 
their offices when NAAIAP comes.
130
  
 
The government‟s desire to scale up the programme rapidly exacerbated the capacity 
and logistical problems associated with delivering the right inputs in the right quantities 
to farmers at the right time. All these factors affected the ultimate delivery of the 
programme and its interaction with the smallholder farmers. The next section explores 
how issues of administrative and institutional capacity affected NAAIAP‟s 
implementation and ultimately the beneficiaries‟ understanding of the programme. It 
examines how institutional factors interacted with the existing political and socio-
cultural factors of the farmers in the given locality.   
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Unpacking the socio-technical system: Interactions between farmers and 
NAAIAP in Butere District 
 
While the first section focused on the institutional evolution of the programme, 
particularly Kilimo Plus, this section analyses the interactions between the farmers and 
NAAIAP‟s organisation. In so doing, it examines how the programme interacted with 
the social, cultural and institutional structures of the farming households and 
communities in the target areas. The section is based on a series of semi-structured 
interviews and focus groups in Butere District in Western Kenya (see Chapter 2 for 
methodology) and explores how NAAIAP‟s tightly controlled selection and distribution 
channels did not allow for information sharing or proper training of programme 
recipients, and created misconceptions and distrust between recipients and 
administrators. It details how NAAIAP‟s processes and administrative structures 
affected the farmers‟ perceptions of the technology package and their view of the 
overall success or failure of the process.  
 
By unpacking the different political factors and knowledge–power relationships at the 
community level, this section highlights how complex social processes interact with 
technology packages in a very site-specific way. Echoing the experiences in MVP, it 
analyses how the programme used the existing administrative structures in the 
community to ingrain existing power structures, which benefited some privileged 
farmers and interest groups over other less well-connected producers. It also examines 
how and why different farmers were able to adopt, adapt or reject the package in such a 
way as to allow innovation niches to develop that resulted in different kinds of 
transformations and changes to the local socio-technical system.  
 
The politics of selection and distribution channels   
 
When introducing a programme that includes the delivery of a technology, the initial 
contact made with communities establishes perceptions and awareness about the 
technology that often affects successful adoption and uptake. NAAIAP‟s messaging 
process in Butere began with the area Assistant Chiefs and programme administrators 
briefing the village elders. The programme administrators briefed the village elders on 
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the selection criteria and asked them to identify eight „serious‟ farmers in their village 
who should benefit from the programme. The criteria they were told to use were: i) 
must have one acre of land that they are farming; ii) must have used fertiliser before; 
iii) must be able to store produce; and (iv) must own their land. The nature of the 
selection criteria resulted in the exclusion of many low-income households from the 
process.  
 
The elders gave the names to the locally hired Agriculture Representative (known 
locally as „farmer reps‟). The farmer reps are local farmers enlisted by the government 
to help the extension officers implement NAAIAP and other programmes. Their role is 
to help the extension officer to facilitate the programmes and to liaise between the 
farmers, the village elders and the government officials. The positions are held for two 
years and are unpaid, although they receive a stipend for each day they assist the 
extension officer. They receive additional training and are viewed as front-line 
extension workers, which is an added benefit to participating in the programme. The 
farmer reps tended to be relatively well off and well connected, both socially and 
politically, to the village elders and the area chiefs.
131
  
 
The farmer reps visited each household and confirmed participation in the programme. 
An extension officer from the Ministry of Agriculture accompanied them on these 
household visits to verify the status of the recipients and to conduct a questionnaire for 
later use as a monitoring tool. However, these questionnaires were conducted in only 
half the cases. In most cases, the farmers had very little contact with the extension 
officer. Contact with the farmers was left entirely to the farmer reps and the village 
elders. This ensured continuity of the power relationship between the village leaders 
and the community, and did not allow the community to question the implementation of 
the programme. Once the farmers were confirmed, the list was submitted to the 
Assistant Chief, who gave his „stamp of approval‟ and forwarded the list to the 
Divisional office in Khwisero.  
 
Since the village elders and farmer reps compiled the lists, there was very little 
community involvement in the selection process. In addition, little information about 
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the programme in general filtered down to the community. Even the Ministry of 
Agriculture‟s information sessions (referred to as sensitisation and mobilisation 
activities) tended to focus on senior field officers and village leaders. Community 
members had few opportunities to learn about the programme, to develop support or to 
spread the message. Of the 13 village elders interviewed in this research, only two 
reported holding community meetings to read aloud the recipient‟s names. Yet, even 
these two elders admitted that meetings were intended to present the recipient list, not 
discuss who should or should not be included. As one village elder and a beneficiary of 
the programme stated: 
 
The problem is everyone will say they are food insecure in the villages and I 
had to choose only eight households out of 230. The task was too difficult and it 
could lead to a lot of quarrels in the village. Therefore, I called a baraza where 
I read out the names. I first explained the criteria given by the government so 
they would understand why some people were not on the list and I told them 
that only eight people could benefit. Therefore, no one could complain if they 
did not get the inputs when they heard those criteria. That helped me and I did 
not have a hard time.
132
 
 
The fact that he was a village elder as well as a beneficiary of the programme 
demonstrates how power networks in the community exerted pressures on the NAAIAP 
selection process. Access to the technology was biased heavily towards those who were 
linked to the patronage networks of the local chief and extension officer. Very few 
community-wide information sessions were held to explain the programme or its 
mandates. Therefore, very little information passed beyond those in the programme, 
leaving many non-recipients with little knowledge or understanding of the programme.  
 
The lack of wider community sensitisation and involvement led to misunderstandings 
and personal conflicts within the communities. In addition, the lack of information 
allowed those with access to the process to benefit disproportionately. Therefore, 
changes in social dynamics occurred as some groups benefited more than others due to 
their access to particular patronage networks and ethnic and economic interests, 
resulting in shifts in the socio-technical system within the community. The next section 
takes a closer look at how the programme and its technology package interacted with 
the pre-existing social and power relations at the local level.  
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Social dynamics and power relations: factors affecting targeting and selection 
 
As described above, the delivery of NAAIAP‟s agricultural input package is based on a 
targeted subsidy directed to subsistence farmers throughout the country. The 
constraints, both political and financial, meant the programme had to cover many areas 
to address the various ethnic groups within the country. However, available financial 
capacity limited the number of farmers who could be included. The result was an input-
support programme that spread benefits to approximately 1,000 farmers within each of 
the 37 districts in which NAAIAP operated. This equated to an average of eight out of 
200 households in each village.  
 
Targeting the poor in any input-support programme is considered difficult because it is 
hard to identify appropriate beneficiaries and there are concerns over „elite capture‟ by 
certain social networks within the community (Levy et al., 2004; Bahiigwa et al., 2005; 
Chinsinga, 2005; Crawford et al., 2006; Minot and Benson, 2009). One of the major 
issues with targeting food security programming is that the “ambiguity of targeting 
leaves open the possibility that outcomes will reflect local power structures rather than 
the priorities of the poor” (Bahiigwa et al., 2005: 494). This ambiguity of targeting was 
displayed by the lack of communication with the community about the subsidy 
programme or its objectives prior to the list of recipients being announced. Members in 
the community had little knowledge of how the recipient list was put together or what 
targeting procedures were used. Even those that benefited from the programme had 
little understanding about who was accepted and why:  
 
All I know is that my name was on a list. I do not know much about NAAIAP.
133
  
 
The village elder, who is my brother-in-law, came to tell me that I was wanted 
at the Chief‟s Baraza [community meeting]. That is how I found out that I was 
to benefit from the programme.
134
  
 
I do not know how I was picked for the programme, but I heard about it at the 
market that I was on the list of beneficiaries.
135
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One farmer rep in the area explained that little information was shared about the 
programme prior to its start in Butere. According to him, this lack of information 
caused misunderstandings and some farmers expressed initial mistrust about the 
programme. Farmers feared that their lands might be confiscated because they were 
asked to provide their land titles to become registered with the programme. He went on 
to state: 
 
Some farmers actually declined to be included in the programme from fears 
about their lands being affected or other consequences of an association with 
NAAIAP fuelled by misinformation.
136
  
 
A farmer in Emutsasa explained his fears in this way: 
 
The farmer rep came to my house and told me about the programme. He said I 
needed assistance and the government was coming with a programme for us. I 
was hesitant to accept because I thought it might create problems, since nothing 
in life is free. I worried about losing my land or that the rep was trying to trick 
me. However, after much discussion I decided to accept and gave my name for 
the list. I was asked for information on my land title deed, which I gave them.
137
   
 
To be included was seen by many as a privilege and as an indication that they were 
good and „serious‟ farmers. However, some were not happy to be included. Through 
my research, I found that the selection and targeting process caused tensions in the 
community with those not selected. One poorer widow reported that by including her in 
the list, she was targeted by other widows in her community who were not selected. 
She complained that even though her status as head of a poor vulnerable household 
would make her a prime candidate for the programme, it created feelings of jealousy 
towards her that made her life harder in the village. She went on to state: 
 
In my view, the government should have supported everyone in the area and not 
just the people they were selecting. I feel that it is not good when one person 
benefits and a neighbour does not benefit. It brings some problems. So many 
people, even my neighbours, complained when I benefited.
138
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In one focus group meeting, village elders explained how farmers voiced concern that 
community members had influenced the selection and that the process had not been 
transparent.
139
 There were instances of well-off farmers using their position of power in 
the village to ensure their names were on the list. For example, one well-off farmer 
described how he became part of the programme, this way: 
 
This was a favour from the chief. Initially my name was not on the list so I went 
to talk to the chief and then found my name had been added to the list.
140
   
 
In this instance, the farmer‟s entitlements are expressed in political terms. He was able 
to use his influence with the political structures to affect the way the goods were 
distributed. Therefore, not only was the list influenced by the social standings and 
power relations within the villages, at times the political administrative structures at the 
district level also had an influence. One village elder from Doho explained how he felt 
that names had been added to the official list after selection had been finalised at the 
village level.  
 
I forwarded the final recipient list to the Agriculture Extension Officer, who 
noted the list included 83 farmer recipients. However, at the distribution centre, 
more than 100 farmers were found on the list. The additional names resulted in 
an input shortfall that meant many recipients had to split the package of inputs 
between two households. The increased number of recipients had not been 
communicated to the farmers or the village elders, and those who had to share 
were greatly disappointed and felt cheated by the programme. This left a very 
negative impression on those farmers and village elders who had made the 
community selection. There was no explanation from programme officials about 
how or why names had been added to the list.
141
  
 
This lack of communication from the programme staff to the community created many 
points of contention and confusion throughout the life cycle of the programme and 
affected how the community interacted with the programme. These feelings of mistrust 
extended to some of the farmer recipients as well. For example, one farmer reported 
that programme staff administering the inputs misappropriated the inventory: 
 
I think there was a deal between the agricultural officers and the extension 
officers because I am told the extension officer‟s own family got about five bags 
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of DAP, his wife got, his daughter got. So that denied most farmers here to get 
the inputs. Imagine, his own household received five bags when some of us got 
half a bag.
142
  
 
Whether these facts of elite capture or misappropriation were real or perceived by the 
community members, it illustrates the feelings of mistrust between the community and 
those administering the programme that ran through most discussions. There was little 
interest in seeking assistance from the programme officials because of a general feeling 
that programme staff and the administration had engineered additional benefits for 
some in the community. These feelings extended to the local administration units. As 
one farmer from Emutsasa reported: 
 
The mistake the government is making is by involving the administration and 
bringing the Assistant Chiefs into this, and they are corrupt. If you involve the 
Assistant Chiefs they may decide they are not on good terms with someone and 
do something to the selection process.
143
  
 
These irregularities demonstrate how people in positions of political or social power 
can use their influence to affect project outcomes if effective verification processes are 
not in place. While difficult to determine whether this problem occurred throughout the 
process, it demonstrates there were ample opportunities for such transgressions to 
occur.  
 
The ambiguities in targeting had a direct effect on who was able to participate in the 
programme. One early observation about programme recipients in Butere was that they 
were either on a par with, or in some cases better off than, the average households in 
the targeted sub-locations. The chiefs and farmer reps confirmed that they had selected 
„serious farmers‟ for NAAIAP and excluded farmers they felt were too poor or might 
misuse or sell the inputs. A farmer rep said that there was pressure from NAAIAP 
programme staff and area chiefs to ensure the programme succeeded. He stated: 
 
We were told from the District level [DAO office] to choose those farmers that 
we believed would not sell the inputs and would put them to good use... we were 
told that we need the programme to succeed so it can continue.
144
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The result was a shift in focus away from the initial concept to include food-insecure 
smallholder farmers and towards „serious‟ farmers who were often associated with 
local elites and government officials. The objective and implementation of the 
programme was altered at the district and sub-district level and further shaped by 
extension officers and village leaders who wanted to ensure the success of the 
programme and their own personal agendas.   
 
These findings are in line with research into the problems of targeting raised in the 
Malawi subsidy programme (cf. Levy et al., 2004; Minde et al., 2008; Minot and 
Benson, 2009). These studies found that targeting the poorest is often difficult as it can 
cause “major social resentment and disproportionately reducing food security gains” 
(Levy et al., 2004: 1). Administratively, the costs of targeting smallholder farmers can 
be extremely high (Minot and Benson, 2009). In addition, setting criteria to ensure 
success (such as larger land holding or wealthier households to ensure more efficient 
use of the inputs) can at times provide subsidised inputs to relatively well-off farmers 
and exclude the very groups the subsidy was intended to assist (Minde et al., 2008). 
Therefore, the results of poor targeting procedures and administrative capacity resulted 
in inputs being appropriated by wealthier farmers and not being directed to the 
appropriate beneficiaries. This was inconsistent with the national policy objectives set 
out in NAAIAP to address poverty alleviation and food insecurity. 
 
Capacity building and participation 
 
One key determinant for success when introducing a new technology is establishing 
awareness about the technology and its potential benefits, risks and use. Dissemination 
of the information is important, not only to increase adoption, but also to “strengthen 
human and social capital such that farmers can continue the dissemination process 
inside the village” (Place et al., 2005: 28). Success depends on recipients having an 
appropriate understanding of the technology, in terms of its application, usage and 
benefits. A poorly administered dissemination approach can have long-lasting negative 
effects on the community and has “as much impact on adoption as the nature of the 
technology itself” (Place et al., 2005: 28). Knowledge about inputs and appropriate 
training is a likely indicator of successful adoption (Kelly et al., 2003: 383). Likewise, a 
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study by Mango (1999: 20) found that farmers‟ use of a particular technology was tied 
closely to their knowledge of how to use it appropriately: 
 
Farmers‟ inefficient use of fertilisers was another reason why they abandoned 
it. The benefits of fertiliser will be limited when farmers use the wrong type, 
apply too low rates, or use it at the wrong moment.  
 
Training beneficiaries on planting techniques, fertiliser use, post-harvest management 
and forming groups for cereal banks were key components for NAAIAP.
145
 Local 
administrators promised farmers that they would receive training as part of their input 
package and this raised expectations. Administrators told the farmers that training 
would be conducted on demonstration plots throughout the villages. However, very 
little training took place in the research area and very few planned field demonstrations 
were implemented due to a lack of extension officers to carry them out. Instead, 
recipients were assembled at a baraza and briefed about the programme and how to use 
fertiliser. These briefing sessions did not measure up to the farmers‟ expectations for 
training. The limited information they received affected their understanding of the 
rationale of the programme, leading to confusion concerning its objectives and intended 
benefits, further adding to farmers‟ frustrations. One wealthy female farmer from 
Khushiku explained:  
 
We received some information on planting, using fertiliser and top-dressing and 
how to dry the maize. However, I would not call it training since we did not 
learn anything new and we did not go to the farm as we were promised. In that 
way, the programme let us down.
146
  
 
In addition, the training intended to introduce new techniques (e.g., spacing, application 
of fertiliser and other crop management techniques) but this message was not delivered 
in a way that matched the needs of the respondents. The information package was not 
adjusted to fit with existing knowledge nor was it modified to fit local needs. Out of the 
36 NAAIAP households interviewed, only 11 percent of respondents (split between 
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wealth categories A and B) reported that they had sufficient awareness about the 
fertiliser package and did not need further briefings:   
 
We were not trained at the meeting since everyone there already used 
fertilisers, we were told to go and plant as we normally do. Therefore, we did 
not need the training.
147
  
 
Overall, the single briefing session and lack of follow-up training did not disseminate 
the technical messages that NAAIAP intended to pass to farmers. Recipients in the 
three sub-locations I studied reported that they gained only minimal knowledge and 
understanding of the technology and programme through NAAIAP training. There is 
little structure within the programme to engage with the community and determine their 
information needs. In addition, despite having a comprehensive list of capacity building 
items in the NAAIAP programme document, only general discussions about the need 
for fertiliser actually took place. According to those farmers I interviewed, this was of 
minimal value to most recipients who were already experienced with the technology.
148
  
 
Changing farmers‟ perceptions and prompting farmer-to-farmer learning requires 
provision of appropriate information, tailored to the local context and presented at the 
right time. In the case of NAAIAP, this did not occur so there was no substantive 
change in the local socio-technical system surrounding that technology. The lack of 
qualified trainers and community involvement prevented development of an 
appropriate curriculum. The political pressures to expand NAAIAP rapidly across the 
country led to over-hasty implementation without consideration of the importance of 
strong local involvement. This section demonstrates that NAAIAP did not consider the 
fact that technologies affect, and are an effect, of their broader environment. As stated 
previously, it is not about the intrinsic workings of a technology, but how it is 
embedded within a specific and dynamic socio-technical system that includes local 
knowledge and social structures and institutions. The disconnect between the national 
political and administrative capacities and the local realities affected the 
implementation of the technology package and its ability to create a positive, lasting 
                                                     
147
 Interview, female farmer, wealth category B, Doho, Butere, May 17, 2010. 
148
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the percentage of Butere farmers that were purchasing fertilisers was 91 
percent, which is much higher in comparison to the MVP site, which was 39 percent. Therefore, 
according to my interviews, the NAAIAP training on general discussions of fertiliser usage was of less 
relevance to the farmers in Butere.  
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impact on local farming systems. The next section goes into further detail on the 
technologies that were part of the package and the programme‟s interactions with the 
community. 
 
NAAIAP’s input-support programme: Predetermined input selection 
 
NAAIAP‟s input packages were targeted at maize production and contained 50 
kilograms of planting fertiliser, 10 kilograms of maize seed and 50 kilograms of top-
dressing fertiliser. According to the NAAIAP annual report (GOK, 2008b: 10) the 
programme distributed a range of basal fertilisers, including other nitrogen, phosphorus 
and potassium (NPK) ranges, DAP and single-superphosphate (SSP), and a range of 
top-dressing fertilisers including urea, calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN) and 
ammonium sulphate nitrate (ASN). DAP and CAN remain the principle basal and top-
dressing fertilisers used in the input packages across the country.  
 
One of the features of the NAAIAP programme in Butere was the inclusion of Mavuno, 
an inorganic planting fertiliser, in the input package.
149
 The farmers in Butere were not 
familiar with this brand. Prior to NAAIAP, DAP was the most common planting 
fertiliser in this area. The purpose of this research is not to determine which planting 
fertiliser is best, but rather it is about an individual‟s perception of a familiar 
technology and the introduction and acceptance of a new technology. Therefore, this 
section takes a closer look at the politics determining the components of the input 
packages and how the farmers received them.   
 
According to Esther Musyuka, NAAIAP Programme Officer, it was the field staff, 
extension officers and agro-dealers who decided what went into the packages: 
 
The type of fertiliser was not set at head office. Local extension officers made 
the decision based on availability at local level. DAP is most liked by farmers 
and CAN, but there are many types of planting fertiliser out there and there is 
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also urea. The type farmers get depends on what is available. The head office 
does not specify, we just say planting fertiliser and top dressing.
150
  
 
Philip Makheti, the NAAIAP Director, defends the decision to provide Mavuno to 
recipients in Butere by explaining that excessive use of DAP has made the land acidic 
in Western Kenya. He goes on to state: 
 
DAP was introduced in the area in 1976. By 1978, the soil pH was up. In 
addition, increasing population growth has forced more people into smaller 
pieces of land leading to excessive use of DAP, which has increased soil pH 
levels. Therefore, we need to return to basal fertilisers and I am an advocate for 
top dressing with CAN and liming. I known Mavuno may be seen as inferior but 
it has been passed by KEBS [Kenya Bureau of Standards]. What we need to do 
is to change the DAO‟s [District Agriculture Officer‟s] culture of DAP. Acidity 
must be reversed.
151
  
 
However, according to Dixon Korir, a NAAIAP Programme Officer, no proper soil 
analysis was undertaken prior to the programme to identify soil acidity or structure 
issues. The most recent national soil surveys were done in 1986 under FURP, which ran 
from 1985 to 1987. He explains: 
  
Most of the farmers are using DAP but we are worried about acidity of soils. 
Therefore, I initiated a programme to test the soils. However, we used some 
people who just gave us the raw data and did not give us an analysis. That is the 
problem with going for the cheapest, they did not analyse. Now we have all this 
raw data but we do not know what to do with it, we cannot understand it. We 
took this data to the national labs but they refused to analyse it because they 
said it was not their samples. Therefore, we spent money on these tests and did 
not get results. So now, nobody knows the recommendations for farms in those 
areas. All the reports we are using are outdated.
152
  
 
Interviews with Athi River Mining, the company that makes the Mavuno fertiliser in 
this area, support the view that the soils are highly acidic. According to Julius 
Nyabicha, Technical Sales Manager, Athi River Mining: 
 
The main problem in this country is soil acidity. Athi River Mining produces a 
lot of lime and we put it in our fertiliser so that instead of giving the farmers 
useless filler material we give them lime. DAP acidifies the soil, after a given 
time you are supposed to lime the soil but the Kenyan farmers never lime their 
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soils. So what is the remedy to that? It is to give them a fertiliser that does not 
acidify the soil and besides that, will be bringing the soil ph to the optimum 
level, which is 6.5, so that is our strategy. If you cannot help a farmer to buy a 
few tonnes of fertiliser to help lime the soil then include that lime in the 
fertiliser so that as the farmer uses the fertiliser they are also able to get that 
lime.
153
  
 
When the programme started in Butere, the NAAIAP officials and extension officers 
did not discuss the type of fertiliser to be included in the input package and no brand 
was identified on the voucher. The fertiliser voucher was generic and indicated a 
monetary value. However, farmers were offered no choice when they went to pick up 
the inputs at the agro-dealers. Many respondents mentioned that since the vouchers 
stated „Planting Fertiliser‟ that there was an expectation that they could choose what 
they wanted. Instead, farmers were given a fertiliser that many felt was inappropriate 
for the area. In this instance, lack of information about the package coupled with a lack 
of choice negatively affected the farmer‟s perception of the programme and the 
technology package. The programme administrators‟ decisions on the fertiliser or seed 
variety were not discussed with the community prior to distribution.  
 
Only five percent of farmers reported having used Mavuno previously. In all instances, 
these were wealthier farmers who had experimented with it on such other crops as 
vegetables. In contrast, all the farmers applying inorganic fertiliser to their maize crops 
used DAP and they were much more familiar and comfortable with this type of 
fertiliser. Therefore, recipients voiced their disappointment when they were unable to 
make a choice. They felt that they had little say in what they were given, reporting 
instead that it was the stockists who decided what to distribute. The seed component of 
the package was another issue. Farmers received little or no choice in the type of seed 
and the majority (83 percent) of farmers I interviewed said they preferred different seed 
types to those made available to them. This led to frustration and distrust between the 
farmers and the agro-dealers and programme administrators.  
 
Many farmers voiced complaints about the inflexible, top-down approach, for example: 
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Who should be convinced on what is the best fertiliser for this area, the farmer 
or the manufacturer? Because these soils here vary a lot. I know much better 
about my soil than someone in Nairobi.
154
  
 
Another farmer questioned whether the programme had done field tests to determine 
the acidity of the soils in the area: 
 
Mavuno has only a small component of DAP in it. It is purely lime so it is only 
good for acidic soils. It is not good for our soils. Most people in this area do not 
like Mavuno. They know only Chapa Meli and Mea [DAP].
155
 
 
A female farmer went further when describing her frustration with Mavuno: 
 
The truth is Mavuno is not fertiliser, it is something else. Even when the 
vouchers came it indicated DAP, but when we went to the shops, we were given 
Mavuno. When we complained we were told that this thing is free so just take 
it.
156
  
 
One of the farmers who applied Mavuno later had to buy DAP for the rest of his plots. 
While admitting that the weather was bad, he observed that the fertiliser he received did 
not boost yields: 
 
I had never used Mavuno before. The plot where I used Mavuno was worse. The 
plots where I used DAP were much better. I would not use Mavuno even if I got 
it for free.
157
  
 
Some farmers altered the fertiliser application and mixed the Mavuno with manure: 
 
My perception is that Mavuno is not as strong as DAP, so I mixed it with cow 
manure.
158
  
 
Not all of the 36 farmers interviewed were negative towards Mavuno. One believes it is 
good when there is drought because it does not scorch the plants. Another farmer 
admitted that he could not judge whether Mavuno was good or bad since it was the first 
time he had used it and the weather was bad.  
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Last year was the first time to use Mavuno but there was a lot of drought that 
destroyed crops. If I could use it for three consecutive years then I would be 
able to tell.
159
  
 
All these quotes show a lack of satisfaction with the input package. A large percentage 
of the recipients (49 percent) purchased additional fertiliser (DAP). All the farmers 
interviewed added seeds, including hybrids and their own local varieties, to the variety 
given by the programme. The majority of this group (58 percent) were from the highest 
wealth category (A), while the remainder came from the middle wealth category (B). 
These farmers purchased additional DAP in the 10–50 kilograms range. In most 
instances, their purchases were in line with the amounts they typically purchased in the 
previous years. The programme had no great effect on the purchasing habits of this 
group, neither did it displace what they typically purchased. The majority of those in 
the lowest wealth category (83 percent) did not purchase additional fertiliser, but did 
mix the fertiliser with compost and boma manure. This group complemented the 
package with local seed or purchased small amounts of different hybrid seed to add to 
the quantities in the package.  
 
Thus, farmers adapted the technology package to fit their own requirements. Some 
farmers purchased other seeds that they had used before and knew could grow well in 
their area. Other farmers continued to use their local seed and experimented with the 
government package seed in certain parts of their field. Others continued to purchase 
additional inputs or tested inputs in trial locations on their farms so that they could 
monitor how the inputs performed. These results show that farmers were re-adjusting 
their farming practices and opening up innovative niches to take advantage of the 
circumstance offered by the programme. These niches provided the farmers with new 
technology models that held better promise for sustainability and were more in line 
with their local economic situation than the original technology package.   
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Figure 17: Monica Okinda and her family, Butere, June 2010 
Building the input-supply distribution network 
 
NAAIAP‟s input packages were distributed through a voucher system redeemable 
through local agro-dealers. The government identified three agro-dealers in Khwisero 
to distribute inputs to the Butere recipients. Farmers collected their input vouchers for 
hybrid seed, planting fertiliser and top-dressing fertiliser from Khwisero Division 
Agriculture Headquarters. Each voucher had a pre-determined value. In 2009, the face 
value of the three vouchers was 7,000 Kenyan Shillings (approximately US$90).  
 
Many recipients found it difficult to collect and redeem their vouchers. Khwisero is not 
within walking distance of any of the sub-locations so the farmers had to take public 
transport. This was especially difficult for the poorer households, especially women 
with young children. Monica, a widow from Doho, explains how the distance to the 
agro-dealers affected her participation in the programme. Monica is 35 years old and 
from the poorest wealth category. Monica lives alone in her compound with her three 
young children. She has half a hectare of land that includes the area where the house 
stands. There are no 
animals here, not even 
chickens. The home is 
bare inside and 
outside. Her food 
security situation is 
precarious. Monica‟s 
household 
consumption of maize 
is six or seven 
kilograms a week for 
her family and she 
estimates that her 
family consumes 
almost four bags of maize a year. However, her average yield when she plants without 
fertiliser is between one and two bags. This year she ran out of maize in March and has 
been purchasing maize since then. She will continue to purchase until harvest time in 
July. She does not sell her maize since she does not grow enough to support her family. 
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However, she cannot rely only on growing maize. She grows other crops, including 
beans, cassava, sorghum, sweet potatoes, banana, kale, cowpeas and avocados, which 
she uses to supplement her family‟s diet.  
 
When the NAAIAP farmer rep came to see Monica at the beginning of 2009, she was 
unsure what the programme was about but was told that she would receive some 
farming inputs. She had no means to get to Khwisero to pick up the package so she 
decided to ask her neighbour Rebecca, also a young widow, to go into town to pick up 
the inputs and she would share the inputs with her. Monica explains:  
 
The distance to get the inputs was very great for me. My neighbour Rebecca 
went to Khwisero to collect the inputs for me as my baby was still too young and 
I could not travel that distance.
160
  
 
Monica says the distance was an impediment for her and suggests future programmes 
need to have inputs brought closer to beneficiaries:  
 
The government needs to have inputs brought closer to us as the distance to 
Khwisero is just too far for a widow like me, with small children, to travel. 
 
In addition to the remote location of the inputs, the fixed price of the vouchers was also 
problematic. The cost of inputs rose after the vouchers were printed. Approximately 29 
percent of households complained that agro-dealers demanded extra cash on top of the 
voucher, arguing that the face value of the voucher was insufficient. As a result, 
farmers in some locations received smaller quantities. The government‟s annual reports 
also noted this problem, describing how agro-dealers, keen to maintain their profits, 
provided less seed or lower quality fertiliser in some areas (GOK, 2008b: 61). A few 
households alleged that the selected agro-dealers were artificially increasing fertiliser 
costs to reap higher profits. One farmer reported that agro-dealers were exchanging 
low-value inputs for vouchers and demanding cash in addition to vouchers for other 
high-value brands:   
 
Mavuno is not good in this area. I feel that stockists gave DAP to others outside 
the programme because it is in high demand. So stockists were only giving 
Mavuno because it is cheaper and saving the more expensive and popular DAP 
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for other people that are willing to pay for it. The problem is the voucher only 
had the quantity of DAP, so stockists gave cheap inputs to us in the programme, 
and then charged the government the higher amount on the voucher.
161
  
 
Another contentious issue for farmers was the late arrival of the inputs. The vouchers 
were delivered late to the Khwisero District Agriculture Office resulting in delays in 
distribution of the planting fertiliser and seeds. Further delays arose when the farmers 
were unable to collect the topdressing fertiliser (CAN) at the same time as the planting 
fertiliser and seed. This was due in part to the stockists having limited capital to stock 
all the inputs, as most were unable to stock all three inputs simultaneously. The 
majority were small local shops with little financial capital. One recipient, himself a 
shopkeeper, explained the plight of the stockist: 
 
The stockist lacked enough capital to supply all the inputs at once. Now that the 
government payment is gradual, it could take up to three months for the 
stockists to get reimbursed so they are waiting for the first payment for the 
planting fertiliser and the seed before they can supply us with the CAN.
162
  
 
As a result, farmers had little option but to leave their vouchers at the agro-dealers, 
hoping to receive the CAN in time for top-dressing. Unfortunately, this did not happen 
and farmers were without CAN for the planting season. The timing of applying top 
dressing to a maize crop is critical and must be done when the maize is around 30–45 
centimetres high, before the plant flowers. If applied too late, the CAN will have little 
effect on plant growth. Farmers who could not obtain top dressing grew increasingly 
frustrated and voiced distrust toward the programme and the stockists. 
 
These problems were not unique to Khwisero. The government‟s late repayment to the 
stockists was a nationwide problem. Discussions with NAAIAP staff in Nairobi 
revealed that most of the stockists across the country suffered chronic repayment delays 
from 2008 to 2010. This led to agro-dealers becoming increasingly frustrated and 
unable to participate in the programme as they could not restock their shelves at the 
appropriate times. The agro-dealers‟ suspicion that the government could not properly 
schedule reimbursements contributed to a lack of qualified agro-dealers participating in 
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the programme. This led to difficulties in enlisting established agro-dealers for the 
programme. According to Luka Erembo, an agro-dealer in Khwisero: 
 
 Many shopkeepers who were part of the programme the year before, or knew 
other shops that had participated, heard stories of late payments, so many 
refused to participate.
163
  
 
In addition, some districts had few qualified or adequately resourced agro-dealers. 
Many of the stockists did not have adequate training or incentives to manage the input 
distribution appropriately. The government collaborated with CNFA/AGMARK, an 
American NGO, to train the agro-dealers in supply management and distribution. 
However, not all trained agro-dealers were able to participate. Some lacked the capital 
or access to credit needed to procure the inputs, others did not trust the government to 
reimburse them in a timely manner, and some blamed rising fertiliser costs that made it 
unprofitable for them to participate. As with the MVP, the Government of Kenya 
partnered with Equity Bank to offer credit to agro-dealers but not all of them qualified 
for this credit. This forced the government to include stockists from neighbouring 
Divisions and/or Districts, making farmers travel even further to get their inputs.
164
 
 
Ana Kataka and Luka Erembo, shop owners in Khwisero, were part of the NAAIAP 
programme and qualified for the Equity Bank loan. However, both Kataka and Erembo 
were unable to pay back the bank loan on time because of government delays in 
reimbursing them for the inputs they had provided to the farmers. Erembo the shop 
owner states: 
 
Yes, I was one of the suppliers under the NAAIAP programme this year. 
However, I faced challenges caused by a delay in payment for the vouchers. I 
still owe farmers delivery of top-dressing fertiliser. I failed to pay back the 
banker‟s loan in time because of the government delay in paying me for the 
original inputs.
165
  
 
Kataka also highlighted some of the problems she had with her involvement in the 
programme:  
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One problem I had with the NAAIAP programme was that most farmers thought 
that the vouchers were for cash and not for inputs and they pressured us to 
supply the top-dressing fertilisers. However, I suffered most from the delay in 
payment by the government.
166
  
 
The NAAIAP officers were aware of these institutional and delivery problems and 
modified the distribution system in 2010. While unable to change the national payment 
structures, they opted instead to focus on adjusting the distribution channels to 
incorporate larger input-dealers (distributors) instead of the small agro-dealers in the 
sub-locations. These larger distributors are contracted at the national level to supply all 
inputs to certain locations during what NAAIAP staff call „input fairs‟. Farmers receive 
all inputs at the same time and (presumably) early enough for proper planting. 
Therefore, NAAIAP overcame one of its technology supply problems by controlling 
the distribution chain of the inputs, but only at the expense of undermining important 
institutional structures (i.e., agro-dealer networks), which they had originally planned to 
strengthen.
167
  
 
This section illustrates some of the challenges of administering a large input-support 
programme. It examines the politics and highlights some of the institutional and 
capacity issues arising from rapid programme expansion. The programme had expected 
farmers to graduate from the input subsidy package in one year, but this proved to be 
too optimistic, since the farmer groups and cooperative cereal banks were poorly 
supported and did not function as intended.  
 
The outcome of the programme 
 
NAAIAP‟s main goal was to “address the problem of food security and poverty for 
resource poor farmers” (GOK, 2008b: 1). Its main thrust was to increase agricultural 
productivity by providing farmers with improved inputs, particularly improved seeds 
and inorganic fertiliser. However, the drought in 2009 drastically reduced yields for 
many farming households in the research area, with 83 percent of households 
interviewed experiencing a lower than average maize harvest. The households in the 
poorest wealth category were hit especially hard, with many of them struggling with 
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food security during the following year. Therefore, one year after the programme 
ended, visits to the same households showed that 90 percent of farmers felt that there 
was little change in their food security situation. Because households did not have the 
yields they expected after receiving the input package, only 13 percent of the 
households felt that they had any gain from NAAIAP. This last section analyses why 
perceptions about technology may have changed after the programme and how farmers‟ 
impressions may have altered their farming systems. 
 
Perception and adaptation of technology package  
 
As mentioned previously, the majority of the programme recipients (92 percent) had 
used fertiliser before NAAIAP, although in varying quantities and not necessarily 
consistently. The majority were from the highest and middle wealth categories (38 and 
35 percent), while 28 percent were from the lowest wealth category. There were more 
male-headed households (59 percent) than female (41 percent) who had used fertiliser 
previously. The remaining households (8 percent) had not used fertiliser or improved 
seeds before the programme. All of these were in the poorest wealth category and were 
evenly divided between male- and female-headed households. These were relatively 
younger households who had recently started farming on their own and the main reason 
they did not use fertiliser was because of a lack of capital.  
 
In 2010, 81 percent of farmers reported buying fertiliser for the next long rains, 
purchasing quantities between 5 and 50 kilograms. None of them purchased the type of 
inputs provided in the NAAIAP package; instead they went back to their previous 
choices, buying DAP and their favoured hybrid seeds. Only eight percent reported 
purchasing top dressing (CAN). In all, farmers returned to purchasing the same types of 
technologies that they were using prior to the programme.  
 
Fewer farmers in the lowest wealth category bought inputs in 2010 than had done 
before NAAIAP started. These households had no coping mechanisms to deal with the 
poor harvests caused by the 2009 drought. Therefore, they were unable to save or 
continue purchasing inputs as they had done in previous years. The programme had not 
been able to provide them with the resilience they needed to withstand and overcome a 
significant environmental shock, such as a prolonged drought. 
  
198 
 
Figure 18: Rose Amanya, Butere, May 2010 
 
In terms of quantity of inputs purchased, wealthier households (Category A) were more 
likely to purchase the same inputs they had used before the programme. One such 
farmer remains convinced that without fertiliser he could not expect a good harvest: 
 
I shall never plant without fertiliser, without fertiliser you do not expect this 
crop to grow.
168
  
 
A few farmers (25 percent) in this highest wealth category applied slightly more 
fertiliser than in previous years. However, none of them attributed their increased 
purchases directly to the programme. They were able to buy more inputs as a result of 
income from other activities, which included beans, soya, livestock or remittances. In 
addition, this group had larger plots (more than two hectares), and many of them could 
store and/or sell maize. Rose is one such farmer from Khushiku. Rose is a retired 
teacher and owns a bookstore and a small primary school. She has two hectares of land, 
which she uses to 
pant a wide variety of 
crops, including 
maize, beans, 
groundnuts, 
sunflowers and a 
range of different 
vegetables. However, 
she says her main 
source of income is 
from her dairy cows 
and from her shops in 
the market. She also 
depends on her small 
pension that she receives. Therefore, her income base is diversified and she has a range 
of options that she can depend on when she needs to purchase inputs. As she states: 
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I never plant without fertiliser and you can see the results in my yields. In half a 
hectare I have been getting between 15 and 17 bags of maize, if there is no 
drought and it rains well, and I plant on time. I have been using DAP even 
before the programme, and I will continue to use it even now. I would plant 
groundnuts and sell them around January so I can get fertiliser to plant maize. 
If it wasn‟t enough then I would use money from my dairy cow to top up what I 
needed.
169
  
 
On average, farmers in the middle wealth group (Category B) bought inputs after the 
programme but in smaller quantities than in previous years. Farmers in this wealth 
category pointed to the poor harvest of the previous year to explain why their input 
purchases this year were much lower. A few households in this group were able to rent 
extra land and sell those crops. However, overall, remittances remain an important 
source of income for this middle-wealth category. Michael, a middle-wealth category 
farmer from Khushiku describes: 
 
Three years ago I received some money from a relative working in a nearby 
town and I used that money to purchase DAP for the first time. I had seen other 
farms doing well with DAP, so I decided to try it. I would not have been able to 
buy the fertiliser without my relative who supported me that year and I 
harvested my highest yield ever. I did not purchase again until the government 
programme came.  
 
After using NAAIAP inputs, Michael decided to buy DAP for the next long rains 
(2010). He sold a goat in the local market and purchased 20 kilograms of fertiliser to 
use with his local seed. He feels that the 20 kilograms of fertiliser is a positive 
improvement, but he remains unsure whether he will continue to purchase the inputs. 
He says that so much depends on the outcomes of the next harvest that he can only 
make plans when the season is about to start.  
 
For the 19 percent of farmers who did not purchase inorganic fertilisers in 2010, most 
(71 percent) came from the poorest households (Category C). Farmers in the lowest 
wealth category returned to their conventional farming systems, using animal manure, 
compost or nothing. This group was the only wealth group in which a reduced 
proportion of farmers used fertiliser. Prior to the programme, 75 percent of farmers in 
the poorest wealth category used fertiliser (albeit in varying quantity), but this fell to 50 
percent one year after the programme. A lack of financing and a poor harvest from the 
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previous year meant farmers could not afford to buy the following year. Many in this 
group rely on a small portion of land for income. Some work on other people‟s farms 
and use some of these earnings to purchase a few kilograms of fertiliser. Low yields as 
a result of the drought meant that many had little to sell and NAAIAP did not help them 
to save enough to buy fertiliser the following year. While the drought played a role, 47 
percent of those interviewed also blamed the input package distributed by NAAIAP. 
Farmers attributed their poor yields to the performance of Mavuno, the seed type and 
the late availability of top dressing: 
 
I had never used Mavuno before. They had used it in Muhanga [neighbouring 
sub-location] last year and I heard that it did not perform well. I am told that it 
was not the government pushing Mavuno, it was the agro-dealers that were 
trying to make a big catch.
170
  
 
This message was common with farmers who voiced their frustration with the 
administration of the programme and the inputs that they believe are not appropriate for 
the area. They expressed confusion as to the role the agriculture officers were to play. 
One poor widow states: 
 
We were supposed to be visited first by the agriculture officer to tell us what to 
do, so I waited for them and they never came. This affected my crop because I 
planted late. I only harvested two bags from the place where I planted with 
government fertiliser. This was much lower than normal. However, the drought 
also affected the crops so much. In truth, I usually depend on local seed and I 
usually get a better harvest than this one.
171
  
 
A well-off elderly woman from Khushiku claimed that staff at the Nairobi headquarters 
were not connected to those who received the inputs in the villages. In her view, this 
led to frustrations in her community about the programme: 
 
The major aim of the government is trying to pull us out of poverty. It is not 
easy because the people who make these programmes do not live here in the 
villages so I do not know if they understand how difficult it is to make a living 
from the land. You may come here and find a farmer who produces less than 
five bags of maize an acre. Do you not think it is a waste of time and energy? I 
wish they could come here and see how it is. I wish they would mix with the 
people from the reserves. Then it would be cheaper to solve this problem.
172
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The household interviews show that due to national political interest in the composition 
of the input packages, the programme administrators were not able to take into account 
the diverse social and political factors that affect local farming systems. The inability of 
the programme to address diversity and to include farmers in the conceptualisation and 
implementation affected the overall outcome of the programme and resulted in little 
change to farmers‟ socio-technical environment. Some adaptation did occur as farmers 
customised the technology package based on their prior experiences and knowledge of 
soil management practices. They mixed the fertiliser with manure, combined it with 
local or alternative seeds, planted or combined the inputs with other crops, and made 
use of the fertiliser and seed in a different way to that envisioned by the programme 
designers. However, the one-year time frame of the intervention was not long enough 
to make substantial changes. Instead, farmers incorporated the programme package into 
multiple socio-technical innovations that emerged through farmer experimentation and 
through ongoing farmer-to-farmer learning at the household level. This resulted in 
interactions with the input that were different and more varied than the outcomes 
expected by the programme.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Throughout this chapter, household-level case studies demonstrated how farmers dealt 
with the technical recommendations offered by the programme and revealed how socio-
technical systems constructed in projects are transformed through highly differentiated 
farming practices. As with MVP, this chapter demonstrates that large-scale national-
level narratives and knowledge-power-policy connections at national and local levels 
affect farmers‟ interactions with the programme and the administration of the 
programme. The overarching national political landscape that exists around NAAIAP 
did not allow for full farmer participation in the creation and implementation of the 
programme. This top-down approach did not allow community involvement in the 
process, which gave the farmers a limited sense of ownership or control, and led to 
distrust and frustration. In addition, the links between the national and local 
institutional and administrative arrangements influenced the style and form of the 
programme, resulting in constraints on administration staff that ultimately affected the 
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outcomes. Local power relations and social networks perpetuated the challenge of 
delivering limited resources to the intended recipients.  
 
Meanwhile, the socio-institutional elements led to transformations in the programme‟s 
implementation. Limited human resources prevented dissemination of the programme‟s 
messages to the community and participants. Due partly to the rapid expansion of the 
programme and the limited capacity of the agro-dealers, the technology packages were 
designed without taking existing farming structures into account. As a result, the 
farmers did not view them as appropriate. Therefore, the overall perceptions of the 
input package were that it did not meet their specific needs or consider their particular 
preferences. The practical difficulties in the programme design (including the location 
of agro-dealers, establishment of cereal banks, lack of training and follow-up, etc.) 
engendered feelings of dissatisfaction among farmers towards the programme, the 
stockists and the technology itself, which meant that the NAAIAP intended outcomes 
were difficult to achieve. Outcomes were further affected by poor timing of input 
delivery that caused delays in planting and ultimately affected yields. Finally, the short-
term, one-time investment and the limited administrative capacity to provide follow-up 
and monitoring were not enough to ensure sustained long-term results.  
 
Overall, the ability of the NAAIAP programme in Butere to alter the local socio-
technical system in the way it had intended has been rather limited, resulting in little 
sustained change in technology usage as originally envisioned by the policymakers. 
This lack of uptake was influenced by external limiting factors (e.g., lack of reliable 
rainfall, labour shortages and financial limitations) that remained the same after 
programme completion. As seen for the MVP, without changing components of the 
local socio-technical system that surrounds fertiliser usage for each household, the 
programme was unable to generate the change needed to construct a new system that 
would embrace the expected outcomes. The disconnect was not only with the specific 
technology package, which did not perform to the expectations of the recipients, but 
also with the wider socio-institutional dimensions, such as training, dissemination of 
information, agro-dealer networks, and setting up of farmer groups. However, the 
farmers have had an opportunity to experiment with the technology. It may not have 
changed people‟s relationship with fertiliser and may not have resulted in massive 
adoption rates, but through this experimentation, there has been a change in the 
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relationship between the social and the technical, although with limited outcomes in 
terms of technology adoption or improved food security. 
 
As with MVP (Chapter 6), this chapter illustrates that adoption, adaptation and 
continued use of a new technology are influenced by a multitude of factors that are 
external to the technology itself and depend on the delivery mechanism and messaging 
that are used to introduce that technology to a community. It offers insights into the 
dynamic interactions between key internal and external factors and their effects on 
sustained use of the new technology. It further reinforces the ways in which local socio-
technical factors, including social networks, local institutions and gender roles, affect 
an individual‟s ability to interact with a new technology and their perceptions of its 
accessibility, utility and affordability. Therefore, programmes that do not consider the 
social, ecological and technological realities are likely to face serious obstacles to long-
term adoption and sustained use of a new technology.  
 
The following chapter looks more closely at MVP and NAAIAP, to examine some of 
the convergences and divergences of the experiences and draw some broader lessons 
that could be applied to input supply programmes in general.   
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Chapter 8 
Comparison of the Two Case Studies 
 
 
This research has focused on the interface between technology and society, 
conceptualised as a process of co-evolution, in which the technology and social context 
interact and change. Building on the analysis of the previous two case study chapters, 
this chapter compares NAAIAP and MVP. It draws conclusions about the outcomes of 
the programmes and the level of change that occurred in local socio-technical practices 
and the wider regime and landscape framed by the Green Revolution narratives. In this 
chapter, I argue that the construction of this change is influenced by the unique 
characteristics of the farmers (and their households), including their relative wealth 
status (e.g., access to land, labour, capital), social standing and cultural factors (e.g., 
actor networks, power relations), as well as their articulation with wider social and 
technological processes. These socio-technical-political interactions come together to 
create a new version of the technology to fit the farmer's particular livelihood 
circumstances.  
 
As stated at the beginning of the thesis, my research aims to move beyond a simple 
'adoption' versus 'non-adoption' question; instead I have sought to determine how and to 
what degree contrasting input-support programmes have altered the socio-technical 
system and the choices open to poor farmers in risk-prone environments. The focus is 
on the encounter between the input supply programmes and local contexts and the 
creation of new hybrid interpretations and practices. At the same time, the results show 
that changes in the local socio-technical systems have a discernable impact on 
programmatic outcomes.  
 
In socio-technical terms, the two case studies are quite different. They are situated in 
two distinct areas, with unique cultures and diverse livelihood/farming systems, as well 
as different histories of exposure to fertiliser and experience with its use (see Chapter 
5). While driven by a similar Green Revolution technology-focused narrative, the two 
programmes have very different designs, administrative arrangements and 
  
205 
 
organisational structures (e.g., scale, budget, targeting). Therefore, a direct comparison 
cannot be made, since it is not a replicated experiment with the same intervention 
(beyond the input focus) in the same context. However, a comparative analysis can 
draw out key lessons that could be relevant to the design and implementation of future 
input-supply programmes. Therefore, based on this premise, the next section begins 
with a closer look at some of the similarities and differences in the design and delivery 
of MVP and NAAIAP. 
 
Comparing the design and delivery of the input-support programmes 
 
As highlighted in the previous chapters, the socio-technical system present in MVP and 
NAAIAP has emerged through a unique set of institutional and administrative 
arrangements. Both programmes originated through, and were influenced by, particular 
political interests and organisational constructs. Furthermore, both programmes were 
dependent on additional donor support to scale up the activities and were driven by 
funding exigencies. Therefore, key actors (including government, donors and input 
suppliers) were instrumental in shaping the evolution of the programmes, couched 
within national (NAAIAP) or household (MVP) food self-sufficiency objectives.  
 
The philosophical foundations of both programmes were derived from the overarching 
Green Revolution narratives of addressing a productivity gap through providing a 
simple technology fix. Specifically, inorganic fertilisers were seen as the missing factor 
that could boost productivity on smallholdings. The rationale was based on statistics 
showing that productivity levels and use of inorganic fertiliser were low in Kenya (and 
in Africa generally), and it was assumed that subsidising the input would lead to 
farmers adopting the technology and improving their productivity and ultimately their 
food security status. However, in both programmes, a disconnect developed between 
the original strategic objectives and the policy-setting agendas of the headquarters-
based administrators, due to emerging institutional and/or organisational barriers and 
changing realities in the field. Table 4 highlights some of the key differences and 
similarities in the design, implementation and overarching narratives of the two 
programmes.  
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Table 4: Comparison of the two input-support programmes 
  MVP NAAIAP 
Scope 
 Geographical 
reach  
Site-intensive (operates within one 
district – Siaya District)a  
National programme (operates 
within multiple districts) 
 Beneficiaries 
reached (2008)
b
 
12,700 households within one 
district  
96,000 households within 70 
districts  
 Scope of activities Integrated programme (multiple 
initiatives within the same 
location) 
Inputs-only programme 
 Percent of subsidy 89 percent (10 percent of yields 
paid back to MVP for the school 
feeding programme)
c
 
100 percent 
Targeting 
 Criteria Initially universal subsidy; shifted 
to targeted subsidy for vulnerable 
population 
Targeted subsidy with a list of 
beneficiaries based on set 
criteria  
 Beneficiary 
selection process 
MVP staff in consultation with 
village-level committees for 
vulnerable targeted programme 
Village Elders and Chiefs 
 Targeting 
mechanism 
Direct delivery and vouchers Vouchers 
Package 
 Package content Decreasing over time and varied. 
Package included planting 
fertiliser + maize seed + top-
dressing fertiliser 
50 kilograms of planting 
fertiliser + 8 kilograms of seed + 
50 kilograms of top-dressing 
fertiliser 
 Cost  per input 
package 
Approximately $86 per package in 
2005 (cost varied over the years as 
package sizes changed and prices 
for inputs fluctuated) 
Approximately $90 per package 
in 2009 (cost of input package 
fluctuated based on cost of 
fertiliser) 
Administration 
 Organisation Donor-driven (NGO and donors) State-led (government funding, 
expanded funding from donors) 
 Level of 
administrative 
support 
Intensive staff/expert support, 
including extension officers, plus 
additional external experts 
Limited staff and expert support, 
use of existing extension 
officers plus farmer reps  
 Length of 
programme 
2–3 years‟ benefits, over a 5-year 
programme 
1-year subsidy, on-going 
national programme 
Delivery 
 Input supply Contracted private companies 
(international and domestic) 
Contracted private companies 
(domestic) 
 Input retail Varied over the years: direct 
distribution, private-sector 
dealers, private company and 
commercial bank loans 
Private-sector distributed inputs 
(agro-dealers) 
Notes: (a) MVP‟s operations in Garrisa District (Northeast Kenya) are not included since it does not have 
an input-support programme. (b) Both MVP and NAAIAP have different numbers of beneficiaries 
depending on the year of operation; therefore, the table highlights the total number of households that 
received inputs in 2008. In 2009/10, NAAIAP increased to 187,000 farmers in over 100 districts, while 
the MVP began its credit programme and reduced the number of recipients receiving subsidised inputs. 
(c) Ten percent repayment was a condition on receiving the subsidy. MVP quantified the repayment of 
maize and beans using government maize prices and market value for beans, deducted this total from 
total cost of the inputs, to state that the total subsidy for 2005 was 89 percent (Mutuo et al., 2006: 11). 
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While the scale, implementation and administrative structures of the two programmes 
are different, the focus is very similar, and so are the wider narratives associated with 
each. As mentioned previously, both programmes were derived from the Green 
Revolution narrative, with a particular technology-driven pathway to addressing food 
insecurity among smallholder farmers. The overall results may vary, but the respective 
constraints and interactions with the farmers are quite similar and, in both cases, the 
programmes were unable (in different ways) to take into account the social and cultural 
dimensions of technological change.  
 
The following section compares key design and implementation features of the two 
case studies. 
 
Community outreach and exchange of information 
 
MVP had an intensive focus on community outreach and training. Most of the project 
farmers had not used fertiliser before and so the training centred on increasing their 
knowledge and understanding of the technology. Universal subsidies in the early years 
encouraged many among the community to experiment with the technology. This 
created social pressures in which farmers did not want to be left out and were 
encouraged to copy their neighbours. MVP relied on a vast network of extension staff 
and agriculture facilitators to introduce the technology and conduct training. 
Continuous follow-up throughout the initial years also helped some members of the 
communities to acquire knowledge. Universal coverage of the entire sub-location also 
resulted in greater farmer-to-farmer knowledge sharing, as all farmers were using the 
same technologies. 
 
In contrast, the majority of the farmers chosen to receive the NAAIAP subsidy had 
prior knowledge of and experience with inorganic fertilisers. Yet, due to the lack of 
training and follow-up, the programme did not expand the farmers‟ knowledge and they 
gained little new information. In addition, the size of the target group limited the extent 
of farmer-to-farmer exchange and there was limited awareness of the programme and 
its objectives within the wider community. The lack of sufficient human resources 
hampered NAAIAP‟s dissemination strategy and its messages did not to extend into the 
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wider community. In addition, the NAAIAP input package was disbursed widely, with 
roughly 100 households in each sub-location, which translated to eight farmers per 
village. Targeting small numbers of recipients meant that farmer-to-farmer exchanges 
were much less prevalent in Butere. Furthermore, there was no properly organised 
information dissemination programme, due partly to a lack of available staff, so the 
farmers received insufficient information.  
 
Participation of end users and appropriateness of technology package  
 
While some community members were involved in certain aspects of the MVP 
programme design, the overall design and direction was led by project staff, with 
community committees filling the role of information dissemination. For example, 
while the large number of extension officers and agricultural experts working with the 
programme allowed MVP to do more field-testing and offer inputs that were tailored to 
the environment, the final decision on input types was viewed by MVP as a technical 
decision and was made by MVP staff. Even though the village committees were formed 
specifically to involve the community, a degree of „elite capture‟ of committees was 
observed, with those who were relatively more advantaged and closely allied with the 
local power structure gaining access to leadership positions within the committees. 
While in general, farmers were satisfied with the MVP package of inputs, there were 
complaints about the quality in more recent years, when the inputs were purchased 
from agro-dealers or when the farmer‟s choice of seeds was not available in the 
markets. 
 
In NAAIAP, the communities were not involved in programme design and 
implementation and this was demonstrated in the farmers‟ lack of knowledge 
concerning the programme goals. However, since the Assistant Chiefs and the village 
elders were responsible for the list of participants, this process reinforced existing 
power structures and ensured that local leaders and rural elites dictated who benefited 
from the programme. Likewise, NAAIAP recipients had no choice in the composition 
of the input package. In many cases, the recipients did not view the inputs offered by 
the agro-dealers as appropriate to their area.  
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Capacity of administration and street-level bureaucrats  
 
An interesting sub-theme emerging from this research is the influence of field-level 
agents or „street-level bureaucrats‟ (Lipsky, 1980) in translating policy into practice at 
the interface between farmers and the technology delivery. Delivery agents, who 
include programme administrators, extension officers and field staff, affected the 
outcome of the programmes when they translated the policies created at the macro or 
meso levels into practice. Local socio-technical interactions were altered by the 
interpretation and discretion of the field-level agents. As Keeley and Scoones (2003: 
32-33) describe: 
 
[Street level bureaucrats] prioritise, interpret instructions, deal with 
overlapping and contradictory directives, and take the initiative in areas where 
there might be a policy vacuum. Even where directives are clear, street-level 
workers can block, deflect or ignore instructions. 
 
The field-level agents were able to exert a subtle but significant effect on the agenda 
and direction of the programmes through their interactions with local people. Their role 
was played out differently in each programme. For example, the shift in NAAIAP‟s 
targeting criteria took the focus away from the most vulnerable in the community and 
towards those who were „serious farmers‟, so including a different group of 
beneficiaries from that originally envisaged. Likewise, in MVP, field agents made 
critical choices regarding budgetary allocations that changed the length and scope of 
the subsidy period, which led to a transformation in the local approach.  
 
There were also differences in field-based capacities between programmes. MVP‟s 
administrative structures were strong, since the programme existed for five years in the 
same location and had sufficient funding to hire trained extension officers and 
specialists. This allowed MVP administrative staff to understand the programme area 
and build long-term relationships with the communities. In contrast, NAAIAP 
depended on the existing and under-funded government extension staff to administer 
the programme. NAAIAP‟s administrative structures were stretched by the need to 
cover a rapidly increasing number of farmers and large areas with inadequate financial 
and logistical support. 
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Building institutions to ensure sustainability 
 
Sustainability is another critical component for development programmes. To be 
sustainable, subsidy programmes need to promote the development of the institutions 
required to make a substantive change in the local area. Input-support programmes 
need to address the broader market factors affecting smallholder farmers, which include 
availability and costs of inputs, price fluctuations of staple products and lack of 
affordable credit or insurance schemes. Both NAAIAP and MVP designed institution 
building into their programmes, with varying degrees of success. Yet, the evolving 
nature of both input programmes hampered the building of lasting institutions in 
different ways.  
 
The agro-dealers created during MVP have not survived and the micro-finance 
institution initially involved has not flourished. MVP built the agro-dealer networks but 
then abandoned the idea in favour of larger input distributors. However, since MVP is a 
multi-year and multi-sector programme, it has been able to expand its focus and 
promote diversification and market-oriented activities.  
 
On the other hand, NAAIAP‟s short timeframe of operation within a given sub-location 
allowed little opportunity for institution building – or even the strengthening of existing 
institutions. While community cereal banks were discussed, few were established due 
to the limited capacity available for training and follow-up. Although training of agro-
dealer networks did occur on a national scale, the lack of appropriate financial 
mechanisms to refund them in a timely manner made it difficult for small-scale agro-
dealers to participate in the programme. NAAIAP was unable to depend on the small-
scale agro-dealers to supply the appropriate inputs at the right times and, therefore, the 
programme began to rely more on the larger state-controlled distributors. Hence, there 
has been little impact on expanding the network of agro-dealers, as originally 
envisioned by the programme.  
 
Political and external pressures on programmes 
 
The pace of implementation and expansion of both programmes greatly affected the 
ways in which the technologies were introduced to the community, the participation 
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and engagement of the recipients and the administrative capacity of the programme 
staff. All these factors affected the co-construction process between the technical and 
the social worlds, with varying results.  
 
The MDG was driven by external pressure to demonstrate rapid success and to provide 
a „proof of concept‟ behind the global MDG Agenda. This political and external 
pressure to show quick results pushed the MVP administrators to proceed at a pace that 
did not allow local government officials and local communities sufficient time to adjust 
to the constant changes. MVP was quick to change the delivery format of its 
programme but the fast-evolving system was not explained properly to the community, 
leading to confusion and frustration.  
 
Similarly, NAAIAP was largely driven by the convergence of national electoral 
(political unrest leading up to the 2007 national elections) politics and food security 
(based on an emphasis on maize production) concerns. Social and political pressures, 
following the droughts and national–level unrests that occurred in early 2008, affected 
implementation and prompted rapid expansion of the programme, while increased 
donor support (interested primarily on social protection after the electoral violence) 
outstretched the capacity of the staff, extension officers and agro-dealers to implement 
the programme. Ultimately, political factors, heavily influenced by social factors, 
underpinned the final project design and implementation. 
 
Both programmes illustrate various ways in which social and technical processes 
interact and co-evolve. The rush to show results at the local level prompted the 
narrowing of Green Revolution narratives, with policymakers enticed by the promise of 
quick wins from improved seeds and fertilisers. Yet, Green Revolution narratives 
implemented through policy and programmatic instruments may influence local socio-
technical changes, but they do not determine the direction or extent of these changes. 
Instead, the two case studies show how the farmers‟ socio-technical systems have been 
fundamentally reshaped or reconfigured, not by externally driven narratives, but as a 
result of local level interactions among farmers, the technologies themselves, and the 
programmes that promote them. 
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Comparing results and outcomes of input-support programmes 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, this research focuses on the socio-
technical factors that come to play when technology dissemination programmes are 
introduced at the household level. The case studies demonstrate how the farmers‟ 
individual socio-technical worlds are altered as a result of their interaction with a 
particular technology and its implementation processes. This results comparison 
focuses on the construction of this change by highlighting some of the main outcomes 
of the two case studies. It also refers to other, similar programmes in Africa, indicating 
common similarities and differences (cf. SOAS et al., 2008; Dorward, 2009; Xu et al., 
2009; Baltzer and Hansen, 2011; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011; Mason and Ricker-Gilbert, 
2012).  
 
In both MVP and NAAIAP, the adoption and continued use of the technology packages 
were influenced by many external factors, including the changing delivery mechanism 
and messages. One important outcome in both programmes was that withdrawing the 
subsidies affected the usage rates of the technologies. For example, the one-year 
subsidy offered by NAAIAP was much too short term to have a significant influence on 
farmers‟ fertiliser usage rates. Likewise, withdrawing or altering the subsidy 
programme too quickly, as in MVP, affected the relationship between the farmers and 
the project and hampered adoption rates as people‟s expectations for continued support 
were not met. In addition, external factors, including weather and administrative delays, 
heavily affected the farmers‟ ability to cope with ongoing risk factors, so many farmers 
reverted to their former farming practices. 
 
Similar results concerning declining input use after the withdrawal of input-support 
programmes are reported in reviews of several large-scale African universal subsidy 
programmes operating during the 1980s and 1990s (cf. Crawford et al., 2006; Dorward, 
2009; Baltzer and Hansen, 2011; Banful, 2011). A study by Reardon et al. (1996: 18) 
found: 
 
In Zimbabwe, smallholders rapidly adopted hybrid maize when fertilizer credit 
was available and output market prices were guaranteed. When fertilizer credit 
was eliminated in 1985, fertilizer use declined.  
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Results in terms of poverty alleviation were affected by the programmes ability to 
target the subsidies to appropriate recipients. Both programmes (MVP and NAAIAP) 
tried a variety of voucher and credit schemes. The voucher scheme used in NAAIAP 
had the potential to target the subsidies to specific smallholders, but social structures 
and power-relations at the local level affected the process. As a result, households with 
better social and political connections were more likely to receive the targeted inputs. 
For example, male-headed households were at times represented as female-headed so 
they could benefit from the programme, leading to a skewed distribution of benefits.  
 
The targeted vulnerable programme in MVP was able to overcome some of these 
difficulties and improve its reach because programme staff built close relationships 
with community members, including village elders, during a relatively longer period of 
time (two to four years). This process was facilitated by having sufficient numbers of 
qualified, well-paid and motivated field staff dedicated to implementing the 
programme.  However, the high level of funding required to replicate such intensive 
supervision has financial implications for the scaling up of the programme to the 
national level, as well as for an adequate return on donor investment.  
 
Similar problems with targeting were found in the Malawi subsidy programme. The 
official criteria for choosing recipients were not very precise and, like in NAAIAP, 
selection was left to the village elders and chiefs. For example, a survey by Holdon and 
Lunduka (2010) found that the pro-poor targeting (aimed at the very poor and 
vulnerable child-headed and female-headed households) was inefficient, with male-
headed households and households with greater assets and incomes receiving a large 
share of the subsidised inputs. This social discrimination meant that the most 
vulnerable households in Malawi were less likely to be considered for the inputs 
(Chibwana et al., 2010). These results put into question the effectiveness of targeting to 
particular farming households, due to problems of diversion and leakage. 
 
Comparing the productivity outcomes is much more difficult, due to the different 
length and coverage of the two programmes. NAAIAP farmers in the study sites did not 
report sustained increases in productivity during or following the one-year programme. 
A period of low rainfall coincided with the subsidy period, and this had a strong 
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negative effect on farmers‟ yields. However, in Siaya, early results indicated yields 
increased up to 2.6-fold from 2004 to 2005 (Sanchez et al., 2007: 16777). In this area, 
the subsidy coincided with good rains and included intensive training to improve 
farming practices (i.e., spacing, weeding, and seed and fertiliser placement). The results 
after the MVP subsidies were withdrawn have been mixed, with overall yields 
declining slightly since the initial highs reported at the beginning of the programme 
(Okoth, 2010).  
 
These findings are in line with those of other authors. For example, Baltzer and Hansen 
(2011: 28) state:  
 
Significant increases in agricultural productivity and food production is 
possible, and the potential for improving agricultural productivity by 
subsidising agricultural inputs exists. However, the estimates are somewhat 
uncertain. .... There is very little convincing evidence to suggest that outcomes 
are likely to persist after termination of the programmes. 
 
National- and global-level politics have also influenced the outcomes and sustainability 
of these two input-support programmes. As mentioned in Chapter 3, input-support 
programmes have the potential to lead to rent-seeking, clientelism and elite capture at 
all levels. Therefore, political interference and controlling costs becomes paramount, 
and this can be difficult for programmes such as NAAIAP, where there is strong 
political advocacy for the expansion of subsidies and strong resistance to scaling down 
or termination of the subsidies. Chirwa et al. (2010: 1) report that the cost of the 
Malawi subsidy programme increased from 2.1 percent of GDP in 2005/06 to 5.5 
percent in 2008/09.  
 
The lasting outcomes on food security in both research sites are still unclear. As stated 
in earlier chapters, food insecurity relates not only to availability of food but also to 
issues surrounding access to and stability of the food supply. Therefore, assessment of 
impact requires a broader view of the different factors affecting food security, which 
include ecology, social dimensions and political economy. A study by Richer-Gilbert 
and Jayne (2011) found that, although it was successful in increasing production, the 
Malawi programme showed little evidence of a long-term positive effect on the income, 
assets, access to food or general well-being of poor households.  
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Comparing the outcomes of NAAIAP and MVP demonstrates the complexity of the 
relationship between input-support programmes and long-term food security. Some 
proponents of these programmes state that lowering the cost of farm inputs is a good 
way to reduce the risk associated with using a new technology. Others criticise 
subsidies and view national policy reforms or market liberalisations as the key. Both 
these views are based on a certain “theory of change” (Kubisch et al., 1995; Weiss, 
1995, 2000; Stame, 2004)  that centres on the ideas that the administrators, 
policymakers and implementers of programmes have on how inputs will be received by 
the recipients. Yet, whether the subsidy programme are justified under one or the other 
of these positions will have an impact on the environment (i.e. institutions and policies) 
that will need to be in place for the subsidy to be successfully withdrawn and for the 
farmers to continue using the inputs.  
 
Based on my research, I contend that narrow focuses on technologies or market-based 
solutions will not be sufficient to address the complex nature of food insecurity. The 
answer must incorporate a broad approach that considers the unique political, 
institutional and social contexts that surround local farm settings. Technology-driven 
programmes must allow for the fact that end users will adapt these technologies 
through individualised social interpretations, localised institutions and political 
processes. Therefore, the social and human factors that affect change and the dynamic 
interface between technologies and human interactions need to be better understood.  
 
Conclusion: The divergence of policy and practice  
 
The two case studies show that policy and practice often diverge, even with well 
intentioned deliberative processes. They show how programme design can evolve in a 
different way than expected due to certain social, political and economic factors, 
funding and delivery systems. They highlight how related policy processes unfold 
through changing actors, networks and funding flows. When a programme hits the 
ground, it takes on its a life of its own, one that is mediated through socially 
differentiated beneficiaries who represent the different categories of adopters, non-
adopters, dis-adopters and partial adopters. This research attempts to understand the 
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challenges, capacities and priorities of a diverse group of actors and interests and the 
relationships between their social worlds and Green Revolution-inspired technologies. 
 
The analysis of the interactions within NAAIAP in Butere offers lessons for the design 
of an effective technology delivery system. The programme‟s administrative problems, 
lack of training and absence of input choice were compounded by the poor rainy 
season, leaving many people disillusioned and feeling that the programme was not as 
successful as it should have been. However, the lessons from NAAIAP in Butere in 
terms of socio-technical influences are more complex than they first appear. This 
research shows that the design of the programme, in terms of the recommended input 
package, was influenced by political and administrative factors at the national and local 
levels.  
 
MVP was also influenced by numerous multi-level interactions at the national, 
programme and local levels, leading it to undergo a number of modifications and 
administrative „retooling‟ over the years. The MVP concept underwent numerous 
renegotiations between key actors. This co-evolution of technology and society resulted 
from the changing politics of the relationship between headquarters and the field and 
the tensions that existed among framing, funding, implementation and practice. As 
highlighted in Chapter 6, some of the changes were due to challenges encountered in 
the field, while others were the result of the broader political, economic and 
institutional context. In addition, some changes came from the project‟s need to show 
results faster than field staff and villagers could adapt. These interactions resulted in an 
evolving system, both at the programme and the farmer level, which continues to be 
transformed over time.  
 
The analysis demonstrates that, in practice, programme implementation unfolds in 
nonlinear and often unexpected ways. Factors at one level interact with those at 
another. For example, the social encounters at the project interface with the community 
are a major factor in determining how the recipients understand, implement and accept 
the programme. Furthermore, these social and political factors come together with the 
project implementation, financing and administration to create diverse trajectories and 
reshape the original intentions. The simple blueprint design dictated at the macro level 
does not lead to a neat outcome, as envisaged by the programme administrators and 
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political actors. At the local level, these multiple negotiations and micro-politics of 
what is and is not incorporated become more significant, and this is where the macro-
level narratives are recast to become more locally specific and socially founded. 
 
Thus, the interface between social and technical factors remains the most important 
aspect determining technology adoption. The interactions among local actors, through 
gradual experimentation and learning processes, as well as their interactions with local 
administration, politics and delivery mechanisms, result in alteration of the technology 
package and creation of innovative niches to fit their individual circumstances. As a 
result, multitudes of new socio-technical arrangements were co-constructed and the 
farmers‟ relationship with the inputs was altered. Farmers‟ negotiations with the new 
technologies, and the way their knowledge was changed, enabled them to determine 
whether the inputs were appropriate to their local and individual context or not. It may 
not have resulted in adoption at the rates promoted by the programmes, but farmers‟ 
knowledge of the technology changed to varying degrees.  
 
Ultimately, this research demonstrates that programmes must consider the socio-
economic realities of poor farmers, and offer more site- and context-specific responses 
that are suitable for complex, diverse and risk-prone farming systems. Only then will 
programme managers understand the obstacles to long-term adoption and sustained use 
of any new technology. Promoting long-term sustainability therefore requires a deeper 
understanding of the wider social, economic and political factors that affect a given 
locality and how individuals create innovative niches to respond to these factors in a 
way that benefits them the most.  
  
  
218 
 
Chapter 9 
Conclusion:  
Re-imagining the Green Revolution 
 
 
This thesis set out to provide a critical reflection on what is meant by a „Green 
Revolution for Africa‟ and to highlight features of the overarching framing of food 
security that are missing within Kenya. It centred on one of the dominant narratives that 
defines the Green Revolution narrowly within a „productivity-technology fix‟ 
paradigm, creating a limited view of technology as the principal means of addressing 
food insecurity in Africa. The thesis shows that this exclusive focus on productivity, 
instead of a more comprehensive view of the economic, social and political factors 
affecting food security, has led to various policy decisions concerning the delivery of 
technology to the food insecure. The findings suggest that Green Revolution 
programmes must consider a more nuanced and context-specific approach that takes 
into account the diversity of the local situation and the socio-economic, institutional 
and political factors that affect it.  
 
The research identified a series of competing national-level food security narratives in 
Kenya, of which the productivity narrative was dominant. Kenya‟s rising levels of food 
insecurity and persisting low productivity have forced the government and donor 
community to refocus on agriculture, specifically on maize, the staple food of the poor. 
This has led to national policies based on Kenya‟s political, economic, social and 
historical context. The research shows how this renewed focus on food security has 
resulted in a certain trajectory based on raising maize productivity, with input-support 
programmes being promoted as a major tool to deliver technology and increase 
productivity among smallholder farmers. This has much to do with politics and the high 
political profile of maize in Kenya. The findings suggest that food security narratives 
supported by key global and international actors and institutions tend to dominate food 
security policy and legislation processes in Kenya, while marginalising alternative 
narratives that include a social dimension.   
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This chapter provides an overview of the finding, draws out key lessons regarding the 
effects of Kenya‟s political and institutional environment (Chapter 5) on MVP and 
NAAIAP and highlights the potential implications for these and future programmes. 
The key elements are summarised below.  
 
 Context matters: Technologies cannot be examined in isolation; they are being 
adapted constantly by the end users due to social interpretations and interactions, 
together with the influences of local institutions and policy processes.  
 
 Politics and interests matter: The adoption and sustained use of fertiliser in Africa 
is linked intrinsically to the perception of the actors, organisations and social 
structures that encompass local farming systems, which, of course, vary from place 
to place.  
 
 Dynamics and diversity matter: Programmes that attempt to introduce a 
technology to smallholder farmers without taking into account the social, political 
and institutional dimensions surrounding that technology will encounter many 
difficulties in adoption and uptake.  
 
 Simple techno-fixes do not work: Focusing on simple, limited solutions, such as 
inputs only, to such complex and multi-faceted problems as food insecurity, will 
address the symptoms but not the underlying causes of low productivity and 
deepening poverty. Long-lasting and sustainable solutions require a much broader 
approach that includes additional elements (e.g., markets, policy, institutions, etc.).  
 
 ‘One-size-fits-all’ does not work: This research highlights the complex and 
diverse nature of smallholder farming systems, which feature a wide range of 
dynamic farming practices and risk mitigation strategies based on the individual‟s 
social and power relations. Generalisations and fixed strategies are therefore 
unlikely to succeed over the long term.  
 
  
220 
 
 Development takes time: Long-term funding and programmes that take a flexible 
approach to planning for the future are more likely to promote change and 
sustainable outcomes.  
 
Overview of findings 
 
The findings demonstrate that previous Green Revolution narratives focused on 
technology fixes created a stable configuration of institutions, processes and supporting 
policies that persist today and continue to direct the trajectory of development 
programmes dealing with food insecurity in Africa. These global productivity-
technology fix narratives have had a strong influence on Kenya‟s agricultural policy 
and its efforts to address the food security challenge. The influence is both historic, 
resulting from the institutions and land-use patterns put in place before independence, 
and current, linked to pressures arising from structural adjustment and market 
liberalisation. 
 
The research provides a greater understanding of the dynamic interactions among 
current Green Revolution narratives as they come together at multiple levels. It also 
throws light on their effects on the design and implementation of specific input-support 
programmes for smallholder farmers. It shows that leading global and national actors 
have retained a strong focus on increasing productivity through the application of a 
relatively narrow selection of agricultural technologies (i.e., hybrid seed and inorganic 
fertilisers). However, it was the interface between the different actors that ultimately 
determined the technical design, dissemination and adoption process and the project 
outcomes. The results show that politics and power play a key role in determining 
whose knowledge is included or excluded at the different levels, from global agenda 
setting, through national policy deliberations, to local community interactions.  
 
The policy decisions resulting from the coming together of Green Revolution narratives 
have framed the current agriculture and food security environment, which has a strong 
focus on maize production as a measure of national food security. Technical and 
political issues have become intertwined in the policy process and are influenced 
heavily by ethnic and regional politics. A focus on food security creates political 
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benefits, with the potential for winning votes, and therefore takes centre stage in setting 
the country‟s agricultural agenda. The result is that policy is not linear and influences 
can come from an array of different political and social directions and pressures, both 
domestic and international. Overall, the findings demonstrate that political and social 
pressures to respond to the food security challenge continue to dominate and shape 
policymaking and programme design in Kenya, and Africa more generally. 
 
The research also focuses on social and power relations and how socio-technical 
systems are constructed at the village level. The household-level stories reveal different 
dimensions of the intersection between the technology and the farmers‟ interpretation 
and perception of its value. It reveals that farmers‟ perceptions are influenced by 
political, institutional and social factors and highlights the important role played by 
social networks in helping or hindering access to technology and information.  
 
Several findings stand out from the case study analysis, particularly the importance of 
accurate targeting, which relies on a complex combination of political, institutional and 
social aspects. For example, there was a strong political rationale (i.e., improve food 
security amongst the most vulnerable) for the proposed targeting in NAAIAP, but the 
targeting system implemented created potential for elite capture. This example shows 
how power dimensions at the local level can affect an institutional process.  
 
The MVP involved the community to a greater extent in targeting, yet this process was 
also affected by political and social factors. Social pressures were created when some 
community members benefited more than others through their involvement in the 
programme (i.e., access to information and privilege) leading to tensions within the 
community. In addition, while the programme‟s large administrative structures 
attempted to encourage community participation in its design and implementation, they 
also had the unintended results of reducing autonomy within the community. For 
example, the changing design of the input supply system was not discussed with the 
community and very few alternatives were offered to those who did not wish (or could 
not) participate in these structures.  
 
Farmer adaptation of technology was another recurrent theme in the research. The two 
programmes under study were representative of more traditional agricultural 
  
222 
 
development projects, which tend to disseminate ready-made technology „packages‟, 
since it is impractical to offer a variety of packages fully tailored to individual 
circumstances. These packages are often designed by experts, yet influenced by 
political interference and financial considerations. However, farmers rarely use a 
package as it comes, they will adopt it, adapt it to fit their own particular circumstances 
or avoid using it altogether. Because households live in different social worlds that are 
determined by wealth, age, gender and social connections, they deal with the package 
in multiple ways. This is the point at which social and institutional factors interact and 
the outcome of technology use is determined.  
 
The research investigated the social processes that determined whether the technology 
would persist, change or disappear and thus create new socio-technical arrangements. 
As highlighted in Chapter 8, input subsidies are a useful means of increasing 
productivity and can have a positive impact – but mainly during the time of the subsidy. 
Once the subsidy period ends, circumstances will lead to a variety of different results as 
the socio-technical system changes. The nature of these changes is perhaps a more 
interesting issue than the standard adoption or dis-adoption question. For example, 
when people try fertiliser, or change the way they use fertilisers, as a result of a subsidy 
system, they may not adopt the new technology in large numbers, but their knowledge 
of the options available to them is enhanced. They now have access to a new set of 
options, based on a revised set of circumstances and knowledge, resulting in 
transformed social arrangements surrounding the technology.  
 
Yet, the ways in which these changes occur and the system is transformed will be 
different depending on people‟s relative wealth, gender or social standing. For example, 
the findings also highlight the ways in which relatively asset-poor people may perceive 
the technology intervention as a social or financial risk. Their interactions will differ 
depending on their increased vulnerability to these risks and the coping mechanisms 
they have available to deal with uncertainties. Because they are asset-poor (and 
possibly socially excluded), these farmers have higher vulnerabilities and therefore 
their ability to adapt or adopt new technologies are affected. 
 
Through these case studies, the research also demonstrates how social and technical 
elements are co-constructed through a process of engagement at the field level. 
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Interfaces between farmers and technical project staff are points of negotiation and 
transformation of the socio-technical system. While influenced by powerful narratives 
– defined at the national and international levels – which project a particular vision of 
the Green Revolution as a „technical fix‟, a whole set of negotiations takes place at the 
interface between project delivery and people‟s day-to-day lives, which result in 
diverse, sometimes unexpected, outcomes. As Scoones et al. (2005: 2) state: 
 
Intermediate factors – social relations, politics, institutions – all imbued with 
power relations, and the interaction of interlocking constraints, all affect how 
inputs (technologies and development interventions) and outputs (development 
outcomes, including poverty reduction) are related.  
 
Bringing all these aspects together, this research makes a unique contribution to the 
input subsidies debate that is both conceptual and empirical. It applies a novel and 
hybrid conceptual framework that combines a socio-technical systems theory with a 
policy approach to fit the specific agricultural, socio-cultural and technological context 
of the case studies. By using a comparative study of two distinct input support 
programmes within the same country context, the research provides new insight into 
how influential the pressures of politics, social pressures, power relations and 
administrative constructs have been on the development and delivery of technology-
support programmes and interactions with smallholders‟ at the micro level. Both 
advance our understanding of the use of technologies within a Green Revolution 
agenda in Africa and offer new insights into current debates about the delivery of input 
subsidy programmes.  
 
Using the hybrid framework, the comparative analysis of MVP and NAAIAP 
demonstrates how programme implementation unfolds in nonlinear and often 
unexpected ways due to the multiple and varied interactions of intermediate factors – 
social relations, politics, and institutions, which at one level have influenced those 
factors at another level. These encounters across levels, and between the project and the 
community, are a major factor in determining how the recipients understand and/or 
accept technologies.  
 
Through a multi-level perspective, the research showed how social and political factors 
interact to create diverse trajectories and reshape, or diverge from, the policymakers 
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original intentions for the input-support programmes. Therefore, the original design and 
intentions at one level do not lead to expected outcomes at another level. These 
multiple negotiations and micro-politics of what is and is not incorporated become 
more significant, and this is where the macro-level narratives are recast to become more 
locally specific. 
 
The research, therefore, advances a greater understanding of this interface to illustrate 
how these linkages between technology and intermediate factors are important aspects 
determining adoption. The analysis of these interactions highlights the complexity of 
the relationship between input-support programmes and long-term food security. It also 
offers a number of practical lessons for the design of future smallholder technology-
delivery programmes. I highlight five key findings below: 
 
 Short-term subsidies or withdrawing direct subsidies too quickly may hamper 
adoption, due in part to people‟s expectation of continued support. Programme 
designers must consider upfront the graduation from a subside programme and 
understand the theory of change that underpins adaptation. Therefore, prior to 
implementing a programme they should establish the necessary conditions 
(institutions and/or policies) to ensure sustainable graduation of the subsidies to 
occur.  
 
 High levels of agricultural inputs are likely to produce a rise in yields, but may not 
necessarily result in higher economic returns, due in part to external risks (e.g., 
hailstorms, floods, pests, market failures or political turmoil), and this may affect 
adoption rates.  External shocks can also upset the administration of a programme 
and diminish expected outcomes. Building in resilience to such unforeseen external 
shocks and events is important, but rarely considered in programme design. 
Programme designers must build in flexibility into their programmes to adjust to 
these shocks and unforeseen events. However, changes to the programme‟s design 
cannot be rushed and must be properly incorporated with the involvement of the 
community to ensure buy-in and acceptance.  
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 Proper targeting is essential to ensure the inputs get to the intended recipients, 
otherwise there is a tendency for richer and socially better connected farmers to 
receive them preferentially. Programme designers must incorporate appropriate 
measures to ensure that programme staff work closely with the community to 
appropriately target the recipients and remain readily available on site to investigate 
discrepancies and address problems that might arise during the implementation of 
the programme. Constant monitoring and wider participation by the community will 
help ensure that both the community and programme staff are able to vet the list 
and thereby improve the targeting process.  
 
 Investing in building a network of agro-dealers will not necessarily create 
sustainability, since these institutions will be over-reliant on demand from project 
farmers, which may not be sustainable. Centralised private delivery systems (e.g., 
Millennium Farms) may be more effective than decentralised agro-dealers, but they 
are more difficult and costly to administer. Therefore, programme designers must 
work with all stakeholders, including the communities and local input suppliers 
involved, to consider the type of institutional arrangements and policies required 
that would allow for the successful removal of the subsidies.  
 
 Large input-support programmes are often hampered by administrative capacity and 
budget restrictions that affect their operation and reduce their ability to reach 
farmers with appropriate messages and create the institutions needed to ensure 
sustainability. Programme designers must appropriately balance the expected 
outcomes for local change against the high level of funding required to ensure 
intensive monitoring and supervision, including the financial implications for 
scaling up of the programmes.  
 
Benefits of combining multi-level socio-technical systems and policy 
narratives perspectives 
 
The research used a multi-level socio-technical systems perspective to gain insights 
into how social and technical aspects interacted between micro- (niche), meso- (regime) 
and macro- (landscape) levels. The multi-level perspective was combined with an 
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analysis of policy processes, which mapped out the actor networks and narratives 
operating in and across these different levels. This provided me with a unique 
conceptual framework within which to ground my empirical case studies and advance 
the understanding of the Green Revolution agenda in Africa, and input subsidy 
programmes in particular.  
 
By taking a multi-level socio-technical perspective, this research has outlined how 
various processes of negotiation and translation take place throughout the different 
levels. Drawing on the multi-level framework presented in Chapter 2, Figure 19 
(below) conceptualises my interpretation of Kenya‟s socio-technical environment and 
the different factors that affect adoption, as seen through the multi-level lens.  It situates 
the two input-support programmes within this framework and draws upon the previous 
chapters to highlight some of the key factors and actor networks that are influencing the 
socio-technical systems at multiple levels.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Kenya‟s socio-technical dimensions of technology use and adoption  
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The figure illustrates how the global landscape, within which particular political 
interests and actor networks frame the Green Revolution narratives, influences Kenya‟s 
national policy formulation, institution building and agricultural programming. 
However, these national political framings are influenced not only by global debate on 
soil fertility, agricultural productivity and the interests of policy elites within 
governments and the donor community, but also by programme experiences and the 
realities on the ground. Therefore, global Green Revolution narratives become 
integrated within Kenya‟s unique national socio-technical system, reinforcing the 
institutions, techniques, practices and networks that create a certain technology-focused 
regime and framing the food security narratives and subsequent solutions.  
 
The NAAIAP and MVP are depicted within Figure 19 to demonstrate how these 
programmes are embedded in this multi-level system. The dotted arrows illustrate the 
impacts of macro-level politics of the global MDGs and high-profile development and 
political actors negotiating with financial allocations, delivery systems and existing 
institutions at the meso- and micro-levels. It shows how the programmes are affected 
by unique institutional and administrative arrangements at the meso-level and how 
these influence the implementation of the programmes and the sustainability on the 
ground. It is at the interface of these multiple levels that the real effects of politics, 
power and social arrangements on socio-technical systems become apparent.  
 
The findings build on the multi-level framework to show that the global- and national-
level narratives fail to capture the dynamic nature of farmers‟ practices in the field, due 
to the multiple micro-level factors (social, economic, political, ecological and 
institutional) that shape the farmers‟ socio-technical system. The results show how a 
broad general framing of programmes at the global and national levels must take 
account of local specificities, in which multiple negotiations and the micro-politics of 
what is and is not incorporated become more significant. This is when macro-level 
narratives become recast at the local level, and new, locally specific and socially 
determined narratives are created.  
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The analysis extends the multi-level framework and identifies the different narratives 
within each level that may or may not be in alignment, and outlined the clashes 
between how the programme was implemented and how the recipients accepted the 
input packages. Looking at change through this socio-technical perspective embeds 
technological change within the narratives that frame the local context and, specifically, 
in the way individuals interact with the technology in their daily lives. 
 
The analysis thus offers an expanded multi-level framework that shows how narratives 
and resulting systems are nonlinear and dynamic. Moreover, narratives do not exist 
solely in one given time frame. Dominant narratives on productivity and technological-
fixes have persisted through time and resurfaced even when there is evidence to suggest 
they may not be the best solution for a given locality.  
 
The findings also identified that narratives are not confined to policymakers and can 
permeate through all levels from decision-making, through the creation of regulations 
and the method of distribution to end users. These different narratives are often 
misaligned and can be conflicting, resulting in clashes and mismatches of ideas, 
knowledge and beliefs on how agricultural inputs are understood and represented. As 
Mango (2002: 290) states:  
 
Most interesting is the fact that local knowledge repertoires clearly question 
and contest scientific knowledge. Claims made by experts that their products 
are higher yielding are immediately counter-claimed by local farmers arguing 
that local maize tastes better, has nicer colours and out yields hybrids.  
 
What this illustrates is that farmers are not only interested in increases in yields, but 
they may prefer to accept a lower yield if the variety is more socially acceptable to 
local cooking techniques, taste preferences, cultural practices and storage attributes. 
Social interactions thus create localised niches that continue to evolve over time as 
farmers interact and experiment with the technology and co-construct their dynamic 
interactions. The findings show that these locally constructed narratives on soil 
management techniques are created and transformed by individual understanding and 
social interpretation of technologies and that greater participation in the process can 
lead to local learning and adaptation.  
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Overall, the research highlights the difficulties of constructing food security 
programmes within a Green Revolution narrative focused on delivering a narrow set of 
technologies. This narrow approach fails to offer site- and context-specific options that 
are sufficiently dynamic to allow for the complex, diverse and risk-prone farming 
environments of Africa. I argue throughout the thesis that more attention must be given 
to the interface between the formulation and delivery mechanisms of input-support 
programmes (developed at the national and global levels) and the interactions of the 
technologies at the local level.  
 
Looking to the future: Implications for policy and practice  
 
Just as the Asian Green Revolution programmes were a result of the geo-political, 
economic and social constructs of the day, the two input-support programmes have 
emerged from current debates on and policies for technology-led agricultural 
development. There is a long history of interventions that deliver a set of technological 
inputs to farmers with donor, government and, more recently, NGO support. However, 
there is also a history connected to the structural adjustment era, during which the 
overall funding to the agriculture sector decreased and subsidies went out of favour.  
 
This lack of attention on the agricultural sector has helped to create the current situation 
and recast the subsidy debate, which is being reconfigured through a new series of 
arguments. These include the humanitarian goal (set out by the MDGs), the economic 
growth model (set out by the Maputo Declaration), and the Malawi subsidy argument, 
which puts the onus on governments to take ownership and invest. Debate surrounding 
the relative benefits and costs of these approaches continue.  
 
Improved agricultural inputs are an important component of productivity increases. 
However, it is crucial to understand the social and political aspects involved in the 
delivery of these technologies. Technology-focused interventions are not created or 
delivered in a vacuum, but are often affected by political processes that can politicise 
the technology and, ultimately, have implications on the design and the implementation 
of the programme. The research shows how the politicisation of hybrid seed and 
fertiliser technology can result in the framing of policy options that supports not only a 
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continued dependence on maize but also the promotion of input-oriented support 
programmes as the primary means to help farmers reach food (maize) security.  
 
Based the research, there are a number of general policy lessons for future technology-
focused programmes directed at smallholder farmers that arise from the case studies. 
Five such policy lessons are highlighted below.  
 
 Programme design: it is important that policymakers allow for adequate time and 
funds to consult with the communities in the design of technology delivery 
programmes, particularly for programme administration and technology 
dissemination. Building in flexibility within the programme design to integrate 
local learning requirements of the community will enhance adaptation.  
 
 Financing: it is vital for policymakers to understand the pros and cons of financing 
subsidies that takes into account the costs of a long-term view to creating local 
change and adaptation with adequate financing for the necessary institutions and 
training required for subsidy withdrawal.  
 
 Timing and sustainability: policymakers need to build in adequate long-term 
planning processes to ensure that programmes are able to embrace a long-term 
vision beyond technology delivery to promote a more comprehensive view that 
focuses on building the local (and national) capacity and institutions required to 
take ownership and carry on project activities once funding expires.  
 
 Training: there are many dimensions to training programmes, which need to ensure 
better and more equitable access to knowledge and create local institutions to take 
ownership of the technology and training. Policymakers need to ensure that this 
training involves the participation of a wide-range of community members in the 
design and delivery and include the necessary gender-related dimensions.  
 
 Monitoring and evaluation: there is currently no framework for the assessment of 
socio-technical transitions. Current processes look only at adoption versus non-
adoption and miss many of the transitions that take place in between. Therefore, 
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policymakers must consider creating a wider systems assessment to ensure that 
adequate and flexible monitoring and evaluation frameworks are integrated 
throughout the process that takes into account the unique and dynamic social, 
technical and political aspects of a given locality.  
 
These lessons are not new, but they highlight the fact that programme design and 
administration have to be target-orientated, time-delimited, geographically focused and 
sufficiently flexible to allow local project staff and farmers to adapt or adjust the 
interventions locally. They pose the question of how to incorporate the many different 
factors in programme design and how to measure success.  
 
The fact that fertiliser is not just a technology, but comes with a whole set of socio-
technical configurations, needs to be better understood by programme developers. The 
concept of success needs to be broadened beyond statistics showing adoption rates or 
increased yields. Outcome assessment needs to take a systems perspective in which 
success is related to co-evolution of the technical, economic, institutional and 
behavioural changes across the multiple levels of socio-technical systems (Berkhout et 
al., 2008).  
 
Africa is a diverse and dynamic continent that requires a holistic and site-specific 
approach that takes into account the complexities of the continent to address the multi-
dimensional nature of food insecurity. This thesis demonstrates that current 
perspectives surrounding food insecurity have been „locked-in‟ (Brooks et al., 2009) to 
a certain technology-led approach, which has been further reinforced by policymakers 
and programme developers.  
 
These narrow policies are constructing particular trajectories for agricultural 
programming that will have long-term implications for smallholder farmers in Africa. 
However, these narrow prevailing approaches can be transformed, modified or replaced 
by more suitable and sustainable alternatives. Berkhout et al. (2008: 10) state:  
 
Path dependency and lock-in are overcome because dominant socio-technical 
trajectories suffer from technical, environmental or social weaknesses that 
prove unmanageable in the context of dominant designs and systems, and 
because viable alternatives that offer relative advantages become available. 
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Therefore, instituting change requires more flexibility in our development thinking. We 
need to examine the virtues of multiple pathways and different scenarios for 
intensification, commercialisation and diversification of agriculture and the rural sector, 
taking into account the unique and dynamic political, social and institutional conditions 
present within the continent. Such flexibility will allow unique development trajectories 
that individual farmers, households and local communities can tailor to their own 
needs, thereby stimulating experimentation and adaptation.  
 
Encouraging innovation has major implications for smallholders‟ ability to adjust to 
changing conditions (climatic or market) thereby reducing their vulnerability to 
external shocks and allowing them to adapt their farming systems to future realities. In 
this way, African Green Revolutions will become more dynamic, relevant and 
sustainable to fit the needs of the numerous livelihoods and regions within Africa.  
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 Photos clockwise  - children from Owiti household, Siaya; Mary Oumo, Siaya; Roselina Omoko, 
Butere; Nathaneil Atulo, Butere; Jane Okoba, Butere; Clementina Ogara, Siaya; Danel Aswani, Butere. 
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Annex A - Full list of interviewees 
 
National Level Interviews (Nairobi), January 2010 – May 2010 
Organization Name Title 
ACDI/VOCA Steve Collins Country Director 
Africa Enterprise Challenge 
Fund (AECF) 
Gem Argwings Kodhek Advisor 
Africa Partnership Advisors 
(APA) 
Pete Ondeng Founder and CEO 
Alliance for a Green Revolution 
in Africa (AGRA) 
Akin Adesina  Vice President, Policy and 
Partnerships 
Alliance for a Green Revolution 
in Africa (AGRA) 
Bashir Jama Director, Soil Health 
Programme 
Alliance for a Green Revolution 
in Africa (AGRA) 
Rebbie Harawa Programme Officer, Soil 
Health Research and 
Extension 
Alliance for a Green Revolution 
in Africa (AGRA) 
Argent Chuula Programme Officer 
Alliance for a Green Revolution 
in Africa (AGRA) 
Abed Kiwia Programme Officer 
Athi River Mining K. Srinivasa Rao Chief Commercial Officer 
Athi River Mining Julius Nyabicha Technical Sales Manager 
Centre for African Bio-
Entrepreneurship (CABE) 
Hannington Odame Executive Director 
CNFA/AGMARK Joseph Mwangangi Director of Agribusiness 
Strengthening Programme 
CNFA/AGMARK Caleb Wangia Senior Technical Advisor 
DFID Leigh Stubblefield Livelihoods Advisor 
Earth Institute, Columbia 
University  
Pedro Sanchez Director, Tropical 
Agriculture and the Rural 
Environment Program 
Earth Institute, Columbia 
University 
Raffaela Kozar Community Development 
Coordinator 
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European Union (EU) David Mwangi  Rural Development 
Officer 
Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) 
Kithinji Mutunga Advisor 
Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) 
Paul Omanga  National Consultant – 
Crop Production 
Farm Input Promotions Africa 
(FIPS) 
Paul Seward Managing Director 
German Agency for 
International Cooperation (GIZ) 
Antti Seelaf Senior Advisor 
Government of Kenya /Ministry 
of Agriculture 
Ken Ayuko  Director, Agriculture 
Policy  
Government of Kenya /Ministry 
of Agriculture 
Philomena Chege  Director, Njaa Marafuku 
Kenya Programme 
Government of Kenya /Ministry 
of Agriculture 
Philip Makheti  Director, NAAIAP 
Programme 
Government of Kenya /Ministry 
of Agriculture 
Rymer Ndengu Deputy Coordinator, 
NAAIAP 
Government of Kenya /Ministry 
of Agriculture 
Dixon Kiptoni Korir NAAIAP Input Promotion 
Officer 
Government of Kenya /Ministry 
of Agriculture 
Esther Musyoka NAAIAP Monitoring and 
Evaluation Programme 
Officer 
Government of Kenya /Ministry 
of Agriculture 
 Jacob Mutua NAAIAP Marketing 
Officer 
Government of Kenya /Ministry 
of Agriculture 
Zaweria Thuku NAAIAP Credit Finance 
Officer 
World Agroforestry Centre 
(ICRAF) 
Frank Place Economist, Theme Leader 
– Land and People 
International Crops Research 
Institute for the Semi-Arid 
Tropics (ICRISAT) 
Richard Jones Assistant Director 
IFDC Rob Groot Director, East and 
Southern Africa Division 
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IFDC Balu Bumb Advisor 
Kenya Agricultural Research 
Institute (KARI) 
Festus Murithi Director, Socio-Economic 
and Applied Statistics 
MDG Centre, East Africa Denis Haraszko Advisor 
MDG Centre, East Africa Glenn Denning Director  
MDG Centre, West Africa Rafael Flor Agriculture and Value 
Chain Development 
Advisor 
Monsanto Kinyua Mbijjewe Government and Public 
Affairs Lead – Monsanto 
Africa 
Rockefeller Betty Kibaara Research Associate 
Seed Industry Representative Seed Representative Manager 
Swedish International 
Development Agency (SIDA) 
Japhet Kiara Programme Officer, 
Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
SNV Stuart Worsley Country Director 
School of Oriental and African 
Studies (SOAS), University of 
London 
Colin Poulton Research Fellow and 
Managing Editor of Food 
Policy  
Technoserve Fred Ogana Country Director 
Tegemeo John Olwande Research Fellow 
United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP)  
Danston Ondanchi  Head of the UN Resident 
Coordinator Secretariat 
United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) 
Phil Dobie  Director, UNDP Drylands 
Centre 
USAID Allen Flemming Director, Agriculture, 
Business and Environment 
Office 
USAID Julius Kilungo Program Specialist 
USAID Makeda Tsegaye Pastoral Development 
Program Manager 
Western Seed Company Saleem Esmail Chief Executive Officer 
World Food Programme Joao Manja Head of Vulnerability 
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Analysis and Mapping 
World Bank Andrew Karanja Agricultural Economist 
 
District Level Interviews (Siaya and Butere Districts), April 2009 – September 
2009 
Organization Name Title 
Millennium Villages Project Eliud Lelerai  Database Manager 
Millennium Villages Project Florence Ashioy Agriculture facilitator 
Lihanda Sub-location 
Millennium Villages Project Hannington Nyando 
Owiti 
Agriculture Facilitator 
Nyandiwa Sub-location 
Millennium Villages Project Herine Okoth Agriculture facilitator 
Sauri Sub-location 
Millennium Villages Project / 
Millennium Farms 
Anginya Tabu Programme Coordinator, 
Millennium Farms  
Millennium Villages Project Jessica Masira Community Coordinator 
Millennium Villages Project Patrick Mutuo Science Coordinator 
Millennium Villages Project Willy Diru Agriculture Coordinator 
Government of Kenya/Ministry 
of Agriculture 
Edward Wange Ziro Butere District 
Agriculture Officer 
(DAO) 
Government of Kenya/Ministry 
of Agriculture 
Daniel Chege Butere District 
Agricultural Development 
Officer (DADO) 
Government of Kenya/Ministry 
of Agriculture 
Joab Aukah Khwisero Divisional 
Crops Development 
Officer 
Government of 
Kenya/NAAIAP 
Musa Justius Okinda Farmer Representative, 
Kisa West Location  
Government of 
Kenya/NAAIAP  
Wycliff Ateka Farmer Representative, 
Kisa Central Location 
Government of 
Kenya/NAAIAP 
Richard Shikumo Farmer Representative, 
Mulwanda Location 
Government of Kenya David Ngwawe Chief, Kisa West Location 
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Government of Kenya Simon Achero Assistant Chief, Doho 
Sub-location 
Government of Kenya Albert Amoni Assistant Chief, Emutsasa 
Sub-location 
Government of Kenya Alexander Malika Assistant Chief, Khushiku 
Sub-location 
Village leader Amos Orony Village Elder, Emutsasa 
Village 
Village leader Gilbert Libuyi Village Elder, Emuli 
Village 
 
Private Sector Agro-dealers interviewed (Khwisero and Yala Division), August 
2009 
Business name  Name of interviewee Location of shop (town) 
Yala Farm Land Veronica Odongo Yala, Yala Division 
Farmers Shop Edward Oyer Muhanda, Yala Division 
Eden Agrovet William Oyoo Ouda Nyangweso, Yala 
Division  
New Safari Shop Daniel Onyango Oyoo Nyangweso, Yala 
Division 
Oasis Farmers Shop Lilian Oluoch Dudi, Yala Division 
Uzima Agrovet Nicholus Were Mutumbu, Yala Division 
Lunza Hardware Margret Abong‟o Wagai, Yala Division 
Sawa Agrovet Seline Awuor Ogalla Wagai, Yala Division 
Elmart Agrovet George Ochieng‟ Luanda, Yala Division 
Mkulima Centre Jacob On‟gare Luanda, Yala Division 
New Bridge Agro-vet Jane Musimbi Khumusalaba, Khwisero 
Division 
New Daktari Agro-care Francis Okachia Khumusalaba, Khwisero 
Division 
Khushiku General Stores Peter Ambundo Khushiku, Khwisero 
Division 
Munyisu Agrovet May Munyikui Simba Khwisero, Khwisero 
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Division 
Farm Care Joseph Nyogi Khwisero, Khwisero 
Division 
Witinye Multi-Purpose Centre Anne Kataka Khwisero, Khwisero 
Division 
Luma Agrovet Luka Erembo Khwisero, Khwisero 
Division 
Survival Shop Francis Lubanga Khumailo, Khwisero 
Division 
 
Household level interviews (Siaya and Butere), May 2009 – June 2010  
Name of interviewee(s)  Sub-location  District 
Teresa Nyambuenya / Jared Nyambuenya 
Ongiyo 
Lihanda  Siaya 
Abigael Awino Lihanda  Siaya 
Joseph William Odur Lihanda  Siaya 
Florence Akinyi Obong‟o Lihanda Siaya 
Sarah Abiero Ongor Lihanda  Siaya 
William Omondi Haja Lihanda  Siaya 
Elias Ouda Obiero Lihanda   Siaya 
Rael Atieno Nyamulo Lihanda  Siaya 
Jane Akinyi Ochieng Lihanda  Siaya 
Pamela Awuor Olila Lihanda  Siaya 
George Opondo Were Lihanda  Siaya 
Charles Omolo / Sara Adiambo Omollo Lihanda  Siaya 
Elsa Aketch Oluoch Nyandiwa  Siaya 
George Otieno Radier Nyandiwa   Siaya 
Dismas Ochieng‟ Okello Nyandiwa   Siaya 
Anton Oloo Oketch Nyandiwa  Siaya 
Sulmena Opiyo Achola Nyandiwa  Siaya 
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John Jow Owuor Nyandiwa   Siaya 
Hellen Anyango Ogoma Nyandiwa  Siaya 
Risper Ajwang Nyandat Nyandiwa  Siaya 
Claris Adhiambo Omollo Nyandiwa   Siaya 
Mariko Nyol Ogutu / Wilfrida Opondo Nyol Nyandiwa  Siaya 
Mathayo Wangara Olala / Rispar Wangara Nyandiwa   Siaya 
Jackline Auma Onyango Nyandiwa   Siaya 
Jared Ouma Odera / Rebecca Ouma Sauri   Siaya 
Laban Onyango Buyu Sauri   Siaya 
Perez Odinga Orera / Caroline Akinyi Sauri   Siaya 
Elisabeth Odera Sauri   Siaya 
Eunice Juma Owino Sauri  Siaya 
Anastasia Awar Oyugi Sauri  Siaya 
Jessica Arua Ateweyo Sauri   Siaya 
Beatric Atieno Ayayo Sauri   Siaya 
Angeline Anyango Otieno Sauri  Siaya 
Mary Atieno Ouma Sauri   Siaya 
Gideon Owiti Achieng / Joseline Owiti Sauri   Siaya 
Teresa Adhiambo Ogonda Sauri  Siaya 
Emily Ariaka / Richard Ariaka Khushiku   Butere 
Rienhard Omoto Amayayi Khushiku   Butere 
Rose Amanya Khushiku   Butere 
Daniel Aswani Ongalo Khushiku   Butere 
Zadock Shikule Khushiku   Butere 
Peter Emali Ambondo Khushiku   Butere 
Julius Ambunya Mwando Khushiku   Butere 
David Aswani Matokho Khushiku  Butere 
Thomas Malika Amboko / Lidya Malika Khushiku   Butere 
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Grace Osale Khushiku   Butere 
Catherine Amakome Olaka Khushiku   Butere 
Roselinda Matendechere Omoko Khushiku  Butere 
Alice Achieng‟ Nandwa Doho  Butere 
Ibrahim Okelo Doho Butere 
John Ougoh Adeya / Selphine Akoth Ougoh Doho Butere 
Joseph Ndong‟a Esala / Elisabeth Auma 
Ndong‟a 
Doho  Butere 
Winfred Aketch Okun Doho  Butere 
Jane Ogoye Agina Doho  Butere 
Peter Odera Wakolo Doho  Butere 
Joice Oriko Hagai Doho  Butere 
Benadict Ashiono Atubukha Doho  Butere 
Monica Ananda Okinda Doho Butere 
Nathaniel Kuya Atulo / Philis Kuya Doho  Butere 
Spensa Ouma Owino Doho  Butere 
Michael Indimuli Askoye Emutsasa  Butere 
Philis Ondong‟i Amakuyi Emutsasa  Butere 
Phanis Omina Oyombe Emutsasa  Butere 
Rose Webo Masakhwe Emutsasa  Butere 
Melisa Eshiatia Shikule Emutsasa  Butere 
Turphosa Omulongi Nyawalo Emutsasa  Butere 
Sara Nyawate Aswa Emutsasa  Butere 
Jane Oronga Okoba Emutsasa Butere 
Barnabas Shikanda Angoya Emutsasa  Butere 
Habil Akhabochi / Milcah Awinja Akhabochi Emutsasa  Butere 
Grace Ayuma Emutsasa  Butere 
Beatrice Were Libuyi Emutsasa  Butere 
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Focus group meetings 
Group Description Date Location 
MVP recipients, including women 
farmers, youth groups and village leaders 
(20 people) 
April 16, 2009 Nyandiwa Sub-
location 
MVP recipients, including women, youth 
groups and village leaders (25 people) 
April 16, 2009 Lihanda Sub-location 
MVP Agriculture Representatives and 
village leaders (7 people) 
April 22, 2009 Lihanda Sub-location 
MVP recipients, including women 
farmers, youth groups and village leaders 
(30 people) 
April 23, 2009 Sauri Sub-location 
MVP Agriculture Representatives and 
village leaders (15 people) 
April 24, 2009 Nyandiwa Sub-
location 
MVP Agriculture Representatives and 
village leaders (12 people) 
April 28, 2009 Sauri Sub-location 
NAAIAP recipients, plus additional 
women farmers and village leaders (12 
people) 
June 10, 2009 Khushiku Sub-
location 
NAAIAP recipients, plus additional 
women farmers and village leaders (11 
people) 
June 11, 2009 Doho Sub-location 
Previous NAAIAP recipients (5 people) June 15, 2009 Wambuleshe Sub-
location 
NAAIAP recipients, plus additional 
women farmers and village leaders (10 
people) 
June 17, 2009 Emutsasa Sub-
location 
Previous NAAIAP recipients (13 people) July 6, 2009 Ebuchero Sub-
location 
 
  
  
243 
 
References 
 
 
Adey, S. (2007). A Journey without Maps: towards sustainable subsistence agriculture 
in South Africa. Wageningen University, Wageningen. 
African Union (2006). Abuja Declaration on Fertilizer for an African Green 
Revolution. Paper presented at the Africa Fertilizer Summit, Abuja, Nigeria.  
Alene, A. D., Manyong, V. M., Omanya, G., Mignouna, H. D., Bokanga, M., and 
Odhiambo, G. (2008). Smallholder market participation under transactions 
costs: Maize supply and fertilizer demand in Kenya. Food Policy, 33(4), 318-
328. 
Aliber, M., Walker, C., Machera, M., Kamau, P., Omondi, C., and Kanyinga, K. 
(2004). The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Land Rights: Case Studies from Kenya. 
Cape Town: HSRC Publishers. 
Anderson, D. (1984). Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography, and Drought: The Colonial 
State and Soil Conservation in East Africa during the 1930s. African Affairs, 
83(332), 321-343. 
Anderson, D. (2002). Vigilantes, violence, and the politics of public order in Kenya. 
African Affairs, 101(405), 531-555. 
Anderson, J. R. (1992). Difficulties in African Agricultural Systems Enhancement? Ten 
Hypotheses. Agricultural Systems, 38, 387-409. 
Antweiler, C. (1998). Local knowledge and local knowing: an anthropological analysis 
of contested 'cultural products' in the context of development. Anthropos, 93(4-
6), 469-494. 
Apthorpe, R. (1986). Development Policy Discourse. Public Administration and 
Development, 6( 4), 377-389. 
Apthorpe, R., and Gasper, D. (Eds.). (1996). Arguing Development Policy: Frames and 
Discourse. London: Frank Cass. 
Ariga, J., and Jayne, T. S. (2006). Can the Market Deliver? Lesson's from Kenya's 
Rising Use of Fertilizer Following Liberalization. Nairobi: Tegemeo Institute of 
Agricultural Policy and Development. 
Ariga, J., Jayne, T. S., Kibaara, B., and Nyoro, J. K. (2009). Trends and Patterns in 
Fertilizer Use by Smallholder Farmers in Kenya, 1997-2007. Nairobi: Egerton 
University, Tegemeo Institute of Agriculture Policy and Development. 
Ariga, J., Jayne, T. S., and Njukia, S. (2010). Staple Food Policies in Kenya, a Paper 
Prepared for the COMESA policy seminar on Variation in Staple Food Prices: 
Causes, Consequence, and Policy Options. Paper presented at the Comesa-
MSU-IFPRI African Agricultural Marketing Project (AAMP).  
  
244 
 
Aringa, J., and Jayne, T. S. (2011). Fertilizer in Kenya: Factors driving the increase in 
usage by smallholder farmers. In P. Chuhan-Pole and M. Angwafo (Eds.), Yes 
Africa can: Success stories from a dynamic continent (pp. 269-288). 
Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Armor, T., Hondale, G., Olson, C., and Weisel, P. (1979). Organizing and Supporting 
Integrated Rural Development Projects: A Twofold Approach to Administrative 
Development. Journal of Administration Overseas, XVIII(4), 276-286. 
Bahiigwa, G., Rigby, D., and Woodhouse, P. (2005). Right Target, Wrong Mechanism? 
Agricultural Modernization and Poverty Reduction in Uganda. World 
Development, 33(3), 481-496. 
Baltzer, K., and Hansen, H. (2011). Evaluation Study: Agricultural input subsidies in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. 
Banful, A. B. (2011). Old Problems in the New Solutions? Politically Motivated 
Allocation of Program Benefits and the "New" Fertilizer Subsidies. World 
Development, 39(7), 1166-1176. 
Barker, R., Herdt, R. W., and Rose, B. (1985). The Rice Economy of Asia. Washington, 
D.C. 
Barrett, C. B. (2008). Smallholder Market Participation: Concepts and Evidence from 
Eastern and Southern Africa. Food Policy, 33, 299-317. 
Barrow, E. G. C. (1989). The value of traditional knowledge in present-day soil 
conservation practice: The example of West Pokot and Turkana. In D. B. 
Thomas, E. K. Biamah, A. M. Kilewe, L. Lundgren and B. O. Mochoge (Eds.), 
Soil and Water Conservation in Kenya (pp. 471-485). Nairobi: Department of 
Agricultural Engineering, University of Nairobi and Sweedish International 
Development Authority. 
Bates, R. H. (1981). Markets and states in tropical Africa: The political basis of 
agricultural policies. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Bates, R. H. (1989). Beyond the Miracle of the Market. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Berkhout, F., Smith, A., and Stirling, A. (2003) Socio-technical regimes and transition 
contexts. SPRU Electronic Working Paper 106. Brighton: SPRU. 
Berkhout, F., Angel, D., and Wieczorek, A. J. (2008). Asian development pathways and 
sustainable socio-technical regimes. IVM Working Paper Series 08/01. 
Retrieved from www.vu.nl.ivm 
Berman, B. (1991). Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Modernity: The Paradox of Mau Mau. 
Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines, 
25(2), 181-206. 
Berman, B., and Lonsdale, J. (1992). Unhappy Valley: Clan, Class and State in 
Colonial Kenya. London: James Currey. 
  
245 
 
Berry, S. (1989). Social Institutions and Access to Resources. Africa: Journal of the 
International African Institute, 59(1), 41-55. 
Berry, S. (1992). Hegemony on a Shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to Agricultural 
Land. Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 62( 3), 327-355. 
Berry, S. (1993). No Condition is Permanent: The social dynamics of agrarian change 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. 
Bicker, A., Sillitoe, P., and Pottier, J. (Eds.). (2004). Investigating Local Knowledge: 
New directions, new approaches. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
Booth, D. (2010). Towards a theory of local governance and public goods' provision in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP) Working 
Paper 13. London: Overseas Development Institute. 
Booth, D. (2011). Working with the grain and swimming against the tide: Barriers to 
uptake of research findings on governance and public services in low-income 
Africa. Working Paper 18. Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP). 
London: Overseas Development Institute. 
Borgstrom, G. (1973). Harvesting the Earth. New York: Abelard-Schuman. 
Borlaug, N. E. (2000). The Green Revolution Revisited and The Road Ahead. Special 
30th Anniversary Lecture. Retrieved May 5, 2012, from 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1970/borlaug-
lecture.pdf 
Boserup, E. (1965). The Conditions of Agricultural Growth. London: George Allen and 
Unwin. 
Bradshaw, Y. W. (1990). Perpetuating Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Link between 
Agriculture, Class, and State. African Studies Review, 33(April 1990), 1-28. 
Brooks, S., Thompson, J., Odame, H., Kibaara, B., Nderitu, S., Karin, F., and 
Millstone, E. (2009). Environmental Change and Maize Innovation in Kenya: 
Exploring Pathways In and Out of Maize. STEPS Working Paper 36. Brighton: 
STEPS Centre. 
Bruner, E. M. (1986). Ethnography as Narrative. In V. Turner and E. Bruner (Eds.), 
The Anthropology of Experience. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
Burchell, G., Gordon, C., and Millers, P. (Eds.). (1991). The Foucault Effects: Studies 
in Governmentality. London: Harvester/Wheatsheaf. 
Buresh, R. J., Sanchez, P. A., and Calhoun, F. (Eds.). (1997). Replenishing Soil 
Fertility in Africa. Madison: Soil Science Society of America. 
Buse, K., Ludi, E., and Vigneri, M. (2008). Beyond the village: the transition from rural 
investment to national plans to meet the MDGs - sustaining and scaling up the 
Millennium Villages Project. Synthesis Report. London: Overseas Development 
Institute. 
  
246 
 
Byerlee, D., and Eicher, C. K. (Eds.). (1997). Africa's Emerging Maize Revolution. 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 
Cabral, L., Farrington, J., and Ludi, E. (2006). The Millennium Villages Project - a new 
approach to ending rural poverty in Africa? In J. Farrington (Ed.). Natural 
Resource Perspectives Number 101. London: Overseas Development Institute. 
Callon, M., and Latour, B. (1981). Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How actors 
macrostructure reality and how sociologists help them to do so. In K. Knorr-
Centina and A. Cicourel (Eds.), Advances in Social theory and Methodology: 
Towards an Integration of Macro and Micro Sociologies (pp. 277-303). Boston: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Callon, M. (1986). The Sociology of an Actor-Network: The case of the electric 
vehicle. In M. Callon, J. Law and A. Rip (Eds.), Mapping the Dynamics of 
Science and Technology: Sociology of Science in the Real World. Houndmills: 
Macmillan. 
Carolan, M. (2010). Ethanol's most recent breakthrough in the United States: A case of 
socio-technical transition. Technology in Society, 32, 65-71. 
Cernea, M. (Ed.). (1985). Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Development 
Projects. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press. 
Chambers, R. (1978). Project selection for poverty-focused rural development: Simple 
is optimal. World Development, 6(2), 209-219. 
Chambers, R. (1980). Rapid rural appraisal: Rationale and repertoire. IDS Discussion 
Paper No. 155. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. 
Chambers, R. (1994). The Origins and Practice of Participatory Rural Appraisal. World 
Development, 22(7), 953-969. 
Chambers, R. (1997). Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last. London: 
Intermediate Technology Publications. 
Chambers, R., Pacey, A., and Thrupp, L. (Eds.). (1989). Farmer First: Farmer 
Innovation and Agricultural Research. London: Intermediate Technology 
Publications. 
Chibwana, C., Fisher, M., Jumbe, C., Maters, W., and Shively, G. (2010). Measuring 
the Impacts of Malawi's Farm Input Subsidy Program. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1860867 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1860867. 
Chinsinga, B. (2005). The Clash of Voices: Community-based targeting of safety-net 
interventions in Malawi. Social Policy and Administration, 39(3), 284-301. 
Chinsinga, B. (2007). Reclaiming Policy Space: Lessons from Malawi's 2005/2006 
Fertilizer Subsidy Programme. Research Paper 06. Brighton: Future 
Agricultures Consortium. 
  
247 
 
Chinsinga, B. (2008). The Malawi Fertiliser Subsidy Programme: Politics and 
Pragmatism. Briefing February 2008. Brighton: Future Agricultures 
Consortium. 
Chinsinga, B. (2011). Seeds and Subsidies: The Political Economy of Input 
Programmes in Malawi. IDS Bulletin, 42(4), 59-68. 
Chirwa, E., Kydd, J., and Dorward, A. (2006) Future Scenarios for Agriculture in 
Malawi: Challenges and Dilemmas. Research Paper 03. Brighton: Future 
Agricultures Consortium. 
Chirwa, E., Mhoni, V., Kachule, R., Chinsinga, B., Musopole, E., Makwenda, B., 
Masankhidwe, C., Kalumula, W., and Kankangadza, C. (2010). The Malawi 
Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme: Lessons from Research Findings, 2005 
- 2008. Policy Brief 034. Brighton: Future Agricultures Consortium. 
Choldin, H. M. (1972). An Organizational Analysis of Rural Development Projects at 
Comilla, East Pakistan. Economic Development and Cultural Change, XX, 671-
690. 
Chomba, S. K. (2007). Site productivity indexing using maize growth functions in Sauri 
Sub-Location, Siaya District, Western Kenya. Master thesis. Moi University, 
Nairobi. 
Cleaver, H. M. (1972). The contradictions of the Green Revolution. The American 
Economic Review, 62(1), 177-186. 
Cohen, D., and Atieno Odhiambo, E. S. (1989). Siaya: The Historical Anthropology of 
an African Landscape. Nairobi/London/Athens: U.S.A.: Heinman Kenya/James 
Currey / Ohio University Press. 
Cohen, J. M. (1980). Integrated Rural Development: Clearing out the Underbrush. 
Sociologia Ruralis, 20(3), 195-212. 
Cohen, J. M. (1987). Integrated Rural Development: The Ethiopian Experience and the 
Debate. Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. 
Cohen, J. M., and Lewis, D. (1987). Role of government in combating food shortages: 
Lessons from Kenya 1984-85. In M. Glantz (Ed.), Drought and Hunger in 
Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cone, L. W., and Lipscomb, J. F. (1972). The History of Kenya Agriculture. Nairobi: 
University Press of Africa. 
Conway, G. (1997). The Doubly Green Revolution: Food for All in the Twenty-first 
Century. London: Penguin Books. 
Conway, G. (2007). A Doubly Green Revolution: Ecology and Food Production. In R. 
M. May and A. R. McLean (Eds.), Theoretical Ecology: Principles and 
Applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
  
248 
 
Cooke, B., and Kothari, U. (Eds.). (2001). Participation: The New Tyranny? London: 
Zed Books Ltd. 
Cornwall, A. (2002). Beneficiary, Consumer, Citizen: Perspectives on Participation for 
Poverty Reduction. Sida Studies No. 2 Stockholm: Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency. 
Crawford, E. W., Jayne, T. S., and Kelly, V. A. (2006). Alternative Approaches for 
Promoting Fertiliser Use in Africa. Agriculture and Rural Development 
Discussion Paper No. 22. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 
De Groote, H., Owuor, G., Doss, C., Ouma, J., Muhammad, L., and Kanda, K. (2005). 
The Maize Green Revolution in Kenya Revisited. e-Journal of Agricultural and 
Development Economics, 2(1), 32-49. 
De Groote H., Okuro J.O., Bett C., Mose L., M., O., and E., W. (2004). Assessing the 
demand for insect resistant maize varieties in Kenya combining Participatory 
Rural Appraisal into a Geographic Information System. In L. Sperling et al. 
(Ed.), Participatory Plant Breeding and Participatory Plant Genetic Resource 
Enhancement: An Africa-wide Exchange of Experiences. Proceedings of a 
workshop held in M ' bé, Ivory Coast. May 7-10, 2001 (pp. 148-162). Cali, 
Colombia: CGIAR Systemwide Program on Participatory Research and Gender 
Analysis. 
Denning, G., Kabambe, P., Sanchez, P., Malik, A., Flor, R., Harawa, R., Nkhoma, P., 
Zamba, C., Banda, C., Magombo, C., Keating, M., Wangila, J., and Sachs, J. 
(2009). Input subsidies to improve smallholder maize productivity in Malawi: 
Toward an African Green Revolution. PLOS Biology, 7(1), 2-10. 
Devereux, S., and Maxwell, S. (Eds.). (2001). Food security in sub-Saharan Africa. 
London: ITDG. 
Djurfeldt, G., Holmén, H., Jirström, M., and Larsson, R. (2005a). African Food Crisis - 
the Relevance of Asian Experiences. In G. Djurfeldt, H. Holmén, M. Jirström 
and R. Larsson (Eds.), The African Food Crisis: Lessons from the Asian Green 
Revolution. Cambridge, MA: CABI Publishing. 
Djurfeldt, G., and Jirström, M. (2005). The Puzzle of the Policy Shift - the Early Green 
Revolution in India, Indonesia and the Philippines. In G. Djurfeldt, H. Holmén, 
M. Jirström and R. Larsson (Eds.), The African Food Crisis: Lessons from the 
Asian Green Revolution. Cambridge, MA: CABI Publishing. 
Djurfeldt, G., Holmén, H., Jirström, M., and Larsson, R. (Eds.). (2005b). The African 
Food Crisis: Lessons from the Asian Green Revolution. Cambridge, MA: CABI 
Publishing. 
Dobie, P. (1974). The laboratory assessment of the inherent susceptibility of maize 
varieties to post-harvest infestation by Sitophilus zeamais Motsch. (Coleoptera, 
Curculionidae). Journal of Stored Products Research, 10(34), 183-197. 
  
249 
 
Dorward, A., Fan, S., Kydd, J., Lofgren, J. M., Poulton, C., Rao, N., Smith, L., Tchale, 
H., Thorat, S., Urey, I., and Wobst, P. (2004a). Institutions and Policy for Pro-
poor Agricultural Growth. Development Policy Review, 22(6), 611-622. 
Dorward, A., Kydd, J., Morrison, J., and Urey, I. (2004b). A policy agenda for pro-poor 
agricultural growth. World Development, 32(1), 73-89. 
Dorward, A., Hazell, P., and Poulton, C. (2008). Rethinking Agricultural Input 
Subsidies in Poor Rural Economies. Briefing February 2008. Brighton: Future 
Agricultures Consortium. 
Dorward, A. (2009). Rethinking Agricultural Input Subsidy Programmes in a Changing 
World. London: SOAS. 
Dorward, A., and Chirwa, E. (2009). The Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme 2005 
to 2008: Achievements and Challenges. Inception Report for DFID Malawi on 
the Evaluation of MAISP 2009-09. London: School of Oriental and African 
Studies. 
Ehrlich, P. R. (1968). The Population Bomb. New York: Ballentine Books. 
Eicher, C. K. (1995). Zimbabwe's maize-based Green Revolution: Preconditions for 
replication. World Development, 23(5), 805-818. 
Eilitta, M. (2006). Achieving an African Green Revolution: A Vision for Sustainable 
Agricultural Growth in Africa. Paper presented at the African Fertilizer Summit.  
Evenson, R. E., and Gollin, D. (2003). Assessing the Impact of the Green Revolution, 
1960 to 2000. Science, 300(758). 
Fan, S., Hazell, P., and Thorat, S. (1999). Linkages between government spending, 
growth, and poverty in rural India. Washington, D.C.: IFPRI. 
FAO (1996). Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan 
of Action. Paper presented at the World Food Summit 13-17 November 1996, 
Rome. 
FAO (1997). Women: The Key to Food Security. Rome: The Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations. 
FAO (2004a). The State of Food Insecurity in the World: 2004. Rome: The Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
FAO (2004b). The State of Food and Agriculture: Agricultural Biotechnology - 
Meeting the needs of the poor? Rome: The Food and Agricultural Organization 
of the United Nations. 
FAO (2008). Water and the Rural Poor: Interventions for improving livelihoods in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations. 
  
250 
 
FAO (2009). The State of Food Insecurity in the World: Economic crises - impacts and 
lessons learned. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations. 
FAO (2010a). Global hunger declining, but still unacceptably high. Retrieved April 20, 
2012, from http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/al390e/al390e00.pdf 
FAO (2010b). The State of Food Insecurity in the World: Addressing food insecurity in 
protracted crises. Rome: The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations. 
FAO (2010c). FAO Hunger Map 2010: Prevalence of undernourishment in developing 
countries. Retrieved July 20, 2012, from 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/es/Hunger_Portal/Hunger_Map_2010b.
pdf 
FAO (2011). The State of Food and Agriculture 2010-2011. Women in Agriculture: 
Closing the gender gap for development. Rome: The Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations. 
Finlay, L. (2002). Negotiating the swamp: the opportunity and challenge of reflexivity 
in research practice. Qualitative Research, 2(3), 209-230. 
Foucault, M. (1989). Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Routledge. 
Foucault, M. (1991). Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Millers (Eds.), 
The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. London: 
Harvester/Wheatsheaf. 
Freeman, H. A., and Kaguongo, W. (2003). Fertilizer market liberalization and private 
retail trade in Kenya. Food Policy, 28(5-6), 505-518. 
Freeman, H. A., and Omiti, J. M. (2003). Fertilizer use in semi-arid areas of Kenya: 
analysis of smallholder farmers' adoption behavior under liberalized markets. 
Nutrient Cycling in Agroecosystems, 66, 23-31. 
FURP/KARI (1994). Fertilizer use recommendations Vol. 1-24. Fertilizer Use 
Recommendationa Project. KARI/NARL. Nairobi. 
Geels, F. W. (2002). Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration 
processes: a multi-level perspective and a case-study. Research Policy, 31, 
1257-1274. 
Geels, F. W. (2004). From sectoral systems of innovation to socio-technical systems: 
Insights about dynamics and change from sociology and institutional theory. 
Research Policy, 33, 897-920. 
Geels, F. W. (2005). Processes and patterns in transitions and system innovations: 
Refining the co-evolutionary multi-level perspective. Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 72(6), 681-696. 
  
251 
 
Geels, F. W., and Kemp, R. (2007). Dynamics in socio-technical systems: Typology of 
change processes and contrasting case studies. Technology in Society, 29(4), 
441-455. 
Geels, F. W., and Schot, J. (2007). Typology of sociotechnical transition pathways. 
Research Policy, 36, 399-417. 
Geels, F. W. (2010). Ontologies, socio-technical transitions (to sustainability), and the 
multi-level perspective. Research Policy, 39(4), 495-510. 
Geels, F. W. (2011). The multi-level perspective on sustainability transitions: 
Responses to seven criticisms. Environmental Innovation and Societal 
Transitions, 1 (2011), 24-40. 
Genus, A., and Coles, A.-M. (2008). Rethinking the multi-level perspective of 
technological transitions. Research Policy, 37(9), 1436-1445. 
Gerdin, A. (2002). Productivity and economic growth in Kenyan agriculture, 1964-
1996. Agricultural Economics, 27 (2002), 7-13. 
Giles, P. H., and Ashman, F. (1971). A study of pre-harvest infestation of maize by 
Sitophilus zeamais Motsch. (Coleoptera, Curculionidae) in the Kenya 
highlands. Journal of Stored Products Research, 7(2), 69-83. 
Government of Kenya (2001a). Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Covering the 2001-
2004: Butere-Mumias District Consultative Forum Report. Rural Planning 
Department: Ministry of Finance and Planning. Nairobi: Government Printers. 
Government of Kenya (2001b). Siaya District Development Plan 2002-2008. Rural 
Planning Department: Ministry of Finance and Planning. Nairobi: Government 
Printers. 
Government of Kenya (2002). Butere/Mumias District Development Plan 2002-2008. 
Ministry of Planning and National Development. Nairobi: Government Printers. 
Government of Kenya (2005). Siaya District Strategic Plan: 2005-2010. National 
Coordinating Agency for Population and Development. Nairobi: Ministry of 
Planning and National Development. 
Government of Kenya (2007). Kenya Vision 2030. Nairobi: Government Printers. 
Government of Kenya (2008a). Food Security and Nutrition Strategy. Retrieved July 
20, 2012, from 
http://www.fao.org/righttofood/inaction/countrylist/Kenya/Kenya_FSNS_finald
raft.pdf 
Government of Kenya (2008b). National Accelerated Agricultural Input Access 
Program (NAAIAP): Annual Report for 2007/2008 FY. Ministry of Agriculture. 
Nairobi: Government Printers. 
  
252 
 
Government of Kenya (2009). National Accelerated Agricultural Input Access 
Program (NAAIAP): Annual Report for 2008/09. Ministry of Agriculture. 
Nairobi: Government Printers. 
Government of Kenya (2010a). Population Projections by Province: Kenya National 
Bureau of Statistics. Retrieved October 1, 2010, from http://www.knbs.or.ke 
Government of Kenya (2010b). Economic Review of Agriculture 2010. Ministry of 
Agriculture. Nairobi: Government Printers. 
Government of Kenya (2010c). Agricultural Sector Development Strategy 2010-2020. 
Ministry of Agriculture. Nairobi: Government Printers. 
Government of Kenya (2010d). The 2010 Short Rains Season Assessment Report. 
Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG). Nairobi: Government Printers. 
Government of Kenya (2010e). National Accelerated Agricultural Input Access 
Programme (NAAIAP): Report of EU/WB Impact Assessment Survey for 2009 
Short Rains Season in Eastern and Central Provinces. Ministry of Agriculture. 
Nairobi: Government Printers. 
Gregory, D. I., and Bumb, B. L. (2006). Factors Affecting Supply of Fertilizer in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
Grillo, R. D., and Stirrat, R. L. (1997). Discourses of Development: Anthropological 
Perspectives. Oxford: Berg Publishers. 
Gudu, S. O., Okalebo, J. R., Othieno, C. O., Obura, P. A., Ligeyo, D. O., Shulze, D., 
and Johnston, C. (2005). Response of five maize genotypes to nitrogen, 
phosphorus and line on acid soils of western Kenya. African Crop Science 
Conference Proceedings, 7, 1109-1115. 
Guijt, L., and Shah, M. (1998). Waking up to power, conflict and process. In I. Guijt 
and M. Shah (Eds.), The myth of community: gender issues in participatory 
development (pp. 1-23). London: Intermediate Technology Publications. 
Harsch, E. (1998). Wanted: green revolution of a different kind. Africa Recovery  Vol 
11 No. 3. Retrieved December 14, 2010, from 
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol11no3/cgiar.htm  
Hassan, R. M., and Karanja, D. D. (1997). Increasing maize production in Kenya: 
Technology, institutions and policy. In D. Byerlee and C. K. Eicher (Eds.), 
Africa's Emerging Maize Revolution. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Ltd. 
Haugerud, A. (1989). Land tenure and agrarian change in Kenya. Africa: Journal of the 
International African Institute, 59(1), 61-90. 
Hazell, P. B., and Ramasamy, C. (1991). The Green Revolution Reconsidered: the 
Impact of High-yielding Varieties in South India. Baltimore, Maryland: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
  
253 
 
Heisey, P. W., and Mwangi, W. (1996). Fertilizer use and maize production in sub-
Saharan Africa. Mexico City: CIMMYT. 
Hertz, R. (Ed.). (1997). Reflexivity and Voice. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Heyer, J., and Waweru, J. (1976). The development of the small farm areas. In J. 
Heyer, J. K. Maitha and W. M. Senga (Eds.), Agricultural development in 
Kenya: An economic assessment. Nairobi: Oxford University Press. 
Hilhorst, T., Muchena, F., Defoer, T., Hassink, J., de Jager, A., Smaling, E., and 
Toulmin, C. (2000). Managing soil fertility in Africa: diverse settings and 
changing practice. In T. Hilhost and F. M. Muchena (Eds.), Nutrients on the 
move - Soil fertility dynamics in African farming systems: International Institute 
for Environment and Development. 
Holdcraft, L. E. (1978). The Rise and Fall of Community Development in Developing 
Countries, 1950-65: a critical analysis and an annotated bibliography. East 
Lansing: Michigan State University Rural Development Paper. 
Holden, S., and Lunduka, R. (2010). Norad-Project: Impacts of the Fertilizer Subsidy 
Programme in Malawi: Targeting, Household Perceptions and Preferences. 
Noragric Report No. 54. Aas: Norwegian University of Life Sciences. 
Holmén, H. (2003). A Green Revolution for Africa - Does It Need to be so 
Controversial? Torino: International Centre for Economic Research. 
Hoogma, R. R., Kemp, J., Schot, J., and Truffer, B. (2002). Experimenting for 
Sustainable Transport: the approach of strategic niche management. London: 
Spon Press. 
Hossain, M., and Singh, V. P. (2000). Fertiliser use in Asian agriculture: Implications 
for sustaining food security and the environment. Nutrient Cycling in 
Agroecosystems, 57, 155-169. 
House, W., and Killick, T. (1981). Inequality and poverty in the rural economy, and the 
influence of some aspects of policy. In T. Killick (Ed.), Papers on the Kenyan 
economy. Nairobi: Heinemann. 
Hyden, G. (1983). No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in 
Perspective. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
IFDC (2003). Input Subsidies and Agricultural Development: Issues and Options for 
Developing and Transitional Economies. Muscle Shoals: IFDC. 
Ikiara, G. K., Jama, M., and Amadi, J. O. (1995). The Cereal Chain in Kenya: Actors, 
Reforms and Politics. In P. Gibbon (Ed.), Markets, Civil Society and 
Democracy in Kenya. Uppsala: Nordiska Africainstitutet. 
Jayne, T. S., Meyers, R. J., and Nyoro, J. (2005). Effects of Government Maize 
Marketing and Trade Policies on Maize Market Prices in Kenya. Nairobi: 
Egerton University, Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy and Development. 
  
254 
 
Jayne, T. S., Myers, R. J., and Nyoro, J. (2008). The Effects of NCPB Marketing 
Policies on Maize Market Prices in Kenya. Agricultural Economics, 38, 313-
325. 
Johnson, M., Hazell, P., and Gulati, A. (2003). The role of intermediate factor markets 
in Asia's Green Revolution: Lessons for Africa? Paper presented at the 
American Agricultural Economists Association Meetings (AAEA) Summer 
Meeting 2003, Montreal, Canada.  
Kapoor, I. (2002). The Devil's in the Theory: A critical assessment of Robert Chambers 
work on participatory development. Third World Quarterly, 23(1), 101-117. 
KARI (1994). Fertiliser Use Recommendations: Volumes 1-22. Nairobi: Kenya 
Agricultural Research Institute. 
Kariaga, B. M. (2004). Intercropping Maize with Cowpeas and Beans for Soil and 
Water Management in Western Kenya. Paper presented at the ISCO 2004 - 13th 
International Soil Conservation Organisation Conference – Conserving Soil and 
Water for Society: Sharing Solutions.  
Katungi, E., Farrow, A., Chianu, J., Sperling, L., and Beebe, S. (2009). Common bean 
in Eastern and Southern Africa: a situation and outlook analysis. Nairobi: 
ICRISAT. 
Keeley, J., and Scoones, I. (1999). Understanding Environmental Policy Processes: A 
Review. IDS Working Paper 89. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. 
Keeley, J., and Scoones, I. (2003). Understanding Environmental Policy Processes: 
Cases from Africa. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd. 
Kelly, V., Adesina, A. A., and Gordon, A. (2003). Expanding access to agricultural 
inputs in Africa: A review of recent market development experience. Food 
Policy, 28, 379-404. 
Kemp, R., Schot, J., and Hoogma, R. (1998). Regime Shifts to Sustainability Through 
Processes of Niche Formation: The Approach of Strategic Niche Management. 
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 10(2), 175-195. 
Kemp, R., and Rotmans, J. (2001). The management of the co-evolution of technical, 
environmental and social systems. Paper presented at the International 
Conference Towards Environmental Innovation Systems.  
Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) (1994). Fertiliser Use 
Recommendations; Volumes 1-22. Kenya Agricultural Research Institute. 
Nairobi. 
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2010). Economic Survey 2010. Nairobi: 
Government Printers. 
Killick, T., and House, W. (1983). Social justice and development policy in Kenya's 
rural economy. In D. Ghai and S. Radwan (Eds.), Agrarian policies and rural 
poverty in Africa. Geneva: International Labor Organisation. 
  
255 
 
Kiptot, E., Hebinck, P., Franzel, S., and Richards, P. (2007). Adopters, testers or 
pseudo-adopters? Dynamics of the use of improved tree fallows by farmers in 
Western Kenya. Agricultural Systems, 94, 509-519. 
Komen, J. J., Mutoko, C. M., Wanyama, J. M., Rono, S. C., and Mose, L. O. (2010). 
Economics of Post-Harvest Maize Grain Losses in Trans Nzoia And Uasin 
Gishu Districts of Northwest Kenya. Paper presented at the 12th KARI Biennial 
Scientific Conference: Transforming Agriculture for improved livelihoods 
through Agricultural Product Value Chains, Nairobi, Kenya. 
Konecky, B., and Palm, C. (2008). Millennium Villages Handbook: A Practitioner's 
Guide to the Millennium Villages Approach. New York: Earth Institute at 
Columbia University. 
Korten, D. (1980). Community organization and rural development: A learning process 
approach. Public Administration Review, 40(5), 480-511. 
Korten, D., and Klauss, R. (Eds.). (1984). People-Centered Development. West 
Hartford: Kumarian Press. 
Kubisch, A. C., Weiss, C., Schorr, L. B., and Connell, J. P. (1995). Introduction. In J. P. 
Connell, A. C. Kubisch, L. B. Schorr and C. H. Weiss (Eds.), New Approaches 
to Evaluating Community Initiatives: Volume 1, Concepts, Methods and 
Contexts. Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute. 
Larson, B. A., and Frisvold, G. B. (1996). Fertilizers to support agricultural 
development in sub-Saharan Africa: what is needed and why. Food Policy, 
21(6), 509-525. 
Latour, B. (1987). Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through 
Society: Milton Kenyes: Open University Press. 
Latour, B. (2007). Reassembling the social: an introduction to actor-network-theory. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Law, J. (1992). Notes on the theory of the actor-network: Ordering, strategy and 
heterogeneity. Systems Practice, 5(4), 387-393. 
Law, J., and Callon, M. (1992). The life and death of an aircraft: a network analysis of 
technical change. In W. E. Bijker and J. Law (Eds.), Shaping 
technology/building societies; studies in sociotechnical change. London: the 
MIT Press. 
Law, J., and Hassard, J. (Eds.). (1999). Actor Network and After. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lawrence, P. (1988). The Political Economy of "The Green Revolution" in Africa. 
Review of African Political Economy, 15(42), 59-75. 
Laws, S., Harper, C., and Marcus, R. (2003). Research for Development. London: Sage 
Publications. 
  
256 
 
Leonard, D. K., Owuor, F. O., and George, K. (2009). The political and institutional 
context of the 2007 Kenyan elections and reforms needed for the future. Journal 
of African Elections: Elections and conflict in Africa: Special Issue, 8(1), 71-
107. 
Levy, S., Barahona, C., and Chinsinga, B. (2004). Food Security, Social Protection, 
Growth and Poverty Reduction Synergies: The Starter Pack Programme in 
Malawi. Natural Resource Perspectives Number 95. London: Overseas 
Development Institute. 
Leys, C. (1974). Underdevelopment in Kenya. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press. 
Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public 
services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Lipton, M., and Longhurst, R. (1989). New Seeds and Poor People. Baltimore, 
Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Liverpool, S. L., and Winter-Nelson, A. (2010). Poverty Status and the Impact of 
Formal Credit on Technology Use and Wellbeing among Ethiopian 
Smallholders. World Development, 38(4), 541 - 554. 
Long, A., and van der Ploeg, J. D. (1994). Endogenous Development: Practices and 
Perspectives. In J. D. van der Ploeg and A. Long (Eds.), Born from Within: 
Practice and Perspectives of Endogenous Rural Development. Assen: Van 
Gorcum. 
Long, N., and van der Ploeg, J. D. (1988). New Challenges in the Sociology of Rural 
Development: A Rejoinder to Peter Vandergeest. Sociologia Ruralis, 28, 30-41. 
Long, N., and Villarreal, M. (1993). Exploring development interfaces: from the 
transfer of knowledge to the transformation of meaning. In F. J. Schuurman 
(Ed.), Beyond the impasse: new directions in development theory (pp. 140-168). 
London/New Jersey: Zed Books. 
Long, N. (1999). The Multiple Optic of Interface Analysis: UNESCO Background 
paper on Interface Analysis, October 1999. 
Long, N. (2001). Development Sociology: Actor Perspectives. London: Routledge. 
Long, N. (Ed.). (1989). Encounters at the interface: A perspective on social 
discontinuities in rural development. The Netherlands: Wageningen 
Agricultural University. 
Long, N., and Long, A. (Eds.). (1992). Battlefields of Knowledge: the interlocking of 
theory and practice in social research. London: Routledge. 
Longhurst, R. (1981). Rapid Rural Appraisal. IDS Bulletin Vol. 12, No. 4. Brighton: 
Institute of Development Studies. 
  
257 
 
Mackenzie, F. (1991). Political Economy of the Environment, Gender, and Resistance 
under Colonialism: Murang'a District, Kenya, 1910-1950. Canadian Journal of 
African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines, Vol. 25(No. 2). 
Mango, N. (1999). Integrated soil fertility management in Siaya District, Kenya. 
Managing Africa's Soils, 7. 
Mango, N. (2002). Husbanding in the Land: Agricultural Development and Socio-
technical Change in Luoland, Kenya. Wageningen University, Wageningen. 
Mango, N., and Hebinck, P. (2004). Cultural Repertoires and Socio-Technological 
Regimes: Maize in Luoland. In J. S. C. Wiskerke and J. D. van der Ploeg (Eds.), 
Seeds of Transition: Essays on novelty production, niches and regimes in 
agriculture. Assen: Royal Van Gorcum. 
Manyong, V. M., Alene, A. D., Olanrewaju, A., Ayedun, B., Rweyendela, V., 
Wesonga, A. S., Omanya, G., Mignouna, H. D., and Bokanga, M. (2008). 
Baseline Study of Striga Control using IR Maize in Western Kenya: An 
agriculture collaborative study on Striga control by the African Agricultural 
Technology Foundation and International Institute of Tropical Agriculture. 
Nairobi: African Agricultural Technology Foundation. 
Marcus, G. E. (1994). What Comes (Just) After "Post": The Case of Ethnography. In N. 
K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Mason, N. M., and Ricker-Gilbert, J. (2012). Disrupting Demand for Commercial Seed: 
Input Subsidies in Malawi and Zambia. Working Paper No. 63. Lusaka: Indaba 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute. 
Masotsi, A., Sigot, A. J., and Onyango, M. O. A. (2008). The Role of Home Gardening 
in Household Food Security in Butere Division of Western Kenya. African 
Journal of Food, Agriculture Nutrition and Development, 8(4), 375-390. 
McCracken, J. (1982). Experts and expertise in colonial Malawi. African Affairs, 81(no. 
322), 110-114. 
McNamara, R. S. (1973). Address to the Board of Governors, Nairobi, Kenya, 
September 1972. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Millennium Villages (2010). FAO on the Millennium Villages. Retrieved March 16, 
2011, from http://www.millenniumvillages.org/docs/MV_FAQ.pdf 
Millennium Villages Project (2005). Annual Report: Millennium Research Villages: 
The First Year: July 2004 to June 2005. New York: The Earth Institute at 
Columbia University. 
Millennium Villages Project (2007). Baseline Report: Millennium Research Village 
Sauri, Kenya. New York: The Earth Institute at Columbia University. 
Millennium Villages Project (2009). Sauri, Kenya - Annual Report July 2008-June 
2009. New York: The Earth Institute at Columbia University. 
  
258 
 
Millennium Villages Project (2010). Harvests of Development: The Millennium 
Villages After Three Years. New York: The Earth Institute at Columbia 
University. 
Millstone, E., Thompson, J., and Brooks, S. (2009). Reforming the Global Food and 
Agriculture System: Towards a Questioning Agenda for the New Manifesto. 
STEPS Working Paper 26. Brighton: STEPS Centre. 
Minde, I., Jayne, T. S., Crawford, E., Ariga, J., and Govereh, J. (2008). Promoting 
Fertilizer Use in Africa: Current Issues and Empirical Evidence from Malawi, 
Zambia, and Kenya. Paper presented at the The Southern Africa Regional 
Conference on Agriculture (SARCA).  
Minot, N., and Benson, T. (2009). Fertilizer Subsidies in Africa: Are Vouchers the 
Answer? Issues Brief 60: July 2009. New York: IFPRI. 
Moors, E. H. M., Rip, A., and Wiskerke, J. S. C. (2004). The Dynamics of Innovation: 
A Multilevel Co-Evolutionary Perspective. In J. S. C. Wiskerke and J. D. van 
der Ploeg (Eds.), Seeds of Transition: Essays on novelty production, niches and 
regimes in agriculture. Assen: Royal Van Gorcum. 
Morris, M. L. (2007). Fertilizer use in African agriculture : lessons learned and good 
practice guidelines. Directions in development. Agriculture and rural 
development, from http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip073/2006033477.html 
Mose, L. O. (1997). Factors Affecting the Distribution and Use of Fertilizer in Kenya: 
Preliminary Assessment. Nairobi: Kenya Agricultural Marketing and Policy 
Analysis Project. 
Mosley, P. (1986). The Politics of Economic Liberalisation: USAID and the World 
Bank in Kenya, 1980-84. African Affairs, 85, 107-119. 
Mosse, D. (1994). Authority, gender and knowledge: Theoretical reflections on the 
practice of participatory rural appraisal. Development and Change, 25, 497-526. 
Mucheru-Muna, M., Pypers, P., Mugendi, D., Kung'u, J., Mugwe, J., Merckx, R., and 
Vanlauwe, B. (2010). A staggered maize-legume intercrop arrangement 
robustly increases crop yields and economic returns in the highlands of Central 
Kenya. Field Crops Research, 115(2), 132-139. 
Mungeam, G. H. (1966). British Rule in Kenya 1985-1912: The establishment of 
administration in the East Africa Protectorate. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Mutuo, P., Okoth, H., Makomere, C., Oule, J., Oduong, G., Ombai, W., Warieoro, J., 
Akinyi, B., Palm, C., and Konecky, B. (2006). Annual Report for Sauri, Kenya 
Millennium Research Village: July 2005 to June 2006: The Millennium 
Villages Project. 
Nelson, R., and Winter, S. (1977). In search of useful theory of innovation. Research 
Policy, 5, 36-76. 
  
259 
 
Ng'ethe, N., Katumanga, M., and Williams, G. (2004). Strengthening the Incentives for 
Pro-Poor Policy Change: An analysis of drivers of change in Kenya: DFID. 
Njuguna, H. K., and Baya, M. M. (1999). Land Reforms in Kenya: An Institution of 
Surveyors of Kenya (ISK) Initiative. The Presidential Commission of Inquiry 
into the Land Law System of Kenya. Nairobi: Institution of Surveyors of Kenya. 
Nyambo, B. T. (1993). Post-harvest maize and sorghum grain losses in traditional and 
improved stores in South Nyanza District, Kenya. International Journal of Pest 
Management, 39(2), 181-187. 
Nyangito, H., and Okello, J. (1998). Kenya's Agricultural Policy and Sector 
Performance: 1964-1996 (Vol. Occasional Paper No. OP/04/98). Nairobi: 
Institute of Policy Analysis and Research. 
Nyangito, H., Argwings-Kodhek, G., Omiti, J., and Nyoro, J. K. (2003). Revitalising 
Agricultural Productivity in Kenya. In M. S. Kimenyi, J. M. Mbaku and N. 
Mwaniki (Eds.), Economic Growth and Development in Africa. Nairobi: 
Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
Nyoro, J. K., Kiiru, M. W., and Jayne, T. S. (1999). Evolution of Kenya's maize 
marketing systems in the post-liberalization era. Paper presented at the 4th 
Agricultural Transformation Workshop (June 27 - 30, 1999).  
Nyoro, J. K., and Jayne, T. S. (2000). Trends in regional agricultural productivity in 
Kenya. Nairobi: Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy and 
Development/Egerton University. 
Nyoro, J. K. (2002). Agriculture and Rural Growth in Kenya. Nairobi: Egerton 
University, Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy and Development. 
Nziguheba, G., Palm, C., Berhe, T., Denning, G., Dicko, A., Diouf, O., Diru, W., Flor, 
R., Frimpong, F., BHarawa, R., Kaya, B., Manumbu, E., McArthur, J., Mutuo, 
P., Ndiaye, M., Niang, A., Nkhoma, P., Nyadzi, G., Sachs, J., Sullivan, C., 
Teklu, G., Tobe, L., and Sanchez, P. (2010). The African Green Revolution: 
Results from the Millennium Villages Project. In D. L. Sparks (Ed.), Advances 
in Agronomy (Vol. 109). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Ochieng', W. R., and Atieno-Odhiambo, E. S. (1995). On Decolonization. In B. A. 
Osgot and W. R. Ochieng' (Eds.), Decolonization and Independence in Kenya 
1940-93. London: James Currey. 
Ochieng, C. M. O. (2007). Development through Positive Deviance and its Implications 
for Economic Policy Making and Public Administration in Africa: The Case of 
Kenyan Agricultural Development, 1930-2005. World Development, Vol. 
35(No. 3), pp. 454-479. 
Odame, H., Kameri-Mbote, P., and Wafula, D. (2003). Governing modern agricultural 
biotechnology in Kenya: implications for food security. IDS Working Paper 
199. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. 
  
260 
 
Odame, H., and Muange, E. (2010). Can Agro-Dealers Deliver the Green Revolution in 
Kenya? Working Paper 014. Brighton: Future Agricultures Consortium. 
Odhiambo, G. D., and Ariga, E. S. (2001). Effect of Intercropping Maize and Beans on 
Striga Incidence and Grain Yield. Paper presented at the Seventh Eastern and 
Southern Africa Regional Maize Conference.  
Oduor, G. I., Smith, S. M., Chandi, E. A., Karanja, L. W., Agano, J. O., and Moore, D. 
(2000). Occurrence of Beauveria bassiana on insect pests of stored maize in 
Kenya. Journal of Stored Products Research, 36(2), 177-185. 
OECD (2010). Measuring Aid to Agriculture. Retrieved June 2, 2012, from 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/38/44116307.pdf 
Oiye, S., Shiundu, K. M., and Oniang'o, R. K. (2009). The Contribution of African 
Leafy Vegetables (ALVS) to Vitamin A Intake and the Influence of Income in 
Rural Kenya. African Journal of Food, Agriculture Nutrition and Development,, 
9(6), 1309-1324. 
Okoth, H. (2010). Adoption rates in the Millennium Villages. Maseno University, 
Maseno. 
Okoth, S., and Siamento, E. (2010). Suppression of Fusarium spp. in a maize and beans 
intercrop by soil fertility management. Journal of Yeast and Fungal Research, 
1(2), 35-43. 
Omamo, S. W., and Mose, L. O. (2001). Fertilizer trade under market liberalization: 
preliminary evidence from Kenya. Food Policy, 26(1), 1-10. 
Omamo, S. W., Williams, J. C., Obare, G. A., and Ndiwa, N. N. (2002). Soil fertility 
management on small farms in Africa: evidence from Nakuru District, Kenya. 
Food Policy, 27(2), 159-170. 
Onduru, D. D., Gachini, G. N., De Jager, A., and Dio, J.-M. (1999). Participatory 
research on compost and liquid manure in Kenya. The Netherlands. 
Orlikowski, W. J., and Barley, S. R. (2001). Technology and institutions: what can 
research on information technology and research on organizations learn from 
each other? MIS Quarterly, 25(2), 145-165. 
Oswald, A. (2005). Striga control - technologies and their dissemination. Crop 
Protection, 24, 333-342. 
Otsuka, K., and Kalirajan, K. P. (2005). An Exploration of a Green Revolution in Sub-
Saharan Africa. E-Journal of Agricultural and Development Economics, 2(1), 1-
6. 
Pearson, S., Fitchett, D. A., Kinyua, W., and Spooner, N. (2004). Implementing the 
Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture (2004-2014): Development Alternatives 
Inc. and USAID/Kenya. 
  
261 
 
Perkins, J. H. (1997). Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat, Genes, and the 
Cold War. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Place, F., Adato, M., Hebinck, P., Omosa, M., Lwayo, M., Nyasimi, M., O'Leary, C., 
Ongadi, W., Ontita, E., and Opiyo, P. (2003). The Impact of Agroforestry-
Based Soil Fertility Replenishment Practices on the Poor in Western Kenya. 
Standing Panel on Impact Assessment (SPIA) / IFPRI Project on the Impact of 
Agricultural Research on Poverty, Case Study 6. Washington: IFPRI. 
Place, F., Adato, M., Hebinck, P., Lwayo, M., Omosa, M., Nyasimi, M., O'Leary, C., 
Ongadi, W., Ontita, E., and Opiyo, P. (2005). The Impact of Fertilizer Tree 
Systems in western Kenya: A study on Impacts of Agroforestry. Nairobi: World 
Agroforestry Centre. 
Poulton, C., Ndufa, J. K., and Gitau, M. W. (2004). The Viability of Seasonal 
Agricultural Lending in Africa: Experiences from SCOBICS in Western Kenya. 
Imperial Collage London and KEFRI Regional Research Centre, Maseno. 
Poulton, C., Kydd, J., Wiggins, S., and Dorward, A. (2006). State intervention for food 
price stabilisation in Africa: Can it work? Food Policy, 31(4), 342-356. 
Poulton, C., and Dorward, A. (2008). Getting agricultural moving: role of the state in 
increasing staple food crop productivity with special reference to coordination, 
input subsidies, credit and price stabilisation. Paper presented at the AGRA 
Policy Workshop, Nairobi, Kenya, June 23-25, 2008.  
Poulton, C. (2009). Fertiliser Subsidies: Lessons from Malawi for Kenya. Policy Brief 
026. Brighton: Future Agricultures Consortium. 
Quifiones, M. B., Norman, Dowswell, Christopher (1997). A fertilizer-based green 
revolution for Africa. In R. J. Buresh, P. A. Sanchez and F. Calhoun (Eds.), 
Replenishing soil fertility in Africa (Vol. Spec. Publ. 51, pp. 16-28). Madison, 
WI: SSSA. 
Rao, M. R., and Mathuva, M. N. (2000). Legumes for improving maize yields and 
income in semi-arid Kenya. Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment, 78(2), 
123-137. 
Raper, A. F. (1970). Rural Development in Action: The Comprehensive Experiment at 
Comilla, East Pakistan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Reardon, T., Kelly, V., Crawford, E., Jayne, T. S., Savadogo, K., and Clay, D. (1996). 
Determinants of Farm Productivity in Africa: A Synthesis of Four Case Studies. 
MSU International Development Paper No. 22. East Lansing: Michigan State 
University. 
Richards, P. (1985). Indigenous Agricultural Revolution. London: Hutchinson. 
Richards, P. (1989). Agriculture as a performance. In R. Chambers, A. Pacey and L. 
Thrupp (Eds.), Farmer First: Farmer Innovation and Agricultural Reserach 
(pp. 39-42). London: Intermediate Technology. 
  
262 
 
Richards, P. (1993). Cultivation: knowledge or performance? In M. Hobart (Ed.), An 
Anthropological Critique of Development: The Growth of Ignorance (pp. 61-
78). London: Routledge. 
Richards, P., and Diemer, G. (1996). Agrarian technologies as socio-technical hybrids. 
Food crop improvement and management of land and water in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Paper presented at the APAD's Negotiated Development: Brokers, 
knowledge systems and technologies.  
Richards, P. (2004). Private versus public? Agenda-setting in international agro-
technologies. In K. Jansen and S. Vellema (Eds.), Agribusiness & Society; 
Corporate Responses to Environmentalism, Market Opportunities and Public 
Regulation (pp. 262-293). London: Zed Books. 
Richardson, L. (1994). Writing: A Method of Inquiry. In N. K. Denzin and Y. S. 
Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Ricker-Gilbert, J., and Jayne, T. S. (2011). Enduring Effects of Fertilizer Subsidy 
Programs on Farm Household Well-being: Evidence from Malawi. 
International Development Working Paper. East Lansing: Michigan State 
University. 
Ricker-Gilbert, J., Jayne, T. S., and Chirwa, E. (2011). Subsidies and Crowding Out: A 
Double-Hurdle Model of Fertilizer Demand in Malawi. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 93(1), 26-42. 
Rip, A., and Kemp, R. (1998). Technological Change. In S. Rayner and E. L. Malone 
(Eds.), Human Choice and Climate Change (Vol. 2, pp. 327-399). Columbus, 
Ohio: Battelle Press. 
Rocheleau, D., Benjamin, P., and Diang'a, A. (1995). The Ukambani Region in Kenya. 
In J. Kasperson, R. Kasperson and B. Turner (Eds.), Regions at risk: 
comparisons of threatened environments. New York: The United Nations 
University Press. 
Roe, E. (1991). Development Narratives, Or Making the Best of Blueprint 
Development. World Development, 10( 4). 
Roe, E. (1994). Narrative Policy Analysis, Theory and Practice. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
Röling, N. G. (1988). Extension science: Information Systems in Agricultural 
Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rondinelli, D. A. (1979). Administration of Integrated Rural Development Policy: The 
Politics of Agrarian Reform in Developing Countries. World Politics, 31(3), 
389-416. 
Rosset, P. (2000). Lessons from the Green Revolution: Do We Need New Technology 
to End Hunger? Retrieved September 23, 2008, from 
http://www.soc.iastate.edu/sapp/greenrevolution.pdf 
  
263 
 
Ruttan, V. W. (1984). Integrated Rural Development Programmes: A Historical 
Perspective. World Development, 12(4), 393-401. 
Sanchez, P., Palm, C., Sachs, J., Denning, G., Flor, R., Harawa, R., and Jama, B. 
(2007). The African Millennium Villages. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 104(43), 16775-16780. 
Sanchez, P., Denning, G., and Nziguheba, G. (2009). The African Green Revolution 
moves forward. Springer Science. 
Scoones, I., Devereux, S., and Haddad, L. (2005). Introduction: New Directions for 
African Agriculture. IDS Bulletin, 36(2), 1 - 12. 
Scoones, I. (Ed.). (2001). Dynamics and Diversity: Soil fertility and farming livelihoods 
in Africa. London: Earthscan. 
Scoones, I., and Thompson, J. (Eds.). (2009). Farmer First Revisited: Innovation for 
Agricultural Research and Development. Warwickshire: Practical Action 
Publishing  
Seale, C. (1999). The Quality of Qualitative Research. London: Sage. 
Sen, A. (1981). Poverty and Famines. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Senga, W. M. (1976). Kenya's Agricultural Sector. In J. Heyer, J. K. Maitha and W. M. 
Senga (Eds.), Agricultural Development in Kenya: An economic assessment. 
Nairobi: Oxford University Press. 
Shipton, P. (1988). The Kenyan land tenure reform: Misunderstandings in the public 
creation of private property. In R. E. Downs and S. P. Reyna (Eds.), Land and 
society in contemporary Africa. Durham, N.H.: University Press of New 
England. 
Shipton, P. (1992). Debts and Trespasses: Land, Mortgages, and the Ancestors in 
Western Kenya. Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 62(3), 
357-388. 
Shiva, V. (1991). The Violence of the Green Revolution: Third World Agriculture, 
Ecology and Politics. London: Zed Books. 
Shiva, V. (1993). Monocultures of the Mind. New York: Zen Books Ltd. 
Shore, C., and Wright, S. (1997). Policy: A New Field of Anthropology. In C. Shore 
and S. Wright (Eds.), Anthropology of Policy: Critical Perspectives on 
Governance and Power. London: Routledge. 
Shrum, W. (2000). Science and Story in Development: The Emergence of Non-
Governmental Organizations in Agricultural Research. Social Studies of 
Science, 30(1), 95-124. 
Smaling, E. M. A., Nandwa, S. M., and Janssen, B. H. (1997). Soil fertility in Africa is 
at stake. In R. J. Buresh, P. A. Sanchez and F. Calhoun (Eds.), Replenishing soil 
  
264 
 
fertility in Africa (Special Publication Number 51) (pp. 47-61). Madison, WI: 
SSSA. 
Smith, A., Stirling, A., and Berkhout, F. (2005). The governance of sustainable socio-
technical transitions. Research Policy, 34, 1491-1510. 
Smith, L., Jones, S., and Karuga, S. (2004). Agriculture in Kenya: What Shapes the  
Policy Environment? : Oxford Policy Management. 
Smith, L. D. (1976). An Overview of Agricultural Development Policy. In J. Heyer, J. 
K. Maitha and W. M. Senga (Eds.), Agricultural Development in Kenya: An 
Economic Assessment. Nairobi: Oxford University Press. 
SOAS, Wadonda Consult, Overseas Development Institute, and Michigan State 
University (2008). Evaluation of the 2006/7 Agricultural Input Supply 
Programme, Malawi: Final Report. London: School of Oriental and African 
Studies. 
Sorrenson, M. P. K. (1967). Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country: A study in 
government policy. Nairobi: Oxford University Press. 
Sorrenson, M. P. K. (1968). Origins of European Settlement in Kenya. Nairobi: Oxford 
University Press. 
Spencer, D. S. C. (1994). Infrastructure and Technology Constraints to Agricultural 
Development in the Humid and Subhumid Tropics of Africa. Washington D.C.: 
IFPRI  
Spencer, I. (1980). Settler dominance, agricultural production and the Second World 
War in Kenya. Journal of African History, 21( 4), 497-514. 
Spencer, I. (1983). Pastoralism and colonial policy in Kenya, 1895-1929. In R. I. 
Rotberg (Ed.), Imperialism, colonialism, and hunger: East and Central Africa 
(pp. 113-140). Lexington: Lexington Books. 
Srinivas, M. N. (1955). The Social Structure of Life in a Mysore Village. In McKim 
Marriott (Ed.), Village India. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Stame, N. (2004). Theory-based Evaluation and Types of Complexity. Evaluation, 
10(1), 58-76. 
Stirling, A. (2003). Risk, uncertainty and precaution: some instrumental implications 
from the social sciences. In F. Berkhout, M. Leach and I. Scoones (Eds.), 
Negotiating environmental change: New perceptives from social science. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Sultana, F. (2007). Reflexivity, Positionality and Participatory Ethics: Negotiating 
Fieldwork Dilemmas in International Research. ACME: An International E-
Journal for Critical Geographies, 6(3), 374-385. 
Swallow, B., and Kamara, A. (2000). The dynamics of land use and property rights in 
semi-arid East Africa. In N. McCarthy, B. Swallow, M. Kirk and P. Hazell 
  
265 
 
(Eds.), Property Rights, Risk, and Livestock Development in Africa. Nairobi: 
International Livestock Research Institute. 
Swynnerton, R. J. M. (1955). A Plan to Intensify the Development of African 
Agriculture in Kenya. Nairobi: Government Printer. 
Thomas, A. (2004). Downward Spiral: The absence of HIV from economic policy-
making. London: Christian Aid. 
Thompson, J., and Scoones, I. (2009). Addressing the Dynamics of Agri-Food Systems: 
An Emerging Agenda for Social Science Research. Environmental Science & 
Policy, 12, 386-397. 
Thompson, J., Brooks, S., Morgan, M., Millstone, E., Odame, H., Karin, F., and 
Adwera, A. (2010). Maize Security does not equal Food Security? Breaking the 
'Lock in' to the Dominant Maize Pathway. STEPS Maize Briefing Paper 4. 
Brighton: STEPS Centre. 
Throup, D. (1987). Economic and Social Origins of Mau Mau 1945-54. London: James 
Currey. 
Throup, D. (1993). Elections and Political Legitimacy in Kenya. Africa: Journal of the 
International African Institute, 63(3), 371-396. 
Throup, D., and Hornsby, C. (1998). Multi-party politics in Kenya: the Kenyatta & Moi 
states & the triumph of the system in the 1992 election. Nairobi: J. Currey. 
Tiffen, M., Mortimore, M., and Gichuki, F. (1994). More people, less erosion: 
environmental recovery in Kenya. London: John Wiley & Sons. 
Tittonell, P., van Wijk, M. T., Rufino, M. C., Vrugt, J. A., and Giller, K. E. (2007). 
Analysing trade-offs in resource and labour allocation by smallholder farmers 
using inverse modelling techniques: A case-study from Kakamega district, 
western Kenya. Agricultural Systems, 95(1-3), 76-95. 
Tripp, R. (2006). Self-Sufficient Agriculture. Labour and Knowledge in Small-Scale 
Farming. London: Earthscan. 
Turner, B. L., Hyden, G., and Kates, R. (1993). Population Growth and Agricultural 
Change in Africa. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 
UN Millennium Project (2005). Halving Hunger: It Can Be Done. New York: Task 
Force on Hunger. 
UN Millennium Project (2010). UN Millennium Project. Retrieved October 25, 2010, 
from www.unmillenniumproject.org/index.htm 
United Nations (1975). Report of the World Food Conference, Rome 5-16 November 
1974. New York. 
van der Ploeg, J. D., Bouma, J., Rip, A., Rijkenberg, F. H. J., Ventuar, F., and 
Wiskerke, J. S. C. (2004). On Regimes, Novelties, Niches and Co-Production. 
  
266 
 
In J. S. C. Wiskerke and J. D. van der Ploeg (Eds.), Seeds of Transition: Essays 
on novelty production, niches and regimes in agriculture. Assen: Royal Van 
Gorcum. 
van Wolfswinkel, M. (2010). Intercropping of Annual Foodcrops. Agromisa Agrobrief 
Number 4. Retrieved April 15, 2011, from 
http:www.agromisa.org/agrobriefs/AB-4%20Intercropping.pdf 
Vanlauwe, B., Kanampiu, F., Odhiambo, G. D., De Groote, H., Wadhams, L. J., and 
Khan, Z. R. (2008). Integrated management of Striga hermonthica, stemborers, 
and declining soil fertility in western Kenya. Field Crops Research, 107(2), 
102-115. 
Waithaka, J. I. (2010). Post-harvest Challenges to Food Security in Kenya. Paper 
presented at the Conference on Expanding Kenya's Agricultural 
Competitiveness, Market Access and Food Security: Research Findings and 
Policy Options.  
Wangia, C., Wangia, S., and De Groote, H. (2002). Review of Maize Marketing in 
Kenya: Implementation and impact of liberalisation, 1989-1999. Paper 
presented at the Integrated Approaches to Higher Maize Productivity in the 
New Millennium. Proceedings of the 7th Eastern and Southern Africa Regional 
Maize Conference, 11-15 February, 2002, Nairobi, Kenya.  
Wanzala, M., Jayne, T. S., Staatz, J., Mugera, A., Kirimi, J., and Owuor, J. (2001). 
Agricultural Production and Incentives: Fertilizer Markets and Insights from 
Kenya. Nairobi: Egerton University, Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural Policy 
Research and Development. 
Weiss, C. (1995). Nothing as Practical as Good Theory: Exploring Theory-based 
Evaluation for Comprehensive Community Initiatives for Children and 
Families. In J. P. Connell, A. C. Kubisch, L. B. Schorr and C. H. Weiss (Eds.), 
New Approaches to Evaluating Community Initiatives: Volume 1, Concepts, 
Methods and Contexts. Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute. 
Weiss, C. (2000). Which Links in Which Theories Shall We Evaluate? In P. J. Rogers, 
T. Hacsi, A. Petrosino and A. Heubner (Eds.), Program Theory in Evaluation: 
Challenges and Opportunities, New Directions for Evaluations. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass. 
Wiggins, S., and Leturque, H. (2010). Helping Africa to Feed Itself: Promoting 
Agriculture to Reduce Poverty and Hunger. Occasional Paper 002. Brighton: 
Future Agricultures Consortium. 
Wiskerke, J. S. C. (2003). On promising niches and constraining sociotechnical 
regimes: the case of Dutch wheat and bread. Environment and Planning, 35, 
429-448. 
Wiskerke, J. S. C., and van der Ploeg, J. D. (Eds.). (2004). Seeds of Transition: Essays 
on novelty production, niches and regimes in agriculture. Assen: Royal Van 
Gorcum. 
  
267 
 
Wood, S., Sebastian, K., and Scherr, S. J. (2000). Agroecosystems: Pilot Analysis of 
Global Ecosystems. Washinton, D.C.: International Food Policy Research 
Institute and World Resources Institute. 
Woomer, P. L., Lan'gat, M., and Tungani, J. O. (2004). Innovative Maize-legume 
Intercropping Results in Above- and Below-ground Competitive Advantages for 
Understorey Legumes. West African Journal of Applied Ecology, 6. 
World Bank (1996). Restoration of Soil Fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa: Concept Paper 
and Action Plan. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
World Bank (2009). Still Standing: Kenya's Slow Recovery from a Quadruple Shock. 
Kenya Economic Update, December 2009, Edition No. 1. Nairobi: World Bank. 
World Bank (2011a). Food Price Watch. Washington D.C.: Poverty Reduction and 
Equity Group and the World Bank. 
World Bank (2011b). Africa Development Indicators 2011. Washington D.C.: The 
World Bank. 
World Food Summit (1996). Rome Declaration on World Food Security. 
Xu, Z., Burke, W. J., Jayne, T. S., and Govereh, J. (2009). Do Input Subsidy Programs 
"Crowd In" or "Crowd Out" Commercial Market Development? Modeling 
Fertilizer Use Decisions in a Two-Channel Marketing System. Agricultural 
Economics, 40(1), 79-94. 
Yanggen, D., Kelly, V., Reardon, T., and Naseem, A. (1998). Incentives for Fertilizer 
Use in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of Empirical Evidence on Fertilizer 
Response and Profitability. MSU International Development Working Paper 
No. 70. East Lansing: Michigan State University. 
 
 
 
